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Over the last fifty years, a series of demographic and sociological shifts have resulted in an 
increasing split of biological families into different households, marriages and cohabitations. This 
process of disaggregation has proved to be a profoundly gendered phenomenon: it signified and 
continues to signify, to a great extent, a fragmentation of fatherhood. Vis-à-vis current family 
realities, this thesis attempts to establish to what extent the European Court of Human Rights 
deviates from or replicates the model of ‘conventional fatherhood’ when determining whether the 
refusal to grant the status of legal father or parental rights to the applicant amounts to a violation 
of his right to respect for family life (Article 8 ECHR), taken alone or in conjunction with Article 
14 ECHR. For present purposes, ‘conventional fatherhood’ presupposes the coexistence of the 
following features within the same individual: a biological link between the father and his child, a 
marital relationship with the child’s mother, economic provision, heterosexuality and, more 
generally, compliance with heteronormative standards.  
The jurisprudential analysis points to, at least, four main findings. Firstly, rather than 
abandoning a conventional understanding of fatherhood, the Court tends to simply add a new layer 
to it: the father’s interest and commitment to the child. However, this combination of change and 
continuity and, more specifically, the increased importance attached to nurturing bear a partial 
exception: the definition of fatherhood and, more generally, of parenthood endorsed in the 
jurisprudence pertaining to homo-parenthood. Secondly, the reaction of the Court to the realities 
of fragmented fatherhood is changeable. In decisions concerning the award of parental rights, the 
Court overcomes the assumption of exclusivity more easily, provided that the coexistence of more 
than one paternal figure serves the child’s best interests. Differently, when it is the full legal status 
of fatherhood that is under scrutiny, the Court attempts to maintain the paternal figure as compact 
as possible, in line with the conventional ideology of fatherhood. Thirdly, the Court has proved 
generally cautious to impose new legal conditions at the national level; therefore, it seems to 
understand the role of the Convention as being that of reflecting – more than transforming – 
national legal realities. At the same time, although to a limited extent, the Court has begun to adopt 
an anti-stereotyping approach, thus employing the Convention as a tool for asserting a new 
definition of fatherhood, untied from general assumptions. Fourthly, and finally, the Court tends 
to focus almost exclusively on the interests of the applicants, thus ignoring the implications of its 
own decisions on other potentially affected parties, in particular mothers. The position of children 
is largely disregarded and, when considered, is subject to variable interpretations. While in the 
domain of homo-parenthood, the child’s interests are interpreted according to conventional and, 
therefore, subjective understandings of ‘good’ parenting, when dealing with the claims of 
unmarried fathers, the Court appears to ground its assessment on the specific circumstances of the 












The primary goal of this thesis is to bring the definitions of fatherhood endorsed by the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’ or ‘Court’) to the fore. More specifically, the following 
jurisprudential analysis attempts to establish whether and, if so, to what extent the Court challenges 
or reproduces the conventional ideology of fatherhood. For current purposes, ‘conventional 
fatherhood’ refers to the individual who has specific features – both physical and behavioural – 
and/or plays a role, which are conventionally tied to the father figure. These conventional 
characteristics are derived from McGlynn’s definition of the ‘dominant ideology of the family’,1 
and include: a biological link between the father and his child, a marital relationship with the 
child’s mother, economic provision, and heterosexuality or, more generally, compliance with 
heteronormative standards. Moreover, in contrast to the reality of ‘fragmented fatherhood’, 
conventional fatherhood presupposes unity and, therefore, the coexistence of these attributes in the 
same individual.   
 
Chapter 1 aims to contextualise the case-law analysis, which is further described in Chapters 2, 3, 
4 and 5. It is made up of two main parts. The first one introduces the key concepts and the 
theoretical framework, which will guide the analysis of the jurisprudence. It exposes, inter alia, 
the gendered dimension(s) of ‘fatherhood’, both as a concept and as a practice. Accordingly, it 
underlines the odi et amo relationship between fatherhood and masculinity: while, in some cases, 
a redefinition of fatherhood is accompanied or even informed by new understandings of 
masculinity and vice versa, in others, the demands of fatherhood are in stark tension with concepts 
of masculinity. Furthermore, the first part of Chapter 1 discusses the notion of ‘fragmented 
fatherhood’ and identifies four main sociological developments which jeopardise the persistence 
of the abovementioned conventional features as determining factors in the allocation of paternal 
status or parental rights to fathers: the advent of assisted reproductive technologies (‘ART’); high 
divorce rates and extra-marital childbearing; increased participation of women in paid 
employment; growing social and legal recognition of same-sex couples and, although at a slower 
                                                        
1 According to McGlynn, the ‘dominant ideology of the family’ is that of a “white, heterosexual, married couple, 
with children, all living under the same roof, where the husband is the main breadwinner and the wife the primary 
carer of children and other dependants”. C. McGlynn, Families and the European Union – Law, Policy and 




pace, of homosexual parents. Finally, the second part of Chapter 1 introduces the ECtHR and its 
modes of operation. By critically engaging with the existing literature, this chapter emphasises the 
main criticism concerning the erratic use of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the ‘living 
instrument’ approach and the rule of consensus and touches upon the consequential legitimacy 
concerns as to the role of the ECtHR as an international court. In preparation for an in-depth 
analysis of the relevant jurisprudence, it provides an overview of the growing scope of the right to 
respect for family life under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) as 
well as of the main operational characteristics of the right to non-discrimination, protected in 
Article 14.        
 
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 address the research questions previously identified by transposing the 
theoretical notions, discussed in Chapter 1, into the jurisprudence of the Court. Each chapter will 
begin by identifying the ways in which each of the above sociological transformations challenges 
conventional understandings of fatherhood and will illustrate the most ‘paradigmatic’ responses 
provided by national legal systems. Chapter 2 examines the reaction of the Court to the 
fragmentation of fatherhood resulting from the advent of ART. More specifically, the case-law 
analysis will attempt to establish whether biology remains a necessary and/or sufficient ground for 
attributing legal fatherhood and parental rights. Chapter 3 undertakes a similar investigation, but 
in relation to unmarried and divorced fatherhood. Given the decline of marriage, the jurisprudential 
analysis will seek to identify the elements through which the Court has attempted to link unmarried 
and divorced fathers to their children. Therefore, emphasis will be placed on the ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
grounds to grant contact and residence rights to the applicant fathers. Chapter 4 explores the impact 
of increased participation of women in the labour market on the male-breadwinner model, as 
embedded in the law. More specifically, the Court’s potential redefinition of fatherhood beyond 
just the breadwinning role will be tested in the jurisprudence pertaining to the right to parental 
leave. Chapter 5 assesses the Court’s attachment to the norm of heterosexuality by investigating 
its limited, but meaningful, case-law arising from the requests of homosexual parents seeking to 





Based on the findings gathered in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, the concluding remarks will shed light 
on the existing tensions, contradictions and trends within the definition(s) of fatherhood endorsed 
















CHAPTER 1 – Setting the Scene: What? Why? And, How? 
 
1. The Rise of Fathers’ Rights Movements Internationally 
Since the 1980s, we have witnessed the rise of fathers’ rights movements in major post-
industrial societies.  Although traces of activism around the issue of fathers’ rights can be detected 
in earlier periods (going as far back as in the 19th century), what has characterised the last decades 
is an intensification of activity in this area, accompanied by unprecedented media and political 
presence. 2  The forces underpinning the growth of fathers’ mobilisation are various and 
controversial. Nonetheless, this phenomenon certainly reveals that men have felt the need to 
reaffirm their position and status as fathers. In addition to their long-standing privileged position 
in society, the father role has re-emerged as another indispensable characteristic of hegemonic 
masculinity. Before analysing the claims and ideologies of fathers’ rights groups, it is important 
to bear in mind that the process of refiguring the rights and responsibilities of fathers is strongly 
influenced by cultural specificities.3 Therefore, the terms ‘fathers’ rights groups’ and ‘fathers’ 
rights movements’ are not meant to suggest total uniformity either within or across national 
contexts.4 
 Many commentators identify a perceived and generalised loss of paternal authority within 
the traditional family – and, more generally, of male privilege – as a trend underlying the 
abovementioned proliferation of fathers’ rights groups and activities.5 Within Fineman’s account 
of the US context, the first strain of fathers’ rights discourse is precisely the reaction to the threat 
posed by re-envisioning gender equality to include the roles traditionally assigned to men in the 
patriarchal family.6 This narrative also fits with the explanation provided by Faludi, according to 
                                                        
2 R. Collier and S. Sheldon, ‘Fathers’ Rights, Fatherhood and Law Reform – International Perspectives’ in R. Collier 
and S. Sheldon (eds.), Fathers’ Rights Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart, 2006), 7.  
3 Ibid, 6-7. Contextual factors include strength of religious factors; the role and impact of key individuals; the 
influence of the media; the presence of a national disposition towards anti-intellectualism; understanding of gender 
roles, children and childhood.  
4 Ibid, 2.  
5 M. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (Routledge, 1995), 
202.  




which the evolution of fathers’ rights movements underlies the attempt to take back the victories 
that the feminist movement gained for women in the 1960s and 1970s.7     
Without a doubt, notions of backlash have animated certain waves of fathers’ rights 
discourses. This has become particularly visible with respect to post-divorce family life. In this 
context, fathers’ rights groups have often attacked mothers for allegedly misusing child support 
benefits to the advantage of their new partners as opposed to their children.8 Another frequent 
complaint condemns mothers for interfering with access to children. 9  According to some 
advocates, feminists are responsible for wrongly opposing ‘proper’ mothering in the heterosexual 
family and, therefore, the maintenance of close ties between fathers and children also after family 
breakdown.10 Other activists went even further by formulating a conspiracy theory, according to 
which feminists have gained excessive power with regards to specific institutions, such as 
women’s shelters and hospitals, which negatively influence mothers against fathers. 11  These 
assertions have often been accompanied by punitive reform proposals, such as the establishment 
of accounting systems to ensure the correct administration of benefits, or imposing fines in cases 
when a mother opposes contact between the father and the child.12  
This attitude seems to reflect the rhetoric of backlash or gender war since it is based on a 
“univalent form of power” that is built around the dichotomy of powerful/powerless mother/father 
and, therefore, conceives a zero-sum as the only possible outcome of mother-father interactions.13 
However, a number of commentators have challenged the authenticity and the accuracy of this 
depiction of backlash by bringing multiple layers of complexity to the fore.14 For instance, Collier 
                                                        
7 S. Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against Women (Chatto and Windus, 1991). This perceived loss of 
authority goes beyond the family sphere and, therefore, ties in very well with broader notions of the crisis of 
masculinity, which will be explored later in this chapter. See also S. Boyd, ‘Backlash against Feminism: Canadian 
Custody and Access Reform Debates of the Late Twentieth Century’ 2004 16(2) Canadian Journal of Women and the 
Law 255. For further literature on this, please see footnote n. 33 in Collier and Sheldon, ‘International Perspectives’, 
8. 
8 Fineman, ‘The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family’, 202; J. Crowley, ‘Adopting ‘Equality Tools’ from the 
Toolboxes of their Predecessors: The Fathers’ Rights Movement in the United States’ in R. Collier and S. Sheldon 
(eds.), Fathers’ Rights Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart, 2006), 84. 
9 S. Boyd, ‘‘Robbed of their Families?’ Fathers’ Rights Discourses in Canadian Parenting Law Reform Processes’ in 
R. Collier and S. Sheldon (eds.), Fathers’ Rights Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart, 
2006), 33.   
10 Ibid, 34. 
11 Ibid, 35.  
12 Crowley, ‘Adopting Equality Tools’, 84. 
13 Collier and Sheldon, ‘International Perspectives’, 9.  
14 For instance, see S. Boyd commenting on the post- separation parenting law reform in Canada: S. Boyd, ‘‘Robbed 




and Sheldon have argued that the prominence of fathers’ rights movements might be better 
explained as one dimension of a multifaceted reconsideration of men’s role as parents in light of 
changing household and family arrangements, societal understandings of parenting and childhood, 
legal regulation and modes of governance.15 These three concomitant broad factors operate, or 
possibly cooperate, within three distinct but linked realities: the real-world, societal imagery and 
legal regulation. 
Firstly, a general decline in marriage as a life-long commitment, or even as a choice, has 
led to the fragmentation of families that, de facto, mainly concerns fatherhood.16 Due to these 
transformations, marital ties and, consequently, fathers’ connections with their children have 
become less stable and more difficult to preserve. At the same time, societal expectations towards 
fathers – as well as the aspirations of fathers themselves – have shifted from merely embodying 
the traditional breadwinner model to emotionally engaging in the lives of their children.17 The 
repositioning of fatherhood is also at the core of political and legal discourses. In the UK, for 
instance, new ideas of ‘good’ fatherhood have permeated the legal regulation of post-divorce 
family life on the occasion of broader political reflections around notions of citizenship and 
responsibility.18   
Those men and fathers’ groups who call for a transformation of the institution of 
‘fatherhood’ have been far less visible, but exist. In the US, Finenam identified two additional 
strains of fathers’ rights discourses, which proposed less harsh solutions towards women and 
children.19 The second type of rhetoric remains focused on the relationship between the sexes 
within the family but without the same overtly hostile tone against women that characterises the 
former.20 The primary concern does not lie in the loss of men’s traditional privilege and power, 
but rather in economic injustice. Although women are not directly concerned in their arguments, 
the ultimate goal of restating fixed gender roles is still present. By referring to the disadvantaged 
position of men historically excluded by society – in particular, African-American and Hispanic 
fathers – this discourse calls on men to regain their position as head of the household. The emphasis 
                                                        
15 Collier and Sheldon, ‘International Perspectives’, 14; R. Collier and S. Sheldon, Fragmenting Fatherhood: A 
Socio-Legal Study (Hart, 2008), 205.  
16 Collier and Sheldon, ‘International Perspectives’, 10.  
17 Ibid, 11.  
18 Ibid, 14.  
19 Fineman, ‘The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family’, 201.  




is on the man, who must be economically and socially empowered to be able to perform the 
traditional role of the father as the breadwinner.21 The Million Man march in 1995 was possibly 
the most emblematic representation of a grassroots mobilisation of African-American men seeking 
to forge links between manhood and fatherhood.22 Their main claim was essentially that poor black 
men were unable to be fathers because they were denied equal access to education and 
employment.23  
The third strain, which Fineman describes as “more imaginary than real”, appears more 
genuinely concerned with the circumstances and the wellbeing of mothers and children.24 Their 
project consists in redefining the role of fathers within contemporary societies.25 More specifically, 
this discourse calls for an assumption of responsibility to replace fatherhood as a principally 
economic or disciplinary relationship.26 Therefore, within this rhetoric, paternal responsibility is 
not synonymous with economic provision but rather with nurturing. As a result, mothers and 
children are the beneficiaries, and not the targets of reform. In so doing, this discourse recognises 
that mothers have thus far been the primary caretakers and, to a certain extent, it acknowledges the 
importance of mothering.27  
Despite the variety of ideologies underlying the rise of fathers’ rights groups, it is possible 
to detect a set of common themes and strategies employed by fathers’ rights groups internationally. 
Undoubtedly, their success in reaching and being heard in a variety of policy-making fora has been 
greatly facilitated by the simplicity of their demands. 28 Among the rhetorical tools used by fathers’ 
rights groups, the language of formal equality has contributed to framing their claim for justice in 
an easily understandable and prima facie logical way.29 These claims gain further moral force from 
the use of explicit language of victimisation, which is often enriched with histories of personal 
tragedies and statistical evidence, albeit not always accurate.30  
                                                        
21 Ibid, 204.  
22 B. Hobson and D. Morgan, ‘Introduction’ in B. Hobson (ed.), Making Men into Fathers – Men, Masculinities and 
the Social Politics of Fatherhood (CUP, 2002), 1.   
23 Ibid.  
24 Fineman, ‘The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family’, 204.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid, 204-205.  
27 Ibid, 205.  
28 Collier and Sheldon, ‘International Perspectives’, 1.  
29 Ibid, 15; Boyd, ‘Robbed of their Families?’, 37.  
30 M. Kaye and J. Tolmie, ‘Discoursing Dads: The Rhetorical Devices of Fathers’ Rights Groups’ 1998 22 
Melbourne University Law Review, 175-178; M. Flood, Fatherhood and Fatherless (ACT, The Australia Institute, 




These groups have often justified and legitimised their action through charges of 
discrimination and bias inherent in family law and legal processes.31 In their view, family law is 
deeply implicated in disadvantaging fathers since it is made of norms that attribute unjust weight 
to the interests of the mother.32 In addition to this, these legal provisions are interpreted and applied 
by a judiciary that is perceived to be lined up against fathers.33 Relying on statistics which blatantly 
prioritise mothers as resident parents, fathers’ rights groups have denounced what in their opinion 
are the defective methods utilised by judges in making decisions concerning post-divorce family 
life.34 One of the most popular arguments is that courts tend to excessively lean towards mothers 
in child custody determinations and attach insufficient importance to the presence of fathers in 
children’s lives after divorce.35 In the US, for instance, some fathers’ rights activists accuse judges 
of punishing them for their (limited) degree of involvement in childcare and family work before 
divorce, rather than viewing divorce as an opportunity for considering new divisions of labour.36 
These claims are often based on a pro-traditional family stance, which a fathers’ rights group in 
Canada translated into the motto ‘kids need both parents’.37  
The sources of frustration of fathers’ rights groups explain why family law has emerged as 
one of the most visible targets of reform within their campaigns internationally. In divorce reform 
debates, several groups supported the institution of a legal presumption of contact and shared equal 
parenting, regardless of the history of care or assumption of responsibility when the family was 
                                                        
31 Kaye and Tolmie, ‘Discoursing Dads’, 164.  
32 Collier and Sheldon, ‘International Perspectives’, 18; B. Geldof, ‘The Real Love that Dare not Speak its Name: A 
Sometimes Coherent Rant’ in A. Bainham, B. Londly, M. Richards and L. Trinder (eds.), Children and Their 
Families: Contact, Rights and Welfare (Hart, 2003), 181.  
33 Ibid.  
34 The ‘anti-professionals’ discourse was sometimes extended to lawyers also, who were viewed as responsible for 
intensifying the tensions between parents with the sole purpose of making money. See H. Rhoades, ‘Yearning for 
Law: Fathers’ Groups and Family Law Reform in Australia’ in R. Collier and S. Sheldon (eds.), Fathers’ Rights 
Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart, 2006), 132-133.  
35 Concerning the US, see J. Crowley, ‘Taking the Custody of Motherhood: Fathers’ Rights Activists and the 
Politics of Parenting’ in M. Fineman and M. Thomson (eds.), Exploring Masculinities – Feminist Legal Theory 
Reflections (Ashgate, 2013), 279; as for the UK, see Geldof, ‘The Real Love’, 171-200; as for Canada, see Boyd, 
‘Robbed of their Families?’, 36.  
36 Crowley, ‘Taking the Custody of Motherhood’, 279. 
37 National Alliance for the Advance of Non-Custodial Parents. S. Boyd, ‘Demonizing Mothers: Fathers' Rights 
Discourses in Child Custody Law Reform Processes’ 2004 6(1) Journal of the Association for Research on 
Mothering 54. The promotion of the traditional heterosexual family is often linked to another recurrent theme in 
fathers’ rights discourses, namely the negative consequences of fathers’ absence and single motherhood. See Boyd, 




still intact.38 In the UK, Bob Geldof and the group Fathers4Justice invoked the idea of ‘equal 
shares’ as the only fair arrangement post-divorce.39 Despite being conceived in the best interests 
of the child, this proposal requires an exact fifty-fifty physical sharing between mothers and fathers 
and implies the need for the child to move between two houses at regular intervals.40 However, in 
certain contexts, such as Australia, the call for equal parenting has been sometimes interpreted 
more as a symbolical demand than a proposal for actual practical change.41    
Their demand for equality has been considered particularly problematic because it calls for 
a formal version of equality or sameness of treatment.42 Many feminist commentators have pointed 
out that the image of the family that these groups have in mind is not always characterised by equal 
sharing of childcare responsibilities between mothers and fathers. 43  Rather, fathers’ rights 
discourses tend to promote a traditional model of parenting, which confers little autonomy on 
mothers and denies them recognition for their labour of motherhood.44 There is, therefore, an 
evident disconnect between the equality rhetoric employed by fathers’ rights groups and the 
gendered realities of parenting, both during intact relationships and after divorce as well as 
between the ‘ideology of change’, according to which men are becoming more engaged in family 
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life, and the slow pace of change in fathers’ behaviour.45 Arguably, these gaps embody some of 
the biggest paradoxes of fathers’ rights movements and, consequently, one of the strongest grounds 
whereby the genuineness and legitimacy of their claims have been challenged.  
Another significant area of reform for fathers’ rights groups is child support legislation. 
Some groups have defined current child support systems as anachronistic. 46  Despite cogent 
evidence of continuing wage inequalities and occupational segregation, fathers’ rights groups have 
often advocated for reforming child support programmes inasmuch as they are conceived for an 
era where most women chose to stay home and, otherwise, faced serious obstacles to paid work.47 
Moreover, some activists have appealed to the relationship between cash and care to construct 
their arguments. For instance, they have sometimes portrayed the failed payment of child support 
as a direct consequence of men’s frustration and suffering due to their treatment as second-class 
parents.48 At the same time, they have called for more rights as non-custodial parents as a means 
of ensuring greater compliance with child support orders. Apart from exemplifying fathers’ 
ongoing possibility to opt-in/out of their relationship with children,49 the representation of rights 
and responsibilities as interdependent offers a valid ground for doubting the seriousness and the 
actual feelings underlying fathers’ claims – whether it is truly altruist and responsible or driven by 
selfish motives – for example, a desire to annoy the mother or for personal gratification.50  
As reported by Smart, fathers’ rights claims have triggered a “relatively muted response” 
from the women’s movement, with one remarkable exception: the endemic problem of domestic 
violence and the extent to which this has been disregarded in the process of recognising the 
importance of fathers’ presence in their children’s lives.51 Increased paternal involvement might 
be a double-edged sword for mothers. The problem of gender violence (mostly, male on female) 
and, more specifically, its positioning within a broader culture that accepts violence and force as 
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male features, conveys confusing messages as to a greater entitlement of fathers to maintain their 
ties with children.52 Besides this, it would seem that most of the requests made by these fathers go 
hand-in-hand with women’s and children’s desires and expectations from fathers, in primis shared 
care and responsibility.53  Therefore, timing and context appear to have been the problematic 
aspects of fathers’ rights claims.54 Paradoxically, fathers become critical of a gender division of 
labour only at the time of separation or divorce, allegedly when the emotional power of mothering 
becomes an incontrovertible fact.55       
 
2. Masculinities and Fatherhood  
In sociological research, fathers have become an important area of focus since the 1970s. Early 
literature examined the correlation between paternal presence and child development. 56  A 
subsequent area of interest concerned the experiences of fathers and their attempt to change their 
experiences. Since late 1980s and early 1990s, a cornerstone research topic has resonated with the 
changing nature of fatherhood and, more specifically, with the ‘new father’ ideal and figure.57 
Apparently, an excessive eagerness resulted in often uncritical and unrealistic accounts of the ‘new 
father’.58 One of the most fundamental reasons for this misrepresentation lay exactly in the absence 
of a gender perspective in analyses of fatherhood.59   
Around the same period, some gender scholars begun to produce critical analyses of men 
and masculinities primarily from a sociological perspective.60 Beforehand, men did not amount to 
gendered beings and, therefore, were largely omitted as an object of gender analysis within 
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feminist theory. 61 Feminist legal literature has been predominantly concerned with documenting 
the patterns of disadvantage and discrimination suffered by women.62 It has developed through 
different waves, whose main claims can be summarised as follows. Liberal feminists viewed men 
as the point of reference and called for equal treatment of women, thus contesting the widespread 
stereotypical belief that women need special protection.63 Their main concern lay in the systemic 
exclusion of women from educational and vocational opportunities and, therefore, their goals were 
merely assimilationist.64 As a result, these scholars did not go as far as to foresee the de facto 
gendered implications of a variety of laws and legal practices.65  
Although agreeing with the liberal call for gender neutrality in relation to most issues, 
difference theorists criticised the limitations of the equal treatment paradigm and demanded 
recognition of the differences between the genders, particularly in the areas of reproduction and 
childrearing.66 In relation to maternity leave, for instance, difference theory argued that a formal 
version of equality denied important biological differences between men and women and, 
therefore, ended up harming women.   
Radical theorists focused more closely on women’s subordination and, more generally, on 
the unequal power relations between men and women.67 They assert that the male norm, which 
defines law and society, operates to promote gender inequality and women’s oppression. To a 
certain extent, therefore, this wave of feminism has been read as proposing a rather limited 
portrayal of both men and women: men as potentially all bad and women as victims of male 
oppression.68 In this context, radical feminists view dramatic social transformation as the only 
means of remedying power imbalance. Different from the previous three stages, postmodern 
feminism is a woman-centred theory.69 As such, it is mainly concerned with the dilemma of 
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essentialism and insists on the idea that there exists no one female experience; rather, race, class, 
ethnicity and culture are major factors in shaping women’s identities and lives.70  
Bearing in mind the risk of oversimplifying sophisticated and intricate theoretical insights, 
each stage of feminist legal theory seems to more or less directly propose a singular approach to 
men and overwhelmingly depict them as a monolithic group.71 Following the account above, it 
appears that men have been treated as object of analysis, as the ‘other’, as the oppressor or have 
been simply omitted.72 One possible exception to this trend in feminist legal theory can be found 
in Ginsburg’s litigation work in the 1970s. Ginsburg’s decision to represent male plaintiffs in order 
to challenge the constitutionality of sex-based state action has been frequently defined a “strategic 
choice”,73 but not always in the positive sense. According to some, in her arguments, attention to 
the condition of men pursued a particular goal: more specifically, men’s disadvantage was used to 
create equal opportunities for women. 74  More nuanced interpretations of Ginsburg’s work, 
however, have explained that the idea of choosing male plaintiffs subtly aimed at encouraging the 
development of a new theory of equal protection grounded on an anti-stereotyping principle.75 
Rather than seeking to promote the role of women,76 it appears that her ultimate purpose – then 
actual achievement – was therefore to shed light on the institutions and social practices, which 
preserve and reiterate sex-based inequalities.77  
Already in the early 1970s, however, some feminist scholars and activists started to 
acknowledge and argue that men were also victims of sexism.78 Several key academics in the US 
begun to question and criticise the models in their disciplines.79 Pleck, for example, offered a 
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remarkable critique of psychological and sociological models of that period. 80  In the 1990s, 
masculinities studies proliferated across different disciplines, as exemplified by courses offered at 
universities, conferences and publications.81 Different from other disciplines, legal scholarship has 
placed relatively limited and marginal attention to the harm of gender stereotypes on men and how 
legal constructs preserve and reproduce these stereotypes. 82  More specifically, feminist legal 
theorists are criticised for limiting their exploration to women’s experiences with men from a 
woman’s standpoint and, therefore, for overlooking men’s experiences with women from a man’s 
standpoint.83 Only relatively recently, and still in a primarily residual fashion, feminist legal 
scholarship has begun to explore how the law and legal practices contribute to creating constructs 
of masculinity.84   
The study of masculinities is a natural progression and an integral part of feminist 
analysis.85 It is committed to “ask the man question”,86 namely “what is the position of boys and 
men in this situation?”87 Dowd identifies various ways how asking the man question will make a 
difference to feminist analysis.88 Firstly and most importantly, by examining the construction of 
power and privilege, masculinities analysis deepens our knowledge of the roots and the complex 
dynamics of subordination and, therefore, contributes to the goal of women’s equality.89 Men’s 
interactions with other men influence the ways in which they manifest their masculinity that, in 
turn, has meaningful repercussions on their relationships with women.90 Similarly, gender role 
stereotyping harming one gender inevitably crystallises expectations towards the other gender.91 
The most obvious example is the stereotypical image of the father as the breadwinner, which goes 
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hand-in-hand with the expectation that the woman’s role is to stay home and look after the children. 
Accordingly, any discrimination suffered by men eventually operates to the detriment of women.92 
For instance, prosecuting only men for the offence of statutory rape simply strengthens the view 
of men as perpetrators and grants women protection, with the side-effect of restricting the latter’s 
sexual freedom.93  
Masculinities theory questions how gender subordinates some or most men, how privilege 
is consciously or unconsciously accepted by men and what price is paid for privilege.94 Therefore, 
most of the theoretical work on masculinities has attempted to reveal how male identity is 
constructed and sustained, rather than how to challenge or alleviate the effects of patriarchy.95A 
crucial argument is that masculinities are socially constructed, rather than biologically determined, 
and therefore they are subject to constant change and redefinition.96 Accordingly, masculinity is 
often portrayed as a quality that cannot be attained once for all; rather, it is something that has to 
be continuously pursued on a daily basis.97  
A key endeavour of masculinities analysis is to rectify an essentialist view of men. 
Masculinities scholarship is consciously and literally plural. 98 There are multiple masculinities: a 
preferred one that is at the top of male hierarchy and is called hegemonic masculinity as well as 
subversive masculinities and subordinated masculinities, which are mostly defined across the lines 
of race, class and sexual orientation. 99  By shedding light on a variety of male identities, 
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masculinities work uncovers ways in which the dominant gender system produces subordination 
and differentiation among men.100 Another central objective of masculinities theory consists in 
making harm suffered by men and boys visible.101 Even the most privileged men exercise privilege 
at a cost. One frequent example is military service, both in terms of compulsory conscription and 
sacrifice of men’s bodies in war.102 Whether this is the price men pay for privilege or the result of 
performing masculinities by exercising domination over other men, one of the pervasive claims is 
that men disproportionately represent the victims of male violence. 103  
A recurrent theme within masculinities work is ‘crisis’. Although prima facie 
contradictory, Kimmel’s words are very emblematic of the position of men: “Men as a group are 
in power (when compared with women), but they do not feel powerful”. 104  This sense of 
powerlessness might reflect ideological shifts in traditional notions of masculinity as well as 
embracing new consciousness that contest old approaches.105 In 1985, Carrigan et al. identified 
two major dimensions of change in the constitution of masculinity: an intensification of tensions 
in their relationships with women and the crisis of heterosexual masculinity that is more frequently 
perceived as out-dated.106 As argued by Beynon, crisis might even have an applied dimension 
when it mirrors empirical data indicating low outcomes for boys and men in terms of health, 
emotional wellbeing, crime and stress.107 Another persistent claim in the narrative of the ‘crisis’ 
in masculinity has been the link between the profound change masculinity has experienced with a 
shift in the status of fatherhood, more specifically the decline of traditional masculine authority 
within the family as it relates to men’s relationships with women and children.108  
As mentioned above, fathers have not always been examined as gendered subjects.109 Only 
recently, studies on fatherhood have been influenced by growing theoretical work on masculinities. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that fatherhood is an essential form of male behaviour and a crucial life 
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role for men. As such, it is influenced and shaped by social representations.110 Masculinities are 
consistently defined in a negative form: to be a man means not to be a woman and not to be gay.111 
Accordingly, the dominant imagery of masculinity describes male behaviour as characterised by 
control, dominance and independence.112 Against this imagery, parenting requires men to take up 
qualities and attributes that are conventionally seen as unmanly and, therefore, it is evidently in 
tension with concepts of masculinity.113 Representing the male within this culture, the degree of 
engagement and types of engagement of fathers in certain activities are over-determined.114  
Fatherhood is also an aspect of men’s lives where the price of patriarchy becomes 
particularly evident through the construction of parenting as entailing economic provision rather 
than caregiving. 115 Apart from leading to male success in wage work, breadwinning expectations 
have contributed to creating work structures and norms which set a hierarchy between family and 
work, thus effectively determining men’s absence or limited involvement in caregiving work.116 
What Connell as well as other theorists call ‘hegemonic masculinity’ – which in present Western 
societies is closely connected to income generating work – keeps men far away from care and, 
therefore, from their children. Different from mothers, who are expected to nurture their children 
and cannot choose to do otherwise, most fathers are not expected to nurture their children but to 
economically provide for their families. The obstacles that men encounter in being engaged fathers 
are the product of socialisation as well as of workplace and market structures. The norms of success 
and power regulating the workplace produce outcomes that disregard and, therefore, clash with the 
care needed by children.117  
According to some commentators, the ‘crisis’ in masculinity and the interconnected shift 
in the status of fatherhood have a specifically legal dimension.118 This ‘crisis’ has been marked by 
a deflation of legal rights, which were historically granted to men over women, children and 
property.119 Let us take the example of child custody in the United States or, more generally, in 
the legal tradition of Common Law. Under early Anglo-American rules, it was extremely difficult 
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for mothers to have their claims heard in relation to custody determinations in divorce cases.120 
Common Law essentially conferred an absolute right of ownership and control over their children 
on the father.121 This legal position was grounded on the notion that fathers were best able to 
financially provide for their children.122 Contrariwise, mothers were considered to be the ‘inferior’ 
parent and they were only entitled to reverence and respect, but no rights. In divorce proceedings, 
courts did no more than verify whether particular circumstances demanded a departure from the 
rule of paternal custody and control. Courts used to consider children as property and, therefore, 
fathers used to be automatically granted the physical custody of children in their capacity as the 
most important property-holder.123  
Already in the 1920s, the authoritarian role of the father started to be questioned vis-à-vis 
childcare manuals celebrating motherhood as the repository of family values.124 At the end of the 
nineteenth century, societal understanding of children shifted from property to individuals with 
special developmental needs.125 Research began to emphasise the peculiar and special nature of 
pre-adult years. 126  Children’s particular needs were, in turn, viewed as demanding a set of 
interpersonal dynamics that, allegedly, only mothers as special nurturers could support.127 By the 
1980s, therefore, the ‘sacred rights’ of a father ceased to exist in the form of formal, legal and 
justifiable entitlements, which he could claim in relation to his children.128  
The departure from the a priori paternal right to custody was achieved with the assertion 
of the ‘best interests of the child’ standard as the principle governing custody adjudications.129 
This novelty prompted repositioning the focus of custody laws and determinations on the right of 
the child to be placed in the more appropriate custodial arrangement. However, the principle’s 
vague formulation entailed significant practical challenges and implementation complexities. In 
the face of a deliberately indeterminate formulation, courts created subsidiary rules to ensure 
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coherence and render the principle immediately meaningful.130 Judges adopted, inter alia, the so-
called “tender years” doctrine, which privileged maternal custody under the assumption that it 
would be in the best interests of the child to continue to be nurtured by the mother.131 In most 
cases, courts did no more than issue orders that confirmed the status quo, without actually 
assessing and identifying who was the most appropriate parent.132 By acknowledging the value of 
the mother's bond to a child, courts implemented the best-interest principle by granting the custody 
of children primarily to women. As a result, a gender division of labour overwhelmingly survived 
the end of the parental relationship. 
The “tender years” doctrine shaped judicial determinations of custody for decades. Only in 
the early 1970s, increasing divorce rates gave rise to debates and tensions over the law regulating 
custody of children.133 Reflecting these changing times, strict provisions for the collection of 
overdue child support payments encouraged the formation of fathers’ rights groups.134 In the wake 
of liberal feminist calls for gender neutrality in the family context, these groups complained that 
men were subject to child custody laws and decision-making processes that were perceived as 
biased towards mothers.135 Both liberal feminists and fathers’ rights groups pursued the ideal of a 
genderless family, where husbands and wives equally shared childcare and domestic 
responsibilities.136 Accordingly, proposals to replace the maternal presumption with joint custody 
arrangements were advanced as a means of furthering equality between the sexes. 
In the US, these aspirations have, more generally, materialised in a well-established legal 
doctrine of anti-discrimination, which is sceptical of any generalisation about gender difference 
and fears paternalism as a threat to individual autonomy.137 This emerges quite clearly from the 
US rejection of any special entitlements for maternity as grounded on paternalistic gender 
stereotypes, rather than on the respect for women’s free choice.138 On the other hand, with few 
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exceptions, European legal orders have not yet fully committed to the proposition that gender 
neutrality is a precondition for gender equality.139 In most European constitutions as well as in EU 
law and European human rights, provisions requiring equal treatment and prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sex are accompanied by provisions or doctrinal interpretations 
authorising or even requiring public authorities to take measures that differentiate on grounds of 
sex with the aim of rectifying systemic inequalities and redistributing different forms of benefits.140  
In so doing, European policies make use of assumptions about gender roles, which are 
likely to be rejected as gender stereotypes in the US legal culture.141 As an example, it is sufficient 
to think of European maternity leave policies, which require all States to provide for at least 
fourteen weeks of paid maternity leaves – two of which are compulsory, thus imposing periods 
when women cannot choose to work.142 These diverging approaches are also reflected in the two 
visions of post-industrial gender order identified by Fraser.143  The first, which is named the 
Universal Breadwinner, is endorsed by most US feminists and liberals and aims to enhance gender 
justice by promoting women’s employment, in particular through the provision of employment-
enabling services.144 The second, which she calls the Caregiver Parity model, drives the political 
practice of most Western European feminists and social democrats and seeks to foster gender 
justice by supporting informal care work, through the provision of caregiver allowances, for 
example.145  
It is argued that both models have produced an incomplete and insufficient revolution.146 
On both sides of the Atlantic, gendered patterns of working and caring persist: the proportion of 
women in paid employment is lower than men’s; women continue to be paid less than men for 
equal work; and a tiny minority of women hold top positions in companies. Moreover, although 
fathers’ involvement in childcare has increased since 1980s, we cannot talk of greater involvement 
in absolute terms. Men’s heightened engagement has benefited younger children more than 
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adolescents, sons more than daughters and biological children more than stepchildren.147 In the 
US, among adults living in households with children under the age of six over the period 2010-
2014, men devoted on average 23 minutes per day to physical care (such as, bathing or feeding a 
child), while, in comparison, women spent one hour. 148  Even more asymmetrical patterns 
characterise European States. Results drawn from the database HETUS reveal noteworthy 
differences between men and women in the average amount of time per day devoted to unpaid 
work.149 Among couples with at least one child aged under six, the gender gap is of almost six 
hours in Italy, more than three in France and almost four in Germany.150  
Above all, women’s time remains more tied up in domestic and childcare activities than 
men’s. What are the reasons for this situation? In Europe, special entitlements for maternity end 
up reinforcing women’s primary role in childcare. Moreover, non-existent or far less generous 
provisions for paternity leave further strengthen traditional gender roles. In the US, employers 
apply the same standard to differently-situated individuals; indeed, also in dual-career families, 
women tend to do more childcare than men.151  Therefore, despite the prima facie anti-stereotyping 
approach, the framework in place fails to challenge the status quo and, thus, to disrupt the 
underlying inequalities upon which stereotypes are based. Taken further, the adverse consequences 
of the US model might go as far as to devalue and render caregiving invisible, thus producing 
unrealistic and punitive responses that further complicate the reality of women’s lives. As a result, 
in both Europe and the US, breadwinning and caregiving continue to be constructed as separate 
roles, labelled masculine and feminine respectively.152 The vision of the Universal Caregiver,153 
which would require “induc(ing) men to become more like most women are now”,154 is far from 
reality.  
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The contribution that masculinities analysis can bring to this debate is to shed light on the 
social, cultural and economic obstacles that men encounter in relation to fatherhood. According to 
Dowd, “including men means situating women within a more realistic picture of gender 
subordination, while acknowledging men’s subordination in that picture”.155 As opposed to a 
‘either/or’ approach, a masculinities analysis offers the possibility – and the challenge – to 
elaborate in-depth reflections that concurrently look at men and women as individuals in relation 
to each other, as opposed to independent subjects, even if gender-specific problem-solving is 
needed. 156  The positions of fathers and mothers in relation to family care and work are 
asymmetrical and therefore call for gender-specific strategies. However, they are also 
interdependent and, thus, it seems fundamental to connect the two gender-specific perspectives in 
order to understand how inequalities interlock. With the support of masculinities analysis, 
therefore, feminist scholarship can effectively investigate issues around fatherhood in a gender-
specific but gender-linked fashion.157   
Relying on the teachings of masculinities theories, the following analysis is based on the 
conviction that fathers need to be viewed and discussed as gendered and as men. Masculinities 
insights will also be employed in order to unravel and understand complex social relationships and 
structures operating within the family context and beyond.158 Having spelt out how male identity 
is constructed and sustained, feminist legal theory can step in and provide a set of theoretical tools 
to more strongly tackle disadvantage and inequality.159 By systematically applying feminist legal 
theory to situations where gender stereotypes harm men, the following analysis will therefore 
clarify the ways in which legal constructs and methods of legal analysis and adjudication have 
contributed to shaping and, possibly, redefining fatherhood. Therefore, my focus on fathers aims 
to offer what might have been missed in previous literature and to hint at how fathers’ inequalities 
inevitably reconnect to women and children.  
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3. The ‘New Father’ 
Despite the persisting inequalities, the emergence of a revisited cultural imaginary of what 
being a ‘good father’ entails is undeniable. At least from an ideological perspective, we have 
embraced a more engaged vision of fatherhood, thus proving it possible to alter the norms of 
masculinities. Already in 1987, Pleck described the ideal father as more than the breadwinner of 
the family but someone who combines full-time work with daily childcare –160 using Crowley’s 
words, “just like any other modern mother”. 161 Our model of fatherhood has therefore changed 
from men’s role as authoritarian patriarchs to expectations of co-parenting and shared nurturing, 
embraced in the ideal of ‘new fatherhood’. As defined by Collier and Sheldon, a ‘new father’ is a 
“man who is not (or, at least, not just) seen as a primary breadwinner but is also, increasingly, a 
‘hands-on’ carer, an individual who is (or who should be) emotionally engaged and involved in 
the day-to-day care of his children”.162  
This shift has become a pattern among a growing proportion of fathers but, at the same 
time, it has entailed men struggling with the concept of fatherhood. One of the complexities of 
refashioning fatherhood lies in the fact that many fathers attempt to construct tasks and roles that 
are not traditional for men as masculine with the purpose of alleviating the threat to their 
masculinity. 163  It is, therefore, not surprising that doubts as to whether involved fatherhood 
represents a real change or simply a reconstruction of hegemonic masculinity have been raised.164 
Studies on involved fathers indicate that most of fathers tend to masculinize care.165 Masculine 
care, as redefined by some Norwegian fathers, consists in being a friend to the child, teaching 
independence and continuing to be heavily involved in the labour market.166 Other researchers 
have pointed out that engaged fathers show a greater involvement in instrumental functions (as 
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opposed to expressive functions), such as discipline, protecting, income and encouraging 
responsibility, which are known as the traditional functions of fathers.167  
Doucet, in her study on men as primary caregivers, employs the concept of ‘borderwork’ 
to describe the ongoing focus on gender differences in parenting.168 She concludes that, even if the 
picture resulting from her study shows that the practices of mothering and fathering have many 
commonalities, fathers experience parenting in a different manner and find it important to 
explicitly state this difference.169 By refashioning care work and masculine conceptions of care, 
these fathers create new types of masculinities.170 Therefore, as argued by Catlett and McKenry, 
fathers have not abandoned their traditional roles, but they have simply attempted to re-envision 
them.171 As a result, traditional fatherhood has not been replaced; new features are merely added 
on.172 The ‘new father’ encompasses both traditional characteristics, in particular breadwinning, 
with greater participation and nurture.173  
The ideal of ‘new fatherhood’ has gone as far as to reconstruct fathers as a distinct kind of 
desirable presence within families and in the lives of their children and, as a result, a father’s 
absence is seen as problematic.174 Relying on a simplistic understanding of the sex role theory, this 
construction of father presence has been couched primarily by reference to the father’s alleged 
specific function as an appropriate male role model.175 For instance, Blankenhorn contested an 
androgynous parenting model on the ground that gender specific roles are crucial to a child’s 
development.176 He went further by arguing that men’s conviction in their own uniqueness is 
fundamental to giving men a strong motive to bond with their children; and that connection, in 
turn, is crucial to becoming a ‘good’ man.177 At the same time, the initial absence of paternal 
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masculinity has been presented as a catalyst for a cycle of maladjusted children.178 Fatherless 
children, especially boys, seemed to have problems in relation to gender identity development, 
educational achievements,179 psychological adjustment and controlling aggression.180 Hence, the 
absence of a properly engaged father has begun to be seen as a social problem in relation to which 
State intervention ought to be accepted.  
In Britain, for instance, the attempt to promote father-inclusive practices in service 
provision and service delivery materialized in various legislative acts such as the Childcare Act 
2006, the Equality Act 2006 and policy documents such as Every Parent Matters and the National 
Service Frameworks.181 Through these initiatives, healthcare providers and local authorities have 
been strongly encouraged to provide fathers with the support and opportunities they need to 
effectively fulfil their parental role, regardless of the degree of involvement in their children’s 
care. 182  Similarly, efforts to promote paternal engagement have commonly resulted in joint 
custody and other shared parenting measures aimed at putting biological fathers on an equal 
footing, regardless of their marital status and demonstrated commitment to parenting. 183 Along 
these lines, also the adoption of more stringent enforcement mechanisms to collect child support 
has been explicitly invoked as necessary to achieve male presence and male responsibility towards 
the family, with the ultimate aim of connecting men with their children.184 Clearly, behind the 
State’s effort of enforcing fatherhood was also the intention to minimise public expenditures and 
support among single-mothers and, more generally, to promote “‘trickle-down’ and ‘personal 
responsibility’” instead of “public provision and social citizenship” in a time of rising 
neoliberalism.185  
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In the 1980s, a number of researchers attempted to measure the effects of increased paternal 
involvement on children. Most of these studies relied on a comparison between the status of 
children in traditional families and that of children raised primarily by their fathers or co-parented 
by their mothers and fathers. 186  Results indicated increased cognitive competence, increased 
empathy and decreased sex-stereotyped beliefs among the children with involved fathers.187 It is 
important to note that, in all these studies, paternal involvement in childcare corresponded to the 
desire of the fathers themselves and their partners.188 Therefore, research shows that fathers must 
be looked at within the broader familial environment: positive father-child relationships are more 
likely to exist when fathers establish and maintain positive relationships with their partners, former 
partners and other children.189  
Moreover, comparisons between children brought up in two-parent heterosexual families 
and children brought up in two-parent lesbian families fail to detect differences in the advantage 
of the former.190 Accordingly, it seems to be the value of co-parenting – rather than the fathering 
on its own – that produces positive child outcomes. Socialisation studies have cogently proved that 
parental nurture, affection and closeness result in positive child outcomes regardless if the parent 
involved is a mother or a father.191 Mothers and fathers influence children by their nurture, not by 
their gender.192 The features of a father as a parent appear much more influential than the features 
of a father as a male adult. Therefore, the implications of absent fathers do not resonate with the 
absence of a key gender piece but rather with the loss of financial and co-parenting contribution.193 
Nonetheless, judges have often used considerable discretion to produce and replicate their own 
convictions about ‘appropriate’ parental practices. 194  Throughout the twentieth century, for 
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instance, the view that families need fathers to ensure the social, psychological and economic 
wellbeing of all its members has informed judicial opposition to single motherhood.195 
 
4. The Dominant Ideology of the Family under Challenge 
The concept of ‘family’ has given rise to abundant literature emerging from different disciplinary 
perspectives. These studies have cogently demonstrated that family structures and functioning 
have varied throughout time and that family is attributed different meanings in different contexts. 
Historical studies of the family have attempted to detect and describe historical shifts in household 
structures.196 In so doing, this body of knowledge has emphasised the malleability of the roles of 
women and men in the family and, indirectly, offered some suggestions as to the changing nature 
of familial masculinity throughout history. It follows that the family is not a pre-given site where 
men and women arrive and live as fixed gender subjects.197 Rather, it is subject to both historical 
and contextual/cultural variations that, in turn, constitute dynamic forces in the social construction 
of ideas of men and women.198  
 Although there is no one transhistorical family form, the existence of a ‘dominant ideology 
of the family’ and, therefore, a traditional (as well as idealised) model of family is undeniable. The 
expression ‘dominant ideology of the family’ is used by Claire McGlynn to describe “the ideal 
against which other family forms and practices are measured”, 199  and it implies a set of 
structural/physical as well as functional features.200 First of all, it refers to a “white, heterosexual, 
married couple, with children, all living under the same roof” and, as such, resonates with the 
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image of the ‘sexual family’, using Martha Fineman’s terminology. 201  In fact, although less 
emphasised in McGlynn’s theory, the shared assumption is that the ideal – or, ‘natural’ – family 
originates from and revolves around a formally celebrated adult sexual affiliation.202 In addition 
to these formal characteristics, the dominant ideology of the family endorses and perpetuates as 
‘natural’ a gendered division of labour, according to which “the husband is the main breadwinner 
and the wife the primary caregiver of children and other dependants”.203  
 The ‘dominant ideology of the family’ inevitably produces and perpetuates stereotypes, 
which do not always reflect reality, about the ‘normal’ family type and the ‘proper’ roles of men 
and women within families. The obsession with the traditional family has gone as far as to conceive 
untraditional different family arrangements to be dangerous to society and implicated in the fall of 
fundamental values.204  The influence of this ideology has permeated and continues to permeate 
the formulation and application of law and policy worldwide.205 By supporting the image of what 
is considered an appropriately constituted family, the law identifies the normal and, as a 
consequence, the deviant.206 As such, the law functions as a potentially coercive and punitive entity 
in the lives of people whose circumstances and desires do not comply with the norm.207  
  Over the last fifty years, however, a series of substantial transformations have occurred in 
relation to both the structure and the functioning of families in Western societies. Possibly, the 
most far-reaching of these is exemplified by the heightened dissolution of the previously 
coextensive family practices of sex, marriage and parenthood.208 It is possible to detect four main 
developments as catalysts for this shift: (1) medical progress and the advent of assisted 
reproductive technologies (‘ART’); (2) the decline in marriage as a life-long commitment to one 
person, the liberation of divorce processes and a concomitant increase in extra-marital cohabitation 
and child-bearing; (3) increasing rates of women participating in the workforce and their 
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continuing engagement in paid employment after childbirth; and (4) the growing social acceptance 
and legal recognition of same-sex partnerships and, although at a slower pace, the expanding 
possibilities for them to become parents and to be legally-recognised as such. 
Around the same time, theorists of the family began to talk about the ‘fragmented family’. 
Smart and Neale, inter alia, have explained how broad demographic shifts, like the ones above, 
have resulted in an increasing split of biological families into different households, marriages and 
cohabitations. 209 Already in 1991, Hill observed that:  
 
We now live in an era where a child may have as many as five different “parents”. These include a 
sperm donor, an egg donor, a surrogate or gestational host, and two non-biologically related 
individuals who intend to raise the child.210 
 
It is self-evident that the pair reproduction-parenthood is at risk of separation as a result of modern 
reproductive techniques. In fact, such techniques allow for the “depersonalization” 211  of the 
procreation process: the biological contribution can be split from the social context of interpersonal 
relationships and, therefore, there are more than two individuals who could claim the status of 
legal parenthood. Although enhancing the role of personal intention in procreation and parenthood, 
the new biological and social realities created by assisted reproductive technologies inevitably 
question old assumptions, sometimes embedded in legal norms. For instance, the rule mater 
semper certa est has lost its absolute character in the face of surrogacy options. Similarly, 
techniques involving the donation of male gametes challenge the accuracy of the so-called marital 
presumption, according to which the husband of the child’s mother is the father of any child born 
within marriage.  
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 The decline in marriage as a once-and-for-all commitment and the concomitant rising 
number of extra-marital births entail equally profound disconnections between marriage, 
reproduction and parenthood. Divorce clearly represents the context where the fragmented nature 
of biological families and parenting practices reaches its peak in terms of practical visibility. 
Despite some increase in the numbers of non-resident mothers, parental separation and divorce 
generally entail a progressive alienation of biological fathers from the lives of their children.212 At 
the same time, should the child’s mother remarry, her new partner might choose to act as a 
stepfather, thus representing a new or an additional source of paternal care to the child. Therefore, 
the fragmentation resulting from separation or divorce is twofold: physical separation of members 
of the nuclear family into two or more households, in conjunction with a split of parental functions 
between more than two adults.   
Over the last two decades, the two-earner family has progressively established itself as the 
norm in both Western Europe and the United States.213 This societal shift has the potential to upset 
the traditional organisation of labour along gendered lines and, therefore, to challenge the enduring 
and undisputed role of men as breadwinners and women’s longstanding primary involvement in 
childcare. Therefore, in such scenarios, fragmentation signifies splitting traditional tasks and 
responsibilities, which have been historically performed by one gender, between two genders. The 
implications of greater participation of women in paid employment, more or less successfully, 
goes beyond the gender divide: although it does not automatically amount to increased paternal 
involvement in the traditionally maternal sphere of childcare, it certainly implies a more equal 
economic contribution between mothers and fathers (pay-gap aside). 
If compared to these recent shifts, the progressive opening of the family avenue to same-
sex couples has offered the chance to rethink the dominant ideology of the family in a more holistic 
manner. Heterosexuality being the prerequisite of natural reproduction and, in most jurisdictions, 
of marriage, the departure from the opposite-sex paradigm automatically triggers two further 
‘deviances’: in fact, in addition to being naturally insufficient to lead to conception, a homosexual 
affiliation remains widely unsusceptible to any formalisation. Therefore, in the domain of 
homosexuality, the conventional continuum between sex, marriage and parenthood is often broken 
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in multiple ways: neither sex nor parenthood are likely to take place within a marital union, 
parenthood does not always follow from biology.       
Despite these demographic shifts and decades of organised women’s movements, the 
sexual family remains “the most gendered of our social institutions”.214 This holds true even if – 
at least, on paper – the current legal system provides for, inter alia, easy access to divorce as well 
as for flexible working arrangements, including maternity leave provisions. As a consequence, to 
the extent that these possibilities are effectively offered, women can freely decide to terminate a 
marital relationship with their partner or never formally create one.215 As a corollary, the choice 
of becoming a mother is no longer dependent on the existence of a formalised union. Along these 
lines, such things like the career/motherhood dichotomy become mere memories that can be traced 
to a time of patriarchy. Rather, women nowadays are allegedly free to combine public and private 
commitments and even to discard any tradition/culture-imposed ‘female’ role.  
However, these transformations have not been attained without a price. The requirement 
of paid work for all women failed to accommodate the gendered lives of most women and, 
therefore, ended up harming the most disadvantaged mothers, rather than empowering them.216 
Although the law no longer contains formally different expectations for mothers and fathers, often 
it does no more than simply pay lip service to the value of substantive and, even more so, 
transformative equality.217 As a result, using Fineman’s words, “Mother is neutered into Parent”, 
but only within the law.218 However, her significance and positive role in childcare remain at the 
societal level.219  
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status per se, but rather on those individuals and groups who experience disadvantage as a result of status-based 
discrimination. More recently, a third version of equality has been conceptualised: transformative equality. As defined 
by Timmer, equality as transformation “challenges the deeply ingrained gender roles and gendered ideology on which 
society is based”. See A. Timmer, ‘Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of Human Rights’ 
2011 11(4) Human Rights Law Review 712.   
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 Possibly, one of the main reasons behind the failed attempt to free women from a 
historically defined ‘female’ role lies in the absence of a concomitant reconsideration and 
reconstruction of the institution of fatherhood outside fixed gender roles. 220  In fact, despite 
endorsing the rhetoric that all parents – mothers as well as fathers – will take care of their children, 
the climate of debate generated by ongoing changes in family practices did not necessarily inspire 
indepth reflections on what being a father concretely entails or ought to entail in today’s society 
and, more importantly, what forces and dynamics impede greater paternal involvement in childcare 
and family work. Consequently, it has often ignored the conceptual and practical implications of 
not questioning the institution of fatherhood when re-envisioning gender equality. Rather, the 
primary preoccupation has often been to ensure a greater participation of women in the public 
sphere and, paradoxically, limited efforts have been spared to address longstanding inequalities 
within the private sphere of parenthood.  
  
5. Defining Conventional Fatherhood  
Many commentators have underlined how difficult it is to define who is a father. 221 In line with 
research conducted by family historians, any study on fatherhood and the definition of the concept 
itself owes much to the particular social, cultural and economic circumstances that produce the 
norms moulding the behaviour of fathers.222 As a result, fatherhood is not a unitary, static or 
‘natural’ concept. Rather, fathers and fatherhood are widely considered social constructions and 
institutions.223  
For the purposes of the present research, I have coined the definition of conventional 
fatherhood. ‘Conventional’ is defined as “based on or in accordance with what is generally done 
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or believed” 224  and, within the current context, should be intended as synonymous with 
‘traditional’ and ‘dominant’. Therefore, ‘conventional fatherhood’ is a legal definition of 
fatherhood based on expectations, presumptions and prescriptions about the ‘good’ or ‘proper’ 
father that are embedded in the dominant culture. Here, ‘conventional fatherhood’ is used to refer 
to the individual who has those features – both physical and behavioural emotional – and/or plays 
a role, which are conventionally tied to the father figure. As anticipated, I draw these characteristics 
from the ‘dominant ideology of the family’, as conceptualised by McGlynn. For present purposes, 
four conventional features of fatherhood can be detected: a biological tie with his child, a marital 
or otherwise sexual relationship with the child’s mother, economic provision, and heterosexuality. 
A fifth characteristic can be added; it lies in the unitary nature of conventional fatherhood and, 
therefore, in the coexistence of all those features within the same individual.  
My definitional framework stems from a law and society perspective, which rests on the 
interpenetration of law and society. Firstly, it captures the “influence on law of forces outside the 
box” of legal logic. 225  The term ‘conventional’ renders visible the often blurred boundaries 
between law, culture and society and testifies to the influence of the dominant culture on the legal 
regulation of fatherhood. Secondly, the idea of conventional fatherhood also incorporates the basic 
view characteristic of ‘law and society’ that law is everywhere, not just in legislation and judicial 
decisions.226 Law pervades every dimension of our life, in terms of choices and behaviour, to the 
extent where ‘law’ and ‘society’ become almost superfluous.227 Moreover, the legal construction 
of conventional fatherhood tends to express a vision of the ‘proper’ father and, indirectly, of the 
appropriately constituted family.228 Consequently, it defines the normal and the deviant.229 While 
normality is generally endowed with greater legal entitlements, deviancy is generally sanctioned 
with lack of recognition and support.230  
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In stark contrast with the ideology of ‘conventional fatherhood’, Collier and Sheldon have 
observed that the abovementioned fragmentation of families is a profoundly gendered 
phenomenon:231 it has signified and continues to signify, to a great extent, a fragmentation of 
fatherhood.232 Overall, ‘fragmented fatherhood’ embodies the male/father-specific effects of the 
fragmentation of the family, as envisaged by Smart and Neale, and it manifests itself in multiple 
ways. The intact nuclear family is less widespread than it used to. Separation and divorce imply 
further parties involved and, therefore, further complexities. Given the proliferation of ‘step’, 
‘blended’ or ‘binuclear’ families,233 it is very likely that children will have to live and be nurtured 
in more than one household during their childhood and adolescence, thus establishing bonds with 
more than two parental figures. This is why divorced fathers, who seek to obtain custody of their 
children, often find themselves in conflict with re-partnered fathers claiming rights over their non-
biological children.234 In addition to private parties, the State has its own public interests to pursue 
as well as a key role to play in relation to the organisation of care and cash provision.235  
Therefore, in its first meaning, ‘fragmented fatherhood’ stands for the split of conventional 
paternal features and roles among two or more men.236 This, in turn, is often accompanied by a 
relocation of family members across different physical and social spaces. Reconstituted families 
provide a very good example of how a child can benefit from all aspects of fatherhood as a result 
of the involvement of more than one man in their lives. In such context, the source of biology does 
not necessarily coincide with the source of economic provision, which might be primarily provided 
by the step-father (child support aside). Moreover, if the reconstituted family is marriage-based, 
the biological link and the marital ties are offered by two distinct men: the divorced father and the 
step-father, respectively. In Collier’s and Sheldon’s view, fragmented fatherhood also resonates 
with the lived experience of those non-resident fathers who see their time with their children, 
divided into time-slots, and these care arrangements being rigidly enforced.237   
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Furthermore, empirical research involving fathers seems to suggest that the idea of 
‘fragmented fatherhood’ reflects their own perception of what fatherhood means and what it 
entails.238 Ives’ work, for instance, pointed out that fatherhood is often used as a fragmented and 
confused concept, to indicate a variety of different roles and relationships.239 The idea that there 
exist multiple types of fathers, each undertaking a specific role, appears to lie at the core of men’s 
understandings of fatherhood. 240  Among this variety of fathers, the predominant narrative 
constructs fatherhood as a dyadic concept: ‘father as progenitor’ and ‘father as carer’.241   
Apart from resulting in a practical and conceptual fragmentation, the suggested sub-
division of fatherhood has a legal dimension. Therefore, an additional interpretation of 
‘fragmented fatherhood’ might refer to the legal responses to changing social realities and, more 
specifically, to a legal recognition of the evolving and heterogeneous nature of men-child 
relationships.242 Referring back to the four sociological developments previously mentioned, it has 
been argued that the law has often shown remarkable contradictions in its way of dealing with 
them, thus prioritising different relationships at different times.243 As explained by Smart and 
Neale, however, these inconsistencies should not be viewed as evidence of disorganised legal 
thinking but rather of the complexity of current family practices, which can no longer fit into neat 
definitions.244    
 Despite these contradictions, some commentators have also observed that family law has 
gradually begun to appreciate each route to fatherhood as equally legitimate and the role played 
by each father as equally fundamental.245 This shifted legal attitude can certainly be understood as 
an inevitable consequence of the abovementioned four demographic changes. In the same way as 
the family has been impacted by these shifts, family law could not remain unchanged.246 The 
traditional channels through which men have established legal relationships with children, such as 
marriage and biology, have ceased to act as immediate connectors. As a result, family law has been 
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forced to develop alternative legal rules to regulate father-child relationships. For instance, in the 
face of high divorce rates and increasing numbers of children born out of wedlock, family law has 
shown certain flexibility in responding to the fragmentation of fatherhood by resorting to biology 
as the factor linking unmarried and divorced fathers with their children. Therefore, within national 
legal systems, de facto relationships and divorce have sometimes resonated more with the 
beginning of biology-based relationships than with the end of the marital family.247   
As a result, there is no one fatherhood model in family law; neither two nor three. The 
question ‘who is a father in law?’ can be more accurately addressed if divided into a set of narrower 
questions, including: who should be named on the birth certificate? Who should be granted contact 
rights and parental responsibility? Who should be responsible for financially providing for the 
child?248 The regulation of fatherhood can no longer benefit from a one-size-fits-all approach; 
rather, it requires the law and courts to navigate the complex reality of fragmented fatherhood, 
thus recognising the many and shifting nuances of fatherhood as a practice and as a culture and, if 
necessary, the contribution of multiple ‘fathers’ in a child’s life. 
 
6. Fragmented Fatherhood and the Structure of the Analysis  
The primary aim of the present study is to assess whether and, if so, to what extent the dominant 
ideology of fatherhood or the ‘conventional’ definition of fatherhood continues to apply or is being 
challenged within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In other words, this thesis seeks to understand 
whether and, if so, how the Court has reacted to the fragmentation of fatherhood, as a practical 
reality brought about by the abovementioned broad demographic changes, and navigated the 
inevitable complexity and diversity of father-children relationships. Therefore, the following 
analysis attempts to reveal whether the Court has embarked on an adjustment process or on a 
transformative process; in other words, whether the Court conceives the law as either a reflective 
tool or a transformative tool, at two different levels. Firstly, it will be considered whether the Court 
employs the law as a means of combatting gender stereotypes and establishing a new definition of 
fatherhood or, alternatively, of reflecting and compensating for existing gendered dynamics of 
work and parenting; secondly, whether the interpretation of the Convention is intended to mirror 
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national legal systems or to impose new legal conditions, whenever the Court feels that 
fundamental rights could be protected in a more dynamic way. Thus, for current purposes, the 
dilemma of adjustment versus transformation concerns the interactions between the Court, as an 
international court, and the Contracting States as well as the broader relationship between law (the 
Convention) and social change.    
The focus on fatherhood, as developed in the present study, should be seen as a means to 
an end as well as to an end in itself. It has been rightly argued that considering fatherhood in 
isolation or fathers’ rights as independent from the need of positive relationships with children and 
their mothers entails the risk of reiterating or reproducing gender inequalities, while empowering 
fathers.249 Therefore, when defining fatherhood, it is essential to consider the consequences for the 
best interests of the child as well as for women’s ambitions, wishes and investments with respect 
to both paid work and parenting.250 This operation can entail high levels of intricacy since the 
different parties involved might pursue conflicting interests.  
For instance, while the preservation of contact between the father and the child might 
ensure the respect for both parties’ family life as well as the best interests of the child, it might – 
at the same time – confront mothers’ authority in relation to their children and force them to remain 
part of a relationship that is no longer desired, for instance in the aftermath of parental separation 
or after a brief sexual encounter.251 In light of this, one of the sub-questions addressed by this thesis 
is whether and, if so, to what extent the Court takes the complexity triggered by the need to give 
due consideration to all parties involved into account. Therefore, the thesis will investigate, among 
other things, the Court’s departure from the conventional paradigm of fatherhood and, 
consequently, new emerging understandings of fatherhood, as they pertain to three distinct but 
interrelated aspects: the best interests of the child; a father’s right to be free from gender 
stereotypes (and, therefore, the promotion and protection of the father’s right to respect for private 
and family life); and women’s equality.  
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The structure of the jurisprudential analysis is defined by the four sociological 
developments previously mentioned, namely: (1) ART; (2) the decline in marriage as a life-long 
commitment to one person and a concomitant increase in extra-marital cohabitation and child-
bearing; (3) increasing rates of women participating in the workforce and their continuing 
engagement in paid employment after childbirth; and (4) growing social acceptance and legal 
recognition of same-sex partnerships and, although at a slower pace, expanding possibilities for 
them to become parents and to be legally recognised as such. Accordingly, the Court’s reliance on 
conventional features of fatherhood when determining the allocation of the status of legal father 
and/or parental rights will be assessed within the following case-law domains: filiation and 
parental rights following the employment of ARTs; right to custody and/or contact of divorced 
and unmarried fathers; family-work reconciliation; and filiation and parental rights of homosexual 
individuals and couples. These areas have been selected by virtue of their ability to directly 
confront the Court with the various factual consequences of ‘fragmented fatherhood’.  
Bearing in mind the overarching goal to investigate the ECtHR’s degree of attachment to 
or deviation from a conventional model of fatherhood, each case-law domain is particularly 
important to reveal the decisiveness attributed to one specific conventional feature when 
establishing who is the legal father of a child and/or deciding who deserves the attribution of 
parental rights. This can be explained by the fact that, in addition to triggering an overall 
fragmentation, the four developments above have more targeted implications. More specifically, 
each of them has the potential to undermine the persistence of a specific feature as the basis for 
allocating the legal status of fatherhood and/or specific parental rights, thus offering a valuable 
opportunity for questioning a factor’s current validity as a parameter of legal fatherhood. 
Therefore, whilst testing the relevance of the traditional ideology of fatherhood, more generally, 
the analysis of each domain will elaborate more closely on the endurance of the conventional 
features of fatherhood, which are most strongly challenged by the demographic change connected 
to the domain.  
Along the four domains, the unifying question is whether and, if so, under what 
circumstances the ECtHR felt prepared to depart from the conventional ideology of fatherhood. 
Although the impact of each sociological shift on the conventional definition of fatherhood will 
be explored in-depth in the following chapters, a couple of preliminary remarks seem necessary to 




In the context of ART, aspects of conventional fatherhood are shared between at least two 
men: the sperm donor and the intended father. The possibility of outsourcing reproduction 
inevitably jeopardises the conventional cause-effect relationship existing between biological 
relatedness and the status of legal father; hence, the tenacity of biology as a defining feature of 
legal fatherhood. Therefore, the jurisprudential analysis in Chapter 2 will attempt to establish 
whether and, if so, to what extent the ECtHR has seized the advent of ART as an opportunity for 
departing from a biological definition of fatherhood. More specifically, it seems interesting to 
investigate whether biology remains an indispensable and/or sufficient ground for legal fatherhood 
or, on the contrary, it requires the existence of other supporting factors.  
Differently, divorce and, even more so, de facto relationships pose a severe challenge to 
the traditional marriage-fatherhood pairing. As argued by Fineman, the family has been 
traditionally conceived as an institution of primarily horizontal relationships, grounded on the 
sexual affiliation between one man and one woman. 252  As a consequence, the parent-child 
relationship has tended to be defined and regulated as a derivative of the relationship between the 
parents. It is worth remembering that children used to be labelled ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ 
depending on whether the parents were married. The growing prevalence across Europe of single-
mother families constitutes an unequivocal sign that fathers, after relationship breakdown, 
typically cease to reside with their children and, consequently, find themselves parenting at a 
distance, or not at all.253 At the same time, should the child’s mother remarry, her new partner 
might choose to act as a stepfather, thus representing a new or an additional source of paternal care 
to the child. As a result, Chapter 3 will seek to determine whether and, if so, under what 
circumstances, biological unmarried fathers and divorced fathers are considered meritorious of 
contact and/or custody rights; whether, in light of marriage’s diminished popularity and duration, 
the Court has begun to rely on a new criterion to regulate post-separation relationships between 
divorced and/or unmarried fathers and their children; and, finally, whether and, if so, on what 
grounds other father figures – such as, stepfathers – are granted rights of fatherhood.  
As previously observed, homosexual relationships entail the disaggregation of the 
conventionally coextensive practices of sex, marriage and parenthood in the most comprehensive 
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possible manner. Thus, it is no coincidence that gay fatherhood remains the most insidious 
stumbling block in the Court’s path toward expanding the boundaries of ‘family life’. The case-
law analysis included in Chapter 5 will, inter alia, assess whether the Court allows itself to 
profitably build upon its own jurisprudential developments achieved in the ART and post-
separation/extra-marital fatherhood domains. More explicitly, it will explore whether any degree 
of deviation from conventional fatherhood manifested in relation to heterosexual fathers will be 
maintained within the jurisprudence concerning homo-parenthood or whether the absence of the 
basic feature of heterosexuality renders the Court’s previous progress void, thus requiring it to start 
from scratch. Furthermore, it will be interesting to investigate to what extent homosexuality 
becomes a gendered concept when operating within the context of parenting.  
Finally, the increasing proportion of two-waged families potentially marks the end of sole 
breadwinning fatherhood. Whilst in the previous scenarios traditional paternal features tend to be 
split between two (or more) men, the implications of a greater participation of women in paid 
employment, more or less successfully, go beyond the gender divide. Although a more equal 
sharing of childcare responsibilities between mothers and fathers is far from being guaranteed, 
economic provision no longer represents a distinguishing feature of fatherhood and its sufficiency 
for the attribution of parental rights – in particular, the right to parental leave – comes under heavy 
attack. Accordingly, the analysis of the jurisprudence concerning family-work reconciliation 
(Chapter 4) will attempt to establish whether fathers’ progressive loss of economic primacy within 
the family has implied a shift from working productivity to parenting performance as the basis for 
attributing a right to paternal leave.  
The endorsement of a conventional definition on the part of the Court rarely manifests itself 
explicitly. Blunt statements such as “X does not deserve the legal status of fatherhood because he 
lacks Y” or “X should have been granted the right to contact by virtue of Y” are sporadic. 
Therefore, the envisaged investigation requires the employment of a fundamental methodological 
tool of feminism, which consists in “unmasking gender biases or assumptions” made by the law 
and, having regard to the present study, underlying the Court’s jurisprudence pertaining to 
fatherhood.254 As explained by Levit, “it is a process that involves (…) making gender visible”, 255 
but not only. More generally, it entails digging deep into the reasoning provided by the Court and 
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unveiling assumptions based on conventional understandings of fatherhood, including gender-
related and non-gender-related. As a result, this thesis embarks on an enterprise of raising-
awareness. By bringing to the fore the Court’s implicit understanding of what a ‘proper/worthy of 
protection’ father involves, the present contribution helps the Strasbourg judges to become more 
self-aware of the definition of fatherhood that they are supporting and promoting.  
 Concerning the selection of cases, this has been mostly driven by the jurisprudence that is 
available. In all case-law domains – with the exception of unmarried post-separation/divorce 
fatherhood – the number of cases brought by fathers or prospective fathers remains quite limited 
and, therefore, no need for selection has arisen. Differently, the amount of jurisprudence regarding 
the legal treatment of unmarried fathers and divorced fathers is considerable. As a result, the cases 
considered in Chapter 3 represent a small sample of the available case-law and have been chosen 
on the basis of two primary considerations: time and jurisprudential overturns. Accordingly, the 
judgments considered either represent the first instance in which the Court – more or less explicitly 
– expressed its opinion on the validity/sufficiency/insufficiency of one or more factors in 
determining the allocation of contact/custody rights, or they encapsulate the Court’s total or partial 
departure from its previous view up until its most recent stance on the issue under scrutiny. 
Accordingly, the whole jurisprudential analysis will seek to track the Court’s attachment to 
conventional fatherhood over time and, inter alia, to understand whether certain conventional 
features have been challenged faster than others.  
 
7. The Role of the Court – Judicial Restraint and/or Judicial Activism? 
At over 50 years, the European Court of Human Rights is considered one of the most successful 
international human rights treaty bodies. 256  It has been commended as the motive power of 
fundamental rights jurisprudence in Europe, reaching out to 47 States and over 800 million 
people.257 The Court consists of a number of judges equal to the number of Contracting Parties to 
the Convention. Their appointment involves both Member States and the Parliamentary Assembly 
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of the Council of Europe. Each Member State is required to nominate three candidates, who satisfy 
the criteria stipulated in Article 21(1) of the Convention: being of “high moral character” and 
possessing “the qualifications required for high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised 
competence”. The Assembly is then responsible for electing one of the candidates by means of a 
majority vote.  
In a nutshell, the Court is entrusted with setting the minimum standard of protection of 
human rights in Europe and, at the same time, with “defining the margin within which States can 
opt for different fundamental balances between Government and individuals”.258 It is argued that 
the adoption of the ECHR by the Member States of the Council of Europe was premised on the 
assumption that they would retain their full prerogatives as sovereign states and, therefore, full 
autonomy of their respective societies, with the sole – but important – exception of the core 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention.259 The ECHR system is therefore the product of 
a “tidy arrangement”260, which is preserved by the principle of subsidiarity. The latter provides 
that national authorities are free to choose the measure they deem appropriate to meet the 
requirements of the Convention, while the Court is responsible for reviewing the compatibility of 
national choices with the Convention standards. Therefore, the Court is entrusted with the delicate 
task of ensuring equilibrium between democratic discretion and diversity at the national level, on 
the one hand, and the universal dimension of the Convention standards, on the other hand.261  
The interpretation of the ECHR is subject to the rules on the interpretation of treaties, 
enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.262 According to Article 31(1), 
which represents the general rule of interpretation, “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose”.263 As explained by the Court itself, the context against which 
the Convention has to be interpreted is a treaty for the effective protection of individual human 
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rights.264 Having ascertained the ordinary meaning to be given to the words in their context, the 
Court is therefore required to read the Convention “as a whole” and interpret it “in such a way as 
to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions”, in accordance with 
the object and purpose of the treaty.265  
Although the Court has prima facie approached interpretation as a unitary process (without 
openly setting a hierarchy among the different criteria for interpretation), reference to the object 
and purpose of the provision in the context of the Convention has proved the most prominent 
principle of interpretation resorted to thus far.266 International human rights instruments – just like 
constitutions – enshrine a set of abstract rights that individuals hold against governments.267 As a 
result, they face the problem of how the passage of time impacts their interpretation and 
application.268 This applies to all treaties, whose drafters wished them to be applicable to new 
circumstances and, therefore, formulated their object and purpose in generic terms. 269 
Accordingly, international human rights courts – in the same way as constitutional courts – are 
confronted with the challenge of ensuring due regard to radical and ongoing change in social 
circumstances, which could not be foreseen at the time of drafting or accession, as they relate to 
abstract legal provisions.270  
Therefore, the general formulations used in the ECHR have been read as disclosing that 
the Court was not only held responsible for enforcement, but also for developing common human 
rights.271 Furthermore, the impossibility of defining the criteria to be applied through secondary 
instruments, together with the complexities inherent in the process to amend the Convention, 
seems to suggest that a certain degree of judicial creativity is not only welcome, but also practically 
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necessary.272 At the same time, however, a certain amount of judicial restraint appears to be also 
essential to avoid that the Court’s jurisprudence goes too far beyond the situation in the Member 
States and, thus, to preserve its own legitimacy. Therefore, as summarised by Nikolaidis, the 
functioning of the Court can be described as “a norm-setting body whose powers are formally 
restrained by the (widely formulated) letter of the Convention, the (not always clear) state of the 
consensus among Member States and, finally, the (distant) possibility of amending the ECHR”.273  
The need to ensure that human rights are constructed in a dynamic fashion while obeying 
the principle of subsidiarity is a recurring tension within most of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
According to Mahoney, this tension is “more apparent than real”;274 he views judicial activism and 
judicial restraint as complementary elements of the methodology of judicial review employed by 
the Court and inherent in the exact nature of the Convention as an international instrument aimed 
to ensure effective protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.275 The dilemma of 
activism versus restraint has emerged also in relation to Article 8. More specifically, it seems that 
the concept of family life has been caught in between two prima facie opposing, and yet 
complementary, needs: to guarantee a greater match with changing social realities and to respect 
State-specific variations.  
The institution of the family has been traditionally conceived as a matter “private” to States 
and, as such, to be regulated within their domestic jurisdiction.276 Having regard to the European 
Union, for instance, parenthood does not fall within its original legislative competences. This is 
mainly due to the fact that Community Law emerged in order to address an economic imperative; 
“It was market creating rather than market correcting”.277 The organisation of parenting and, 
therefore, issues relating to gender equality were considered to the extent that they had economic 
consequences. 278  Therefore, although the importance of attaining equality between men and 
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women was often recognised, it did not represent the principal goal pursued by the EU.279  
However, this clarifies the reasons why the EU began to engage with parenthood and its regulation 
in the fields of freedom of movement and employment.280   
In the broader context of international law, all major human rights instruments include 
provisions applicable to the family. For instance, both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that “the family is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State”.281 
Nonetheless, the right to respect for private and family life has historically been understood as 
entailing only the State’s negative duty to abstain from interfering with the private and family 
sphere.282 In addition to overlooking the family as a locus of potential abuse and, therefore, leaving 
the structural subordination of women untouched,283 this very traditional view of the role of the 
State has been largely criticised for reproducing the public/private dichotomy within international 
human rights law.284 Yet, it should be acknowledged that increasing recognition of the existence 
of human rights positive obligations has generally led to States’ greater involvement in the sphere 
of the family.  
This division of labour between national jurisdictions and supranational or international 
jurisdictions can be further explained by the social and cultural variations in the understandings 
and practices of fatherhood across different States. Although the multiple (and often contested) 
ideas around fatherhood, which cut across institutional and cultural settings, have made the 
relationship between law and fatherhood a subject of international interest,285 the pronounced 
moral dimension of the concepts of ‘family’, in primis, and subsequently ‘fatherhood’, have 
eventually made these debates context-specific. As underlined by sociological, anthropological as 
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well as historical literature, any reconsideration and redefinition of fatherhood has been moulded 
by the specificities of the national legal systems, local cultures within legal practice and, more 
generally, gender and power relations within the specific context of reference.  
At the same time, family realities are one of the fastest changing domains in society. Since 
the drafting of the ECHR, we have witnessed unpredictable transformations in the forms of 
personal and social relationships between individuals living within the Council of Europe and/or 
in other States. These evolutions have triggered the need for updating the Court’s jurisprudence 
and the expansion of the notion of ‘family life’ under Article 8 (illustrated in detail in the next 
section) constitutes a lively depiction of this process.286 A clear example of this trend is represented 
by the judgment in Schalk and Kopf v Austria,287 concerning the inability for a same-sex couple to 
marry under Austrian law. In this case, the Court overturned its previous jurisprudence and 
concluded that the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple in a stable 
partnership, fell within the notion of ‘family life’ under Article 8, just as any relationship of the 
same kind between heterosexual partners. It is interesting to note that the inclusion of homosexual 
partnerships within the definition of family life was premised exactly on the “rapid evolution of 
social attitudes towards same-sex couples [that] has taken place in many Member States”.288  
If we stop here, the judgment in Schalk and Kopf v Austria reveals the Court’s willingness 
to reflect contemporary social behaviours and, thus, to expand the boundaries of family life to 
include same-sex couples.289 However, if we consider the final outcome of the case, this judgment 
expresses also the Court’s unwillingness to deviate from the text of the Convention, when there 
has not been a significant evolution in the laws of the Contracting States. Indeed, despite the shift 
in the Court’s interpretation of family life, the Court found itself bound by the language and the 
origins of the Convention with respect to the right to marry. More specifically, it refused to 
interpret Article 12 ECHR as to grant same-sex couples access to marriage because “although the 
institution of marriage has undergone major social changes since the adoption of the Convention, 
(…) there is no European consensus regarding same-sex marriage”.290 Given the absence of a 
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present-day consensus on the right of same-sex couples to marry (at the material time, same-sex 
marriage was allowed in only six Contracting States), the Court concluded that the applicants had 
not suffered a violation of Article 12. Therefore, as argued by Mowbray, the decision in Schalk 
and Kopf can be finally seen as an “illustration of the Court respecting the will of the states rather 
than the applicant’s contention (supported by non-governmental organisation) that the needs of 
today require states to permit civil marriage for same-sex couples”.291  
Despite the specific outcome, this judgment is also emblematic of the development of the 
notion of ‘family life’ and, more generally, of the scope of Article 8 as a result of natural tensions 
between two attitudes of adjudication, which tend to resonate with the two main interpretative 
tools employed by the Court. On the one hand, judicial activism – exercised through the living 
instrument doctrine – pushes the boundaries of the Convention towards progress.292 On the other 
hand, judicial self-restraint – expressed through the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, coupled 
with the Court’s reliance on comparative empirical evidence and the policy of incremental 
advancement – helps to make sure that judges do not go too far, too fast.293  
In light of this, it seems possible to imagine that also the Court’s adherence or departure 
from conventional fatherhood has been contingent upon the interplay between these two 
interpretative forces: the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and a dynamic interpretation of the 
Convention. Therefore, as a sub-question, it will be interesting to explore whether and, if so, to 
what extent the Court has made use of these two tools, respectively, and with what effects. Before 
embarking on a detailed analysis of the expansion of the right to respect for family life within the 
Court’s jurisprudence, the following two sections will focus on the operational characteristics, the 
advantages and the dangers inherent in these two doctrines.          
7.1. The Interpretation of the Convention as a Living Instrument: between Consensus and 
Effectiveness  
Going beyond the case of Schalk and Kopf, it is argued that overall the Court has tended to interpret 
and apply the Convention in light of present-day conditions and needs.294 It is no coincidence that 
one of the main doctrinal lines of argument employed by the Court to shape its jurisprudence 
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resonates with a dynamic or evolutive interpretation. Despite triggering fears of judicial 
creativity295 – together with concerns about democratic illegitimacy – the rationale underlying this 
tool of interpretation reflects the true intention of the founding fathers to create an instrument for 
the protection of rights, which are practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory.296  
The ‘living instrument’ approach was inaugurated by the judgment in Tyrer v the United 
Kingdom.297 In assessing whether the existence of corporal punishment was in conformity with the 
prohibition of degrading treatment or punishment, the Court held for the first time that “the 
Convention is a living instrument which (…) must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions”. 298 The implications of this statement were made particularly clear in the judgment of 
Marckx v Belgium, which was decided one year later. In this case, the Court decided that the 
unfavourable treatment of an unmarried mother and her child born out of wedlock under Belgian 
law violated their right to respect for family life and breached the requirement under Article 14 
that Convention rights should be secured without discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court recognised that “at the time when the Convention (…) was drafted, it was regarded as 
permissible and normal in many European countries to draw a distinction (…) between the 
‘legitimate’ and the ‘illegitimate’ family”.299  However, given that the Convention had to be 
interpreted in light of present-day conditions, the standards that were granted conclusive relevance 
were those accepted in European society at the material time.300 In particular, it was observed that 
the domestic law of the great majority of the Member States of the Council of Europe has evolved 
and was continuing to evolve, together with the relevant international instruments, towards full 
recognition of the rule mater semper certa est.301  
Thus, as explained by Mahoney, the focus must be on the drafters’ general intention, as 
opposed to their particular intention at the time of adoption of the Convention.302 The living 
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instrument doctrine is, therefore, an interpretative technique aimed at enabling the Court to update 
its jurisprudence in accordance with new/changed conditions not foreseeable by the original 
drafters.303 When used to creatively interpret the Convention, however, the living instrument 
doctrine cannot go as far as to reading new rights into the Convention, especially when they were 
left deliberately out of the Convention. 304  This explains why, for instance, an evolutive 
interpretation of Article 12 (the right to marry) that includes the right to divorce has not been 
possible, despite divorce being generally accepted and recognised as a right in the juridictions of 
the Member States.305 The only material that can be interpreted in an evolutive fashion and, 
possibly, brought into fields or in directions unforeseen by the drafters, is a right that is already 
explicitly or implicitly stated in the text of the Convention.306 However, rather than discovering 
rights that are not explicitly mentioned, what is more concerning and dangerous is that the Court 
does not always manage to legitimise a dynamic interpretation with the support of objective, 
predictable and transparent rules that guide its discretion.307  Hence, it is sometimes disputed 
whether the Court actually reflects present-day conditions or, conversely, attempts to interpret the 
Convention in order to shape and impose new conditions.308  
Before setting a new standard through an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, the 
Court has proved quite thoughtful by anchoring its interpretation to State practice primarily.309 
When States have expressed their intention to review the extension of a Convention right through 
the negotiation and ratification of additional protocols (for instance, with respect to the death 
penalty) or where a Convention provision was formulated as having a clearly restricted ambit and 
the relevant practice of the Contracting States has not subsequently expanded that right (like, in 
the case of Shalk and Kopf), the Court has felt mostly unprepared to interpret the Convention 
against the will of the states.310  
Therefore, the methodology employed by the Court seems to require any step forward in 
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the interpretation to be supported by empirical evidence and is not based on the judges’ perception 
of the common will.311 At least in principle, empirical evidence of a material change in law and 
society acts as a constraint on the Court’s power of review.312 As a result, despite its flexibility, 
the evolutive interpretation is “a limited means of adaptation”313 of the Convention. In fact, if there 
is no consensus on the side of Contracting States, the Court has tended to rely upon national 
legislation by adopting a lowest common denominator approach or to respect variations in State 
practice by resorting to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation of the State.314  
In a number of cases and contexts, including family life, the Court has produced empirical 
evidence of the common will by means of a comparative approach – for instance, through 
comparative surveys of the laws of the Contracting States.315 The weight placed on state practice 
reveals that, different from other international instruments, the interpretation of the Convention 
might be grounded legitimately on a shared European standard or a legal tradition common to the 
countries of the Council of Europe.316 However, the Court has never clarified what makes a 
standard common or shared and, in practice, the establishment of commonly accepted standards 
has followed more or less loose and linear measurements, thus sometimes raising doubt as to 
whether the Court is paying lip service to the idea of common ground.317  
Despite the erratic use of the rule of consensus, it has been argued that interpreting the 
Convention as a living instrument is a legitimate and even necessary exercise to preserve the 
credibility and the effectiveness of the ECHR system.318 Rather than being disregarded, the text 
and the drafters’ intention are attached substantive meaning to make the Convention provisions 
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practical and effective (as opposed to theoretical and illusory) in present times.319 Nonetheless, the 
Court’s power to read the Convention in accordance with present-day conditions is not unlimited. 
Indeed, the effective functioning of the ECHR system is very much contingent upon the confidence 
and trust that Contracting States have in the Strasbourg machinery and, more specifically, in the 
Court.320  
Given that the ultimate responsibility for implementing the Convention rests with States, 
no advantage stems from the imposition of progressive judgments, through the interpretation of 
the Convention as a living instrument, on unreceptive national authorities. Rather, effectiveness is 
conditioned upon the Court acting with caution, assuring a certain pattern of continuity and 
stability and achieving jurisprudential progress only through minimal, incremental additions 
within specific fields, rather than surprising parties with abrupt changes. 321  Therefore, as 
emphasised by the Court itself, it can advance (dynamic) interpretations only to the extent strictly 
necessary for the resolution of the case under scrutiny.322 This constraint clarifies why the Court 
frequently specifies that its reasoning is limited to the specific circumstances of the case at hand 
as well as the Court’s reluctance to express itself on controversial legal issues unless strictly 
required by the facts of the case, even if these questions might be relevant for the development of 
the Court’s jurisprudence.323 
7.2. The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation: Two Types and Related Dangers  
In light of the above, the Court has attempted to prevent judges from exceeding their interpretative 
tasks by developing a tool of self-restraint, namely the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.324 
As explained by Benvenisti, this doctrine is grounded in the notion that “each society is entitled to 
certain latitude in resolving the inherent conflicts between individual rights and national interests 
or among different moral convictions”.325 Its rationale is closely interwoven with the principle of 
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subsidiarity326 and the Court’s international nature. According to the division of enforcement 
responsibility whereby the Convention system is grounded, national authorities hold the primary 
duty to protect the guaranteed rights and freedoms within their domestic legal systems and, 
depending on the nature of the issue and on the state of consensus, this responsibility might imply 
a certain degree of discretion as to the appropriate means of implementation.327  
While a disparity between the practices of Contracting States will often, but not always, 
trigger room for legitimate difference of opinion, the existence of a European consensus will 
generally imply a limited area of discretion for States that do comply.328 It follows that a violation 
cannot be found, unless national authorities have exceeded or misused their discretion, even if 
judges feel that there is a better way of implementing the Convention or realising the goals of the 
Convention.329 Therefore, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation helps to draw the boundaries 
between and, at the same time, to reconcile the sovereignty and autonomy of the national 
authorities and the interpretative role of the Court. 330  As such, the doctrine fits into the 
interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument; more specifically, it embodies the elements 
of representative government and majority rule that counterweight the need for expanding the 
Convention’s core protections in line with contemporary conditions.331   
The doctrine has thus far attracted more condemnation than approval. The most basic strand 
of criticism argues that the doctrine lacks textual legitimacy since it is not enshrined in the text of 
the Convention but it is an invention of the Strasbourg organs. 332  More importantly, most 
commentators condemn the doctrine of the margin of appreciation for its inconsistent modus 
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operandi.333 In particular, it has been pointed out that the Court’s reasoning has sometimes failed 
to use the doctrine in a way that supports legal certainty and obeys clear principles, thus diluting 
the normative guidance of substantive rights provisions. 334  Apart from triggering normative 
ambiguity, a standardless application of the doctrine entails the risk of producing a “pernicious 
‘variable geometry’ of human rights”,335 undermining the acquis of existing jurisprudence and 
producing different levels of protection in the Contracting States.336 The doctrine has even been 
compared to “spreading disease”,337 since its scope of application has been expanded to undermine 
one of the crucial roles of the Strasbourg machinery, namely “to ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties”.338 
Efforts devoted to systematise the use of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation have 
resulted in the identification of two sub-types, which also replicate two dimensions of the principle 
of subsidiarity.339 The first variant, which is called structural, resonates with what Ambrus refers 
to as the ‘original’ concept of the margin of appreciation.340 As such, it reflects the structural 
dimension of the principle of subsidiarity, which provides for a vertical division of labour between 
a supranational court and national legal systems.341 The structural concept of the doctrine can, 
therefore, be easily spotted in those cases where the Court finds no consensus among Contracting 
States on what human rights individuals have and, consequently, declares national authorities 
‘better placed’ to assess local values.342 As a result, in these cases, the Court will generally neither 
find a violation nor scrutinise national decisions for reasons pertaining to the nature of the ECtHR. 
Rather, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation will be invoked to address the limits or intensity 
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of its own review due to its status as international court.343  
As pointed out by Macdonald, the danger is that the margin of appreciation is used as a 
device for the Court to evade its duty to articulate the reasons for deference.344 It is clear that, if 
the Court provides as the only reason for not intervening is because the matter falls within the 
margin of appreciation of the State, it is simply expressing its conclusion to not review the case, 
thus leaving the real reasoning obscure.345 Such use of the doctrine would therefore obfuscate the 
fundamental distinction between reviewability and justifiability.346 The Court would, indeed, fail 
to grasp the subtlety of a “context-dependent spectrum of appropriate intensity, ranging from total 
deference (amounting to unreviewability at one extreme) through less deferential standards to the 
most stringent standard of justification at the other”.347  
Differently, the second type of the doctrine of the margin – called substantive – is employed 
to settle a tension between individual freedoms and collective goals.348 It is no coincidence that 
this concept of the doctrine is very well displayed by the accommodation clauses in Articles 8, 9, 
10 and 11 and, more specifically, emerges when balancing the rights set down in paragraph 1 
against possible interferences that might be justified under paragraph 2.349 To sum up, these are 
cases where there was interference but, eventually, no violation was found because the Court 
believed that the human rights of the applicant had not been violated. To reach this determination, 
the Court usually employs a four-stage test: firstly, it investigates whether there is an interference; 
if so, whether the interference was prescribed by law;350 whether the purpose falls within the list 
of legitimate aims mentioned in the accommodation clause; and, finally, whether the interference 
was proportionate or necessary in a democratic society.351  
Hence, there exist a strong correlation between the substantive variant of the doctrine of 
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the margin of appreciation and the principle of proportionality.352 Existing literature points to three 
main forms of proportionality test employed by the Court.353 The strictest type addresses the 
question: is the contested measure the least restrictive/onerous that could be taken, given the 
circumstances of the case? 354  The second form resonates with what Arai-Takahashi calls 
‘sufficiency test’.355 Here, the Court assesses whether relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the 
interference under scrutiny can be found. Finally, the most lenient type is commonly referred to as 
‘fair balance test’.356 When applied, the Court asks whether there is a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the interference and the legitimate aim pursued or whether a fair balance 
between the private and the public interests at stake has been struck.357 While there is no consensus 
on what doctrine influences the other, scholars agree upon the fact that there is a generally inverse 
relationship between these two doctrines. Therefore, the wider is the margin accorded to States, 
the stricter is the proportionality test applied by the Court.358  
The use of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in its substantive variant expresses 
the Court’s willingness to develop a sense of partnership with national authorities, which consists 
in a “shared decision-making process and the joint responsibility for the final outcome”.359 As 
such, a substantive version of the doctrine highlights the importance of deference to national 
authorities resorting to arguments of legitimacy.360 At the same time, however, the danger of 
placing the threshold of local deference too low has given rise to concerns and further criticism on 
the modus operandi of the doctrine. Firstly, the Court has been criticised for escaping the 
responsibility for its decisions. In other words, an excessive resort to the judicial self-restraint 
rationale might produce a pattern of non-accountability.361 Secondly, the Court has been deemed 
to abdicate its institutional and, to a certain extent, constitutional task of setting universal human 
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rights standards, against the “tyranny of the majority”,362 or its duty to independently review of 
governmental conduct.363 Similar criticism has gone as far as to state that the Court seems to 
“retreat evasively into the thinly disguised veneer of cultural relativism”.364   
 To conclude, judicial self-restraint and judicial activism are indispensable ingredients for 
a balanced and effective jurisprudence that promotes human rights in contemporary societies, 
while respecting a legitimate range of opinions. While the existence of consensus might prepare 
the ground for a dynamic interpretation of the Convention, a lack of consensus among Member 
States will usually be accompanied by a certain margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State. 365 
Hence, although prima facie conflicting, the evolutive interpretation and the doctrine of the margin 
of appreciation represent two sides of the same coin.366 
 
8. Introducing the Core Provisions of the European Convention of Human 
Rights 
8.1. The Interpretation of the Right to Respect for Family Life within the ECtHR Jurisprudence: 
Multiple Dimensions of Expansion  
 
Article 8 is by far the most litigated provision from a family law perspective. The first paragraph 
provides that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence”. Concerning its personal scope, by stating “everyone”, Article 8 incorporates the 
rights of both parents and children to respect for private and family life. Therefore, it is no 
coincidence that family disputes involving children often consists in tensions between the 
conflicting Article 8’s rights of all parties concerned. Hence, whether the Court takes into 
consideration all parties affected when developing its jurisprudence under Article 8 proves to be a 
relevant sub-question to be addressed in the upcoming case-law analysis.  
Regarding its material scope, for those who are familiar with the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
under Article 8, it is absolutely clear how far beyond the basic text of the provision the Commission 
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and, subsequently, the Court have gone. Since the 1950, the four notions – private life, family life, 
home, and correspondence – have become the “nursery in which (a multiplicity of sub-rights and 
interests which were not conceivable at the time of drafting) are born”.367 The ECHR was tactically 
conceived as and structurally remains an example of a one-dimensional approach to rights and 
duties.368 With few exceptions, most of the safeguards enshrined in the text of the Convention 
regard civil and political rights and, therefore, rights to freedom from interference. 369  This 
primarily one-dimensional structure can be linked and explained through reference to a particular 
general purpose of the Convention, as identified by Bates. On the basis of a study on the historical 
development of the Convention, Bates has pointed to the creation of a “collective pact against 
totalitarianism” as the principal aim pursed by the drafters in 1950.370 Given that it was conceived 
in the aftermath of the Second World War, its mission was allegedly to protect human rights and 
the rule of law and to promote democracy across Europe.    
However, if considered in ‘action’, it appears that this function of the Convention has 
emerged only in a tiny minority of inter-State cases, thus remaining amply dormant.371 At the same 
time, the Strasbourg organs seem to have embarked on another mission, which resembles the 
creation of a type of European Bill of Rights.372 This explains why the individual’s right of 
recourse has been given greater importance vis-à-vis that of States and the Court’s relationship 
with Contracting Parties is centred upon roles which are to a large extent constitutional.373 The 
tension between these two potential aims of the Convention and their respective repercussions on 
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the scope of the Convention rights are very well summarised by the conversations between the 
majority and the dissenting judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in the case of Marckx v Belgium. Against 
the majority, which concluded that a violation of Article 8 had occurred, Fitzmaurice argued for a 
particularly narrow and ‘negative’ conception of Article 8. He stated that:  
  
It is abundantly clear (…) that the main, if not indeed the sole object and intended sphere of 
application of Article 8 (…) was that of what I call the ‘domiciliary protection’ of the individual. 
He and his family were no longer to be subjected to (…) domestic intrusions, searches and 
questionings; to restrictions on the use of radio and television; (…) to measures of coercion such 
as cutting of the electricity or water supply; to such abominations as children being required to 
report upon the activities of their parents (…) – in short the whole gamut of fascist and communist 
inquisitorial practices. (…) It was for the avoidance of these horrors, tyrannies and vexations that 
private and family life (…) were to be respected.374 
 
Clearly, Fitzmaurice adhered to the view that the Convention pursued an anti-totalitarian aim and, 
therefore, States were under the obligation to merely abstain from interfering with the human rights 
of individuals. However, the majority proved successful in pushing the overall aim of the 
Convention beyond its original historical context and prepared the ground for an incremental 
expansion of the scope of Article 8. Apart from being the battlefield on which conceptions as to 
the mission of the ECHR machinery have clashed, the judgment in Marckx v Belgium has, to a 
certain extent, determined the expansion and, therefore, the present status of Article 8, and of the 
whole Convention more generally.375  
It seems important to point out that the Court does not openly discuss concepts, such as 
fatherhood and motherhood; rather, it tends to convey its definitions by approaching the question 
from the perspective of whether family life can be established under Article 8.376 With regard to 
family life, the assessment of cases brought under Article 8 is made of one to three steps.377 The 
first resonates with the establishment of family life within the meaning of the Convention. The 
classification of the relationship at stake as ‘family life’ is the prerequisite for the following 
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stage(s) of analysis. Only if the Court holds that there exists family life, will it continue its 
investigation to determine whether Article 8 has been violated, by reference to either the concept 
of failure to respect or the existence of an interference with the right considered. Should 
interference be found, the Court will embark on a third and final stage, which consists in examining 
the justification of the interference against the criteria set in Article 8(2): “in accordance with the 
law”, “legitimate aim” and “necessary in a democratic society”. 
For the purposes of the current research, all three stages of analysis undertaken by the Court 
(when available) are of interest, since they all contribute to bringing to the fore the definition of 
fatherhood endorsed by the Court. For the sake of simplicity, however, the second and third steps 
will be considered as part of the same stage of the analysis, as they both address the wider question 
whether the failed conferral of the status of legal father, or specific rights, amounts to a violation 
of Article 8. Having regard to the first step, this thesis will therefore explore the threshold at which 
family life is held, or cannot be held, to exist between a father and his child; in other words, what 
factors – conventional or not – entail the existence of a family tie worthy of protection under 
Article 8 between a father and his child or, in the case when the application fails, the missing 
factors to reach the minimum threshold for an Article 8 violation. In relation to the second and 
third analytical steps, now unified under one single stage, the case-law analysis will investigate 
the conditions under which the establishment of family life between a father and his child brings 
along a set of rights in favour of the paternal figure; or, on the contrary, it will identify the missing 
conditions that have justified the refusal to grant the applicant rights which fall under fatherhood. 
As a result of these considerations, for present purposes, family life and fatherhood are not 
interchangeable terms. Rather, family life is a precondition to fatherhood. The status of legal 
fatherhood and the conferral of specific parental rights are trotted out by the establishment of 
family life. However, this does not mean that the Court’s conception of fatherhood can only be 
analysed when family life is found. On the contrary, if family life does not exist, the very elements 
that prevented the establishment of family life are also necessary prerequisites for the allocation 
of the full legal status of fatherhood and parental rights to fathers.  
Prior to embarking on a father-specific investigation, this section will outline some of the 
milestones in the Court’s endeavour to clarify the content of the notion of ‘family life’ and, more 
generally, of the right to respect for family life. Concerning the former, the Court boasts more than 




Generally, it has maintained a flexible approach to the interpretation of this notion and, to a certain 
extent, it has attempted to adjust its approach to determining filiation ties and allocating parental 
rights to new realities of broken, reconstituted and otherwise unconventional families. 378 
Arguably, this flexibility has been enabled by what Choudhry and Herring calls a “test of 
intentionality”, namely a concern with the intentions behind the family arrangement.379  
In their analysis of the ECtHR jurisprudence, these two authors have pointed out that the 
form remains the primary criterion to determine the existence of family life. In other words, the 
best evidence of the parties’ intention to create family life can be found in conventional formalised 
types of relationships, in primis marriage and possibly civil partnership.380 Indeed, the Court’s 
emphasis on intentionality has benefited public and legal undertakings, other than marriage. In the 
case of Burden v the UK, the Court clarified that the legal consequences of registered partnerships, 
which couples deliberately decide to incur, make those relationships different from other 
cohabitations.381 Therefore, no analogy can be drawn between married couples and civil partners, 
on the one hand, and heterosexual and homosexual couples who decide to live together but decide 
not to become husband and wife or civil partners, on the other hand.382 Hence, it does not seem to 
be the length and/or the emotional concreteness of these relationships that call for the protection 
of family life, but rather the existence of a legally binding agreement.383 Only in the absence of 
these formal requirements, the Court will embark on a “functional-based” 384  analysis of 
intentionality. 
Without a doubt, the overall outcome to date resonates more with a de facto – as opposed 
to a de jure understanding of the family. This emphasis on facts is attributable to, inter alia, the 
fact that the notion of ‘family life’ represents an autonomous concept within the Convention. This 
doctrine, which was developed in 1976,385 implies that the terms used by the Convention do not 
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necessarily have to be interpreted in accordance with the definitions endorsed by the national legal 
systems.386 It follows that concepts based on a European tradition and common to the Contracting 
States are not granted decisive importance for interpretation purposes.387 As a result, families 
whose structure follows cultural patterns that are not typically European, such as polygamous 
families, cannot be a priori denied protection. This interpretative tool has also provided the 
Strasbourg organs with a certain degree of flexibility in order to allow them to take into account 
social, legal and technological developments across the Council of Europe.388  
Bearing in mind the risk of oversimplification, three main stages of development can be 
identified throughout the Court’s process of reconfiguring the notion of ‘family life’: the refusal 
of marriage as a prerequisite for family life between a child and his/her parents; an increased 
attention to real and concrete emotional ties between the parties; and the inclusion of ‘potential’ 
ties within the scope of family life. Rather than being perceived as separate and perfectly 
distinguishable, these three sub-phases should be considered closely interrelated and the organic 
continuation of one another.  
The Court began to show awareness of the increasing diversity of existing family 
arrangements and the growing emergence of non-traditional families as early as in 1979, in its 
landmark judgment in Marckx v Belgium. In determining the applicability of Article 8, the Court 
accepted a single woman and her child as one form of family no less than others and, consequently, 
it held that the notion of ‘family life’ included the ‘illegitimate’ family in the same way as the 
‘legitimate’ family.389 The Court also specified that ‘respect’ for family life required “the existence 
in domestic law of legal safeguards that render possible as from the moment of birth the child’s 
integration in his family”.390  
The judgment in Berrehab v the Netherlands391 consolidated and expanded the Court’s 
findings in Marckx to cover divorce as well. In this case, the applicants were a citizen of Morocco, 
divorced from his Dutch wife, and his daughter, who lived with her mother. After the divorce, the 
Government of the Netherlands refused to renew the father’s work permit and eventually expelled 
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him from the country. The Court concluded that Article 8 had been violated because the refusal to 
renew the work permit and the expulsion of the father prevented the applicants from maintaining 
regular contact. In line with the obligations of ‘respect’ envisaged in Marckx, the Court held that 
a child born within a family union is ipso jure part of that relationship; hence, from the moment of 
the child’s birth and by the very fact of it, there exists a bond between him/her and his/her parents 
that amounts to family life.392 Although not explicitly stated, it seems that the recognition of family 
life as a direct consequence of birth opened the door to a wider rule, which permeates most of the 
jurisprudence concerning family life: the disconnection between the mother-father relationship and 
the relationship existing between the child and his/her parents.393 As a rule, these two relationships 
are deemed to evolve along two parallel tracks and, more importantly, family life between a child 
and his/her parents is not, at least in principle, contingent upon the nature of the relationship 
between the two parents.  
This has two major implications. Firstly, as already emerging following the Marckx 
decision, the fact that the relationship between the parents is not marriage-based should not 
compromise or affect the formation of family life between the child and his/her parents. It follows 
that, although there might be a privileged form of family with respect to family life under Article 
8(1), any differential treatment towards children on the ground of family form will not meet the 
test under Article 8(2).394 Apart from benefiting Ms Marckx, the application of such rule has 
further meant that family life can also be established between non-married parents and their 
children. Secondly, as shown by Berrehab, the end of the relationship between the parents does 
not entail the termination of family life between the child and his/her parents. In other words, once 
it exists, family life between a parent and his/her child cannot be severed, save in exceptional 
circumstances.395 This confirms that parent-child relationships and mother-father relationships do 
not, at least in principle, move along together.  
Article 8 of the ECHR does not expressly include a right of contact between family 
members. However, the Strasbourg jurisprudence has repeatedly asserted that, once the existence 
of family life is established between parent and child, their right to respect for family life under 
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Article 8(1) of the ECHR is intended to embrace their right to contact with each other.396 As 
clarified in the judgment of McMichael v the UK: 
 
[T]he mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental 
element of family life, even if the relationship between the parents has broken down, and domestic 
measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right protected by Article 8 
of the Convention.397   
 
According to the principle of ‘mutual enjoyment’, the child has a right of contact with the 
father and the mother and each of them enjoys a right of contact with the child. As interpreted by 
Bainham, these rights generate corresponding duties in two ways.398 Firstly, a right conferred to 
one person imposes an obligation on the other.399 This implies that, inter alia, a residential parent 
(most likely, a mother) has the duty to allow contact between a child and his non-residential parent 
(most likely, a father), as long as this right is reasonably exercised.400 Secondly, by virtue of his/her 
rights, the rights-holder is required to undertake certain duties.401 For instance, the father, who has 
a right of contact with his child, is under the obligation to enjoy his right by assuming responsible 
behaviour.402  This explains why, in cases of violence, abusive fathers might be legitimately 
deprived of contact with their children: not because they do not have a right to contact, but because 
they have failed to preserve it by acting adversely.403  
The detachment from marriage and its ‘natural’ consequences as determining factors for 
the establishment of family life between a parent and his/her child has been accompanied by a 
heightened importance attached to the emotional ties between the parties. As noted by Choudhry 
and Herring, the establishment of family life under Article 8 has become increasingly dependent 
on the “the real existence of close personal ties” and, although form often remains the first indicator 
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of an intention to create family life, the Court will then undertake a functional-based analysis of 
intentionality.404 Using the Court’s own explanation, “family life in the sense of Article 8 implies 
close personal ties in addition to parenthood”.405 In other words, the existence or non-existence of 
family life is a question of fact, which depends on the real existence of concrete personal bonds 
between the individuals concerned. 
Already in Marckx, the Court observed that “Paula Marckx assumed responsibility for her 
daughter Alexandra from the moment of her birth and has continuously cared for her, with the 
result that a real family life existed and still exists between them”.406 Although it originated within 
a case brought by a mother, this test has garnered greater relevance to the positions of fathers, since 
fatherhood has been traditionally less capable of being determined with legal certainty. As early 
as in the case of Berrehab, it was held that divorce “does not alter the fact that, until his expulsion 
from the Netherlands, Mr Berrehab saw his daughter four times a week for several hours at a time; 
the frequency and regularity of his meetings with her prove that he valued them very greatly” .407  
As illustrated by this quote, the Court has begun to emphasise that the actual circumstances 
of the case are decisive in order to determine whether family life between a parent and a child 
exists. Certain facts have been accorded particular weight in light of their alleged indicativeness 
of close personal ties, such as the frequency and nature of contact between a parent and his/her 
child and the acknowledgment of paternity at birth. A further product of a greater emphasis on 
facts and existing concrete ties is the long-awaited inclusion of same-sex relationships within the 
concept of family life. In the case of Schalk and Kopf v Austria, the Court acknowledged a rapid 
evolution of social attitudes towards homosexual couples and, consequently, considered it artificial 
to maintain its previous view, according to which same-sex couples cannot enjoy family life under 
Article 8.408  
Finally, the concept of family law under the Court’s jurisprudence has witnessed a further 
expansion to the advantage of ‘potential’ or ‘intended’ relationships, which can develop between 
a natural parent and his/her child born out of wedlock. This particularly malleable definition of 
family life has been adopted in exceptional cases, where the failed establishment of family life was 
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not attributable to the applicant.409 For the purposes of intended family life, weight has been 
attached to the nature of the relationship between the natural parents as well as to a demonstrable 
interest in and commitment by the parent to the child both before and after the birth.410 This third 
phase of development clearly represents the ultimate peak of the functional-based test of 
intentionality, envisioned by Choudhry and Herring. 
Whilst attempting to schematize and reach the crux of the Court’s jurisprudence on family 
life, this account has necessarily failed to capture the nuances of family realities – in other words, 
how scenarios conceptualised here as distinct can actually overlap in practice. Apart from the ‘old’ 
families and the ‘new’ families, a third group of families exists, which, exactly because of their 
intermediate and transitional/temporary quality, give rise to regulatory complexities of a 
particularly intricate nature.411 This third group is made of those relationships between biologically 
unrelated or partially-related children, who are raised under multiple roofs at different times, and 
their successive parental figures are not necessarily united by marriage. It is hoped that the concrete 
examples of some of the main challenges triggered by the transformation(s) and the fragmentation 
of the family have been properly explained in the section on ‘The Conventional Paradigm of the 
Family under Challenge’. What is important to recall is that evolving family practices and realities 
have thrown into confusion the typical category-based approach of the law and, more specifically, 
the ideal of the ‘conventional family’ that has consistently guided the interpretation and application 
of family law.  
In addition to opening the doors of family life to new loving and caring arrangements, the 
interpretation of the right to respect for family life has resulted in the creation of a set of sub-rights 
and, consequently, in the imposition of new, positive obligations upon States. As previously 
mentioned, the vast majority of Convention provisions enshrine civil and political rights. Under 
the traditional perspective, this group of rights merely entail negative obligations, namely the 
prohibition of State interference with the right concerned. However, since the famous judgment in 
Marckx v Belgium, the Court has increasingly required Contracting States to actively protect or 
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fulfil Convention rights. 412 Having regard to Article 8, the Court specified that:  
 
The object of (Article 8) is “essentially” that of protecting the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities. Nevertheless it does not merely compel the State to abstain 
from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive 
obligations inherent in an effective “respect” for family life.413  
Since then, the existence of positive obligations has been repeatedly invoked by the Court to extend 
the scope of application of existing rights, as far as to enter the socio-economic sphere.  
Despite its widespread resort to positive obligations, the Court never felt the need to 
articulate a general theory.414 Rather, it has preferred to adopt a case-by-case approach, thus 
leaving the ratio and the principles that guide a correct application of positive obligations 
obscure.415 What is clear, however, is that resorting to the concept of positive obligations has 
supported the Court in accomplishing its mission to interpret the Convention as a ‘living 
instrument’. 416 The interpretation of ‘respect’ in active terms – rather than as a passive concept – 
has enabled the Court to expand the scope of the right to respect for family life, in light of evolving 
social and moral assumptions.   
Within the context of family life, the positive obligations approach has proved particularly 
fundamental to serve two purposes: to promote the legal recognition of family ties and to protect 
the integrity of family ties.417 Once again, the Court’s judgment in the case of Marckx v Belgium 
is exemplary of the first positive outcome deriving from the development of positive obligations 
in relation to family life.418 Having established that the relationship between a single mother and 
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her biological daughter amounted to ‘family life’, the Court further argued that States are required 
to “act in a manner calculated to allow those concerned to lead a normal family life”.419 In the 
Court’s view, this entails, inter alia, the provision of legal safeguards that enable the child’s 
integration in his/her family from the moment of birth.420 Therefore, a requirement placed upon 
unmarried mothers to initiate legal proceedings in order to obtain official recognition of their 
affiliation with their children was found in violation of Article 8.    
Concerning the second positive aspect of the right to respect for family life – the protection 
of the integrity of family ties – the obligation to take action to aid the maintenance of existing 
family ties has been asserted by the Court in three distinct scenarios: placement of children in 
public care,421 private custody and contact arrangements, and family reunification.422 Of particular 
relevance to the current project, the Court has long since interpreted Article 8 as imposing the 
positive duty to aid the reunification of natural parents with their children in post-parental/divorce 
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situations. For instance, in the case of Hokkanen v Finland, 423 the children of the applicant had 
been placed in custody of his parents, following the death of their mother. The grandparents 
ultimately refused to return the children to the applicant and opposed any contact initiated by him. 
The situation was left unresolved for a long time and, eventually, the national courts transferred 
legal custody of the children to their grandparents. The Court established that Article 8 implied an 
obligation on the State to take action to bring about the reunion of parent and child. Although it 
was clarified that the rights and interests of all concerned – in particular, the best interests of the 
child – are to be taken into account, national authorities must make every effort to facilitate 
cooperation of all parties involved.424 
Once it is established that the there has been an interference with Article 8(1), the Court 
moves on to examine whether such interference is justified (second stage of analysis). Indeed, 
Article 8 is a qualified right and, as such, has concomitant limitations expressed within the right 
itself. More specifically, Article 8(2) lays down the conditions upon which a State can interfere 
with the protected right. Limitations are allowed if they are “in accordance with the law” and 
“necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, well being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others”.  
In the context of family law – as in relation to other Convention rights – it has been 
observed that, the intensity of the assessment of proportionality depends, to a great extent, on the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation.425  The width of the margin, in turn, tends to be influenced 
by the factual circumstances of the case.426 Among the latter, it is worth mentioning the textual 
provisions of the Convention rights, the existence of any common ground between the Contracting 
States, the legitimate aim of the interference, the seriousness of the interference, the existence of 
ethical and moral isssues as well as the likelihood of financial implications.427 As a rule, the wider 
is the margin enjoyed by the State, the less restrictive is the test of proportionality employed and 
viceversa.  
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In relation to the decision to place a child in public care or to commence adoption 
proceedings, the Court has generally granted a wide margin of appreciation to States on the ground 
that national authorities are better placed (thanks to their direct contact) than an international court 
to assess the needs of the parties affected.428 In this specific range of cases, however, it is not 
always possible to draw a causal link between the width of the margin and the intensity of the 
proportionality assessment.429 Indeed, although the decision to remove the child is likely to fall 
with the wide margin of the State, the decision-making process is generally subject to some 
scrutiny.430 The same dynamic can be observed in relation to private arrangments, at least to a 
certain extent.431 When decisions regarding contact are stake – differently from when decisions 
concerning the award of custody rights are at stake – the Court commonly applies a stricter 
proportionality test. 432  Overall, it can be argued that when the measure under scrutiny is 
particularly restrictive or has potentially irreversible effects on the preservation of the family ties, 
the Court will apply the ‘sufficiency test’.433 Furthermore, it is argued, when undertaken, this test 
will only be met if the Court deems the measure to be in the child’s best interests.434 
However, as pointed out by Choudhry and Herring, the most widely applied test of 
proportionality in family law cases is the ‘fair balance test’ and, therefore, the least strict.435  In 
this regard, the Evans case436 – which will examined in more detail in Chapter 2 – constitutes a 
clear example of the relationship between the doctrine of proportionality and the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation. The legal issue at stake was whether the applicant should be allowed to 
use her fertilised embryos despite her former’s partner (sperm donor)’s withdrawal of consent. The 
Grand Chamber held that, given the lack of a European common ground on the issue at stake and 
the fact that the national rules struck a fair balance between the various interests at stake, there had 
been no violation of Article 8.437 In reaching its conclusion, therefore, the Court chose to grant a 
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wide margin of appreciation to the State and, consequently, to undertake the most lenient standard 
of review.438     
It is critical to stress that the above considerations apply not only to negative duties, but 
also to positive obligations concerning the protection of family life between a parent and a child. 
As expressed in Hokkanen, positive obligations are not absolute. Just like negative obligations, 
positive obligations are subject to the application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and 
its relationship with the doctrine of proportionality.439 This has two main, interrelated implications. 
Firstly, the State might enjoy a certain margin of appreciation also in the realm of positive 
obligations; and, the wider is the margin, the narrower is the extent of the positive obligation 
imposed on the State. Secondly, regard must be given to the proportionality principle, also in the 
context of positive obligations. In this regard, Lavrysen points out that, while the Court’s approach 
to negative obligations has diligently followed a two-step analysis (establishment of whether there 
is an interference and, if so, whether the interference is justified), these two steps are often merged 
in cases involving positive obligations.440 In the latter, the Court tends to do no more that assess 
whether, all in all, a State’s inaction has not upset a fair balance.441  
It is argued that the balancing approach, which is typical of the ECHR machinery, has the 
potential to allow for an “express recognition and separation out of specific individual rights”,442 
thus revealing the different values at stake. It follows that, the (failed) undertaking of a balancing 
exercise can be held indicative of the extent to which the Court has given consideration to all 
parties affected. However, this might not be enough, especially with respect to the best interests 
of the child. One of the dangers of the vague formulation of this principle is that it can leave room 
for other principles and policies to craftily exercise influence on its interpretation; similarly, when 
upholding this standard, judges might simply assess a child’s best interests in accordance with 
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their own value system and not in light of the evidence.443 In other words, there is an inevitable 
“element of values and hence subjectivity”.444  
For instance, it is argued that, in post-divorce scenarios, courts have sometimes assumed a 
total overlap of the interests of the child with those of the mother, thus automatically reserving an 
inferior status to fatherhood.445 Using Théry’s word, the principle of the best interests of the child 
might therefore serve as an “alibi for conventional ideology”.446  Bearing this in mind, when 
assessing whether the Court has taken the child’s best interests into consideration, a further sub-
question must be addressed: are the interests of the child assessed independently from those of the 
parents and in a fact-sensitive fashion, namely on the basis of the specific circumstances of the 
case? If not, the endorsed interpretation of the principle will potentially disclose underlying 
normative ideas about the ‘proper’ family arrangement and the ‘proper’ father, thus revealing the 
Court’s attachment or departure from the conventional model of fatherhood.  
To conclude, it is relevant to mention that, although family life can extend to potential 
relationships that might develop between children born out of wedlock and their biological fathers, 
the protection of the right to respect for family life is premised on the existence of a ‘family’ and, 
therefore, it does not include the right to found a family. This explains why the Court considers 
pre-birth claims as falling within the notion of ‘private life’. The right to respect for private life 
protects, inter alia, the legal position of aspiring parents in relation to the beginning of human life 
and, as such, the possibility to become parents through the employment of ART.447   
8.2 Article 14 and the Variables that Influence the Strictness of Review 
Article 14 represents the primary ground for protection against discrimination under the 
Convention. Protocol 12 was aimed, inter alia, to introduce an independent guarantee of non-
discrimination; however, due to the slow ratification process, Article 14 continues to have no 
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“independent existence” 448  and, according to its formulation, its ‘reach’ remains limited to 
discrimination only with respect to other Convention rights.449 In this sense, therefore, it has been 
argued that Article 14 contains (at least, on its face) a limited conception of legal or formal equality 
– as opposed to substantive equality – that ensures equal treatment only before the law of the 
Convention, thus not immediately concerned with all cases involving instances of social 
disadvantage that are grounded on a personal characteristic.450  
The analytical approach adopted by the Court to assess whether there has been 
discrimination contrary to Article 14 is made up of two steps.451 The first step, which is called the 
‘comparability test’, consists in examining whether there has been differential treatment between 
persons or groups who are placed in a comparable situation. If this requirement is met, the Court 
will proceed to the ‘objective and reasonable justification test’, according to which a violation does 
not occur if the contested measure pursues a legitimate aim452 and there is a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved. Unlike the 
legitimate aim test – which is described as “uncritical and rhetorical”453 and, as such, seems able 
to be met in every circumstance454 – it has been consistently pointed out in the literature that the 
Court’s approach to proportionality lacks consistency and clarity. Therefore, commentators tend 
to focus more on the strictness of review or the intensity of assessment, as opposed to the test of 
proportionality as such, as the element that determines the outcome of the case”.455  
In their analysis, some authors have attempted to understand the strictness of review – be 
it strict, lenient and intermediary intensity – through the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.456 
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Gerards has explicitly defined this doctrine as a “tool for differentiation of the intensity of the 
assessment”.457 In a nutshell, it has been observed that the width of the margin of appreciation 
enjoyed by States tends to be inversely proportional to the intensity of review conducted by the 
Court. More specifically, when States are granted a wide margin of appreciation, the Court is left 
with a limited margin of manoeuvre to carry out the objective and reasonable justification test. In 
such case, therefore, the Court generally undertakes a very general test of reasonableness and, 
often, sufficient reasons might be enough to justify a difference in treatment.458 On the contrary, 
when States are accorded a narrow margin of appreciation, the Court will normally undertake a 
full assessment, also referred to as ‘strict proportionality test’. With some exceptions, while a 
finding of violation is symptomatic of a stricter review, a finding of non-violation tends to reveal 
a more lenient review.459  
Furthermore, there are cases where the intensity of review is somehow intermediary. In 
such cases, where Court is left “wrestling with the appropriateness of judicial intervention”,460 a 
careful qualitative assessment of the reasoning, in combination with the outcome of the case, helps 
to establish the intensity of review. Finally, it has been argued that the Court’s silence on the 
margin of appreciation is generally indicative of the Court’s confidence in determining the issue 
at stake. In other words, the Court tends to remain silent when the case at hand is straightforward 
and the existence of a violation or a non-violation is clear. 461  Thus, even silence can help 
understand whether the Court undertook a lenient or strict assessment.462   
As regards factors influencing the width of the margin of appreciation and, consequently, 
the strictness of review in cases under Article 14, the Court has expressly mentioned the existence 
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of a common ground between the laws of the Contracting States.463 While the absence of a shared 
approach (or the existence of little common ground) on the issue under scrutiny leads to a lenient 
assessment, if there is a European consensus, the strictness of scrutiny varies depending on the 
nature of the common ground.464 If the difference in treatment is approved of by the majority of 
European States, the assessment will be lenient; if the disputed distinction is generally disapproved 
of, the Court will undertake a stricter review.465 Moreover, in many cases, the State is granted a 
wide margin of appreciation because the Court considers national authorities to be better placed – 
than itself – to take a decision vis-à-vis a particular situation. The invocation of the ‘better placed’ 
argument is generally conducive to lenient assessment.    
Another variable that might affect the level of scrutiny is the badge of differentiation. Some 
commentators have spotted a trend towards a narrower margin of appreciation and, consequently, 
a stricter scrutiny in cases involving differential treatment on the basis of certain suspect grounds 
or classifications. 466  Using the Court’s language, when a suspect ground is involved, the 
assessment of proportionality tends to manifest itself in its stringent version and, therefore, “very 
weighty reasons” are needed to justify the contested distinction.467 In such cases, as the reasons 
put forward to justify the treatment complained of are strictly scrutinised, the Court is more likely 
to find a violation of Article 14.468  
In the case-law considered here, complaints of discrimination under Article 14 are brought 
in relation to the following personal characteristics: sex, sexual orientation and illegitimacy. The 
Court has explicitly characterised these grounds as suspect,469 and despite some variations, they 
tend to command strict scrutiny.470 Concerning sex, the judgment in Abdulaziz, Cabales and 
Balkandali v UK471 represented the first instance where the Court used the formula “very weighty 
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reasons” as a prerequisite for finding a distinction compatible with Article 14. Since then, it is 
argued, every case involving a differentiation on the basis of sex has attracted a heightened 
strictness of scrutiny, although not uniformly.472 Of particular interest to the current thesis, it has 
been noted that the Court has encountered some difficulties in conducting a strict review in cases 
involving the difference in treatment of men in the private sphere.473  
The judgment in Petrovic v Austria474 is representative of this trend.475 In this case, the 
applicant complained that the refusal to grant him parental leave allowances, while available to 
mothers, violated Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. 476  Despite recognising the 
importance of sex equality and noting that very weighty reasons were needed for a distinction on 
grounds of sex, the Court placed greater, or even exclusive, emphasis on the factors triggering a 
wide margin of appreciation.477 Elements taken into consideration include: the date of the events 
(around 1989), the gradual process towards a more equal sharing of family responsibilities and, 
more importantly, the existence of a significant disparity between the legal regulations of European 
States in the field of parental leave allowances. In light of this, the Court did not apply the “very 
weighty reasons” test; rather, it conducted a lenient assessment, which led to the difference in 
treatment being justified.478 As a result, the factor ‘suspect ground’ was overruled by the doctrine 
of the margin of appreciation. 
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The fact that the situation of men in the private sphere is less sensitive to a full assessment 
than other issues of sex discrimination becomes even more evident if the judgment in Petrovic is 
compared to cases involving discrimination against men in the public sphere.479 For instance, in 
the case of Van Raalte v the Netherlands,480 the Court held that, although the State enjoyed a wide 
margin of appreciation regarding the regulation of exemptions from contributory payments, 
“compelling reasons” were needed to justify that unmarried childless men over the age of 45 were 
required to pay contributions under the Child Care Benefits Act, while women of the same age 
were exempt.481 To support this distinction, the Government submitted, inter alia, that women of 
45 years or above were less likely to have children than men of the same age and that expecting 
the same contribution from women would “impose an unfair emotional burden on them”.482 The 
Court concluded that the above reasons could not provide a justification for the gender-based 
difference in treatment suffered by the applicant. In so doing, the Court refused traditional and 
stereotypical notions to the detriment of men as objective and reasonable justifications of 
distinctions on grounds of sex.  
However, it must be noted that the Petrovic judgment was overturned in the relatively 
recent case of Markin v Russia.483 In this case, the Court concluded that the refusal to confer 
parental leave on military servicemen, while the leave was available to servicewomen, breached 
the applicant’s right to respect for family life taken in conjunction with Article 14. Along the lines 
of its decision in Van Raalte, but more explicitly, the Court held that “gender stereotypes, such as 
the perception of women as primary child-carers and men as primary breadwinners, cannot, by 
themselves, be considered to amount to sufficient justification for a difference in treatment”.484 
Therefore, it can be argued that the finding of a violation in the case of Markin has at least 
contributed to reducing the distances between the Court’s approach to the situation of men in the 
private and public spheres, respectively.   
Concerning ‘illegitimacy’, where it is the child the victim of differential treatment, the 
Court has often emphasised evolutions in national legal systems and international instruments 
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requiring equality between children born within and outside wedlock and applied strict scrutiny.485 
Since its landmark judgment in the case of Marckx v Belgium, the Court has required – although, 
not always explicitly – very weighty reasons to justify a difference in treatment based on whether 
the child was born from a marital relationship or not.486 However, it is debated whether the same 
strict review is undertaken when it is the father who suffers discrimination. In the case of 
McMichael v the United Kingdom, the Court stated that the difference in treatment, according to 
which a married father held parental rights automatically, while an unmarried father had to submit 
an application and obtain the mother’s consent, pursued the legitimate aim of identifying 
meritorious fathers, thus protecting the interests of the child and the mother, and met the 
proportionality test.487 However, already in the case of Hoffmann v Germany, the Court required 
very weighty reasons to justify discrimination with respect to contact rights between unmarried 
fathers and divorced fathers.488 More specifically, the Court was not persuaded by the stereotypical 
arguments which were advanced by the Government – in other words, unmarried fathers were 
generally uninterested in maintaining contact with their children and might leave a non-marital 
relationship at any time – and found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 
8.489 
Finally, with regards to sexual orientation, it is widely argued that the judgment in 
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal490 asserts, for the first time, that sexual orientation amounts 
to a suspect category, thus attracting strict review.491 Drawing on the passages of the contested 
national decision, the Court observed that the applicant’s homosexuality had played a decisive role 
in the final decision in refusing his request for the custody of his child.492 It went on to state that a 
distinction grounded on sexual orientation “is not acceptable under the Convention”493 and a 
violation of Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 had occurred. Differently, in the case of 
                                                        
485 Arnardóttir, ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination’, 148. 
486 For instance, see Inze v Austria, Application no. 8695/79, 28 October 1987, para 41; Vermeire v Belgium, 
Application no. 12849/87, 29 November 1991, para 25; Mazurek v France, Application no. 34406/97, 1 February 
2000, para 54 (no good reason for discrimination based on adulterine birth).  
487 McMichael v the UK, Application no. 16424/90, 24 February 1995. 
488 Hoffmann v Germany, Application no. 34045/96, 11 October 2001, para 56. 
489 Ibid, para 57. 
490 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal, Application no. 33290/96, 21 December 1999. 
491 Arnardóttir, ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination’, 153-4; Nikolaidis, ‘The Right to Equality’, 59. 
492 Salgueiro v Portugal, para 35.  




Fretté v France,494 concerning the refusal to authorise a single homosexual man to adopt a child, 
the Court found no violation of Article 14. Despite the outcome, the Court classified sexual 
orientation as a suspect ground and affirmed that very weighty reasons had to be put forward to 
justify a distinction on that specific ground. However, similar to the Petrovic judgment, the factor 
‘suspect ground’ was overruled by the lack of a European common ground among the Contracting 
States on whether homosexual should be granted access to adoption.495 The status of European 
consensus, in combination with the fact that “the law appears to be in a transitional stage”,496 led 
to the conclusion that the State enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation. Hence, a lenient assessment 
was undertaken.  
However, it must be noted that, in the case of E.B. v France,497 which overturned the Fretté 
decision, the Court seems to have reverted back to its position in the Salgueiro judgment. In the 
case of E.B., the decisive role played by the applicant’s sexual orientation in determining the 
rejection of her application for authorisation to adopt was inferred from the national authorities’ 
recurrent references to the ‘lack of a paternal reference’. The Court concluded that, given the need 
for very weighty reasons to justify differential treatment on grounds of sexual orientation, a narrow 
margin of appreciation was enjoyed by the Respondent State and, ultimately, found a violation of 
Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8. This case-law clarifies that sexual orientation, just 
like any other badge of differentiation, does not automatically and uniformly requires strict 
scrutiny. Rather, the ground of discrimination represents only one factor among the multiple 
variables that can influence the intensity of the Court’s assessment.498         
Although factors determining the suspectness of grounds fall outside the scope of the 
current investigation, it is interesting to mention the role of the evolutive and comparative methods 
of interpretation in the development of the jurisprudence on suspect discrimination. 499  For 
instance, it is by expressly referring to the advancement of the equality of the sexes as a major goal 
in the Member States of the Council of Europe that the Court justifies the need for a strict 
assessment in cases involving discrimination based on sex or gender. The presence of a common 
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ground in the laws of Contracting States has proved equally decisive for the applicability of the 
very weighty reasons test to birth outside wedlock.500 Throughout the time, however, the Court 
seems to have reexamined the desirability of relying on the existence of a common ground as the 
only starting point for choosing the strictness of its review.501 Recent case-law exhibits a greater 
willingness to define the discrimination grounds and their implications for the width of the margin 
of appreciation in a more accurate and explicit manner.502 As argued by Arnardóttir, the Court 
tends to increasingly provide more substantial justifications for undertaking strict scrutiny by, inter 
alia, placing value on the fact that certain distinctions come from stereotypical and traditional 
views of gender roles.503  
 Similar to the development of the scope of Article 8, the evolution of the right to non-
discrimination under Article 14 constitutes further evidence of the difficulties encountered by the 
Court in ensuring a balance between the two apparently contradictory and yet complimentary 
approaches of judicial activism and judicial restraint.504 Moreover, the jurisprudence on Article 8 
taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14 is also a good starting point to illustrate how a 
substantive conception of equality has penetrated the reasoning of the Court without attracting 
express acknowledgment.505 Taking the jurisprudence concerning homosexuality as an example, 
the following section will illustrate how far the Court has gone in extending the ambit of the 
prohibition of discrimination. In the view of Nikolaidis, the Court has almost gone so far as to 
establish ‘freedom from prejudice and stereotyping’ as a distinct human interest animating the 
application of Article 14.506   
8.3 Toward Substantive Equality and Anti-Stereotyping 
Despite the parasitic nature of Article 14, the Court has tended to apply and interpret this provision 
in an effective manner. 507  Since its judgment in the Belgian Linguistic case, the Court has 
considered that the applicability of Article 14 does not necessarily presuppose the violation of 
another Convention right, provided that the claim falls ‘within the ambit’ of that Convention 
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right.508 Moreover, it is argued that, particularly over the last decade, the Court has made great 
strides in developing a right to substantive equality within its case-law.509 Although there are 
various substantive conceptions of equality, this paradigm tends to be concerned with “the effects 
of the law in reality, rather than questions of whether the law on paper makes distinctions”.510 As 
explained by Nikolaidis, substantive equality requires not only prohibiting an unjustifiable 
difference in treatment (like formal or legal equality), but also enabling individuals to pursue their 
life options in an autonomous manner, namely “free from (…) prejudice and stereotyping and lack 
of reasonable accommodation relating to their personal characteristics”.511 Therefore, different 
from legal equality, which can be seen as a means to an end, substantive equality is an end in 
itself.512  
According to Nikolaidis, one way through which the Court’s approach to equality has 
become more substantive has consisted in conflating discrimination with other claims brought 
under Article 8. 513  This pattern is particularly evident in the jurisprudence pertaining to 
homosexuality. Until the judgment in Salgueiro v Portugal, the Court consistently refused to 
consider cases of prejudice against homosexuals through the lens of discrimination.514 Instead, it 
used to proceed by arguing that, since sexual life was a component of private life, the distinction 
contested (such as, the criminalisation of private homosexual acts) breached Article 8.515 Although 
refusing to examine a claim under Article 14 entails the risk of minimising the importance of 
addressing systematic prejudice and stereotypes in society, dealing with discrimination claims 
through Article 8 has had the positive consequence of liberating the development of anti-
discrimination jurisprudence from the literal texture of Article 14. 516  More specifically, it is 
argued, it has resulted in emphasising that anti-discrimination is not only about ensuring equal 
enjoyment of Convention rights (treating likes alike), but also about ensuring that individuals can 
pursue opportunities without being subject to social oppression on the basis of sex, race and other 
personal characteristics.517   
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Another technique for extending the scope of Article 14 has involved employing 
discrimination as a “magnifying lens”, as effectively argued by Arnardóttir.518 For our purpose, it 
is sufficient to share two out of the three distinct ways – as identified by this author – in which the 
interpretation of Article 14 has contributed to reinterpreting the ambit doctrine, with the ultimate 
effect of magnifying Article 8. Firstly, in some cases, where Article 8 was in fact applicable, 
Article 14 has resulted in a further violation or operated as an aggravating factor.519 Once again, 
the case of Marckx v Belgium can be used as an example of this approach. The recognition of a 
mother-child relationship clearly fell within the scope of Article 8. However, since the law 
distinguished between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ families, the Court found also a violation of 
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.   
The second kind of magnifying effect consists in relying on the ground of discrimination 
in order to make a claim fall within the ambit of a Convention right.520 An example is provided by 
the case of Fretté v France. Although acknowledging that Article 8 does not encompass either the 
right to adopt or the right to found a family (and, as such, Article 8 on its own could not be declared 
applicable), the Court decided to consider the claim under Article 14 since French law allowed 
single individuals to adopt but not Mr Fretté because of his sexual orientation. Despite a different 
outcome, a similar approach was adopted in the case of E.B. v France, where the Court held that 
the prohibition of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 14 “applies also to those additional 
rights, falling within the general scope of any Convention Article, for which the State has 
voluntarily decided to provide”.521 Therefore, although Article 8 on its own could not be declared 
applicable, the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 on the 
ground that the French Government protected the additional right to adopt by taking discriminatory 
measures.522 This kind of magnifying effect becomes visible in cases, like E.B., where a State 
decides to accord protection to a certain interest in the form of a ‘right’ in its national legislation, 
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although not required and therefore above the minimum standards established by the 
Convention.523 
Although challenging from a strictly methodological viewpoint, these judgments 
demonstrate the Court’s eagerness to address instances of social disadvantage suffered by 
homosexuals and, therefore, to review cases based on prejudice and stereotyping.524 This attitude 
becomes particularly evident by the efforts of the Court to unveil hidden discriminatory motives 
underlying a specific treatment. Indeed, in both cases, the treatment of the applicants was found to 
be based on the applicants’ sexual orientation even if the contested decisions actually referred to 
Mr Fretté’s “choice of lifestyle” and “the lack of a paternal reference” and “the ambivalent 
commitment of each member of the household” in the case of E.B. The Court’s search for 
prejudiced motives reveals that, under the ECHR system, a distinction can be discriminatory not 
only in its form, but also with respect to the powerful forces which give rise to it.525     
Another method used by the Court to develop a substantive conception of equality has 
consisted in placing emphasis on the systemic implications of the discrimination claim in order to 
determine whether a certain treatment is justified or not.526 In such cases, the Court has proceeded 
with analysing the specific case with respect to the situation of the whole group to which the 
applicant belongs. Once again, the judgment in Marckx exemplifies this approach. In response to 
the arguments of the Government, which described unmarried mothers as generally more 
irresponsible and justified the lack of automatic recognition of the maternal filiation tie on the 
basis of the child’s best interests, the Court refused to accept generalisations about the behaviour 
of unmarried mothers as a justification for the contested distinction. To a further extent, the Court’s 
efforts to take systemic implications into account have gone as far as to highlight the history of 
disadvantage suffered by a specific group to narrow down the margin of appreciation enjoyed by 
States, thus leaving them almost no room for justifying differential treatment.527    
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This systemic examination of the discrimination complaint has not gone unnoticed. Within 
the Court itself, the dissenting opinion of Judge Borrego Borrego in the case of D.H. and Others v 
Czech Republic sheds light on the close links between such approach and the potential departure 
of the Court from its judicial role.528 The dissenting judge criticised the majority of the Grand 
Chamber for taking up a new role consisting in assessing the overall social context, rather than 
(limiting its task to) examining individual applications.529  In this case, which concerned the 
placement of Roma children in ‘special’ schools, the majority held that “as a result of their 
turbulent history and constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantage 
and vulnerable minority”.530 Even more problematic in Judge Borrego Borrego’s view, the Grand 
Chamber concluded that there was no need to examine the individual cases of the applicants “since 
it has been established that the relevant legislation (…) had a disproportionately prejudicial effect 
on the Roma community” and, therefore, “the applicants as members of that community 
necessarily suffered the same discriminatory treatment.”531 It is clear that, by constructing social 
exclusion and lack of opportunity as something that disadvantages not only the individual 
applicants but also the whole group that they belong to, the approach taken by the majority pursues 
a goal of substantive equality, which according to Judge Borrego Borrego exceeds the mandate of 
the Court.    
Another example of the Court’s increased attention to the systemic implications of the 
discrimination claim is represented by the Grand Chamber’s judgment in the case of Markin v 
Russia. Apart from grounding the overturning of Petrovic on the evolution of legislation in the 
Member States towards extending parental leave allowances to men, the Court insists on the 
detrimental consequences of stereotyping. In particular, it states that excluding fathers from 
parental leave entitlements would perpetuate the stereotypical images of women as primary 
caretakers and of men as breadwinners.532 As elaborated by Arnardóttir, this judgment displays a 
‘new social-contextual approach’.533 In other words, it spells out the previously implicit ratio legis 
behind the suspect badge of differentiation, thus making it explicit. 534  In her view, this 
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development is to be welcomed as it makes the substantive dimensions of Article 14 more evident 
than before, thus bringing about clarity and consistency in the case-law.535  
Along similar lines, Timmer asks the Court to continuously search for the underlying social 
dynamics and beliefs which have led to the cases brought to its attention.536 This approach is made 
under the assumption that the Court has the potential to “change the way we speak – and thereby 
influence the way we think – about stereotypes and gender ideology”, thus ultimately transforming 
the reality in which we live. 537  In so arguing, she calls for the Court’s adoption of a 
‘transformative’ conception of equality which, in addition to calling for increasing positive 
equality duties on States, places emphasis on and addresses the root causes of disadvantage.538 As 
Timmer herself recognises, her definition of transformative equality does not differ from what 
many scholars – for instance, Nikolaidis as illustrated in the quote above – classify as substantive 
equality.539 Hence, for current purposes, substantive equality and transformative equality are used 
interchangeably and they are associated with a notion of the role of the law as fighting gender 
stereotypes, as opposed to compensating for existing gender role differences. 
On the contrary, a formal version of equality – which is premised on the atomistic definition 
of the ‘liberal subject’ – tends to be tied with a conservative role of the law since it has proved to 
mirror power relations, thus entrenching the status quo, despite being an equality model. Although 
it has been at times praised for rejecting undue ‘special treatments’ (based on asserted gender 
differences which, rather than favouring the alleged beneficiaries, result in their marginalisation), 
the mere prohibition of discrimination has proved highly inadequate to oppose or contest structural 
patterns of domination and subordination. As explained by Fineman, a formal equality framework 
is primarily intended to identify the victim and the perpetrator of discrimination, the individual 
injury as well as the intent underpinning each specific occurrence.540 As a result, there is no room 
for considerations related to systemic aspects of societal arrangements. The adoption of a similar 
framework has also fundamental repercussions on the role of the State and its relationship to 
institutions and individuals.541 Formal equality frameworks are likely to adopt a gender-neutral 
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approach over distinctions; therefore, they tend to disfavour States’ positive action as a means of 
redressing past disadvantage or, at best, they accept it as a justified form of discrimination.542 
Differently, a substantive model of equality imposes positive equality duties on the State and, as 
such, views positive action as essential to address structural discrimination.543  
Within the more specific realm of gender, Timmer argues that the ECtHR has a two-fold 
role to play in tackling structural discrimination.544 Firstly, it should not ground its own reasoning 
on stereotypes and, more precisely, on gender stereotypes. 545 As understood by Cook and Cusack, 
a stereotype is a “generalised view or preconception of attributes or characteristics possessed by, 
or the roles that are or should be performed by, members of a particular group”.546 And, more 
specifically, gender stereotypes are those “concerned with the social and cultural construction of 
men and women, due to their different physical, biological, sexual and social functions”.547 
Secondly, the Court should ‘name’ gender stereotypes, whenever relied upon at the national level, 
and ‘contest’ their discriminatory effects.548  
In order to facilitate the Court’s undertaking of an anti-stereotyping approach, Timmer has 
attempted to identify specific steps through which the Court can ultimately contribute to 
eliminating gender stereotypes. Her methodology encompasses two phases: naming and 
contesting. Naming, as originally devised by Cook and Cusack and subsequently re-elaborated by 
Timmer, constitutes a fundamental device for “revealing an otherwise hidden harm, explaining its 
implications, and labelling it as a human rights concern, grievance, or possible human rights 
violation”.549 It is, indeed, difficult for someone to lodge a complaint, if this individual does not 
know that his/her experience is recognised as a wrong. In addition to contributing to raising 
awareness of the socially persistent and pervasive forms of gender stereotyping, ‘naming’ also 
helps shed light on the ways through which gender stereotypes harm both men and women.550  
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Two questions are particularly emblematic of the inquiry conducted during the naming 
process551:  
 How does a law, policy or practice stereotype men or women? 
 How does the application, enforcement or perpetuation of a gender stereotype in a law, 
policy or practice harm men or women? 
In brief, the ‘naming’ process entails identifying and exposing forms of gender stereotyping, for 
which it is of crucial importance to engage in a careful analysis of facts.552 It is made of a series of 
steps. Firstly, ‘naming’ requires examining the contexts where gender stereotypes operate and their 
means of perpetuation.553 In order to do so, specific attention should be drawn to situational (how 
the individual is affected by social contexts, such as the family and the employment sector) and 
broader factors (for example, industrialisation, broader social context of patriarchy) that are 
relevant to the production and reproduction of gender stereotypes.554 Secondly, it is essential to 
shed light on the current effects of the stereotypes.555 In so doing, “it is important that efforts to 
identify operative gender stereotypes extend to stereotypes of both men and women”.556  The third 
step consists in ‘unmasking the stereotype’, thus spelling out its negative consequences and the 
State’s international obligations to combat gender stereotypes.557   
 The second phase, which consists in contesting the ‘named’ stereotype, similarly translates 
into four main steps. In accordance with the anti-stereotyping approach developed by Timmer, the 
first lies in declaring Article 14 applicable.558 The underlying assumption is that, if a specific 
matter is pervaded by harmful gender stereotypes about a certain group of individuals, the 
prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 applies.559 The following two steps are almost 
mechanical. As a general rule, when a provision or practice is grounded on gender stereotypes, the 
Court undertakes an intensive review.560 In other words, very weighty reasons have to be put 
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forward by the State to justify the difference in treatment and, as a result, the State is granted a 
narrow margin of appreciation.561 Furthermore, the comparability test should be replaced by the 
disadvantage test. 562  The latter is argued to be more appropriate for cases based on gender 
stereotypes because an appropriate comparator is not always present and the harm they inflict on 
both men and women is proof itself of disadvantage.563 As a result, once it is established that a 
gender stereotype is operative, the Court can almost automatically conclude that there is a 
disadvantage.564 The fourth, and final, stage of the contesting phase concerns the justifications 
advanced by the State for its actions. In order to bring an anti-stereotyping analysis to an end, the 
Court should investigate the reasons put forward and dismiss appeals to culture, traditional 
practices and images as insufficient grounds for differential treatment.565        
To the extent that stereotypes ignore ‘individuality’ and ascribe to an individual’s specific 
features and roles only by virtue of his/her membership in a particular group, the impact of gender 
stereotyping on the protection of fathers’ right to respect for family life is of immediate 
understanding. It is widely recognised that the reliance on gender stereotypes has significantly 
contributed to denying fathers the opportunity to be involved in childcare, both de facto and de 
jure. For instance, it can be observed that women’s allegedly ‘natural’ predisposition to family 
work has for a long time concealed the need for gender-neutral parental leave. Hence, the relevance 
of the above anti-stereotyping approach to assess the version of equality promoted in the case-law 
pertaining to fatherhood and, consequently, the extent to which the Convention has been used a 
tool for merely compensating for existing differences or, rather, for transforming the reality.566  
While in Timmer’s framework, each step is intended as necessary and indispensable to 
ensure a successful anti-stereotyping analysis, for current purposes, the Court’s degree of departure 
from a conventional understanding of fatherhood will be tested against a simplified version of the 
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methodology described above. This choice is justified by the aim of the present analysis: the 
Court’s jurisprudence is not scrutinised with respect to its ability to effectively eradicate gender 
stereotypes as a whole but rather to contest the stereotypes which deny the applicant the enjoyment 
of the right to respect for his family life in the specific case under review. Therefore, the multiple 
steps envisaged by Timmer are considered merely indicative of a successful anti-stereotyping 
perspective, rather than prescriptive. Accordingly, the Court will be considered to have adopted 
an anti-stereotyping approach if it proves aware of an operative gender stereotype and contests it 
by finding a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.     
 
9. Recap of Research Questions addressed by the Thesis  
Prior to embarking on the analysis of the Court’s case-law, it seems useful to recap the multiple 
sub-questions and goals that will guide the following jurisprudential investigation: 
 What features of conventional fatherhood are affirmed, revised or abandoned or 
not? 
 How does the Court deal, or fails to deal, with the concept of fragmented 
fatherhood?  
 Does the Court understand the law as a reflective or a transformative tool? And, 
what is the role of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and of the 
interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument in supporting one or the other 
concept of the law? 














CHAPTER 2 – Donating Fatherhood: Who is the ‘Father’ in the Context 
of Assisted Reproductive Technologies? 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will attempt to assess to what extent the Court’s jurisprudence pertaining to ART has 
reproduced or departed from a conventional understanding of fatherhood, as described in the 
previous chapter. The chapter is made of three main parts. Section 1 describes the reactions of 
national authorities to the advent of ART and the latter’s impact on the legal determination of 
parenthood and, more specifically, of fatherhood within domestic legal systems. Section 2 will 
shift the debate around fatherhood and ART from the national setting to Strasbourg. This part will 
therefore consist in the analysis of the paradigmatic cases, where the Court was called on to discuss 
the determination of legal fatherhood vis-à-vis the employment of various reproductive techniques, 
including sperm donation, in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and surrogacy. To conclude, Section 3 will 
attempt to pull these strings together by identifying what features of conventional fatherhood 
persist or give way to others, which ones are abandoned or adapted. This step will also enable me 
to assess which of the national trends outlined in Section 1 fits better with the Court’s approach 
and, thus, to what extent the Court is either leading or following legal changes at the national level. 
  
1. The Impact of ART on Parenthood and National Legal Responses 
Popular culture thinks of individuals as having two parents, one mother and one father, each of 
whom is partly responsible for the child’s biological inheritance.567 It is no coincidence that the 
heterosexual two-parent family has been traditionally considered the ‘norm’ by the law.568 In the 
real world, however, this conventional pattern of parenting can be bypassed in a variety of different 
ways, including adoption, fostering and extra-pair mating.569 In modern times, ART have unsettled 
the traditional reproductive process by enabling individuals and couples – whether infertile or not 
– to reproduce and become parents, thanks to medical assistance and the intervention of third 
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parties.570 By further challenging the ‘norm’ resulting from biology, reproductive medicine offers 
the opportunity for a constructive reconsideration of the determining factor(s) in the legal 
assignment of parental status.     
The existing body of knowledge exploring the impact of bioethics on parenthood has 
primarily focused on the choices or roles of women in artificial procreative situations, such as 
surrogacy and IVF.571  Some authors appreciate and welcome ART because they offer more 
reproductive opportunities to women.572 On the contrary, others criticise these technologies as a 
way through which patriarchal societies exercise further control on the reproductive life and 
choices of women.573 These techniques have the power to commodify both women and children: 
women can be reduced to wombs, or “fetal containers”.574 New possibilities entail further lines of 
control by essentially making it even more difficult for women to escape societal expectations and 
choose the deviant path of non-motherhood.  
Despite the heightened interest in fathers’ issues, very few scholars have investigated the 
implications of modern techniques on the notion of ‘fatherhood’.575 This lack of research is partly 
explained by the fact that many of the authors, who have attempted a gendered analysis of 
parenthood in the context of ART, have applied a strictly feminist lens.576 Additionally, the central 
emphasis on motherhood might reflect the existing differences between the biological functions 
of males and females, in terms of temporal and physical involvement in the procreation process.577 
Finally, the omission of fatherhood in the debate might result from sexist customs that assume the 
mother-child relationship to be characterised by a more intrinsic and irreversible connection than 
                                                        
570 B. Feuillet-Liger, ‘Preface’ in B. Feuillet-Liger, T. Callus and K. Orfali (eds.), Reproductive Technology and 
Changing Perceptions of Parenthood around the world (Bruylant, 2014), 23. 
571 Inter alia, M. Stanworth (ed.), Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine (Polity, 1987); R. 
Arditti, R. Duelli Klein and S. Minden (eds.), Test-Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood? (Pandora Press, 1984); 
B. Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in a Patriarchal Society (Norton and Co., 1990).  
572  More generally, on the new freedoms entailed by ART see J. Robertson, ‘Genetic Selection of Offspring 
Characteristics’ 1996 76(3) Boston University Law Review 421-482; M. Ertman, ‘The Upside of Baby Markets’ in M. 
Goodwin (ed.), Baby Markets and the New Politics of Creating Families (CUP, 2010), 23-40. 
573 See, inter alia, J. Raymond, Women as Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle Over Women’s Freedom 
(Harper, 1993); C. Gena, The mother machine: reproductive technologies – from artificial insemination to artificial 
wombs (Harper and Row, 1985).  
574 M. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (Routledge, 1995), 
217. 
575 D. Callahan, ‘Bioethics and Fatherhood’ 1992 Utah Law Review 735.  
576 S. Sheldon, ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood: The Regulation of Reproductive Technologies’ 2005 68(4) Modern Law 
Review, 526. 
577 M. Shultz, ‘Reproductive Technology and Intent-based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality’ (1990) 




the relationship that exists between father and child.578 In light of these considerations, it appears 
interesting to examine how medical progress has contributed to the fragmentation of the traditional 
‘father figure’ and thus to redefining the legal conception of ‘fatherhood’, which has traditionally 
followed the genetic connection. 
However, prior to embarking on a father-specific investigation, this introductory section 
will explain how the advent of ART has challenged the primacy of blood ties in defining 
parenthood and granting legitimacy to family ties. In a study on American kinship, Schneider 
described blood ties as “facts of life” belonging to a “natural order”.579 Interestingly, he went on 
to argue that blood relationships are “relationship(s) of substance, of shared biogenetic 
material”. 580  Different to marital ties, which can be severed by divorce, the parent-child 
relationship is not capable of being definitely dissolved because biology and genetics are deemed 
irrefutable scientific facts by the dominant culture.581 This emphasis on blood ties has permeated 
and strongly determined not only accounts of American kinship, but also blood and genes have 
consistently represented the ‘natural’ and the best situations for child rearing in European 
discourses.582  
Adoption emerged as the first context where the logic of biogenetics showed its limits to 
reflect the variety of family forms currently existing in society. In more recent times, the 
development of ART has forced legal operators worldwide to rethink parenthood – more 
specifically, who has rights to the resulting child and who is excluded – beyond the rule of 
biology.583 It has also required legal mechanisms to move beyond the two-parent heterosexual 
family model, namely the idea that a child might only have one mother and one father. By allowing 
the introduction of third parties into the reproduction process and, to some degree, into the child’s 
environment, reproductive medicine contributes to the on-going debates – previously discussed in 
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the context of adoption and step-families – around the idea of multi-parenthood.584 Apart from 
providing for an easier resolution of conflicts between interested parties, overcoming the bi-
parental family norm might also result in a more respectful approach to what Sharp calls 
“sentimentality”; 585  in other words, the bioethical era brings precious opportunities to revise 
legalistic logics to better incorporate important affective understandings of care, nurture and, even, 
love.586  
The question of who, in the eyes of the law, is the child’s parent was already fraught with 
difficulties before the advent of new methods of reproduction. Only the establishment of maternity 
seemed to follow a clear rule – mater semper certa est – since based on a simple fact of nature, the 
mother is the one who gives birth. To a certain extent, however, the natural fact of parturition is 
no longer capable of establishing a clear maternal connection. In cases of ART using an egg donor, 
the mother who gives birth is not the biological mother; hence, the distinction between a biological 
mother and a gestational mother.587 Furthermore, surrogacy scenarios are able to produce as many 
as three maternal figures: the biological mother, the gestational mother and the social mother, 
namely the woman (commissioning mother) who has resorted to ART in order to reproduce. In 
those jurisdictions where surrogacy is allowed, the legal determination of motherhood is likely to 
stem from a voluntary act by the commissioning mother, rather than from biology. Even more 
worrisome, fatherhood is an altogether complex and fragmented status. The question whether 
children born of sperm donation should be granted the right to know the identity of their biological 
fathers has provoked much debate in several jurisdictions. And many other issues regarding men’s 
rights and obligations in ART scenarios have been brought before the courts.    
Apart from shedding light on the fallibility of biology as a bright-line test to determine 
legal parenthood, reproductive medicine questions the heterosexual nature of parenthood.588 The 
voices of homosexuals willing to become parents have become increasingly louder in several 
European States, which can also be traced to the desexualisation of reproduction allowed by 
ART.589  Lesbian couples can now fulfil their desire to become parents by employing sperm 
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donation, while male couples are enabled to have a child through surrogacy. This development has 
also triggered the issue of the interchangeable nature of parenthood, namely the option for one 
person to change from his/her legal status of father or mother to the other one following a gender 
reassignment.590 In all of these scenarios, the status of parent is granted to a person, irrespective of 
his/her gender; hence, the traditional continuum between gender and parenthood is broken.   
There are many more issues which States have been called on to address, as a result of 
ART. Despite the fact that medical advancement is almost identical in all countries, legal responses 
vary significantly from country to country depending on the concept of parentage held by each 
country as well as on how the relationships between individual rights, family structures and 
societal organisation are conceived.591 Germany, France and the UK offer three distinct but equally 
instructive approaches. While the German legal system remains ultimately centred upon the 
importance of blood ties in the name of the best interests of the child, France has adopted a 
diametrically opposed stance by attributing primary importance to intentionality. The approach 
taken by the UK legislator provides for a middle-ground solution: while valuing intention, it still 
makes legal parenthood contingent on its resemblance to the conventional family.   
In addition to revealing a continuing emphasis on the mother-father relationship as a 
determining factor of legal fatherhood, the German reaction to ART also shows a persistent 
fixation on biological truth.592 The underlying value that the German legal system attempts to 
promote is the dignity of a child born as a result of ART.593 Therefore, the child’s best interests 
are given absolute or, at least, frequent priority over the interests of science.594 In line with this 
approach, the law ensures the indivisibility of maternity by prohibiting both surrogacy and egg 
donations.595 Although these practices are prohibited under national law, the resort to cross-border 
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surrogacy arrangements by German couples has not triggered any real debate. Different from other 
countries, such as France and Italy, German authorities generally do not oppose the transcription 
of foreign birth certificates and, therefore, the commissioning parents are recognised as legal 
parents under German law.596 It is sufficient to recall a ruling of December 2014, where the 
German Federal Court of Justice ordered the civil registry office to register a child’s birth 
certificate and recognised the appellants – a same-sex couple in a registered partnership – as joint 
legal parents, in accordance with a Californian judgment.597  
In its reasoning, the Federal Court of Justice stressed that German public policy was not 
breached by the mere fact that legal parenthood was conferred on the intended parents in a case of 
surrogacy, provided that one intended parent was also the child’s biological father and the 
surrogate mother had no genetic link with the child. In this particular case, given that the surrogate 
mother was not married, the biological father was able to acknowledge paternity with no 
complications. Moreover, since the surrogate mother did not wish to assume parental 
responsibilities and, therefore, there was no tension between her and the second intended parent, 
the Court concluded that that depriving the child of a legal relationship with the second intended 
parent was not in his best interests. As a result, in the context of surrogacy, parental intention has 
been given priority over gestation, but only if supplemented with one partner’s genetic relatedness. 
Despite the assumption that each child should be connected with his/her maternal genetic 
lineage, the law has not equally opposed the divisibility of fatherhood, as artificial insemination 
and IVF are lawful in Germany.598 The Federal Medical Association devoted its full attention to 
the consequences of using gametes of a third-party donor only in 2006. Given the primary 
importance attributed to the dignity of the resulting offspring, one peculiarity of the German 
regulation of heterologous ART lies in the possibility for the child to have the donor’s anonymity 
reversed.599 Therefore, the doctor who takes care of the procedure has the duty to create a file 
including the identity as well as non-identifying information concerning the donor.600  
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Despite ensuring the child’s right to know his/her biological origins, the directives issued 
by the Federal Medical Association have failed to consider the consequences of the split of paternal 
functions over two men as a result of sperm donation. In cases involving both married and 
unmarried couples, this gap has been filled by the general law, which provides for a presumption 
of paternity.601 As a result, the mother’s husband or male partner is ipso jure the legal father of the 
child born from artificial insemination. Moreover, as provided by a reform introduced in 2002, 
neither the mother nor her husband/partner is allowed to contest paternity when they had consented 
to the heterologous treatment.602  
This reform was supposed to prevent scenarios where a child born from artificial 
insemination was left without a legal father (and, possibly, financial support) and, therefore, to 
protect donors from actions seeking to establish paternity.603 However, the possibility to rebut the 
marital presumption remains on the part of the child. Following an action brought by the child, the 
judge can therefore declare the paternity of the donor in accordance with the results of DNA 
tests. 604  As of now, therefore, there is no provision that effectively protects donors.  
Unsurprisingly, this legislative lacuna has resulted in a drastic reduction of sperm donors, possibly 
in line with the State’s desire to reduce the employment of heterologous techniques as much as 
possible.  
The German legislator’s refusal to safely protect donors reveals profound anxieties over 
the risks of departing from the conventional definition of fatherhood entailed by ART; it attempts 
to deny the fragmentation of fatherhood brought about by heterologous techniques and, 
accordingly, to cover possible disconnections between biological fatherhood, marital fatherhood 
and nurturing fatherhood. Overall, it seems that the definition of fatherhood emerging from the 
German regulation of ART closely resembles the characters of either marital fatherhood or 
biological fatherhood, depending on whether the child chooses to bring an action to rebut the 
marital presumption. If he/she does not, priority is given to the existence of a connection between 
the alleged father and the child’s legal mother. Otherwise (upon the child’s request), DNA 
evidence has the potential to bring a shift from a legal definition based on marriage to a legal 
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definition based on genes.605 In the name of the best interests of the child, the search for the 
biological truth goes as far as to exclude de facto the anonymity of a sperm donor and to make him 
financially responsible for the child following a judicial determination of his paternity.606  
Different from the trend identified in German law, French law has witnessed a progressive 
elimination of biological ties and a concomitant emphasis on intention as the basis for determining 
legal parenthood.607 In the context of ART, reliance on biological ties is totally ruled out by the 
principle of donor anonymity that implies the impossibility for the child to create any de jure or 
de facto bond with the donor.608 The underlying idea is that of leaving the way clear to determine 
parenthood only on the basis of intention.609 Therefore, consent is given a key role – particularly, 
in cases of gamete donation – because it represents not only a prerequisite for undertaking a 
treatment, but also the ground whereby parenthood is established.610 The prioritisation of intention 
over biology in the scenario of ART fits perfectly into the wider family law system, which has 
consistently made a distinction between biological origins and legal parentage and grounded the 
latter on notions of spontaneous parental acceptance.  
An exception to this approach is represented by the French approach to surrogacy, which 
has, until very recently, generally privileged gestation over intention. Different from Germany, 
French couples’ resort to cross-border surrogacy following its prohibition on the national territory 
has given rise to a heated debate in France. When confronted with intended parents’ requests for 
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the transcription of the foreign birth certificate of their children born out of surrogacy abroad into 
French birth registers, domestic courts have shown a tendency to consider public policy as violated 
by the mere fact that surrogacy had taken place. Accordingly, they refuse recognition of filiation 
ties of surrogate children, considering them as the product of a fraudulent process. As a result, 
these children have often been left stateless and parentless.611 This situation was also brought to 
the attention of the ECtHR in the cases of Mennesson v France612 and Labassee v France.613 which 
found the national authorities’ opposition to transcription in breach of Article 8 concerning the 
children’s right to respect for their private life. These judgments were only implemented in the 
domestic legal system in July 2015, when the Court of Cassation held that surrogate motherhood 
cannot per se justify the refusal to transcribe the foreign birth certificate of a child who has a 
French parent into French birth registers.614 Despite representing an important step forward, some 
commentators have argued that the Court of Cassation did not go far enough, as only the biological 
father – together with the birth mother – will be allowed to be registered on the birth certificate.615  
 Similar to the mainstream approach in France, the UK legislator has, at least prima facie, 
proved able to detach itself from the English Common Law default position, which relies on 
biological truth to recognise paternity.616 Rather, it has introduced specific legislation whereby the 
recognition of legal parenthood stems from the intention of parents who employ ART, thus 
reducing the relevance of the biological link. Nonetheless, existing provisions equally express 
entrenched assumptions and highly conservative understandings about what constitues the 
appropriate family.617 When revising the rules concerning the establishment of legal parenthood 
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of children born out of ART, the drafters were faced with multiple questions, like whether the law 
should recognise two women as a child’s parents; if so, on what grounds and what terminology 
might be the most appropriate for two parents of the same sex; and how to best recognise in law 
the fundamental presence of social parents in the child’s life, next to those who offered biological 
contribution.618  
Eventually, the idea of the legislator was to position the child born from ART ‘as if’ he/she 
were the biological child of the two adults recognised as parents.619 The underlying intent and de 
facto outcome is the persistence of the heterosexual dual parent model. According to the rules 
stipulated in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (‘HFEA 2008’, which amended the 
1990 Act of the same title), the legal father of the child is the husband of the mother who consented 
to his wife’s assisted insemination.620 In case there is neither a legal father by virtue of marriage 
nor a female parent by virtue of civil partnership, an unmarried man can be recognised as the 
child’s legal father, provided that a set of ‘agreed fatherhood conditions’ – which, in essence, 
ground legal fatherhood on consent, both the mother’s and the father’s – are met.621 As a result, it 
is the connection of the alleged father with the child’s mother, rather than a biological link between 
the alleged father and the child, that is decisive for establishing who the child’s legal father is. Like 
in France, the donor is excluded from any legal parental status. However, due to the abrogation of 
the principle of donor anonymity in April 2005, the child has the right to know his/her identity 
upon the age of 18.622   
Paradoxically, also the recognition of same-sex parents following the employment of ART 
rests upon the heterosexual dual parent model.623 One of the most innovative aspects of the HFEA 
2008 lies in the possibility for two women to jointly qualify as legal parents of a child born through 
sperm donation since the moment of birth.624 Interestingly, however, both women will not be 
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recognised as legal mothers; rather, whilst the birthgiver is ipso jure the legal mother of the child, 
her partner can be recognised as ‘the other parent’ in accordance with rules that strongly resemble 
those regulating the establishment of fatherhood. 625  Apart from holding the indivisibility of 
maternity, these provisions reiterate that, in a child’s life, there can only be one parent who enjoys 
the legal status of mother.626 It follows that, in cases of registered partnerships, the partner of the 
legal mother will be accorded the status of ‘other parent’ unless it is proved that she did not consent 
to artificial insemination.627 Where a woman is not in a civil partnership, her partner’s recognition 
as the ‘other parent’ of the child is contingent upon the performance of the treatment at a licensed 
clinic and the existence of ‘agreed female parenthood conditions’ (which, just like the ‘agreed 
fatherhood conditions’, require evidence of the parents’ intention to treat the female partner as a 
parent).628 It is interesting to note that the so-called marital presumption has been extended to 
scenarios where the lack of a biological link between the parent and the child is an incontrovertible 
fact.  
In a nutshell, under the HFEA 2008, “genetics could be taken out of the equation of legal 
parenthood, but the latter could still only be attached to social parents able to emulate the 
biological, necessarily heterosexual, mother/father dyad”. 629  This reading of the Act is also 
confirmed by the new provisions pertaining to parental orders following surrogacy. As a result of 
another novelty brought by the HFEA 2008, civil partners as well as unmarried heterosexual 
couples and same-sex couples not in a civil partnership are allowed to apply for a parental order, 
which would extinguish the rights and responsibilities of the surrogate mother (and, if relevant, 
the paternity of her husband) and would enable them to be recognised as legal parents of a child 
born through surrogacy.630 Among the conditions to be met in order to obtain a parental order, the 
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commissioning parents must be a couple and at least one of them has to be genetically related to 
the child.631 As a result, as of now, a single person remains unable to apply for a parental order.    
In addition to perpetuating the primacy of the dual parent model, the tenacious hold of the 
dominant ideology of the family is further demonstrated by the hierarchy set between the position 
of husbands and civil female partners and that of those who are not in a formalised union.632 The 
former are indeed given priority at parental status. Only when their absence is ascertained, the 
judge can consider the attribution of legal parenthood to another male or female partner under the 
abovementioned agreed conditions. Therefore, the HFEA 2008 draws a distinction between 
married fathers or fathers in a registered partnership and fathers not in a formalised union. Overall, 
it seems that the marital or pseudo-marital relationship between the alleged father/other parent and 
the child’s mother is a prevalent feature in the definition of fatherhood endorsed by the UK 
regulation of ART. If considered within a wider context, this aspect of the HFEA does not fit 
within the process of erosion that has affected the primacy of marriage in English family law since 
the 1970s.633 The roots of this inconsistency seem to lie in concerns over the threat posed by ART 
to the traditional ideology of the family, expressed when the HFEA 1990 was enacted. 634 It 
remains, however, bizarre that the drafters of the 2008 reform have not simply preserved this 
distinction, but built on it. 635 
Finally, it is important to link the new rule as to ‘female parenthood’ to another 
controversial amendment brought by the 2008 reform to the text of HFEA 1990. Section 14(2)(b) 
of the new Act replaced the reference to the need for ‘a father’, previously included in Section 
13(5) of HFEA 1990, with the need for ‘supportive parenting’ as a condition for accessing ART.636 
Although it did not include any overt condemnation of single or lesbian motherhood, Section 13(5) 
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– also known as the ‘welfare provision’ – intended to restrict access to treatment services to 
married couples.637 This amendment has been object of sustained criticism. Most of the concerns, 
prima facie, pointed to the reform’s alleged consequence of undermining the value and importance 
of fatherhood.638 More convincingly, however, it has been argued that the critiques addressed to 
Section 14(2)(b) underlie, once again, fears of departure from the conventional paradigm of the 
family.639 In other words, that criticism seemed to stem more from the recognition that preserving 
the reference would “symbolically” jeopardise the non-traditional, fatherless families recognised 
elsewhere in the 2008 Act.640 
These examples provide an overview of the efforts invested by national legal systems in 
creating solutions to the numerous problems triggered by the impact of modern reproductive 
techniques on parenthood. They also shed light on emerging ‘new’ or recently just revisited 
understandings of fatherhood. All of the above national systems have shown an increased 
recognition of parental intention. This shift, however, has not necessarily implied a departure from 
conventional fatherhood. Rather, this emphasis on parental intention tends to go hand-in-hand with 
the persistence of a biological understanding of fatherhood. Moreover, a continuing attachment to 
the dual parental model and, more particularly, to the connection between the father and the child’s 
mother seem to remain the underlying forces guiding the attribution of legal fatherhood.  
 
2. Moving the Debate to Strasbourg: ART as a Chance to Realise the 
Fragmented Nature of Fatherhood 
It is precisely in relation to its case-law pertaining to ART that the Court has furthered the scope 
of Article 8 using what Burbergs refers to as a ‘tree-like mode’, “where one ‘branch’ is the base 
and support for other branches to grow”.641 In particular, Burbergs observes that the right to respect 
the decision to/not to become a parent, established in the case of Evans v UK, developed into the 
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rights to choose the circumstances of becoming a parent, 642  to choose to become a genetic 
parent,643 to access IVF,644 and finally, to become a parent through surrogacy.645 Despite this 
progressive expansion of the scope of Article 8 and, when relevant, the acknowledgment of the 
existence of family life among the applicants, the Court has, in most cases involving ART, found 
that Article 8 has not been violated. In this regard, it seems worth anticipating a certain role of the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation in hindering the finding of a violation. Indeed, the Court has 
often held that, given the sensitive moral and ethical issues triggered by medical and scientific 
progress, together with the lack of a clear consensus among the Contracting States on these matters, 
the Respondent State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation.646  
Although the Court never explicitly addresses the question ‘who is a father?’, the 
establishment of the legal tie of fatherhood has been interestingly discussed in a number of cases 
concerning the use of ART, where the Court has more or less indirectly emphasised the presence 
of specific factors as crucial for the determination of legal fatherhood. Compared to the other case-
law domains that will be examined subsequently, this set of cases encompasses factual accounts 
that are quite different from each other. Accordingly, the following analysis will divide the existing 
jurisprudence into two sets of cases, depending on whether the claims brought by the applicants 
are pre- or post-birth. Concerning the latter, the investigation of the Court’s approach will be 
centred upon its decisions in X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom,647 Mennesson v France and 
Labassee v France and Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy.648 Whilst these cases stemmed from the 
applications of three want-to-be legal fathers of already born children, the following two cases 
concerned the hypothetical right to/not to become a father and, accordingly, discussed the 
appropriateness of childbirth in the given circumstances. The judgments in Evans v the United 
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Kingdom649and Dickson v the United Kingdom650 are, therefore, paradigmatic of the Court’s stance 
in relation to pre-birth claims.  
This variety of scenarios implies greater possibilities for assessing the interaction of 
biology with other conventional features of legal fatherhood and, more generally, for measuring 
the tenacity of biology and other characteristics of conventional fatherhood against a variety of 
family forms and situations. In relation to each of them, this chapter will attempt to establish to 
what extent the Court has assimilated the idea of ‘fragmented fatherhood’ and, accordingly, has 
reacted to the growing distance between family realities and the conventional ideology of 
fatherhood. Overall, it will be shown that, in the first set of cases, there is a gradual departure from 
a conventional understanding of fatherhood based on the existence of a biological link between 
the child and the alleged father. This does not seem to be the case, however, when the child is 
unborn. Indeed, both the Evans and the Dickson judgments reveal a strong degree of continuity 
with the conventional paradigm of fatherhood, particularly concerning the relevance of biology as 
well as the marital link with the child’s mother. A definition of fatherhood as a derivative based 
on his ties with the child’s mother emerges also from the judgment in X, Y and Z, where the Court 
seems to place significant weight on the gender identity of the applicant when dismissing his 
request to obtain legal recognition of his social ties with an ART-conceived child. This, in turn, 
indicates a persisting attachment to a heteronormative conception of fatherhood.      
2.1 X, Y and Z v the United Kingdom (1997): What Matters? Interplays between Gender Identity, 
Marriage and Biology  
X, a post-operative female-to-male transsexual, had lived with the female applicant Y as her male 
partner since 1979. More than a decade later, X and Y applied jointly for permission for Y to 
undergo artificial insemination (‘AI’) treatment with sperm by an anonymous donor to enable Y 
to have a child. After an appeal, a hospital ethics committee granted permission and asked X to 
acknowledge himself as the father under Section 28(3) of the HFEA 1990, according to which in 
cases where an unmarried woman gives birth as a result of AI with the involvement of her male 
partner, the latter, rather than the donor of the sperm, shall for legal purposes be treated as the 
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father of the child.651  
Nonetheless, X was not allowed to be registered as the child’s legal father because, in the 
Registrar General’s view, only a biological man could be considered a father for the purposes of 
registration. Before the ECtHR, the applicants argued that the relationship between X and Z 
amounted to family life by virtue of their close ties since Z’s birth. As a result, they submitted that 
the lack of legal recognition of that bond amounted to a violation of Article 8 and discrimination 
contrary to Article 14. Conversely, the government pointed out that the union of a transsexual and 
partner could be equated to that of two women living together, since X was still regarded as female 
under domestic law. Similarly, X did not enjoy family life with Z, because he was not related to 
the child by blood, marriage or adoption.        
The Court’s analysis follows a two-tiered process, as envisaged in the previous chapter: 
after having established family life, it goes on to assess whether there has been a violation of 
Article 8. In discussing the applicability of Article 8, the Court began by addressing the issue of 
whether family life could be established between X and Y. It recalled that the notion of ‘family 
life’ is not confined solely to marriage-based relationships and might also include de facto family 
ties.652 It went on to clarify that the establishment of family life is dependent upon the existence 
of three key factors: cohabitation, 653  the length of the relationship, and “whether they have 
demonstrated their commitment to each other by having children together or by any other 
means”.654 The first part of the analysis was successfully met through the employment of a ‘reality 
test’, aimed at assessing the existing emotional involvement between the concerned individuals 
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and, more generally, the effective concreteness of their relationship.655 When applying this test to 
the circumstances of the present case, the Court held that de facto family ties, under Article 8, 
existed among the three applicants.656 This conclusion was grounded on four main considerations: 
X had undergone gender reassignment surgery and, as a result, looked like a man to all 
appearances; X and Y had lived together since 1979; they had jointly sought AI treatment in order 
to become parents; and X has supported Y during the treatment and had acted as Z’s father since 
birth.657  
For the purposes of the current analysis, the fact that family life is found regardless of the 
lack of a biological tie ought to be appreciated for valuing care (in other words, for valuing doing 
over being). In taking this approach, the Court went even beyond its admissibility decision in the 
earlier case of J.R.M. v the Netherlands, by stating that biology is not only insufficient, but also 
superfluous to establish family life.658 In J.R.M., the applicant acted as a sperm donor to enable a 
lesbian couple to have a child, under the agreement that the child would have been raised by the 
couple. However, after childbirth, he decided to become involved in the child’s life and applied 
for contact rights, against the couple’s will. When faced with the applicant’s claims, the Court 
found Article 8 inapplicable, as “the situation in which a person donates sperm only to enable a 
woman to become pregnant through artificial insemination does not of itself give the donor a right 
to respect for family life with the child.”659 Despite prioritising X’s close personal ties with Z over 
biology, it cannot be overlooked that the finding of family life between X, Y and Z was also 
contingent on the nature of the relationship between the adults: to all appearances, they were a 
male-female couple, who had cohabitated for a long time and had undertaken a parental project 
together.   
The enthusiasm injected by the finding of family life is quickly weakened by the ultimate 
dismissal of the applicant’s plight (in a non-violation finding) on the ground of a wide margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by the State. In assessing compliance with the Convention, the Court stated 
that Article 8 might entail positive undertakings, in addition to negative obligations. In the case of 
Marckx, for instance, Belgium had been held responsible for introducing legal safeguards to render 
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possible, from the moment of birth or as soon as practicable thereafter, the child’s integration in 
his biological family.660 However, the Court was of the opinion that this principle could not be 
directly applied to the present case, since it raised different issues: different from the Marckx case 
– Z was conceived via ART and not biologically related to X, who is a transsexual.661  
The Court further observed that there was no common European standard with regard to 
the conferral of parental rights on transsexuals or the way through which the tie between an 
artificially-conceived child and his/her social parent should be recognised by the law.662 According 
to the Court, therefore, a different approach was needed and, more specifically, one that consisted 
in weighing up the arguments in favour and against the legal recognition of the ties between the 
applicants in order to strike a fair balance between the conflicting interests of the individuals and 
of the community as a whole.663 Among the latter, emphasis was placed on the community’s 
interest in preserving a coherent system of family law that prioritises the best interests of the 
child.664 However, it was not specified how denying legal recognition to the relationship between 
X and Z would have served the protection of this community’s interest. Furthermore, the Court 
noted that the State could legitimately be cautious in amending the law, since the reform sought 
by the applicants might have had adverse repercussions in other areas of family law. 665  For 
instance, the legal system could have been subjected to criticism on the ground of inconsistency, 
if a female-to-male transsexual was permitted to become a legal father, while still incapable 
entering into a contract of marriage with a woman.666  
The Court moved on to balance the disadvantages suffered by the applicants as a result of 
the lack of recognition of X as the legal father of Z against these community’s interests. Before 
this case, the Court had already placed an emphasis on the significant benefits ensuing from the 
legal recognition of family ties not only in the case of Marckx, but also in the cases of Johnston v 
Ireland and Kroon and Others v the Netherlands.667 In all these previous cases, the Court had made 
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it clear that children should not be subject to disadvantages as a consequence of the parents’ status. 
Differently, in the case of X, Y and Z, the Court chose to undervalue the advantages of legal 
recognition and, rather, to place emphasis on the means through which the applicants could reduce 
the obstacles they face.668 It was noted, inter alia, that the absence of any automatic right of 
inheritance in case of X’s death could have been practically circumvented by making a will.669 
Moreover, the Court noted that X was not prohibited from contining to act as the social father to 
Z and could have obtained full parental responsibility for her by seeking joint residence.670 In light 
of the above, the Court found it impossible to foresee the extent to which Z’s development would 
be negatively affected by the absence of a legal tie between her and X.671  
In conclusion, the Court held that “given that transsexuality raises complex scientific, legal, 
moral and social issues, in respect of which there is no generally shared approach among the 
Contracting States”, Article 8 could not, in this context, be interpreted as implying a positive 
obligation on the State to legally recognise as the father of a child someone who is not his/her 
biologic father.672 No separate issue was found to stem from the applicants’ complaint under 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 and, accordingly, it was not considered.673 As envisaged 
in the introductory chapter, the application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation was 
grounded on the rule of consensus. The establishment of the latter, however, does not come from 
a detailed and clear assessment.  
Literally, the Court refers to “the information available to the Court” 674 – presumably, the 
submissions of the parties and the Commission’s assessment – as the only basis for finding a 
limited common ground among the Contracting States. Apart from failing to substantiate its 
statement through reference to the exact sources of knowledge or comparative data relied on, the 
conclusion that there was little common ground clashes not only with the evidence put forward by 
the applicants, but also with the account provided by the Commission. As reported in the judgment, 
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the Commission had observed “a clear trend”675 among the Contracting States towards the legal 
recognition of gender reassignment; and, consequently, it had argued in favour of a presumption 
of legal recognition to the advantage of a post-operative transsexual who lived as part of a family 
relationship.676  
Furthermore, the conclusion reached in X, Y and Z appears “shaky at best”,677 especially in 
light of the subsequent decision in Goodwin v UK, where the Court chose to attach less importance 
to the absence of a common European approach, than to the “clear and uncontested evidence of a 
continuing international trend in favour (…) of increased social acceptance of transsexuals”.678 
Following the binary classification of the margin of appreciation proposed by Letsas, the doctrine 
in this case is used in its substantive version: it is indeed invoked to settle a tension between 
individual rights and collective interests.679 Leaving aside the obscure method used to ascertain 
the lack of consensus, the award of a wide margin has led to lowering the standard of review. 
Although most part of the reasoning is centred upon the test of proportionality and, accordingly, 
is invested to determine whether a fair balance had been struck between the fundamental freedoms 
of the applicants and public interests, the actual focus is on how difficulties faced by the applicants 
can be alleviated, not on their disadvantages per se. 
With regards to the interests of the parties, the Court seems to be concerned with how to 
treat transsexuals rather than with how to recognise children’s family ties.680 Therefore, despite 
being one of the applicants, the best interests of Z were not given adequate attention; at best, they 
were mostly considered as overlapping with the interests of the adults. Judge Pettiti also expressed 
this concern in his concurring opinion, which was echoed by Judge Gotchev,681 in his dissenting 
opinion. Possibly aware of the criticism generally brought to ART regulation (both legislative and 
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judicial) as prioritising the interests of adults to the detriment of those of the resulting child, Judge 
Pettiti contested that the reasoning of the majority was excessively based on the personal demands 
of X and Y alone and on balancing the advantages and disadvantages deriving from amending, or 
not, Z’s civil status. Furthermore, he argued that assuming that Z shared the exact same interests 
of her parents obscured the existence of a potential conflict of interests among them: the legal 
recognition of X as Z’s father might, in his opinion, run counter Z’s potential interest to know his 
biological parentage. 
From a more substantive viewpoint, the finding of no violation clarifies that the 
establishment of family life requires less than what is needed to be granted the full legal status of 
fatherhood. While it is sufficient for the purposes of family life, the presence of close social ties 
does not apparently reach the threshold of legal fatherhood. Moreover, the Court seems to argue 
that a denial of legal fatherhood per se does not constitute a violation of family life. Having regard 
to the considerations of the Court throughout the second stage of analysis, the finding of no 
violation seems to be justified by the fact that the needs of a child can be adequately met regardless 
of the provision of legal recognition. However, this clashes with what was established in Marckx, 
as the Court itself observes. Thus, one of the most suspicious passages of this judgment specifically 
relates to the failed extension of the positive obligation to introduce legal safeguards to ensure the 
child’s integration into his family (as established in Marckx) to the case of X, Y and Z.  
The Court distinguishes between these two cases along two interrelated lines: the lack of a 
biological link between X and Z and the fact that X is a post-operative transsexual. In so arguing, 
the Court affirms that, although a relationship might fall within the notion of family life under 
Article 8, the positive obligation to respect such family life benefits only those linked by biological 
ties. Besides the lack of a biological connection, what might have actually hindered the finding of 
a violation of Article 8 is X’s gender identity and the lack of a marital or otherwise formalised 
union between X and Y, as not sanctioned by the law at the material time. By arguing that the legal 
amendment sought by the applicants would stand in contradiction with the legal impossibility for 
transsexuals to marry, the Court seems to indirectly privilege marital fatherhood. In other words, 
in addition to reserving the respect for family life to biological ties, the Court seems to have further 
conditioned the establishment of a legal connection between X and Z upon the existence of a 
marital union between X and Y.   




the Court seems to reject the indispensability of a biological link by implicitly (establishing family 
life between them) arguing that a ‘parent’ is not necessarily the person who procreates, but the 
person who acts as such in a social sense.682 In so doing, the Court brings its contribution to the 
already intense debate of social versus biological parenthood with respect to the best interests of 
the child.683 More precisely, the Court pushes the definition of family life beyond the conventional 
boundaries of biology by endorsing a functional-based test of intentionality and, implicitly, 
conveys the message that care is all that matters.  
However, when it comes to the conferral of legal fatherhood (second stage of analysis), 
care is no longer sufficient; rather, biology and marriage are restated as bases for granting legal 
fatherhood. The lack of a biological link between X and Z as well as the absence of a formalized 
relationship between X and Y – both consequences of X’s gender identity – emerge as the factors 
that impeded the application of the Marckx’s judgment to the present case and, therefore, the 
obligation to provide the ties between X and Z with legal recognition. As a result, X and, more 
generally, transsexuals are put in a special category due to their gender identity. The discriminatory 
dimension of the case was acknowledged by, possibly, the most powerful dissenting opinion. 
Judge Foighel pointed out that the text of Article 8 – “everyone has the right to respect for private 
and family life (…)” – encompasses transsexuals.684 To prove the discriminatory nature of the 
case, Judge Foighel observed that had X been biologically male, he would have been entitled to 
register as a father despite the lack of a biological link with Z under Article 28(3) of HFEA 1990.685 
As a result, at least according to his interpretation, it was X’s gender identity more than the absence 
of a biological link with Z that informed the majority’s finding of no violation.     
Regarding the applicants’ complaint under Article 14, the Court considered it as a mere 
restatement of the complaint under Article 8 and, therefore, held that it was not necessary to 
investigate the issue again. 686   Apart from failing to examine the case through the lens of 
discrimination, the Court itself endorses a discriminatory attitude against post-operative 
transsexuals. The finding of no violation signals the Court’s attachment to a conventional 
understanding of fatherhood, at many levels: the absence of a biological connection was expressly 
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identified as justifying the failed recognition of X’s and Z’s social tie (as a result of the non-
application of the positive obligation established in Marckx); similarly, although less explicitly, 
X’s gender identity, his consequential departure from heteronormativity and, further, his 
impossibility to comply with the ideal of marital fatherhood seem to have played a decisive role 
in dismissing the applicants’ request to recognise X as the legal father of Z.   
What prevented a full departure from the traditional ideology of fatherhood is the 
problematic use of its precedent in Marckx. This attitude, as argued by Kilkelly, seems to reflect 
the Court’s broader tendency to water down positive obligations when the family life at issue 
involves unconventional families.687 In other words, although the Court has demonstrated a strong 
awareness of the importance of formally recognising family ties, it has failed to extend this 
approach equally to all types of relationships.688 In this case, the Court seems to accept some 
differential treatment with respect to positive obligations not only in light of the unconventional 
features of the family at stake, but also on the basis of the absence of a European consensus on the 
issue. Thus, the lack of consensus and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation ultimately served 
to justify the non-application of the positive obligation to provide existing ties with legal 
recognition and, as such, supported the Court’s persistent attachment to a conventional ideology 
of fatherhood.     
2.2 Surrogacy Cases: A Chance to Revise the Approach Taken in X, Y and Z v UK 
The Court has been recently called on to deliberate on the implications of international surrogacy 
arrangements on the right to respect for private and family life of both the intended parents and 
the surrogacy-born children. In the cases of Mennesson v France689 and Labassee v. France,690 the 
applicants – namely the couple and the child(ren) born overseas as a result of surrogacy - failed to 
secure recognition under French law of the legal parent-child relationship that had been legally 
established in the US.691 The refusal to enter the birth certificates of the surrogacy-born children 
in the French register of births was ultimately justified by the Court of Cassation on the ground 
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that recording such entries would give effect to a surrogacy agreement that was null and void on 
public-policy grounds under the French Civil Code.  
Relying on Article 8, the applicants complained that, to the detriment of the children’s best 
interests, their inability to obtain recognition under French law of the parent-child relationships 
established abroad between them breached the right to respect for their private and family life.692 
Moreover, in the case of Mennesson, it was further argued that, as a consequence of the refusal to 
grant legal recognition of their family ties, the children were discriminated against with respect to 
their right to respect for family life, thus violating Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.693     
When declaring the applicability of Article 8, the Court expressly referred to its previous 
judgment in the case of X, Y and Z and reaffirmed that it is the existence of concrete relationships 
between the individuals concerned that leads to family life.694 In both cases, it was noted that the 
first two applicants acted as parents towards the third applicants since their birth and that they all 
lived together in conditions that could not be distinguished from ‘family life’ in the accepted 
meaning of the term.695 Therefore, the Court held that the refusal of the French authorities to 
legally recognise the family ties among the applicants constituted an interference with their right 
to respect for their family life. It was also argued that the ‘private life’ limb of Article 8 was 
applicable, as the right to identity was an integral component of one’s private life and, therefore, 
there was a strong link between the children’s right to respect for private life and the determination 
of their legal parentage. Similar to Z, it must be noted that the applicant children in Mennesson 
and Labassee were only partially genetically related to their social parents; in fact, they had been 
conceived via IVF using the gametes of their father and the eggs of a donor.  
When examining whether this interference was justified, the Court accepted that the refusal 
to recognise parent-child relationships between children born abroad from surrogacy and the 
intended parents pursued two legitimate aims under Article 8(2) – namely, the protection of health 
and protection of the rights and freedoms of others – as it sought to deter nationals from employing 
ART prohibited in France and, finally, to protect children and surrogate mothers.696 Nonetheless, 
the refusal was ultimately considered unnecessary in a democratic society, at least with respect to 
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the children’s right to respect for family life. Before embarking on the balancing exercise, the 
Court stressed the lack of a European consensus on the lawfulness of surrogacy arrangements or 
on the legal recognition of the relationship between the commissioning parents and children 
conceived abroad.697  
The absence of consensus, together with the sensitive ethical questions raised by surrogacy, 
would – in principle – call for a wide margin of appreciation and, therefore, make the prohibition 
of surrogacy under French law compatible with the Convention.698 However, since the identity of 
individuals was at stake, it was argued that its width needed to be reduced.699 Therefore, by 
differentiating between the right to respect for family life and for private life, the Court moulds 
the limits of the margin of appreciation depending on whether the parents or the children are 
involved, possibly with the aim of adopting an approach more cautious and respectful of national 
choices. 
The Court also had to examine whether a fair balance had been struck between the interests 
of the State and those of the individuals directly concerned, with particular reference to the 
fundamental principle according to which, whenever the situation of children is at stake, their best 
interests are paramount. 700  When applying the proportionality test, the Court distinguished 
between the impact of the lack of recognition under French law on the applicants’ right to respect 
for their family life and on the right of the children to respect for their private life, respectively.701 
Concerning the former, the Court concluded that the national judges had succeeded in striking a 
fair balance between the interests of the applicants and those of the State.  
Indeed, as argued by the Court, despite the refusal to register the birth certificate in the 
French register, the applicants did not face any insurmountable obstacle to the daily enjoyment of 
their family life in France: they were all able to settle in France shortly after the birth of the 
children, they “are able to live together in conditions broadly comparable to those of other 
families” and there is nothing to suggest a risk of separation.702 Different to the judgment in 
Marckx and others (for example, Johnston v Ireland and Kroon and Others v the Netherlands), the 
Court relativizes and quickly dismisses the difficulties encountered by the applicants as a result of 
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a lack of legal recognition by noting that, their living conditions were, in fact, similar to those 
enjoyed by other families. In so doing, the Court seems to reiterate the controversial approach 
adopted in the case of X, Y and Z: in other words, there is family life between the applicants but 
no positive obligation on the State to protect it. Moreover, in line with its previous judgment, the 
lack of a European consensus contributes to justifying differential treatment with respect to 
positive obligations.  
On the contrary, when assessing the alleged interference with the children’s right to respect 
for private life, the Court stressed that these children were left in a position of legal uncertainty, 
which undermined their identity within French society.703 As a result, their right to respect for 
private life, according to which everyone shall be able to establish details of their identity, 
including their legal parentage, was significantly compromised.704 The deprivation of recognition 
of their legal affiliation under French law was, therefore, found to run contrary to the children’s 
best interests.705  
The Court went on to state that this analysis acquires a “special dimension” when one of 
the intended parents is also the child’s biological parent, like in the present case.706  Given the 
importance of biological parentage as a component of identity, the Court argued that depriving a 
child of the legal recognition of his/her biological parentage cannot be considered to be in the 
child’s best interests.707 Therefore, it was concluded that, by preventing the establishment and 
recognition of the children’s legal tie with their biological father, France had overstepped its 
margin of appreciation, thus violated the children’s right to respect for private life.708 In view of 
this violation, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the applicants’ complaint under Article 
14. 
Overall, the Court’s judgment seems to reflect an underlying compromise: it is not possible 
to confer a right to become parents on those who have deliberately gone abroad to circumvent a 
prohibition under national law, but the resulting children should not suffer the adverse 
consequences of the decision of their intended parents.709  However, the bilateral nature of a 
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filiation tie makes it difficult to punish parents without encroaching on the children at the same 
time.710 As a result, by attempting to reconcile irreconcilable needs, the Court ends up delivering 
a judgment that, although appearing prima facie “particularly balanced”, 711  proposes a quite 
limited conception of filiation and, consequently, of parenthood.712  
Indeed, although with respect to the children’s private life, the Court seems to favour a 
biological conception of fatherhood as compatible with the child’s best interests. In other words, 
according to the value system of the Court (which, in these cases, came to a unanimous decision), 
the legal recognition of biological parentage is a prerequisite for ensuring the respect for the 
children’s private life and, more generally, the realisation of their best interests. This vision of the 
best interests of the child serves, therefore, to restate a conventional understanding of parenthood 
and, more precisely, a biological conception of fatherhood, in line with Théry’s warning raised in 
Chapter 1.713  
Although the violation is found from the children’s perspective, it inevitably has positive 
implications for the biological fathers, too. However, by disregarding the bilateral nature of a 
filiation tie and holding that the rights of children and those of parents can be seen as independent, 
the Court let believe that it is possible, through the recognition of the father-child tie, to pursue the 
child’s best interests and to protect his right to respect for private life with no spillover on the 
father’s right to respect for family life.714 The distinction made between the two limbs of Article 8 
seems, therefore, more artificial than real. Indeed, the benefits of the legal recognition of biological 
fatherhood – which is the remedy suggested by the Court – do not stop at protecting the children’s 
right to an identity, but go as far as to formally acknowledge an existing social tie between the 
father and the child.715     
On the contrary, the Court’s finding does not help the mother at all, since she is not 
biologically related to the children. Rather, the emphasis on biology inevitably attributes a lower 
status to the intended mother, although she was involved in the parental project and enjoys social 
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ties with the children as much as the father. In conditioning the recognition of the father-child 
relationship upon biology and, even before, in finding no violation with respect to the applicants’ 
right to respect for family life, the Court underestimates the social dimension of filiation and 
parenthood. As a result, the judgments in Mennesson and Labassee do not simply oppose, but 
rather invite States to differentiate between motherhood and fatherhood on grounds of biology.  
In light of the above, it seems that, had the children been totally genetically-unrelated to 
their social parents, a violation of Article 8 was not going to be found. However, having regard to 
the Chamber’s judgment in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy, this no longer seems to 
be the case. This recent decision – although not yet final (referral to the Grand Chamber pending) 
– is of particular interest, as the intended parents had no biological link with the surrogacy-born 
child. The applicants – husband and wife who had resorted to surrogacy in Russia – complained 
that the child’s removal from them and the refusal to acknowledge the parent-child relationship 
established abroad by registering the child’s birth certificate in Italy amounted to a violation of 
their right to respect for family life.  
The facts are definitely more dramatic than those in Mennesson and Labassee, as the child 
had been taken away from the intended parents and placed under guardianship on the basis of the 
DNA test that indicated no link between the child and the couple. When considering the 
applicability of Article 8, the Court notes that the applicants spent the first stages of the child’s life 
with him: six months in Italy, starting from his third month of life and, before then, the intended 
mother had already spent some weeks with the child in Russia.716 Therefore, despite the short 
period of time, the Court concluded that the applicants had acted as parents towards the child and, 
therefore, de facto family links existed between them.717  
Although, in all three cases, the applicants complained of the national authorities’ refusal 
to recognise their parent-child relationships established abroad, the primary issue upon which the 
Court focuses in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli is the child’s removal from the couple and 
his placement under guardianship.718 In so doing, the Court, once again, chooses not to analyse the 
case as one involving positive obligations and, therefore, does not consider the interpretation of 
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Article 8 as implying the obligation on the State to formally recognise de facto family ties and to 
protect their integrity. Notwithstanding this shortcoming in its interpretation, it still finds the 
child’s placement for adoption disproportionate and, consequently, a violation of Article 8.  
More specifically, when examining whether a fair balance had been struck between the 
public interest and the applicants’ rights under Article 8(1), the Court reiterated the principle 
according to which, whenever the situation of a child is at stake, his/her best interests are 
paramount.719 It was further stated that the principle of the best interests of the child implies that 
family ties can be broken only in very exceptional circumstances, like when there is a need to 
protect the child from an immediate danger (such as, violence), and that States must take the child’s 
best interests into account, “regardless of the nature of the parental relationship, genetic or 
otherwise”.720 In light of this, the Court concluded that the national authorities had not attached 
sufficient weight to the best interests of the child, when balancing them against public-policy 
considerations, thus breaching the applicants’ right to respect for their private and family life.721 
Different to the cases against France, the Court explicitly detaches the best interests of the 
child from his/her biological parentage. Although a violation of Article 8 is found on the ground 
of the child’s removal and his placement under guardianship (different from the Mennesson and 
Labassee cases), the Court seems to argue that the right to respect for family life and, more 
specifically, the right to have de facto ties preserved, does not presuppose the existence of a 
biological connection. Therefore, over a period of almost twenty years, we can observe a gradual 
dismissal of the conventional understanding of fatherhood, which anchors the protection of the 
right to respect for private and family life to biological parentage.  
In X, Y and Z, the Court explicitly invoked the lack of a biological link between X and Y 
(as a distinguishing factor between the case under consideration and the precedent in Marckx and, 
as such) as a justification for not interpreting Article 8 as implying an obligation to formally 
recognise de facto family ties. Similarly, in the cases of Mennesson and Labassee, the existence 
of a biological link between the intended fathers and the surrogacy-born children proved decisive 
for finding a violation of Article 8, although from the children’s private life perspective. Finally, 
in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli, any relevance of the biological connection to determine 
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who is entitled to protection under Article 8 is explicitly ruled out. A father and a child who enjoy 
de facto family ties are considered worthy of protection under Article 8, regardless of their 
biological unrelatedness. As such, the conclusion reached in 1997 is overturned in 2015.   
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the Court had dismissed the couple’s application on 
behalf of the child for lack of standing, referring to the fact that they had no biological link with 
the child and they could not represent him before domestic courts.722 Notwithstanding the issue of 
standing, the Court found that de facto family life existed among them and, more importantly, it 
took the rights of the child into consideration in reaching its conclusion. Indeed, the Court insisted 
on, inter alia, the fact that the child was deprived of any existence for more than two years (since 
he was denied identity papers until April 2013) to argue that his best interests had not been given 
due regard, thus finding a violation.723  
To conclude, in none of the surrogacy cases did the Court explicitly refer to the nature and 
length of the relationship between the intended parents. In the French cases, legal fatherhood has 
been expressly constructed by virtue of Mr Mennesson’s and Mr Labassee’s biological tie with 
their children. Nonetheless, the lack of any explicit mention to the father-mother relationship 
should not be read as signifying the irrelevance of this factor in finding a violation, especially in 
the case against Italy. Rather, given that, in all three cases, the intended parents were married, the 
Court might have simply found it superfluous to spell out the existence of a formalised and stable 
union between the intended parents as one of the factors leading to establishment of family life 
among the applicants. 
However, it is interesting to note that, in the case of Paradiso and Campanelli, the Court 
stressed the importance of taking the emotional aspects of the case into consideration. 724  In 
particular, it mentions that that the couple had applied for adoption; once considered suitable to 
adopt in 2006, they had to wait for several years due to the limited number of available children 
for adoption; and, hopeless, they decided to undertake a surrogacy agreement in 2010.725 Having 
regard to the three key elements of family life identified in X, Y and Z – namely, cohabitation, 
length and presence of children – one might argue that the couple’s intention and commitment to 
having children as demonstrated by applying for adoption and, subsequently, by resorting to cross-
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border surrogacy might have played a role in classifying their relationship with the child as ‘family 
life’, despite the short period of cohabitation, and ultimately in finding a violation.  
2.3 Evans v the UK726 and Dickson v the UK727: Fatherhood as a Unitary Status 
In July 2000, Natalie Evans (the applicant) and her partner, J., commenced fertility treatment at 
the Bath Assisted Conception Clinic, in the UK. In October 2001, during an appointment at the 
clinic, the applicant was diagnosed with pre-cancerous tumours in both ovaries and was offered 
one cycle of IVF treatment prior to the surgical removal of her ovaries. On the same occasion, a 
nurse explained that the applicant and J. would each be required to sign a consent form to undergo 
the treatment and that, in compliance with the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (‘HFEA 1990’), it would be possible for either of them to withdraw his or 
her consent at any time prior to the implantation of the embryos in the applicant’s uterus. Being 
aware of this bright-line rule, the applicant considered whether she should opt for freezing her 
unfertilized eggs but J. reassured her that their relationship was not going to break down and that 
he wanted to be the father of her child.  
In November 2001, the couple underwent IVF treatment and, as a result, six embryos were 
created and placed in storage. Two weeks later, the operation to remove the applicant’s ovaries 
was performed and she was told she would need to wait for two years before attempting any 
embryo’s implantation in her uterus. In May 2002, the relationship between the applicant and J. 
ended. He promptly informed the clinic of the separation and requested the embryos to be 
destroyed. Consequently, the clinic notified the applicant of J.’s withdrawal of consent to the 
continued storage and use of the embryos by the applicant and informed her that it was under a 
legal obligation to destroy them. 
The applicant commenced proceedings before the High Court and sought an injunction 
requiring J. to restore his consent. Her claims were dismissed because J. was found to act in good 
faith, as he had embarked on the treatment under the assumption that his relationship with the 
applicant would continue. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal, which reiterated that 
J. had only ever consented to undergoing ‘treatment together’ with the applicant. Given the clarity 
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of the statute, it was never likely that the national courts would interpret it to her advantage.728 
Since leave for appeal was refused by the House of Lords, the applicant lodged an application with 
the ECtHR and contented that the consent rules included in the HFEA 1990 breached Articles 2, 
8 and 14 in conjunction with Article 8.729  
More specifically, she argued that, since her ovaries had been removed to fight cancer, the 
embryos at stake represented her only chance to have a child to whom she would be biologically 
related.730 As a result, J.’s withdrawal of consent would inevitably thwart her life’s ambition to 
become a mother. In response to her claims, the Government submitted that the 1990 Act aimed 
at promoting a number of interrelated interests, including the woman’s right to self-determination 
in respect of pregnancy once the embryo was implanted and the primacy of freely given and 
informed consent to medical intervention.731 Moreover, it noted that the absence of a common 
European ground as well as the challenges inherent in striking a balance between the competing 
interests of two individuals justified a wide margin of appreciation with regards to the point at 
which a sperm donor should be allowed to withdraw his consent.  
In summary, the Chamber stated the applicability of Article 8 on the ground that the notion 
of ‘private life’ encompasses the right to respect for both the decisions to become or not become 
a parent. Different from the domestic proceedings, it classified the case as one involving positive 
obligations, rather than an interference by the State with the applicant’s right to respect for private 
life. The ensuing issue was, therefore, whether Article 8 entailed a positive obligation on States to 
ensure that a woman, who has undergone IVF treatment for the specific purpose of having a 
genetically-related child, is allowed to proceed to implantation regardless of the withdrawal of 
consent by her former partner. Given the lack of an international and European consensus with 
respect to the regulation of IVF treatment, the use of resulting embryos and related ethical and 
moral issues, the Chamber granted a wide margin of appreciation to the Respondent State and 
concluded that the absence of a power to override a genetic parent’s withdrawal of consent did not 
exceed this margin.  
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Once before the Grand Chamber, both parties reiterated their previous claims. In addition, 
the applicant pointed out that a significant difference existed between the emotional and physical 
investment of the female party and the male’s contribution to the process of IVF (mere sperm 
donation).732 This factor, in her opinion, should have prevented J. from suddenly abandoning the 
project, without even providing an explanation for his change of mind. 733  Moreover, she 
complained of discrimination contrary to Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8. In this regard, 
she contended that, under HFEA 1990, a woman who could naturally procreate was subject to no 
control over the embryos developed from the moment of fertilisation, while herself and any other 
woman conceiving via IVF was subject to the will of the sperm donor.734      
The Grand Chamber began by observing that the complexity and intricacy of the case, 
which derived from the existing tension between two mutually exclusive interests and, therefore, 
two irreconcilable positions.735 In fact, if the applicant was permitted to use the embryos, J. would 
have been “forced to become a father”.736 Similarly, due to her health conditions, her desire to 
have her own biological child risked being frustrated by J.’s withdrawal of consent.737 The Court 
found it important to underline that the applicant was not otherwise prevented from becoming a 
mother in a social, legal and even physical sense.738 In addition to the two private interests, the 
Grand Chamber argued that the UK legislation was also meant to serve public interests, such as 
upholding the principle of the primacy of consent and promoting legal clarity and certainty.739    
Once reiterated that the question at stake was whether the consent provisions of the HFEA 
1990 struck a fair balance between the conflicting public and private interests concerned, the first 
step consisted in determining the applicability of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in the 
Evans case. Firstly, it was held that, when a particularly fundamental aspect of an individual’s 
existence or identity is concerned, the afforded margin will be narrow.740 However, this rule allows 
for exceptions whenever there is no consensus among the Member States of the Council of Europe, 
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concerning either the importance of the interest at stake or the best means of protection.741 Another 
exceptional situation, which calls for a wide margin of appreciation, is when the State is required 
to strike a balance between conflicting private and public interests or Convention rights. 742        
Having regard to the present circumstances, therefore, the Grand Chamber concluded that 
the Respondent State ought to be afforded a wide margin of appreciation in light of the morally 
and ethically delicate nature of the questions at stake, in conjunction with the lack of a uniform 
European stance in the context of IVF. In order to substantiate its finding, the Grand Chamber 
noted that, whilst IVF is regulated by primary and secondary legislation in a number of European 
States (for example, in Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Switzerland, the and the United Kingdom, etc.), others (like Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Malta, 
Poland, etc.) have left the matter to medical practice and guidelines.743 In addition, even among 
the former group, national legislation provides for different practices concerning the storage of 
embryos as well as the time limits for a potential withdrawal of consent. For instance, in Germany 
and Italy, fertilization represents the point at which both parties become unable to withdraw 
consent.744 Differently, in Denmark, Greece, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, the parties’ 
consent becomes irrevocable at the time of implantation.745 Furthermore, the Grand Chamber 
insisted on the difficulty in comparing the effects on J. to be forced into fatherhood and the 
consequences on the applicant of being deprived the opportunity to have her own biological child 
by referring to a divided jurisprudence in the US and Israel.746 
Moreover, the Court placed emphasis on the origins of the HFEA – in particular, on the 
fact that its formulation was preceded and accordingly informed by an in-depth examination of the 
social, ethical and legal consequences of medical progress in the domains of human fertilization 
and embryology. 747  Against the applicant’s criticism that the rules on consent could not be 
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disapplied under any circumstances, the Grand Chamber held that the absolute character of the 
national legislation did not breach Article 8 per se. Rather, the legislature’s decision to enact the 
contested bright-line was justified by the aim of ensuring a balance between the parties involved 
in IVF as well as respect for human dignity and free will. Further, the absolute nature of the rule 
was to be praised for promoting legal certainty, thus avoiding inconsistencies inherent in balancing 
on a case-by-case basis.748 
Despite its great sympathy for the applicant’s particularly delicate situation, the Court 
concluded that Natalie Evans’ right to respect her desire to become a biological mother should not 
have been accorded greater weight than J.’s interest not to become a father.749 Therefore, given the 
absence of a European consensus on the matter, the fact that the national rules reached a fair 
equilibrium between the competing interests and had been brought to the attention of the applicant, 
the majority of the Grand Chamber (thirteen votes to four) concluded that no violation of Article 
8 had occurred.750 Concerning the applicant’s complaint under Article 14, the Court considered 
that no separate analysis was needed because the reasons underlying the finding of no violation of 
Article 8 could also provide for a justification under Article 14.751      
If compared to the previous case-law, the position of J. is certainly peculiar. While in X, Y 
and Z v the UK and in the surrogacy cases, the applicants wished to be recognised as the legal 
fathers of their children by virtue of their commitment to and involvement in their children’s life, 
in the Evans case, J. wishes to resist fatherhood and, accordingly, opposes the use of his genetic 
material by his former partner for her own purposes. However, a similar idea of what it entails to 
be a father cuts across all three narratives. J. had explained his withdrawal of consent to prevent a 
situation where his biological child was not actively raised by himself, together with the child’s 
mother.752  His decision was not driven by the legal and financial burdens of fatherhood; he 
clarified that “his clear position was one of fundamental rather than purely financial objection”.753 
Therefore, his understanding of fatherhood fits perfectly within the model of ‘new fatherhood’: he 
refuses the limited view of fatherhood as a legal status accompanied by financial responsibilities 
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and describes fatherhood as a more hands-on and responsible role.754  
More importantly, by stating that the implantation of the embryos in the applicant’s uterus 
would have necessarily forced J. to become a father, the Court seems to fail to understand the 
variety of subtleties and nuances enclosed in the concept of fatherhood and might have missed a 
great opportunity to realise the ongoing fragmentation of fatherhood and to reconsider what being 
a father requires and entails. Arguably, the above statement might simply mean that, according to 
the Court, fatherhood – whether it means care or provision – must be freely chosen. An alternative 
reading, however, might reveal the Court’s sharing of the same concern of J. and, consequently, 
its efforts to promote the indivisibility of fatherhood.  
Although not explicitly recognised by the Court, it is widely agreed that pregnancy has 
different implications for men and women.755 Men can choose to walk away from it and undertake 
no more than the minimum responsibilities established by law – such as, financial provision.756 
Apart from deciding the extent of their involvement following the sexual intercourse, the 
possibility for fathers to have an ‘opt-in/opt-out’ relationship with their children remains 
throughout this period.757 Differently, women are forced to bear greater responsibilities as a result 
of pregnancy. Walking away entails legal and psychological challenges; and, later, they undertake 
a disproportionate share of child rearing.758  
IVF creates a lapse of time between conception and pregnancy. In the case of Evans, it is 
clear that this specific timeframe enabled J. to exercise a level of control over his procreation, 
which he would not have enjoyed in case of natural reproduction. During the period where the 
embryo is temporarily placed outside the woman’s body, it seems possible to allow the male 
gamete provider to have a say on the future of the embryo without interfering with the woman’s 
physical integrity.759 The Court seems to embrace this very approach. Until when allowed by ART, 
the Court takes the chance to promote gender equality in the sphere of reproductive decision-
making by conceptualising fatherhood as a unitary status (‘all or nothing’), thus bringing the 
position of J. closer to the indivisibility of motherhood. The emerging definition of fatherhood 
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would therefore be an all-encompassing one, which adds nurture to the conventional feature of 
biology, heterosexuality and the existence of a stable relationship (if not marriage) between the 
biological parents. No intermediate forms of fatherhood seem to be conceivable in the Court’s 
mind.    
However, treating the parties as entirely alike amounted to denying the gendered reality of 
their lives.760 In the context of infertility treatments and, more generally, in the procreation domain, 
men and women are not easily comparable.761 In the present case, the statute did not openly 
discriminate between men and women; however, its consequences on men and women were de 
facto different. This explains why the best way for the applicant to challenge the UK legislation 
was possibly to insist on the discriminatory dimension of her situation and, more specifically, 
argue that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex.762 If J. had testicular cancer, he 
would not have faced the same challenges posed by ovarian cancer to Ms Evans.763 He could have 
simply stored his sperm through a fairly safe and uncomplicated procedure, with no need to create 
and store embryos.764 At the time Ms Evans received treatment, the state of medical science made 
it easier for sperms to be stored and successfully used later, than it was for egg cells.765 Indeed, no 
successful pregnancy had ever resulted from stored eggs; therefore, embryo storage represented 
Ms Evans’ only viable option.766 On this basis, it would have been relatively easy for the Court to 
conclude that the UK legislation violated Article 14.767 However, the Court refused to confront the 
discriminatory dimension of the case.  
The Court, however, seems to believe that compelling J. to father a child against his will is 
equivalent to compelling Evans to carry one against hers.768 Accordingly, the fact that J. cannot 
force Evans to undergo invasive and undesired ART treatment and carry an unwanted pregnancy 
to create a child for him to raise was perceived directly comparable to the fact that Evans could 
not insist on using the embryos and creating a genetic child of J. against his own will.769 A similar 
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policy of formal equality entails what Collier and Sheldon calls the risk of geneticisation: it focuses 
exclusively on genetic links, thus treating men’s and women’s contributions to a child as equal, at 
the expense of any consideration for gestation.770 A similar argument was brought forward by the 
dissenting judges, according to whom the circumstances of the case required to “look beyond the 
mere question of consent in a contractual sense”.771 In their joint opinion, the values and issues 
called into question by the particular situation of Ms Evans weighed heavily against the contractual 
approach adopted by the majority. 772  
Along the same lines, the dissenting judges criticised the majority’s use of the doctrine of 
the margin of appreciation as a “merely pragmatic substitute for a thought-out approach to the 
problem of proper scope of review”.773 In so doing, the majority abstained from exercising its 
supervisory role and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation was eventually accorded normative 
force in striking a fair balance between the interests and rights involved. With particular regard to 
this issue, rather than undertaking its own review, the Court does no more than underline the 
comprehensive nature of the debates preceding the entering into force of HFEA 1990 and restates 
the legitimate considerations which informed the formulation of the rules on consent. On the 
positive side, however, the assessment of a European consent was taken seriously. The Court 
demonstrated the absence of a uniform approach to the issue of IVF by developing a comparative 
analysis that effectively documented the variety of ways through which IVF was dealt with within 
the Member States of the Council of Europe and beyond.774  
Another concern underlying the dismissal of Evans’ application might reflect the Court’s 
attachment to the bi-parental family model and, therefore, to an understanding of fatherhood that 
is derivative from his relationship with the child’s mother. In other words, the Court seems to 
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favour marital fatherhood, broadly interpreted as fatherhood that depends on existing marital or 
similar ties between father and mother. Arguably, the dissolved relationship between Evans and J. 
was interpreted as further discouraging the continuation of a parental project, which, at least in the 
eyes of the Court, appeared incomplete as involving a poor version of fatherhood. The Court’s 
privileging of marital fatherhood is also confirmed by its judgment in Dickson v UK (which was 
decided in the same year as Evans), where the existence of a marital tie between the applicants 
proved decisive in finding the refusal to grant access to artificial insemination (AI) techniques to 
a serving prisoner in breach of the applicants’ right to respect for private life.775  
The first applicant, Mr Dickson, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. The second applicant, Mrs Dickson, met her husband while she was also 
imprisoned. Subsequently, she was released and they married in 2001. Since the applicants desired 
to have a child, they applied for facilities for AI. Considering Mr Dickson’s earliest expected 
release date (scheduled for 2009) and Mrs Dickson’s age, the couple were unlikely to be able to 
have a child together without the employment of AI arrangements. Nonetheless, their application 
was eventually refused by the Secretary of State on the ground that, in accordance with the general 
policy, requests for artificial insemination by prisoners could only be granted in “exceptional 
circumstances”.   
Having exhausted all domestic remedies, the couple lodged an application with the 
Strasbourg Court arguing that the refusal of AI facilities breached their right to respect for private 
and family life guaranteed by Article 8 as well as their right to found a family under Article 12 of 
the Convention. In response, the Government based the justifiability of the contested policy on 
three distinct principles: losing the opportunity to beget children was an inevitable and necessary 
consequence of imprisonment; public confidence in the penal system would be compromised if 
the punitive and deterrent elements of a sentence were circumvented by allowing prisoners 
convicted of serious offences to conceive children; and the inevitable absence of one parent for a 
long period would have negative implications on the child and, consequently, on society as a 
whole. 
The Chamber held that, given the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State on this 
matter, the decision to refuse facilities for AI had not failed to strike a fair balance between the 
                                                        





interests involved, thus not breaching Article 8. This judgment was subsequently referred to the 
Grand Chamber for consideration, which attentively examined the three justifications advanced by 
the Government to support the policy’s consistency with the Convention. In relation to the first, it 
was held that the inability to procreate was not an inescapable consequence of imprisonment.776 
Secondly, there is no place under the Convention framework for the automatic forfeiture of rights 
by prisoners based merely on what might offend public opinion.777 Thirdly, the State’s positive 
obligations to guarantee the effective protection of children cannot go so far as to prevent a couple 
from attempting to conceive a child, particularly in circumstances similar to those of the present 
case.778 In fact, the second applicant was capable of taking care of the child until the husband was 
released.  
Regarding the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State, the Grand Chamber observed 
that, although more than half of the Contracting States provides for conjugal visits, the Court has 
not yet interpreted the Convention as requiring States to do so. Therefore, in line with the Chamber, 
it argued that this represents an area where States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in 
determining the means to ensure compliance, having regards to the needs of the individuals and of 
the community. However, the Court also argued that any real balancing exercise between the 
competing individual and public interests was excluded by the peculiar structure of the contested 
policy. More specifically, it was noted that the policy placed an extraordinarily high 
‘exceptionality’ burden on the applicants: they were required to prove that the refusal of access to 
AI would have prevented conception altogether as well as that their position was ‘exceptional’ 
within the meaning of the criteria of the policy.779 The high threshold that was consequently set by 
the policy ultimately precluded the assessment of the proportionality of the interference with the 
rights of the applicant, as required by the Convention.780 Given the fundamental importance of the 
matter for the applicants, the Grand Chamber concluded that the Respondent State had overstepped 
its margin of appreciation, since no fair balance between the conflicting interests had been 
struck.781 Accordingly, a violation of Article 8 of the Convention was found.  
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As argued by Burbergs, the judgment in Dickson further expanded the scope of Article 8 
by building on its previous judgment in Evans. More specifically, the right to respect the decision 
to become or not become a parent, established in the Evans case, developed into the right to choose 
to become a parent in the case of Dickson.782 A great deal of trust was accorded to the mere 
intention of Mr Dickson to become a parent, regardless of his strictly personal circumstances. Two 
interrelated considerations – both displaying the Court’s adherence to marital fatherhood – 
possibly underlie the Court’s conclusion: firstly, it must be noted that Mr Dickson and Mrs 
Dickson were married and their marital union might have conferred an extra layer of trust 
regarding his intention; secondly, the inconsistency of his inability to immediately act as a carer 
with the best interests of the child was considered capable of attenuation by virtue of the second 
applicant’s potential involvement since the very moment of birth. Accordingly, the Grand 
Chamber notes that Mrs Dickson is at liberty and therefore able to take care of the child, in 
anticipation of the husband’s release.783  
Different from the Evans case, biology is conceived as something that can exist separate 
from care. At least in the short-term, neither Mr Dickson nor the Grand Chamber seem to be 
inspired by the ideal of ‘new fatherhood’, thus conceiving fatherhood as a mere legal status  
grounded on a biological link and accompanied by financial burdens. It would almost seem that 
the recognition of Mr Dickson’s right to become a parent stems from the symbolic value of fathers 
in completing the nuclear family, rather than from the more concrete need to provide the child with 
a social father.784 Daily contact is not deemed necessary and indispensable for the exercise of a 
meaningful paternal role – at least, temporarily.785  
What is clear is that, at least for short-term purposes, the Court approves a traditional 
division of labour, which does not require the biological father to be present as a caretaker. 
Therefore, biological fatherhood – most likely, thanks to the coexistence of marital fatherhood – 
seems sufficient to get a parental project started. Had Mrs Dickson been the one longer in prison, 
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it remains to be ascertained whether a violation of Article 8 would be found and, if so, whether her 
reproductive contribution per se (provision of gametes followed by pregnancy and delivery) 
without the possibility to provide care would have been sufficient to make Mrs Dickson a legal 
mother.  
Moreover, despite her potentially crucial role for the child’s early development, the 
reasoning of the Court remained mainly concerned with the position of Mr Dickson and the welfare 
of the conceived child. The fact that AI techniques were likely to represent the last chance for Mrs 
Dickson to reproduce was acknowledged only en passant and, more generally, her Convention 
rights were not considered separately from those of her husband in the balancing exercise.786 
Possibly, in the Court’s opinion, interference with her rights was partially justified by the 
seriousness of her husband’s crime as if she was guilty by association.787       
Finally, it is interesting to draw a link between the opposite outcomes reached by the 
Chamber and Grand Chamber, respectively, and the application of the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation. Both panels of judges agreed on the need to award a wide margin of appreciation in 
light of the lack of European consensus on the issue whether prisoners should be allowed access 
to AI. What made the ultimate difference, therefore, were the implications of the doctrine on the 
standard of review. Having regard to the Chamber’s reasoning, the Court did no more than report 
on the careful consideration given to the particular circumstances of the applicants by the Secretary 
of State and the national courts, thus abstaining from its supervisory task.788 The employment of 
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation therefore resulted in a total deference to national 
perceptions and standards. Differently, although it forgot to consider the interests of the second 
applicant separately, the Grand Chamber assessed itself on whether a fair balance between 
competing private and public interests had been struck.789 Clearly, in this instance, the undertaking 
of a human rights review by the Court itself – as opposed to deference to national authorities – 
played a decisive role in finding a violation of Article 8.      
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3. Concluding Remarks: What Persists and What is Abandoned  
This concluding section will attempt to provide an answer to all the sub-questions that this thesis 
aims to address, as enumerated in the previous chapter (on page 80). Firstly, in light of the above 
jurisprudential analysis, it seems possible to conclude that the definition of fatherhood endorsed 
by the Court remains largely informed by the conventional paradigm, described in Chapter 1.  
Concerning the first set of cases – namely, those arising from post-birth claims – the Court has 
downplayed the importance of a biological link in making someone a legal father, which it 
reiterated as recently as in January 2015, on the occasion of the case of Paradiso and Campanelli 
v Italy (which, as anticipated, is not a final judgment).  
Prior to this, in the case of X, Y and Z, the Court had ruled out the precedent set down in 
Marckx on the basis that Z was not X’s biological child, as a result of the latter’s transsexuality. 
By virtue of this element, coupled with the absence of a European consensus, Article 8 did not 
trigger the positive obligation to ensure Z’s integration in his family through the legal recognition 
of the tie between X and Z. Hence, although not relevant to the finding of family life among the 
applicants, biology was reinserted as necessary to achieve legal fatherhood. Similarly, in the cases 
of Mennesson and Labassee, it was precisely the biological link existing between the intended 
father and the twins born as a result of surrogacy in the US that led to a violation of the children’s 
right to respect for family life under Article 8. Therefore, it is only in the case of Paradiso and 
Campanelli that the Chamber disentangles a father’s right to respect for his family life from the 
nature of his tie with a surrogacy-born child. In this case, the Court’s deviation from a biological 
understanding of fatherhood occurred in the name of the best interests of the child, which were 
interpreted as allowing the child to continue living with his intended parents with whom he enjoyed 
de facto family life, regardless of whether their social ties is backed up by biological relatedness 
or not.790  
The same departure cannot be observed in the second set of cases. The judgment in Evans 
is emblematic of the Court’s refusal to accept the reality of fragmented fatherhood. By supporting 
the English court’s decision to oppose the use of stored eggs by Evans following J.’s withdrawal 
of consent, the Court eventually conceptualises fatherhood as a status that is not susceptible to 
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disaggregation and that, in addition to biology, requires other circumstances, such as the provision 
of care within a dual parental family (aversion towards multi-parenthood). Similarly, in the case 
of Dickson, the biological contribution of a serving prisoner – coupled with his intention to become 
a father and his marital union with the prospective mother of the child – was taken as sufficient to 
get a parental project started. In other words, since Mr Dickson could contribute to conception by 
merely providing his sperm, refusing access to AI techniques amounted to depriving him of his 
right to become a parent through ART, as derived from Article 8.  
Despite the different approach to biology, all judgments under analysis seem to express a 
preference for the bi-parental family model – intended as the presence of two carers – and, 
accordingly, to support a marital or pseudo-marital understanding of fatherhood; in other words, 
the Court tends to constructs fatherhood as a corollary of his relationship with the child’s mother. 
This preference for a derivative conception of fatherhood explains why the Court reached two 
opposite outcomes in the cases of Evans and Dickson. Whilst the divergence of future plans 
between the two potential biological parents – Ms Evans and J. – ruled out the possibility for the 
child to be raised by a two-parent family, the promising family package in the case of Dickson 
seems to have contributed to the recognition of the right to become parents to Mr Dickson and Mrs 
Dickson.  
Different from Evans, where the potential biological father was no longer in a relationship 
with Ms Evans, Mr and Mrs Dickson enjoyed a formalised relationship accompanied by serious 
intentions to create a family together. In the case of Dickson, therefore, it is not necessarily true 
that biology per se was held sufficient to entail legal fatherhood; more likely, the promising family 
package and, more substantially, the marital relationship existing between the applicants enabled 
Mr Dickson to reach the threshold of legal fatherhood. The same attachment to a marital 
conception of fatherhood emerges also in the case of X, Y and Z, where the legal impossibility for 
X and Y to marry due to the former’s gender identity seems to have played a role in leading to the 
finding of non-violation of Article 8.  
Concerning the other two conventional features, while the relevance of breadwinning is 
not discussed in any of the analysed judgments, the Court’s attachment to a heteronormative 
conception of fatherhood is at the core of its decision in X, Y and Z. As explicitly acknowledged 
by the Court, the positive obligation to provide legal recognition to existing parent-child ties – 




as Z was not related, in the biological sense, to X, because of his transsexualism. Given the 
significant weight attached to the gender identity of the aspiring father, it seems possible to identify 
the enduring resistance of a heteronormative view of fatherhood, which presupposes alignment of 
biological sex, sexuality and gender identity. 
In addition to restating the relevance of biology (with the exception of the decision in 
Paradiso and Campanelli), heteronormativity and marriage, the Court adopts an increasingly 
broad definition of the notion of family life that, although grounded on the existence of close 
personal ties between the parents and their children, does not seem to require – at least in the case 
of Paradiso and Campanelli – more than six months of cohabitation. The establishment of family 
life being a requisite for discussing whether the applicant has a right to be legally recognised as 
the legal father of the child under Article 8, these judgments seem to indicate that legal fatherhood 
requires also the existence of close personal ties and, consequently, care. It appears, therefore, that 
the Court has become fond of the model of ‘new fatherhood’, whose new characteristic is a greater 
involvement in care in addition to traditional paternal roles. Therefore, ‘new fatherhood’, as 
perceived by the Court, does not necessarily imply a departure from the conventional paradigm. 
Rather, it is more likely to add new features to the traditional father figure. In this specific domain, 
this process resulted in no discount being made in relation to the requirement of biology (with the 
exception of Paradiso and Campanelli), marriage and heterosexuality, which seem to remain 
decisive for determining legal fatherhood. 
 Apart from grounding their complaints in Article 8, in the cases of X, Y and Z and Evans, 
the applicants also brought a discrimination claim to the attention of the Court. In the case of X, Y 
and Z, the applicants argued that had X been born a man, he could have been registered as Z’s 
legal father, in accordance with the law at the material time (HFEA 1990).791 Similarly, Ms Evans 
complained a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 on the ground that, while a 
woman who was able to conceive without medical assistance was not subject to any control 
concerning the development of the embryos after fertilisation, a woman who could conceive only 
via IVF was subject to the will of the sperm donor.792  However, the Court did not take the 
discriminatory dimension of these cases seriously. Indeed, in both cases, the Court held that there 
was no need to consider the complaint under Article 14, as the reasons supporting the finding of 
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non-violation of Article 8 could be used to address the other complaint as well. As a result, no 
trace of an anti-stereotyping approach can be found within the Court’s jurisprudence pertaining to 
ART.  
 Moving onto the interpretative tools employed, ART is an area where, given the delicate 
moral, ethical and social issues triggered by the employment of these techniques, coupled with the 
lack of a common European approach, the Court has proved quite generous in granting a wide 
margin of appreciation to the Contracting States. As previously observed, in the case of Paradiso 
and Campanelli, the Court did not focus on the issue of surrogacy, but on the removal of the child 
and his placement under guardianship. Still, the Court was of the opinion that national authorities 
enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in the field of adoption or when the need for placing a child 
in public care had to be evaluated.793  
As to the implications of the use of this doctrine, two main and interrelated points can be 
made. Firstly, the lack of a European consensus is used to justify differential treatment with respect 
to positive obligations.794 In the cases of X, Y and Z, Mennesson and Labassee, it seems that the 
Court did not feel prepared to extend the application of the positive obligations to provide legal 
recognition to de facto family ties and protect their integrity in the cases under scrutiny, especially 
in light of the absence of a consensus across Contracting States on issues related to transsexuality 
and surrogacy. Hence, the positive obligations doctrine does not seem to amount to a sufficiently 
convincing argument to triumph the absence of a European shared approach. Although this stance 
tends to be the reasoning offered for the conclusion of a non-violation, it appears that the extent to 
which positive obligations are deemed applicable varies also in accordance with the degree of 
adherence of the family to the conventional model.795 This is succinctly illustrated by the judgment 
in X, Y and Z, where the family life at issue involved a female-to-male transsexual, his female 
partner and her biological child conceived through sperm donation.   
Secondly, and possibly obviously, the finding of a violation depends on the standard of 
review undertaken by the Court – in other words, how strict is the Court’s assessment under Article 
8(2). When the resort to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has not lowered the standard of 
review, as it has been observed with respect to the judgments in Paradiso and Campanelli, Dickson 
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and Mennesson concerning the children’s right to respect for private life,796 the Court has found a 
violation. Differently, when granting a wide margin of appreciation resulted in total deference, like 
in the case of Evans, the Court concluded that no violation had occurred. A third group of cases, 
however, can be detected among this jurisprudence: it includes those cases where the Court’s 
reliance on the doctrine has lowered the standard of review but without leading to deference. This 
modus operandi of the doctrine can be observed in the case of X, Y and Z as well as in the 
judgments of Mennesson and Labassee regarding the applicants’ right to respect for family life. In 
these cases, the Court has done no more than emphasise how the disadvantages suffered by the 
applicants could be practically overcome, rather than effectively balance the disadvantages against 
the competing public interests. Just like in Evans, in the case of X, Y and Z and, partially, in the 
French surrogacy cases, the Court’s failure to undertake a proper proportionality analysis has led 
to a finding of non-violation.    
 Despite being able to draw links between the effect of the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation and the final judgment, it does not seem possible to identify similar connections 
between the modus operandi of the doctrine and the Court’s degree of departure from a 
conventional understanding of fatherhood. Arguably, one could expect that the lower the standard 
of review, the more respectful the Court is towards national choices which, therefore, leaves less 
room for updating and reconsidering the traditional paradigm of fatherhood. However, this does 
not appear true if due regard is given to the judgment in Dickson. In this case, although it has been 
noted that the reliance on the doctrine of the margin of appreciation had no impact on the standard 
of review, the finding of a violation of Article 8 signified a reinforcement of biology and marriage 
as crucial factors of legal fatherhood.     
However, the Court’s departure from a biological understanding of fatherhood in the case 
of Paradiso and Campanelli seems to have been facilitated by employing an implicit interpretation 
of Article 8 that in light of present-day conditions. Indeed, although the judgment did not directly 
concern the issue of surrogacy, the Court seems to be aware of the fact that scientific and medical 
progress creates the inescapable need for updating the notion of ‘family life’ and expanding the 
scope of Article 8 to reflect contemporary family realities, thus preserving the effectiveness of 
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rights. In the case of Paradiso and Campanelli, the interpretation of Article 8 in light of present-
day conditions is realised through a reading of the best interests of the child that is dictated by 
his/her concrete social ties, rather than by a biological understanding of filiation and, therefore, of 
parenthood.  
This brings us to discuss to what extent the Court has taken all parties affected into 
consideration. Overall, the Court appears unwilling to recognise a potential conflict of interests 
between the parties, except in extreme cases, like in Evans. In this case, the position of the 
applicant is definitely discussed, but only through the limited lens of formal equality. Having 
regard to the rest of the case-law, the child and the mother have not been systematically granted 
due regard. In all cases, apart from Evans, the implications of the contested decision on the 
(potential) mother’s rights and interests are not given separate treatment; rather the mother’s claims 
are considered only in as much as her position aligns with that of the father. This explains why, in 
the cases of X, Y and Z, Dickson and Paradiso and Campanelli, the final outcome favours or 
compromises the mother’s and the father’s interests in equal measure, while in the cases of 
Mennesson and Labassee, the claims of the father are provided with a positive answer, while those 
of the mother are left out in the cold. Indeed, by identifying the existence of a biological link as 
decisive to find a violation of the children’s right to respect for private life, the Court automatically 
excludes any legal relevance of the social ties existing between the mother and the child.  
The interests of the child, or children, involved were considered in a more systematic but 
not necessarily proper way. In the case of X, Y and Z as well as in the surrogacy case-law, the 
Court approached the issue of whether the legal recognition of the father/parent-child relationship 
would make a difference for the child. However, this step did not always lead to a correct 
consideration of the best interests of the child. As previously highlighted, in the case of X, Y and 
Z, the Court stressed how the obstacles encountered by the child (as well as by the parental couple) 
could have been circumvented, rather than acknowledging – in line with its previous jurisprudence 
– that providing a social tie with legal recognition serves the best interests of the child. Similarly, 
in the cases of Mennesson and Labassee, the children’s right to have their ties with their social 
parents legally recognised was considered worthy of protection under Article 8 but only with 
respect to biological parentage.  
Finally, in both Evans and Dickson (Grand Chamber), although not explicitly mentioned, 




existence of a stable family unit made of a mother and a father. Overall, with the exception of 
Paradiso and Campanelli, the interpretation of the principle of the best interests of the child seems 
to have primarily reflected a conventional ideology of the family and, consequently, of fatherhood: 
the existence of a biological link with the father, the latter’s compliance with heterornormative 
standards and a marital or pseudo-marital relationship with the child’s mother (to the detriment of 
father-child social ties) emerge as indispensable ingredients for an effective realisation of the 
child’s best interests.      
To conclude, what comes to light quite clearly is the persistence of biology, 
heteronormativity and marriage as necessary factors for allocating legal fatherhood. To what extent 
is this approach to fatherhood mirrored in national legal systems? Having regard to surrogacy, all 
three domestic approaches outlined in Section 1 (on Germany, France and the UK) seem to 
condition the conferral of legal parenthood on the existence of a genetic link between one of the 
intended parents – who is generally the father – and the child and, although not always explicitly, 
on the relationship between the intended parents as a couple.797 As such, national responses fit 
perfectly within the Court’s endorsement of a biological definition of fatherhood before its 
decision in Paradiso and Campanelli. Indeed, it must be recalled that, it is only in its latest 
judgment that the Court declared genetic relatedness irrelevant when assessing the best interests 
of the child. Had the judgment been primarily concerned with the issue of surrogacy, the Court 
could have been legitimately considered the forerunner of a gradual departure from a biological 
understanding of fatherhood. However, given that the object of analysis was the child’s removal 
and his placement under guardianship, the degree of novelty and progress brought about by the 
Court is debatable.  
Concerning the relevance of marriage or marriage-like relationships, the UK and the 
German approaches seem to be in line with the Court’s endorsement of a derivative conception of 
fatherhood. In these two national systems, the construction of fatherhood as a corollary of his 
relationship with the child’s mother emerges from the rules pertaining to the attribution of legal 
parenthood following ART. Moreover, in all three countries considered, a certain attachment to a 
marital or pseudo-marital conception of fatherhood can be inferred also from the impossibility for 
single persons and, more specifically, men to access these services. Surrogacy, which represents 
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the only means of having a child for a single man, is prohibited under French and German laws, 
while it is limited to couples under the HFEA 2008. 
Overall, with the controversial exception of the judgment in Paradiso and Campanelli, the 
Court has shown a certain unwillingness to take up an activist role and, as such, to use the law as 
a tool for pushing for or imposing legal change at the national level. Rather, the Court’s wide resort 
to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, together with its reluctance to analyse the 
discrimination claims brought in the cases of X, Y and Z and Evans and the strong alignment 
between the Court’s jurisprudence and the national legal systems are indicative of the Court’s 
attempt to respect national choices and, therefore, of its understanding of the role of the law as 






CHAPTER 3 – The End of the Marital Family: What Matters Then? 
 
Introduction  
This chapter attempts to investigate to what degree the Court deviates or adheres to the 
conventional definition of fatherhood, in the specific domain of post-separation/divorce family 
life. Just like the previous chapter, it will be divided into three main parts. Section 1 considers 
national reactions to an increased decline of marriage as a choice or as a lifelong commitment. In 
the face of such sociological change, this section will outline what has replaced marriage, which 
has traditionally been a trait d’union between fathers and their children, or whether/how marriage 
has simply been revisited in national legal systems. Section 2 critically analyses a limited number 
of ECtHR cases arising out of requests of unmarried and divorced fathers seeking greater 
involvement in the lives of their biological children through the award of contact or residence 
rights. The relevant jurisprudence will be split into two sub-sections, one considering cases brought 
by unmarried fathers and the other exploring the Court’s attitude towards applications lodged by 
divorced fathers. The analysis of this case-law will bring to the fore the definition of fatherhood 
endorsed by the Court and, more specifically, it will seek to identify what conventional features 
are retained, abandoned or adjusted. Moreover, to make the analysis easier to follow, each sub-
section will end with concluding remarks anticipating the most visible jurisprudential trends vis-
à-vis the sub-questions addressed by the present thesis. Finally, Section 3 will focus primarily on 
the direct comparison between the approach adopted by the Court with respect to unmarried 
fathers’ and divorced fathers’ claims, concerning the elements deemed relevant to find a violation 
of Article 8.  
 
1. Marriage in Crisis – New/Old Ways of Linking Fathers to Children at the 
National Level 
In recent times, a striking rise in the rate of extra-marital births and the failure of marriage as a 




with children living apart from at least one of their biological parents.798 Despite some increase in 
the numbers of non-resident mothers, parental separation and divorce tend to result in a progressive 
alienation of fathers from their children’s lives.799 The prevalence across Europe of single-mother 
families represents an unequivocal sign that fathers, after relationship breakdown, typically cease 
to reside with their children and, consequently, find themselves parenting at a distance, or not at 
all.800 Men who preserve parental roles and responsibilities will also possibly share the father role 
with the new partner of the child’s mother and, should they re-partner too, they will probably 
cohabitate with and parent the children of their new partner.801  
Fathers’ behavioural patterns are affected by the high rate of relationship breakdown.802 
Due to the fact that children are more likely to live with their mothers, fathers tend to parent 
according to a serial pattern.803 In other words, fathering reflects the serial character of men’s adult 
pairing.804 On the other hand, mothering is more likely to follow a linear pattern.805 This means 
that mothers generally continue to live with and nurture their biological children and sometimes 
they also parent the children of their partner.806 By contrast, male parenting is strongly correlated 
to their relationship with their partner as well as whether they live with their partner.807 Fathers 
parent by household and, therefore, they are more likely to nurture the children they live with.808 
Instances where fathers engage in multiple and simultaneous nurturing relationships are rare, 
although increasing.809  
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Men’s serial parenting is a clear illustration that fatherhood is seldom “practiced in 
isolation”.810 On the contrary, the father-child relationship has been strongly mediated by men’s 
relationships with women.811 In other words, fatherhood has been traditionally perceived as part 
of a “package deal”,812 in which the father-child tie depends on the inter-parental relationship. 
Marriage was and, to some extent, continues to be the institution through which the law confers a 
status on both men and children. The concept of fatherhood itself has historically developed 
through reference to the legal institution of marriage.813 In accordance with the so-called ‘marital 
presumption’, children born in wedlock were automatically considered to be the legitimate 
children of the husband of the mother. Marriage has also been the parameter against which the law 
has granted the full legal status of fatherhood and parental rights to men.814 Marriage is therefore 
the social construct through which the law has historically sought to tie men to children.815  
However, marriage can no longer be considered as an “adequate securer of paternity”.816 
In the EU-28, recent decades have witnessed a heightened proportion of live births outside 
marriage. In 2011, approximately 39% of children were born outside wedlock, compared to 
approximately 27% in 2000. 817 According to data from 2012, the proportion of children born out 
of wedlock accounted for the majority of live births in a number of countries, including France 
(55.8%), Denmark (50.6%), Sweden (54.5%), Belgium (52.3%), Bulgaria (57.4%) and Slovenia 
(57.6%).818 Furthermore, based on the available data, the crude marriage rate – namely, the number 
of marriage per 1000 inhabitants – in the EU-28 has decreased from 7.8 in 1965 to 4.2 by 2011.819 
Apart from occurring less often, marriages have become less stable. The crude divorce rate has 
actually doubled from 1.0 divorces per 1000 inhabitants in 1970 to 2.0 divorces by 2008.820 This 
trend has been accompanied by equally high rates of remarrying and the frequent presence of a 
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stepfather in the lives of many children from divorce families.821  
In the United States, marriage and extramarital birth are closely connected to race and 
class. 822  The decline of marriage has predominantly concerned Americans without college 
education, whilst the college-educated population continue to choose marriage.823 Although to a 
possibly lesser extent, extra-marital childbearing is ascribable to lower educational attainment and 
“a pattern of disadvantage” also in most Western European countries. 824  As such, unmarried 
families have often been seen as a social problem, which requires State intervention. At the same 
time, however, the negative depiction of unmarried fathers as irresponsible and uninterested in 
their children’s life has been progressively complemented with, if not replaced by, the opposite 
image as unfairly denied a relationship with their biological children and, as such, as victims of 
family law: using Sheldon’s powerful words, there has been a certain shift from “absent object of 
blame”825 to “fathers who want to take responsibility”.826  
The efforts to connect children with their biological fathers are attributable to an extensive 
body of social science research that has emphasised the vital and long-life importance of children’s 
relationships with both parents.827 Furthermore, the importance of maintaining the relationship 
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between parent and child has a firm legal foundation in international human rights instruments.828 
For instance, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) explicitly enshrines the right 
of the child to maintain direct and regular contact with both parents, when separated by them, 
unless similar arrangements are contrary to the best interests of the child. 829  Similarly, the 
European Convention on Contact Concerning Children was conceived to respond to the pressing 
need to enhance the realisation of the right of children to maintain personal relations and direct 
contact with both parents on a regular basis as well as to improve the machinery for international 
cooperation in cases of custody and transfrontier access.830  
At the national level, a series of reforms have attempted to reinforce (legal) connections 
between children and their biological fathers. An increasing tendency has been to place unmarried 
fathers on an equal footing with married fathers. An enhanced significance of the genetic link as a 
way of grounding legal fatherhood has been identified as a reaction of legal systems to the crisis 
of marriage.831 In the US context, Dowd has observed a shift from marriage to genes as the basis 
for establishing legal fatherhood.832 Besides notions of gender equality and children’s rights, she 
argues that the inclusion of unmarried fathers within the definition of legal fatherhood has been 
primarily motivated by the need to ensure financial support for children.833 Clearly, this shift has 
been greatly facilitated by the advent of DNA technology, which has put the validity of 
presumptions regarding fatherhood – in primis, the marital presumption – to the test.  
In the UK, for instance, legislative efforts of this kind have culminated in the compulsory 
requirement of joint birth registration for unmarried parents.834 This measure represents another 
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example of what Collier and Sheldon refer to as ‘geneticisation’ of understandings of fatherhood; 
in other words, biology has served to replace marriage in connecting men with children.835 At its 
core, this reform was mandated by child welfare concerns. In a nutshell, the underlying idea was 
that mandatory joint birth registration would foster the child’s contact with both parents.836 Given 
the current climate of decline of marriage, birth registration was proposed as a means of ensuring 
unmediated and autonomous relationships between fathers and children.837 As such, the reform 
arguably reflected a remarkable optimism about the desire of fathers to become more involved in 
their children’s lives and its likely positive impact on broader social problems.838 However, some 
commentators have pointed out that the origins of this reform had a closer nexus to discussions 
concerning child support legislation. Among others, Fortin and Wallbank suggest that the ‘real’ 
objective of compulsory joint registration consisted in making fathers visible for child support 
purposes, thus alleviating the State’s responsibility to support single mothers.839  
 Moreover, the significance for the child’s wellbeing of preserving ties with both parents 
(in line with the predominant legal construct of co-parenting840) has translated into legislative 
initiatives aimed at either ensuring contact with a non-resident parent – in the majority of cases, 
the father – or promoting a shared residence arrangement in case of separation or divorce. This 
proliferation of interest has arisen partly out of the evolution of activism and social concern around 
the issue of fathers’ rights. As explained in Chapter 1, fathers’ rights groups have attempted to 
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“refashion and reposition fatherhood in the legal and cultural imaginary”,841 by invoking ideas of 
(formal) equality and relying on the image of the ‘new father’ as carer and sharer of 
responsibilities. In their views, the law has not kept pace with social reality and new family lives, 
where many men are and want to be involved not only in paid work but also in childcare and 
domestic work.842  
The influence of campaigning groups has been particularly powerful in the context of post-
separation or divorce parenting. The demands of fathers for closer involvement in the emotional 
lives of their biological children have succeeded in shaping the contours of policy debates 
concerning contact and shared residence, as well as the content of legislation and the orientation 
of case-law. 843  For instance, the Italian law no. 54/2006 on “provisions relating to parental 
separation and shared custody of their children” was a direct outgrowth of the lobbying activities 
carried out by associations of separated fathers.844 Theoretically at least, this reform triggered a 
radical change in the regulation of post-separation family life, by establishing joint custody – as 
opposed to sole custody – as the default rule. In relation to contact, the amended Civil Code states 
that “[e]ven in the event of parental separation, the child holds the right to preserve a balanced and 
continuous relationship with both parents and to receive care, education and instruction from both 
and to retain relations with his or her ascendants and relatives of each branch”845. Accordingly, the 
law establishes that each parent retains parental responsibility (potestà genitoriale), unless his or 
her behaviour causes serious harm to the child.  
Similar attempts to introduce explicit norms on fathering vis-à-vis the decline of marriage 
have been made in other European countries.846 In Germany, a new law on child custody entered 
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into force in May 2013. As it will emerge from the following case-law, until recently, child custody 
was automatically granted to the mother if the parents were not married at the time of childbirth. 
Unmarried parents could be granted joint custody only through a joint custody declaration. As a 
result, the mother held veto power over the unmarried father’s request for custody rights. In 2010, 
the Federal Constitutional Court declared these provisions unconstitutional, thus implementing the 
ECtHR judgments in the case of Zaunegger v Germany.847 Within the new law, contact with both 
parents and, consequently, joint custody, are assumed to pursue the best interests of the child.848 
Accordingly, upon the application of one parent, “the family court is to transfer parental custody 
or a part of parental custody to both parents jointly unless if the transfer is not inconsistent with 
the best interests of the child”.849 The other parent is given a time limit to respond. If he/she fails 
to put forward any reasons, which might be inconsistent with the award of joint parental custody, 
and if such reasons are not otherwise evident, joint parental custody is presumed consistent with 
the best interests of the child.  
Although legislation – like the above – tends to employ gender-neutral standards, concerns 
about the gendered consequences of separation/divorce persist. As argued by Day Sclater and 
Yates, gender-neutral provisions in the context of post-separation/divorce might result in a “new 
opportunity for the expression of the old patriarchal powers”.850 In their view, gender neutrality 
serves to camouflage men’s colonisation of the terrain of motherhood, with no change in their 
behaviour in relation to childcare, thus reinforcing their claims and rights without benefitting 
women.851 Moreover, despite the rethinking of the place of fatherhood in post-separation/divorce 
scenarios, there is a danger that paternal ties remain mostly biological, legal and financial.852  
In many legal systems, the introduction of more invasive mechanisms to collect child 
support represents a further channel through which the law has sought to enforce male 
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responsibility towards his children.853 From an ideological standpoint, child support perpetuates 
the assumption that dependency and, therefore, the welfare of children, is a private concern.854 
Clearly, the notion of responsibility endorsed by these measures is consistent with the gendered 
nature of the conventional ideology of the family and, more specifically, with the traditional role 
of the father as the breadwinner.855 Child support policies seek to “reconstruct the gendered 
complementarity of the traditional family through the imposition of the economically viable 
male”. 856  While being consistent with the fact that mothers continue to represent a huge 
disproportion of primary residential parents,857 this account does not take into consideration that 
many caring mothers who become single parents do not rely solely on child support. Rather, they 
are often faced with the predominant expectation of a double shift and with financial hardship 
following divorce and, as a result, they find themselves engaged in both paid employment and 
unpaid care work.858  
Having regard to the Italian situation, the above-mentioned reform (law no. 54/2006) has 
had a visible impact in terms of patterns of custody decisions: in 2011, sole custody to the mother 
was chosen in a tiny minority of cases (8.5%), whilst joint custody was granted in 90.3% cases of 
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separation.859  Nonetheless, a study based on the analysis of 1020 judgments issued by Italian 
courts in the period 2006-2011, demonstrates that the new provisions, as currently applied, have 
done little more than paying lip-service to the principle of joint custody.860 In practice, by coining 
the concept of ‘primary domicile’ (domicilio prevalente), courts have continued to identify one 
parent as ‘resident parent’ (genitore collocatario), responsible for lodging and daily care, and to 
confer contact rights on the other parent.861 As a result, the actual content of the rights hold by 
non-custodial parents (primarily fathers) have remained almost unaltered: contact arrangements 
granted to a co-custodial non-resident parent are de facto very similar to that enjoyed by a non-
custodial parent (every other weekend, two weeks in the summer and some holidays).862  
As effectively argued by Bergman and Hobson, although in relation to joint custody 
legislation in Sweden, “obligatory joint custody is about compulsory fatherhood rather than 
compulsory fathering”.863 What is implicit in the coding of post-separation/divorce fatherhood is 
the assumption that the best interests of the child resonates with having contact with both biological 
parents, even if the contact with the father can only amount to having a father who holds custodial 
rights. 864  Compulsory joint custody – and, therefore, the maintenance of contact with both 
biological parents – can be viewed as a way of continuing a stable family unit, namely a fictional 
group made of a father, mother and child.865  
More generally, this account reflects Collier’s view, according to which the role historically 
played by the institution of marriage in determining legal status has been progressively 
supplemented, if not replaced, by other ‘organising concepts’, such as cohabitation.866 The latter 
has increasingly resembled the institution of marriage concerning its legal consequences on both 
the status of children and property entitlements at separation. Especially through reference to the 
principle of the best interests of the child, certain marriage-type relationships – in particular, 
heterosexual cohabitation – have been increasingly considered, regulated and comprised within a 
                                                        
859 ISTAT, http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/91133 (last access on 16 March 2016). Concerning divorces, joint custody 
was granted in 73.8% of cases in 2010. See Long, ‘Post separation fathering’, 100.  
860 A. Cardinale, ‘Affido condiviso dei figli. Una legge disapplicata’ online at 
http://www.imille.org/2011/04/affidamento-condiviso-dei-figli/ (last access on 16 March 2015). 
861 Ibid.  
862 Long, ‘Post separation fathering’, 100.  
863 Bergman and Hobson, ‘Compulsory Fatherhood’, 103.  
864 Ibid, 101, 103.  
865 Ibid, 103.  




“reconstituted familial domain”.867 These developments are indicative of a persisting focus on the 
adult relationship (horizontal) as a means of defining vertical relationships between a parent and 
his/her child. Hence, the latter continues to be mediated by the former. 
The importance of contact in a child’s life has achieved such force that, it is suggested by 
Bainham, it almost operates as a “fundamental presumption which may be rebutted – but only for 
good reason”.868 The characterisation of contact as a right has triggered concerns among some 
feminist scholars, who spot a problematic gendered dimension within this issue. One of their main 
claims underlines that, while separated/divorced mothers tend to frame their relationships with 
children in terms of needs and responsibilities, fathers talk mainly about rights and, additionally, 
are viewed as right-bearers by the legal system.869 Moreover, it has been argued that fathers find 
themselves in a better position to engage in legal proceedings to obtain custody because they tend 
to dispose of greater financial means.870 Against this, given their greater poverty, mothers might 
be forced to give up custody or agree on joint custody, against their wishes.871 As a result, at least 
in certain contexts, the success rate of fathers contesting custody tends to be relatively high: around 
50% in Canada and from 38 to 70% in the United States.872  
Furthermore, the perceived fundamental importance of contact has sometimes given rise to 
an expectation that both parents recognise and ensure the promotion of child welfare through 
contact.873 Accordingly, residential mothers are expected to behave like responsible parents by 
facilitating contact and non-residential fathers by assuming contact.874 Once again, however, the 
gender-neutral standard of responsible parent might de facto end up punishing the residential 
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mother.875 Some scholars have pointed out that the judicial assessment of parental responsibility 
tends to follow a double standard.876 An extra burden is often placed on mothers in terms of 
managing family life in the post-separation context: mothers are hailed to be friendly and 
accommodating to enable non-residential fathers to undertake their desired parental duties.877 As 
a result, a mother who does not act responsibly by hindering contact has been often described as 
‘hostile’, along the lines of the very negative depiction of women put forward by fathers’ rights 
movement. 878 However, it is argued, no similar label has ever been attached to fathers who fail to 
have contact with their children.879 This double standard, therefore, might have the effect of 
“supporting a free-floating concept of rights which has no commensurate presumption about 
responsibilities”.880   
The construction of fatherhood as a mutually beneficial relationship between fathers and 
their children has led to and strongly supported the opinion that denial of contact is a cause of 
suffering for both of them.881 Obviously, a narrow approach to contact as a ‘father-child only’ 
issue or an excessive emphasis on the positive advantages for the child of continuing contact with 
his/her father (‘children need fathers’) entail two main risks: subsuming the best interests of the 
child by those of the father, thus denying the former separate treatment and addressing the issue 
of contact as an issue of equality between the mother and the father; ignoring the potential spillover 
of contact on the wellbeing of the residential mother – such as, violence. As pointed out by Sterba, 
women are at higher risk of battery by their former partners after separation;882 and, it is no 
coincidence that a common complaint made in feminist critiques of judicial treatment of child 
contact cases is that judges allow men to exercise control and power over mothers or, even more, 
they fail to take instances of domestic violence seriously.883 
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To conclude, the issues of contact and joint custody do not constitute isolated experiences 
between the father and his child. 884 Recognising the importance of a father-child relationship 
through issuing joint custody and/or contact orders and ensuring their implementation pursues and 
sometimes achieves the laudable aims of respecting the right to respect for family life of both 
children and non-residential fathers and of promoting gender equality in the domain of care. At 
the same time, however, feminist commentators have underlined the importance of acknowledging 
and adequately reacting to the gendered pattern of the investments – such as, financial support and 
nurture – made by the parents during their relationship.885 As clearly expressed by Wallbank, legal 
approaches to contact should not be excessively concerned with re-envisioning society in 
accordance with the aspirational ideal of fatherhood.886 Rather, they should “value and attend to 
the gendered realities of mothers’ and fathers’ lives” while their relationship was intact. 887 
Therefore, whilst seeking to enhance father participation, judges must be aware of the risk of 
devaluing or overlooking “the social importance of mothers and mothering”.888 These dilemmas 
reflect some of the theoretical questions advanced in Chapter 1 as to the role of the law, namely 
whether the law should recognise a reality where women do more care and compensate for gender 
role differences or, rather, attempt to transform such reality.  
 
2. The Role of Marriage in Creating Family Life under Article 8 ECtHR  
In metaphorical terms, the disruption of family has resulted in the ‘Herculean knot’,889 binding 
men and their children to become loosened or untied. If analysed through the lens of the traditional 
ideology of the family, both the emergence of unmarried families and increasing family breakdown 
                                                        
884 J. Dunn, ‘Contact and Children’s Perspectives on Parental Relationships’ in in A. Bainham, B. Lindley, M. 
Richards and L. Trinder, Children and Their Families: Contact, Rights and Welfare (Oxford, Hart, 2003), 20. 
885 Wallbank, ‘(En)gendering’, 116; Boyd, ‘Child Custody, Law and Women’s Work’, chapter 7; McGlynn, 
‘Families and the EU’, 89. On the different investments made by mothers and fathers, see also Fineman, 
‘Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law’, 1041. Fineman argues that, although economic provision contributed to 
the wellbeing of the child, it does not have the same consequences in the post-divorce context, when you compare to 
nurturing. Paid work, which generates economic provision, is also a self-investment because it enhances one’s 
professional skills. On the contrary, nurturing hinders the development of professional skills, thus compromising 
one’s market position.  
886 Wallbank, ‘(En)gendering’, 117. 
887 Ibid, 116. 
888 R. Collier, ‘Fathers 4 Justice, law and the new politics of fatherhood’ 2005 17 Child and Family Law Quarterly 
525. 




rates have posed serious threats to the institution of marriage, as the ground for legal fatherhood 
and the associated rights and responsibilities. In cases of parental separation/divorce, the end of 
the marital tie literally resonates with the termination of marriage; while, in the other scenario – 
unmarried families – the end of marriage is in primis symbolically represented by the couple’s 
choice not to formalise their union and, potentially, by the subsequent breakdown of their 
relationship. In both situations, marriage ceases to act as a channel through which the father-child 
relationship forms and develops itself. As a result, the law has to look for an alternative connector.  
The traditional paradigm of the family can be further confused by the appearance of a third 
party who, in the capacity of the resident parent’s new partner, acts as a social parent towards the 
child. In such cases, the resulting family arrangement no longer fits into the conventional bi-
parental structure. In this scenario, therefore, the legal question to be addressed has often been 
‘who between the biological and the social father is given preference?’, rather than ‘how can they 
be both accommodated within the child’s life, provided that they both make distinct contributions 
to his/her life?’890  There is an additional conventional feature that is called into question in 
separation scenarios: the gendered division of labour. In fact, as previously mentioned, national 
legal systems continue to give precedence to mothers over fathers in custody-related disputes, 
while holding fathers and mothers financially responsible for the needs of their children. This has 
contributed to perpetuating a gendered division – as opposed to a sharing – of parental 
responsibilities even after parental separation. On the one hand, as the resident parent, the mother 
tends to remain the primary caretaker and is often also involved in paid employment. On the other 
hand, the father’s monetary contribution to their children’s life runs the risk of him being reduced 
to economic provision.  
If transposed into the ECHR framework, heterosexual married families are at the top of the 
evidentiary hierarchy.891 They are automatically granted the status of ‘family life’ by virtue of their 
demonstrated intention to create family life through marriage. It is no coincidence, therefore, that 
the Strasbourg machinery has been criticised for privileging the conventional family model over 
other forms of relationship. Nonetheless, the Court has often recalled that marriage remains an 
institution that is widely accepted as conferring a special status on those who entered it and, as 
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such, can serve as a justification for differential treatment.892 It is not by chance that the right to 
marry is protected by Article 12 of the ECHR, which reads that “men and women of marriageable 
age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the 
exercise of this right”. Apart from reflecting the conventional family model at the time of the 
drafting of the Convention, the maintenance of marriage as the privileged family form might also 
mirror the legislative reality of most Contracting States. 893  Consequently, the persisting 
importance of marriage can be viewed as a direct consequence of the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation.894  
As stated in the introduction, this chapter attempts to investigate the reaction of the ECtHR 
to the overall decline of marriage as the interface between men and their children and, as such, as 
the basis for allocating parental rights. More specifically, it wishes to identify the factor(s) which 
the Court resorts to, in the absence of marriage; in other words, what type of tie – biological, 
nurturing, marriage-like – is relied on by the Court to either hold the incompatibility of denying 
an unmarried/divorced father contact with or custody over his child within the Convention 
framework or to justify its interference with the right to respect for family life of the father 
involved.  
Thus, the Court’s ability to challenge the conventional ideology of fatherhood in this 
jurisprudential domain will be assessed at multiple levels: firstly, by considering whether the Court 
finds family life to exist between an unmarried father and his child born out of wedlock as well as 
between a divorced father and his biological child, respectively. If so, what elements are 
considered relevant for a father-child tie to fall within the notion of family life? More specifically, 
is the relationship between the natural parents still taken into consideration? If so, to what extent 
and what are the implications? If marriage is no longer a prerequisite for obtaining paternal rights, 
it will be interesting to assess whether other marriage-type relationships have taken its place and, 
therefore, whether it is possible to talk of a ‘revisitation’ of the concept of marriage or, on the 
contrary, the focus on horizontal relationships has gone once and for all. Another crucial question 
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to address in order to test the Court’s departure from the conventional paradigm of fatherhood is 
whether any weight is attached to biology.  
Finally, bearing in mind the ‘principle of mutuality’ as interpreted by Bainham, the 
following case-law analysis will investigate the extent to which the Court has acknowledged the 
relational dimension of the right to contact and has taken the multiple parties involved (child, 
biological father, mother, step-father) into consideration. Separation and divorce are known as 
contexts where tensions among concurring interests and rights are further intensified by the 
entrenchment of one-sided narratives and the consequential essentialisation of ‘mother’ and 
‘father’, ‘woman’ and ‘man’.895 The establishment of positive interactions between parents after 
family dissolution might be compromised by the profound divergence existing between the 
perspectives of mothers and fathers on post-separation/divorce parenthood.  
Women’s perceptions of the difficulties arising out of contact cases predominantly allude 
to the deficiencies of fathers.896 More specifically, mothers stress fathers’ lack of experience in 
nurturing activities, their scant or absent involvement in the past, and their potential inadequacy to 
act as good parents in the future.897 Consequently, where childcare arrangements fail, former wives 
depict fathers as irresponsible, careless, unreliable, deceitful and selfish.898 In particular, non-
resident fathers are commonly blamed for arriving late for visits, for being inconsistent in 
maintaining contact and for being inattentive to the negative implications of their behaviour on 
their children’s wellbeing.899  
From the fathers’ standpoint, men should be accorded the opportunity to meaningfully 
participate in their children’s lives, not only as (absent) financial providers, but also as (present) 
emotional carers. 900  Accordingly, the most frequent reason that non-resident fathers offer 
regarding the loss of contact consists in residential mothers’ implacable hostility and unreasonable 
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obstruction of contact.901 Mothers are, therefore, depicted as liars who would do anything in order 
to obtain the custody of their children, including inventing allegations of child abuse against the 
fathers.902 As a result, mothers are structurally placed in opposition to fathers and, essentially, in 
opposition to their children, whose best interests are interpreted as resonating with those of 
fathers.903  
In light of such hostility between the sexes (institutionalised through the organisation of 
women and men in gendered interest groups), it is not surprising that children, like any other asset 
of the family, offer a further terrain of conflict between men and women when their relationship 
ends.904 As a result of the polarisation of mothers’ and fathers’ positions, children find themselves 
in the “vortex of backlash”.905  Custody determinations, therefore, might become an issue of 
equality between mothers and fathers.906 In light of this, it will be interesting to observe whether 
the risk of placing children ‘outside’ legal disputes,907  thus neglecting their experiences and 
treating them as mere objects of privilege908 is also present within the approach of the ECtHR.  
The relevant jurisprudence is divided into two sub-groups, depending on whether the 
applicants are unmarried or divorced fathers. This separation is meant to offer a further analytical 
lens: that of discrimination on grounds of marital status. As it will emerge from the cases brought 
against Germany, divorced fathers have often been granted contact rights ipso jure, whilst 
unmarried fathers have been required to prove their suitability for contact by obtaining either a 
court order or the mother’s consent. Therefore, despite divorce, the marital origin of the 
relationship between the natural parents has tended to benefit divorced fathers and their children. 
This trend is confirmed by the nature of the claims brought by divorced fathers. Different from 
unmarried fathers who have abundantly complained of refusal of contact/custody rights, divorced 
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fathers have been mostly involved in cases concerning the failed enforcement of existing contact 
orders.    
2.1 Unmarried Fathers Seeking Contact and Joint Residence 
In order to make the analysis easier to follow, the case-law involving biological fathers seeking to 
obtain contact or custody rights with their children born out of wedlock will be split into two sub-
sections. The first includes those cases, where the opposition to contact/joint custody comes from 
the child’s mother. In the second sub-section, as an alternative, the applications stem from the 
child’s secret placement for adoption without the knowledge and consent of the father. As a 
consequence of either event, the applicant fathers were denied contact and/or custody rights and 
brought a complaint of a violation of their right to respect for family life, which was sometimes 
taken in conjunction with Article 14. 
Out of eight cases, the Court found a violation of Article 8 or Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8 in all but one of the cases considered. This is a clear sign of the fact that 
the Court takes the claims of unmarried fathers seriously. Despite an increasing reliance on the 
actual circumstances of the case, aimed at grasping the quality of the relationship between the 
applicant and his child, the nature of the parental relationship continues to be drawn on as a relevant 
factor to reach the threshold of ‘family life’ (in other words, to establish whether family life exists 
between a father and his child born out of wedlock) as well as to conclude whether the applicant’s 
right to respect for family life has been violated.  
2.1.1 Standard cases: Maternal Opposition to Contact or Joint Custody  
This section deals with cases brought by biological (in one case, alleged biological) fathers seeking 
to obtain contact or custody rights with respect to their children born out of wedlock, against the 
will of their former partner (the child’s mother). Although it is clearly not the latest judgment on 
this issue, the position held in the case of Sahin v Germany909 remains representative of the Court’s 
approach, at least in relation to two distinct aspects: the undertaking of an anti-stereotyping 
approach and the prima facie overcoming but de facto mere revisitation of the conception of 
marital fatherhood. After outlining the Court’s position in the case of Sahin, it is worth expanding 
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the analysis to other cases, which, by building on the ruling in Sahin, have brought additional 
elements to the table.    
In the case of Sahin, the applicant met Ms D. in 1985 and he moved into her flat in 
December 1987. In 1988, a child was born out of their relationship. He acknowledged paternity 
and undertook to pay maintenance. They ceased to cohabitate in July 1989 or, as stated by the 
applicant, in February 1990. In any event, he continued to see his child and former girlfriend until 
February 1990 and, between July and October 1990, he regularly met his child for visits. From 
November 1990, Ms D. prohibited any contact between him and his daughter. His request to be 
granted a right of contact with the child was dismissed by the District Court on the basis of a 
section in the German Civil Code, according to which unmarried fathers could only have contact 
with the child if the mother’s child approved or if this was found to be in the best interests of the 
child by a court ruling.910    
Before the Strasbourg Court, the applicant contended that the German courts’ decision 
dismissing his request amounted to a violation of his right to respect for family life under Article 
8 of the Convention. In particular, the father of the child alleged that, having regard to the specific 
circumstances of the case, the national authorities had overstepped their margin of appreciation, 
since he had not been sufficiently involved in the decision-making process.911 In response, the 
Government advanced two main reasons justifying the refusal of contact; namely the inevitably 
negative repercussions of the serious tensions existing between the parents on their daughter’s 
wellbeing as well as the risk that contact visits would disturb and frustrate the child’s development 
in the single-parent family provided by the mother.912  
Firstly, the Court failed to consider the applicability of Article 8 and, therefore, whether 
the relationship between the applicant and his child amounted to family life. It merely stated that 
it shared the view – held by the parties – that the refusal of contact rights constituted an interference 
with the applicant’s right to respect for family life.913 Arguably, the Court might have inferred the 
applicability of Article 8 from the mere fact that the applicant and the child’s mother cohabitated 
at the time of birth and continued to do so for the following year. As argued by O’Mahony, the 
stance adopted in Sahin possibly reflects a wider trend, according to which, whenever the 
                                                        
910 Sahin v Germany (Grand Chamber), para 16.  
911 Ibid, para 55.  
912 Ibid, para 67. 




biological parents lived together at the time of childbirth, the father’s degree of contribution to 
raising the child is not necessarily a relevant factor, at least for the purpose of establishing the 
existence of family life.914   
Prior to determining whether the reasons provided by the Government amounted to 
sufficient justifications for the purposes of Article 8(2), the Court noted that national authorities 
were better placed to take a decision as they benefited from closer contact with the parties 
involved.915 As a result, the Court’s role was simply to review (rather than replace) the decisions 
taken by these authorities in their exercise of the margin of appreciation.916 However, different 
from custody matters – where States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation – restrictions placed on 
contact rights call for a stricter scrutiny since, the Court argues, these limitations entail the risk 
that the relationship between a young child and his/her parent(s) would be effectively damaged.917 
Furthermore, it held that Article 8 required States to place particular weight on the best interests 
of the child when striking a fair balance between all interests involved.918  
Having regard to the particular case, the Court was of the opinion that German courts had 
put forward relevant reasons justifying their refusal of access, namely the detrimental impact that 
the tensions between the parents would have had on the child.919 However, it was held that, in 
order to properly assess whether the justifications adduced by the Government were sufficient, it 
was also necessary to verify whether the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 were met. 
Indeed, when decisions, such as placing restrictions on parental rights or placing children for 
adoption or in public care, are to be taken, Article 8 requires that emphasis be placed on the 
development of national proceedings.920 More specifically, the Court explained that, in light of its 
potentially irreversible consequences on the parent-child relationship, the decision-making process 
had to ensure sufficient protection of the father’s interests.921 In this regard, it was observed that 
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the father had been able to put forward all arguments in order to obtain contact arrangements and 
he was also granted access to all relevant information that was relied on by the authorities.922  
It was further noted that the Regional Court had ordered an expert report investigating 
whether contact was in the child’s best interests and, on the basis of that report, had preferred not 
to hear the child in court.923 The Court agreed with the decision taken by the Regional Court or, at 
least, did not contest the decision on the ground that, as a general rule, it falls within the 
competence of the State to determine the means to ascertain the facts of the case.924 As stated by 
the Court, “it would be going too far to say that domestic courts are always required to hear a child 
in court on the issue of access to a parent not having custody”.925 Therefore, having regard to the 
State’s margin of appreciation, it was concluded that the German courts had ensured the necessary 
protection of the applicant’s interests and that, accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 
8.926 
Therefore, although the matter at stake concerned restrictions placed on parental rights and, 
as such, would generally entail a narrow margin of appreciation, the Court’s reliance on the ‘better 
placed’ argument seems to have prevailed and played a role in determining the finding of non-
violation of Article 8. The ground that grants the State a wide margin relates to the supranational 
nature of the Court; and, in light of Letsas’ account, it is not totally surprising that the application 
of the doctrine in its structural variant ended up lowering the standard of review and, with regards 
to the determination of the best interests of the child, resulted in total deference. Given that national 
authorities enjoyed closer contact with the parties and were, therefore, better positioned to grasp 
the needs of all those involved, the Court argued that it had no cause to question the professional 
competence of the expert appointed by the Regional Court or the way in which she interviewed 
the child. As a result, the complaint brought under Article 8 was considered only from a procedural 
viewpoint.  
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The failed hearing of the child in court and, more importantly, its acceptance by the 
majority cast doubts as to the actual weight accorded to the views of the child vis-à-vis the hostility 
of the mother. Apart from not hearing the child in person, it emerged that the expert appointed by 
the Regional Court had not even asked the child about her father.927 Although the desires of a 5-
year-old girl cannot be given conclusive weight, exhaustive and reliable information on the child’s 
relationship with her biological father constitutes an essential element for determining the child’s 
true feelings and wishes and, consequently, for striking a fair balance among the various interests 
at stake.928  
However, given the legislative regime in place, it cannot be excluded that the child was 
denied independent voice and the mother’s hostile feelings towards the applicant were accorded 
primary importance, almost a priori. As argued by the dissenting Judges Rozakis and Tulkens, it 
almost seems that the courts’ decision to deny contact rights to the applicant was grounded on a 
mere hypothesis that the preservation of the father-child tie was not in her best interests due to her 
mother’s adverse attitude towards her former partner.929 By sharing the national courts’ decision, 
the Court proved unaware of the permanent implications stemming from denial of contact on the 
applicant’s and child’s right to respect for family life. In fact, as underscored by Judge Rozakis 
and Tulkens, the prohibition of contact represented a radical measure, which not only infringed 
temporarily upon their right to family life, but also totally demolished it.930 At the same time, 
however, regard must be paid to a sizeable body of literature – although not unanimous – that 
demonstrates a negative impact of inter-parental conflict, including post-separation conflict, on the 
wellbeing of the child.931 For instance, it has been found to increase children’s stress, to give rise 
to loyalty conflicts and to indirectly jeopardise parental consistency in discipline.932 Apart from 
alleging a violation of Article 8, the applicant complained that he had been victim of discriminatory 
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treatment contrary to Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.933 In particular, he emphasised that, 
at the material time, the relevant legislation allowed mothers to deny natural fathers any contact 
with their children born outside marriage.934 In justification of the contested domestic provision, 
the Government argued that, in the past, fathers of non-marital children had frequently 
demonstrated little or no interest whatsoever in establishing or maintaining family ties with their 
children. 935  By reflecting a generalised reality, the contested provisions were not considered 
discriminatory at the material time. According to the same ratio, a subsequent reform of the Civil 
Code was grounded on recent changes in social attitudes.936  
In the wake of the Chamber’s judgment, the Grand Chamber observed that, at the material 
time, the German Civil Code provided different standards for divorced fathers of children born in 
wedlock and fathers of children born out of wedlock.937 Whilst the former group of fathers were 
legally entitled to contact, which could be restricted or suspended if necessary in the child’s 
interest, the latter’s contact with their children presupposed either the mother’s consent or a court 
ruling establishing such contact in order to meet the child’s best interests.938 However, because the 
examination of the Civil Code’s provisions did not fall within the Court’s competences, the issue 
to be determined was whether the application of German law in the present case entailed an 
unjustified differential treatment between the applicant and the case of divorced fathers. In this 
regard, the Grand Chamber found that:  
 
Having regard to the fact that these courts were convinced of the applicant’s responsible motives, 
his attachment to the child and his genuine affection for her, they placed a burden on him which 
was heavier than the one on divorced fathers.939  
 
Having established the existence of differential treatment, the Court went on to decide 
whether it was justified. In this regard, it recalled that very weighty reasons needed to be put 
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forward before differential treatment on the ground of birth out of or within wedlock could be 
considered compatible with the Convention. 940  In the Court’s view, the same held true for 
differential treatment of the father of a child born in a relationship where the parties were living 
together out of wedlock as compared with the father of a child born of a marriage-based 
relationship.941 Since sufficiently weighty reasons could not be discerned in the present case, the 
Court held that there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.  
When examining the complaint under Article 14, any significance of the margin of 
appreciation was ruled out because of the suspect grounds of discrimination under scrutiny and the 
employment of Article 14 as a “magnifying lens”. 942 As observed in Chapter 1, the suspect nature 
of the badge of differentiation is likely to trigger the application of the very weighty reasons test 
and, therefore, to subject the contested measure to strict scrutiny. Moreover, the finding of a breach 
of Article 14 taken into conjunction with Article 8 provides a good example of the reinterpreted 
scope of the ambit doctrine, as described by Arnardóttir. The Court considered the decision-
making process of sufficient quality to ensure the protection of the applicant’s interests and, 
accordingly, found no violation of Article 8. However, given that German law distinguished 
between fathers depending on whether their children were born within or outside wedlock, a 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 was found. Therefore, the discriminatory 
dimension of the case ultimately operated as an aggravating factor and, together with the suspect 
ground of discrimination, prevailed over the ‘better placed’ argument as the factor determining the 
outcome of the complaint.         
Furthermore, this judgment sheds light on the tensions between the notion of ‘stereotype’ 
and generalised reality as well as between two different understandings of the role of the law as a 
tool for either fighting stereotypes or providing compensation for existing gender role differences. 
As previously stated, a stereotype can be defined as a “generalised view or preconception of 
attributes or characteristics possessed by, or the roles that are or should be performed by, members 
of a particular group”.943 It has been argued, and also verified, that stereotypes might reflect the 
realities that individuals actually encounter in their daily lives.944 However, to what extent a 
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generalisation describes the actual position of an individual is considered irrelevant for the purpose 
of classifying it as a stereotype.945 Whilst the generalisation might perfectly match the situation of 
an individual, the fact that no attention was directed to this individual’s needs, wishes, abilities 
and circumstances makes it a stereotype.946  
Having regard to the present case, it is worth recalling that the Government justified the 
provisions of the Civil Code as non-discriminatory on the basis that “in the past, fathers of children 
born out of wedlock had frequently shown no interest in their children”. 947  In light of the 
definitions above, the considerations relied on by the Government represent a clear example of 
how stereotyping operates in the law-making process. Although possibly reflecting the behaviour 
of unmarried fathers at the material time, national courts have ascribed a certain attitude to the 
applicant by virtue of his gender and marital status. They have placed a certain pattern on him, 
regardless of how he acted towards the child when they lived together and, more generally, of his 
abilities and desires. The applicant was therefore judged on the basis of his group-membership and 
ties to a particular identity.948  
Although not directly concerned with gender stereotypes, the judgment in Sahin displays 
some anti-stereotyping efforts. Indeed, in line with the approach envisaged by Timmer, it 
investigates the reasons put forward by the Government and dismisses any appeal to stereotypical 
and generalised views around unmarried fathers as insufficient grounds for differential treatment 
on the basis of marital status. More specifically, it was held that:  
 
[T]he Court is not persuaded by the Government’s arguments, which are based on general 
considerations that fathers of children born out of wedlock lack interest in contact with their 
children and might leave a non-marital relationship at any time. Such considerations did not apply 
in the applicant’s case. He had in fact been living with the mother at the time of the child’s birth in 
June 1988 and had maintained contact with her until October 1990. He had acknowledged paternity 
and undertaken to pay maintenance. More importantly, he had continued to show concrete interest 
in contact with her for sincere motives.”949  
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Stereotyping had therefore resulted in subjecting the applicant to a test, which was stricter 
than the one applied to divorced fathers. By identifying a “structured set of beliefs about the 
personal attributes” 950  of unmarried fathers, the Grand Chamber discards marriage as a 
determining factor in the allocation of contact rights to the advantage of a fact-based and nurture-
oriented assessment of the applicant’s behaviour in relation to the child. In so doing, the majority’s 
outcome under Article 14 eventually gives voice to the concerns raised by Judges Rozakis and 
Tulkens in their partly dissenting opinion, although in relation to Article 8. In their opinion, the 
denial of contact was to be held incompatible with Article 8(2) because it pursued an illegitimate 
aim; namely, the protection of the “ceremonial aspect of family life” as opposed to the “real aspects 
which constitute the concept of family in a modern society”.951 However, by approaching the issue 
of form over substance from the perspective of discrimination, the majority limits the relevance of 
its own findings to the situation of unmarried fathers vis-à-vis divorced fathers.   
Traces of an anti-stereotyping approach can also be found in subsequent case-law dealing 
with the same legal question. To this end, it is sufficient to mention the Court’s judgment in the 
case of Zaunegger v Germany, where an unmarried father was denied joint custody of a child on 
the ground that the German Civil Code provides that a child born out of wedlock shall be in the 
sole custody of the mother unless the parents marry or make a declaration of joint custody.952 It 
was acknowledged that the domestic courts’ decision and, accordingly, the contested legislation 
pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the best interests of the child born out of 
wedlock. Due to the multiplicity of life situations into which non-marital children are born (ranging 
from cases where the identity of the biological father is not established to those where the father 
is fully engaged in his child’s development),953 the Court accepted that the primary attribution of 
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parental authority to the mother – in the absence of a joint declaration – was justified to ensure the 
identification of a person at birth who could act as the legal representative of the child.954  
Moreover, the Court was of the opinion that, in certain cases, there could be valid reasons 
for rejecting any participation of an unmarried father in parental authority; for instance, when 
hostility or the lack of communication between parents has the potential to disrupt the child’s 
wellbeing.955 Nonetheless, it was argued that “nothing establishes that such an attitude is a general 
feature of the relationship between unmarried fathers and their children”.956 More explicitly, the 
Court could not accept the assumption that joint custody against the mother’s will is prima facie 
not in the child’s best interests.957   
Having regard to the circumstances of the applicant – in particular, the early recognition of 
paternity, the fact that the applicant had lived with his daughter for more than five years and, after 
relationship breakdown with the mother, he had maintained regular contact – the above assumption 
appeared unsustainable in face of reality. 958  Since the Government had failed to show why 
unmarried fathers were not entitled to judicial scrutiny of their request for custody, the Court 
concluded that there was not reasonable proportionality between the exclusion of judicial scrutiny 
of the mother’s sole custody and the goal of protecting the child’s best interests.959 As a result, a 
violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, was found.   
Having observed a trend towards fighting stereotypes, it remains to be clarified whether 
the dismissal of marriage as a source of justified differentiation signals a full departure from the 
conventional paradigm or, rather, has merely created space for other conventional or quasi-
conventional features. In order to clarify these points, references to some cases following the Sahin 
decision will be made. Firstly, throughout this case-law, the expansion of the notion of ‘family 
life’ reaches its peak. In the case of Lebbink v the Netherlands, an unmarried father was denied 
contact with his child born out of wedlock on the ground that, although he was present at birth and 
regularly visited the child, a close personal bond between them could not be found.960 When 
assessing whether the relationship between the applicant and his child could qualify as family life, 
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the Court held that, when a “potential relationship which could develop between a child born out 
of wedlock and her natural father” is a stake, relevant factors demonstrating the existence of 
personal close ties encompass the nature of the relationship between the biological parents and the 
demonstrable interest in and commitment by the father to the child, before and after birth.961   
This definition of family life was adopted again in the cases of Anayo v Germany and 
Schneider v Germany, where the applicants were denied contact rights with respect to their 
(allegedly, only in Schneider) biological child, as they did not fall within the group of individuals 
who were entitled to contact under the Civil Code, namely the legal father or a person who has 
established a social and family relationship with the child. In both cases, the applicant had a 
relationship with a married woman and the child, who was born from that relationship, had lived 
with his/her mother and her husband, who was also the child’s legal father, since birth.  Based on 
these facts, the Court argued that, in addition to de facto family ties, the intended family life might 
exceptionally fall within the ambit of Article 8, especially in cases where the failed establishment 
of family life is not attributable to the applicant.962  
Apart from being considered relevant to establishing family life, these two elements have 
also been consistently relied on to conclude that stereotypical views were inapplicable to the 
applicants and, eventually, to find a violation. Concerning the mother-father relationship, emphasis 
has been frequently placed on the fact that childbirth or, at least, conception had occurred while 
the applicant and his former partner enjoyed a pseudo-marital relationship. However, it must be 
noted that, in neither of abovementioned cases, a pseudo-marital conception of fatherhood stands 
alone. Rather, the Court’ references to the nature and length of the mother-father relationship tends 
to be complemented with instances of nurture or, at least, nurturing intentions pertaining to the 
father’s direct relationship with his child.   
The combination of these two elements can be found in Sahin, where stereotypical views 
are not applicable to the applicant (and a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 
8 was found) on the basis of his demonstrated interest in the child’s life after his break-up with his 
former partner, coupled with the fact that childbirth occurred while the applicant and his former 
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partner cohabitated.963 Another example is provided by the judgment in Lebbink, where the Court 
began by observing that the child was born from a “genuine relationship”964 that lasted for about 
three years and went on to discuss the existence of certain ties between the applicant and his child. 
In particular, it was observed that: “although the applicant never cohabited with Ms B. and Amber, 
he had been present when Amber was born, that – as from Amber’s birth until August 1996 when 
his relation with Amber’s mother ended – he visited Ms B. and Amber at unspecified regular 
intervals, that he changed Amber’s nappy a few times and baby-sat her once or twice, and that he 
had several contact with Ms B. about Amber’s impaired hearing.” 965  In light of these 
considerations, the Court found family life to exist between the applicant and his child. 
Consequently, the decision of national courts to declare the applicant’s request inadmissible on the 
ground that no family ties could be established was consider in breach of Article 8.  
Although the Court’s attention to the conduct of the father after childbirth is not unique to 
the judgment in Lebbink, different from the account of the father’s involvement in other cases, the 
Court goes beyond the emotional dimension to value physical care. In addition to underlining Mr 
Lebbink’s regular visits to the child, the Court mentioned that he had even changed A.’s diaper on 
a few occasions. In so doing, the Court may wish to emphasise the uniqueness of his involvement. 
Various studies on father involvement have cogently pointed out that, although the division of 
childcare between mothers and fathers has witnessed a certain quantitative redistribution, the kind 
of parenting activities undertaken by fathers is often gendered.966  
Whilst fathers are more likely to participate in recreational and interactive activities, 
physical care of young children – such as bathing and changing a diaper – remains primarily the 
mother’s work.967 Therefore, Mr Lebbink constitutes an exceptional ‘new father’. By deriving 
commitment from occasional visits and physical childcare, the Court adheres to the ideology of 
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‘new fatherhood’ in a more comprehensive form: fathers are expected to provide not only greater 
emotional care, but also physical care. However, controversy remains as to the amount of care in 
order to meet the threshold and, more specifically, whether changing diapers and babysitting a 
child a few times can be considered sufficient to reach this threshold.   
In the case of Zaunegger v Germany, the combination of the mother-father relationship 
with the father’s demonstrated commitment to his child proved decisive to dismiss the 
stereotypical image of unmarried fathers as generally uninterested in maintaining a tie with their 
children. In this case, the Court noted that the applicant had cohabitated with the mother and the 
child until the latter was three and a half years old.968 It was further observed that, after parental 
separation, the child continued to live with the father for more than two years;969 and, also after 
the child moved to the mother’s flat, the father continued to enjoy extensive contact with his 
daughter and to provide for her daily needs. 970  As a result, the Court could not accept the 
assumption whereby joint custody against the will of the child’s mother is automatically 
detrimental to the child’s best interests.971  Given that the Government had failed to advance 
sufficient reasons why the request of the applicant – who had been acknowledged as the child’s 
father and had behaved as such towards the child – should call for less judicial scrutiny than 
requests for joint custody submitted by divorced fathers, a violation of Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8 was found.972   
 Similarly, in the judgment of Schneider v Germany, the Court observed that, although the 
child’s biological parents never cohabitated, it was undeniable that they had a relationship which 
lasted for one year and four months and, therefore, was not considered merely haphazard.973 In 
addition to this, the Court emphasised the applicant’s demonstrated interest and commitment to 
the child by referring to the following pre-birth circumstances: at least according to Mr Schneider’s 
account, the couple had planned to have a child together; he had accompanied Mrs H. to medical 
examinations related to her pregnancy and had acknowledged paternity.974 After his son’s birth, 
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he had initiated proceedings to obtain contact and information concerning the child’s development 
“relatively speedily”, namely in less than six months after the child’s birth.975 Given the legal 
parents’ opposition, the Court concluded that the applicant had sufficiently demonstrated his 
interest in his son.976 Against this background and, more generally, the family realities of the 21st 
century, the Court was no longer convinced that the best interests of a child living with his legal 
father but having a different biological father could be accurately established by a general legal 
assumption.977 Considering that national authorities did not take into consideration whether, in the 
specific case, contact between the father and his child would be in the latter’s best interests, a 
violation of Article 8 was found.  
As a result, in all cases, fatherhood is constructed as derivative of both the mother-father 
relationship and nurture or, in the case of Schneider, nurturing intentions. Given the increased 
importance attached to nurture/nurturing intentions, it follows that the existence of a biological 
connection between the father and his child born out of wedlock is not sufficient to trigger the 
existence of family life between them. The insufficiency of biology was expressly stated in the 
case of Lebbink. More specifically, it was held that:    
 
The Court does not agree with the applicant that a mere biological kinship, without any further legal 
or factual elements indicating the existence of a close personal relationship, should be regarded as 
sufficient to attract the protection of Article 8.978    
 
Apart from being held insufficient, the existence of a biological link was denied any 
relevance in the case of Schneider v Germany. Indeed, it must be noted that, different from the 
other applicants, the paternity of the child had not been established by national courts and the 
mother claimed that Mr Schneider could have been the child’s biological father as much as the 
mother’s husband (legal father of the child). Given that the Court held that national authorities had 
to assess, rather than presume, the compatibility between granting contact rights to the applicant 
and the child’s best interests, regardless of the uncertainty as to the paternity of the child, it seems 
possible to conclude that, in the Court’s view, a potential lack of biological link should not make 
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an unmarried father’s request for contact a priori unworthy of consideration. Hence, biological 
relatedness appears superfluous for an unmarried father’s request for contact rights to be 
considered, and eventually, accepted.       
 Despite the identified trends, it is worth noting that the outcome of Sahin is, however, not 
completely in line with subsequent cases. While a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 is also found in the case of Zaunegger, the non-finding of a violation of Article 8 remains 
exceptional to the judgment in Sahin. Indeed, in both Lebbink and Schneider, the Court found the 
inability for an unmarried father to obtain contact rights without the mother’s consent was in 
violation of his right to respect for family life. This difference in outcome might depend on, inter 
alia, the roles played by the margin of appreciation and by the interpretation of the Convention as 
a living instrument as well as their interplay. While in the Sahin case, as previously explained, the 
Court’s reliance on the doctrine seems to have facilitated the finding of a non-violation of Article 
8 by lowering the standard of review, in the case of Lebbink, the doctrine was not even mentioned 
and, curiously, a violation of Article 8 was found even if, compared to Mr Sahin, Mr Lebbink had 
never cohabitated with either A. or his mother.  
In the case of Zaunegger, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation makes a reappearance. 
However, different from the case of Sahin (concerning a complaint under Article 8), the doctrine 
did not stand in the way of finding a violation. The Court held that, despite the lack of consensus 
as to whether unmarried fathers have a right to apply for joint custody without the mother’s 
consent, most Contracting States appear to share a common point of departure when making 
custody determinations, namely the best interests of the child.979 Moreover, it was noted that, in 
case of tensions between the parents, the majority of national legislations provided that such 
decisions should be subject to the scrutiny of national courts.980 In this instance, therefore, the rule 
of consensus – although in a limited version – served to limit the typically wide margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by States when settling custody matters. Apart from relying on the existence 
of a common point of departure, the finding of a violation was greatly facilitated by a dynamic 
interpretation of the Convention. The Court explicitly recalled that the Convention shall be 
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interpreted as a living instrument and, in this case, regard had to be given to the evolving European 
family realities and the increasing proportion of unmarried parents.981  
A dynamic interpretation of the Convention is also advanced in the case of Schneider, 
where the Court held that “having regard to the realities of family life in the 21st century”, it was 
not persuaded that the best interests of the child living with his legal father but having a different 
biological father could be determined by a legal assumption. By finding a violation of the 
applicant’s rights under Article 8, the need – manifested in the case of J.R.M v the Netherlands – 
to afford absolute protection to the nuclear/legal family from the incursions of third parties faded. 
In turn, the end of the sanctity of the legal/bi-parental family signals the Court’s awareness of the 
on-going fragmentation of fatherhood and, accordingly, its openness to accepting multiple father 
figures, either concomitant or successive.982 In so doing, the Court overcomes the assumption of 
exclusivity – which strongly characterises its jurisprudence on ART – according to which each 
child can have only one real father.983  
 Therefore, it seems possible to observe that, whenever the reliance on the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation avoids impacting the standard of review, the Court will find a violation. A 
stricter scrutiny, in turn, appears to be facilitated by at least three variables: the existence of a 
suspect discriminatory ground and the employment of Article 14 as a “magnifying lens” (Sahin 
concerned a complaint under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8), the existence of a 
European consensus and, related to this, the Court’s undertaking to advance a dynamic 
interpretation of the Convention provision (Zaunegger and Schneider). Therefore, while in the 
case of Sahin, the adoption of an anti-stereotyping approach stemmed from the categorisation of 
sex as a suspect ground which entails the application of the ‘weighty reasons test’, coupled with 
the magnifying effects of Article 14, in the following two cases, the Court felt ready to contest 
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general legal presumptions employed by national courts, when faced by changed realities of family 
life – in particular, an increasing proportion of unmarried parents – and by a certain consensus 
among legal systems. Thus, at least in Zaunegger and Schneider, the Court seems to employ the 
law as an instrument that mirrors social change and national legal approaches, more than 
attempting to transform present realities. 
Although the methodology employed by the Court to establish consensus is not of direct 
interest to the present work, a couple of observations might be useful to show how the Court’s 
explicit reference to the existence, or non-existence, of a common ground do not always translate 
into an effective reliance on consensus, which are due to methodological inconsistencies. Indeed, 
a more attentive look at the establishment of consensus in the cases of Zaunegger and Schneider 
can reveal that, more than reflecting present-day conditions, the Court’s interpretation of Article 8 
attempted to establish new conditions. In the case of Zaunegger, the countries included in the 
survey on comparative law are not mentioned. Thus, when the judgment speaks of the ‘majority’, 
it is unclear to what extent the common approach actually reflects a majoritarian position within 
the Council of Europe. Moreover, as acknowledged by the Court itself, only a limited group of 
countries provide an explicit response to the issue of a lack of agreement between the parents. 
Therefore, as pointed out by the dissenting Judge Schmitt, whilst the majority of Contracting States 
might allow for judicial scrutiny in cases concerning a tension between unmarried parents, the 
existing legal provisions and, more generally, the underlying legal approaches are not similar in 
their details. It follows that, as expressly stated by the Court, the survey of comparative law merely 
identified a common point of departure rather than a common legal solution eventually adopted in 
the event of a conflict between the parents.  
Similarly, in the case of Schneider, the Court appears to derive its perception of present-
day family realities from its own comparative research, which is included in paragraphs 38-46 of 
the judgment. This study concerned 23 Member States of the Council of Europe and, as its primary 
finding, indicated the absence of a uniform approach to the issue whether and, if so, under what 
circumstances, a biological father has a right of contact with his child, provided that a different 
man was recognised as legal father. Without providing any precise number or proportion of States, 
the Court identified three different existing legal responses: the biological father can obtain contact 
rights by challenging the paternity presumption; the biological father has no standing to challenge 




reserves a right to contact only to legal parents and other relatives and, therefore, the biological 
father lacks standing to apply for contact rights also as a third party.  
As illustrated in the introductory chapter, the absence of a shared approach is usually 
conducive to a wide margin of appreciation, as opposed to a dynamic interpretation of the 
Convention. In light of the divergent answers provided by Contracting States, it therefore appears 
surprising that no decisive role was conferred on the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in 
settling these two cases. Whilst the Court pursues the laudable aim of ensuring the protection of 
the rights of unmarried parents as a growing category of parents in present-day families, its ratio 
decidendi lacks consistency or, at best, employs the doctrine of the Convention as a living 
instrument as a tool for judicial activism, thus giving rise to obvious legitimacy concerns.  
 This section concludes with a final remark on the Court’s appreciation of the interests of 
all parties involved. Firstly, the mothers’ reasons for opposing contact are never considered. Not 
even implicitly, the Court seems to express the idea that the mother has a right to move on with 
her life and, since she takes care of the children, to do so without undue interference by the child’s 
biological father. Not even in the case of Lebbink, where the child’s mother had complained of the 
applicant’s violent behaviour toward the child. In this case, moreover, the Court approaches the 
issue of contact exclusively from the father’s perspective, thus ignoring the child’s best interests. 
Differently, in the other three cases, the best interests of the child are consistently referred to as a 
paramount consideration in settling cases concerning the relationship between a biological parent 
and his/her child.  
However, it remains to be established whether the child’s interests have been given 
adequate consideration. As mentioned above, in the case of Sahin, the Court accepts the assessment 
of the child’s best interests conducted by national authorities in light of their closer contact to the 
parties involved.984 However, this attitude of deference might have given space to the stereotypical 
belief that contact against the will of the mother of a child born out of wedlock runs counter the 
child’s best interests; therefore, an overlap between the child’s interests and the mother’s 
opposition to contact might have been assumed in the end. Differently, in the judgments of 
Zaunegger and Schneider, the Court attempts to extricate the principle of the best interests of the 
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child from general principles and underlying ideologies. In so doing, it proposes an investigation 
of the child’s best interests that is grounded on the specific circumstances of the case.985   
Obviously, the need to assess the child’s best interests on grounds of individual cases goes 
hand-in-hand with the need to conduct a case-by-case evaluation of the father’s interest and 
commitment. In turn, an increased importance attached to serious nurturing intentions is closely 
connected to the progressive abandoning of gender stereotypes related to parenthood, to which 
national authorities are invited to participate by the Court. Overall, the Court seems to accept that 
a man can actually seriously want to become a father (regardless of the relationship with the 
mother) and that an unmarried father can be as committed as a married/divorced father or an 
unmarried mother. 
Nonetheless, as previously noted, when looking for evidence of the father’s interest and 
commitment, the Court does not ground its evaluation solely on the applicant’s behaviour towards 
the child, but also on the nature of the relationship from which the child was born. In so doing, the 
Court seems to rely on a presumption connecting casual sex with irresponsible fatherhood and 
sexual relations, which took place in the context of a more-stable/committed relationship and 
responsible fatherhood. The Court must be aware that contact and custody disputes are sometimes 
about instrumentalising children to assert control over their mothers. Thus, the Court’s persisting 
attachment to marital fatherhood, although in a revisited form, might simply be the response to its 
own need to identify a way of testing true commitment and reliability in the future.   
2.1.2 Secret Placement for Adoption without the Consent of the Biological Father 
This sub-section analyses the Court’s position with respect to those cases whether the child born 
out of wedlock was placed for adoption, without the knowledge and consent of the biological 
father. In order to so, the focus will be placed on four judgments, whose sequence displays a 
heightened importance attached to the father’s demonstrated interest and commitment to his child 
born out of wedlock. This trend is accompanied by a decreased explicit emphasis on the mother-
father relationship as a relevant factor to establishing family life and to finding a violation. 
However, a more in-depth investigation of the Court’s reasoning seems to point to a different 
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direction by showing a link between the presence of a stable and committed relationship from 
which the child was born and the analysis of the applicant’s claim from the perspective of the 
State’s positive obligations arising out of Article 8.     
In the case of Keegan v Ireland,986 the applicant and his girlfriend (V.) cohabitated from 
February 1987 until February 1988. In December 1987, they decided to have a child and, 
subsequently, they got engaged. In February 1988, V.’s pregnancy was confirmed. However, 
shortly after this, the couple split up. Nonetheless, the applicant visited V. at a private clinic and 
saw the new-born baby when she was one-day old. Two weeks after childbirth, the applicant went 
to V.’s parents’ home but he was not allowed to see either V. or the child. Eventually, a registered 
adoption agency placed the child with an adoptive family, in compliance with agreements made 
by the mother during her pregnancy.     
 The applicant instituted proceedings before the Circuit Court to be appointed guardian in 
order to be able to oppose the proposed adoption. He also applied for custody rights. Both his 
requests were accepted by the Circuit Court. The mother and the prospective adopters appealed to 
the High Court. The latter found that the applicant was fit to be appointed guardian and that there 
were no circumstances involving the welfare of the child requiring a refusal. However, after the 
High Court proceedings, the case was referred to the Supreme Court, upon the application of V. 
and the prospective adoptive parents. This court held, inter alia, that a natural father did not have 
an automatic right to be guardian but only a right to apply for guardianship. The first and 
paramount consideration in the exercise of judicial discretion was the welfare of the child.  
The High Court resumed examination of the case in the light of the Supreme Court's ruling 
and concluded that the applicant's request for guardianship and custody should be dismissed 
because, with the additional passage of time, the child's attachment to the prospective adopters had 
grown stronger and, therefore, the danger of psychological trauma should the child be moved 
would be greater. An adoption order was eventually made in respect of the child. Having exhausted 
all domestic remedies, Mr Keegan lodged an application with the Commission and argued that the 
secret placement of his daughter for adoption, without his knowledge or consent, violated his right 
to respect for family life. The case was considered admissible and referred to the Court.  
The Government submitted that the “sporadic and unstable” relationship between Mr 
Keegan and the mother of child did not possess the “minimal levels of seriousness, depth and 
                                                        




commitment” to qualify as ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8.987 The Court recalled that 
the notion of ‘family life’ applies beyond marriage-based relationships and might include other de 
facto relationships where the partners live together outside of marriage.988 It was also reiterated 
that a child born out of that relationship was ipso jure part of that relationship from the moment 
and by the very fact of birth. Moreover, irrespective of whether the parents cease to live together, 
once family life between a child and his/her parent has been established, this will remain over 
time.989 
Therefore, contrary to the Government’s arguments, the Court concluded that the 
relationship in question had “the hallmark” of family life, as interpreted under Article 8, and family 
life existed also between the applicant and his daughter since and by virtue of her birth. 990 
Therefore, the father-daughter relationship was constructed as a derivative of the interparental 
relationship. More specifically, in the Court’s assessment, emphasis was placed on the fact that 
the relationship between the applicant and his girlfriend had lasted two years, one of which entailed 
cohabitation.991 It was also noted that the birth of the child was the product of a deliberate decision 
and that the couple had also planned to formalise their relationship through marriage.992  
Moreover, the Court reiterated that (as established in the case of Marckx v Belgium) once 
the existence of a family bond is found, Article 8 requires the State “to act in a manner calculated 
to enable that tie to be developed” as well as to introduce “legal safeguards (…) that renders 
possible as from the moment of birth the child’s integration in his family”.993 The Court was, 
therefore, of the opinion that the fact that Irish law enabled the secret placement of the child 
without the applicant’s knowledge or consent and the consequential attachment of the child to the 
adopters amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for family life.994  
When assessing the compatibility of the interference with Article 8(2), the Court accepted 
that the decision to place the child for adoption was in accordance with Irish law and pursued a 
legitimate aim, namely the protection of the rights and freedoms of the child.995 However, it 
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concluded that the child’s placement was not necessary in a democratic society because the 
Government had failed to provide reasons related to the welfare of the child to justify its departure 
from the positive obligations of respect arising from Article 8.996 To substantiate its ruling, the 
Court observed that the placement of a child with alternative carers had potentially irreversible 
consequences. By leading to the establishment of new ties, it compromised the nurturing of a bond 
between the natural father and the child and it gave rise to a process which placed the biological 
father at a disadvantage, vis-à-vis the prospective adopters, with respect to the custody of the 
child.997 For these reasons, the Court unanimously held that there had been a violation of Article 
8.  
The first analytical remark is of larger applicability and, in a certain way, contributes to 
explaining and justifying the structure and the axis of the present analysis. By stating that the 
relationship between the applicant and his ex-girlfriend “had the hallmark of family life”,998 the 
Court acknowledges that its analysis is developed against the background of a particular notion of 
‘family life’, which presupposes the existence of a set of specific conditions. Accordingly, this 
ideal model of the family works as a parameter against which the existence of family life in 
unconventional scenarios and, more importantly, the legitimacy of the applicants’ claims are 
assessed. This seems to suggest the existence of a rule, according to which the father’s complaint 
is considered to fall within the notion of family life depending on the existence of a marriage-like 
relationship between the applicant and the child’s mother at the time of conception.  
Having regard to the present case, the factors which were held relevant to determine the 
establishment of family life between Mr Keegan and his ex-girlfriend and, consequently, with his 
child pertain exclusively to the interparental relationship.999 In line with the judgment in the case 
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of X, Y and Z v UK, the Court placed emphasis on three key elements: the length – two years – and 
the nature of their relationship – that included a period of cohabitation of one year – as well as the 
couple’s intention to have a child and get married. Therefore, in this case, the existence of a 
marriage-like relationship sufficed to establish the existence of family life between the applicant 
and his daughter and, consequently, to impose a positive duty to enable the development of that 
ties on the State. The Court did not even attempt to build on the facts that were already known to 
demonstrate the applicant’s willingness to raise his daughter. For instance, it could have been 
argued that, by keeping contact with the mother, by visiting her and the new-born child when she 
was one day old, and by having to resort to initiating custody proceedings, he had shown a genuine 
interest in establishing a bond with his child.  
As a result, his family life with the child is considered not to develop autonomously; but 
rather, it is portrayed as a total derivative of and mediated by his relationship with the mother. 
Hence, the Court seems to remain attached to a pseudo-marital conception of fatherhood, which 
presupposes childbirth in the context of a stable and committed relationship and, accordingly, 
identifies a father more as the partner of the mother. The primary focus on the father-mother 
relationship (even if the existence of family life between them is extended (ipso jure) to the father-
child tie) is possibly due to the fact that, similar to the cases concerning the employment of ART, 
the applicant had not had the chance to transform his caring intentions into reality. Therefore, the 
sole existing situation that was capable of being assessed remained the relationship between the 
two adults.  
Nonetheless, it seems important to note that the national authorities’ decision to place the 
child for adoption regardless of Mr Keegan’s consent ultimately did not satisfy the proportionality 
test due to the lack of justifications pertaining to the welfare of the child on the part of the 
Government. Therefore, whilst a certain degree of resemblance with marriage is sufficient to reach 
the threshold of family life, the allocation of residence rights must follow from an assessment of 
the best interests of the child. In accordance with its own jurisprudence, the Court reserves a 
                                                        
and Others v the Netherlands, Application no. 18535/31, 27 October 1994. In this case, the applicants – the mother 
(Mrs Kroon), the biological father (Mr Zerrouk) and the child (Samir) – were unable to obtain recognition of the 
second applicant's paternity of the third applicant due to the presumption of paternity existing under Dutch legislation 
in favour of the husband of the mother at the time of registration of the birth. The Court observed that, since 1987, 
four children had born out of the relationship between the applicant and Mrs Kroon; “thus, there exists between Samir 
and Mr Zerrouk a bond amounting to family life, whatever the contribution of the latter to his son’s care and 




particularly prominent role to the child’s best interests in a case – like the present – which involves 
decisions affecting the child’s upbringing.  
 However, although not explicitly stated, the Court seems to adhere to a specific view of the 
best interests of the child: the biological tie between an unmarried father and his child should be 
protected against irreversible processes that place the natural father in a disadvantaged position 
vis-à-vis that of prospective adopters with respect to the custody of the child (like in the cases of 
Mennesson and Labassee).1000 Hence, biology seems to be constructed as naturally closer to the 
child’s best interests. The weight attached to the biological connection emerges even more clearly 
in the following case, whose facts resemble those of Keegan. In the case of Görgülü v Germany,1001 
the child (Christofer) had been placed with a foster family and, according to the national courts, 
transferring the custody or granting contact rights to the applicant would have been detrimental to 
the child’s wellbeing in light of his deep social and emotional ties with the foster family.  
The applicability of Article 8 was almost assumed. The Court did no more than observe 
that the parties agreed that the decision not to grant contact and residence rights to the applicant 
amounted to an interference with his right to respect for family life.1002 When assessing whether 
this interference was justified under Article 8(2), the Court noted the potential relevance of the 
lack of cohabitation between the applicant and Christofer in striking a balance between the 
competing rights and interests of the foster parents, the applicant and the child.1003 Nonetheless, as 
in Keegan, it also recalled that effective respect for family life required the State to act in a manner 
which enabled the development of the tie in question and, accordingly, to facilitate the 
reunification of a natural father with his child.1004 It followed that, in this specific context, effective 
respect also entailed the State’s obligation to prevent future relations between a father and his child 
from being compromised by the passage of time. Therefore, although acknowledging that 
separating Christofer from his foster family would have had negative repercussions on his mental 
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and physical wellbeing in the short-term, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 on the following 
basis:  
   
[B]earing in mind that the applicant is Christofer's biological parent and undisputedly willing and 
able to care for him, the Court is not convinced that the Naumburg Court of Appeal examined all 
possible solutions to the problem. […] The Court recalls in this respect that the possibilities of 
reunification will be progressively diminished and eventually destroyed if the biological father and 
the child are not allowed to meet each other at all, or only so rarely that no natural bonding between 
them is likely to occur.1005 
    
Both judgments in the cases of Keegan and Görgülü seem to suggest that biology is relevant but 
not necessarily sufficient. While in Keegan, the biological link was accompanied by the 
interparental relationship (two-year long cohabitation, deliberate decision to have a child and 
intention to get married), in Görgülü, no emphasis was placed on the father-mother relationship 
but, rather, biology was presented in conjunction with the applicant’s nurturing intentions and 
potential.1006 Indeed, given the lack of any previous contact between the applicant and his child, 
the Court could not rely on concrete instances of nurture.  
At least prima facie, in the case-law following Keegan, any emphasis on the interparental 
relationship seems to give way to an increased attention to the father-child relationship. Indeed, 
even before Görgülü, the Court had embarked on a nurture-oriented investigation of the 
circumstances of the applicant in the judgment of Söderbäck v Sweden.1007 The latter includes a 
more detailed factual account of the relationship of the father and his non-marital child and, 
possibly thanks to this, also the ratio decidendi hinges more upon the applicant’s personal 
situation. Mr Söderbäck’s situation and concerns resemble those of Mr Keegan. He met K.W. in 
1980 and, two years later, she gave birth to a daughter (M.), of whom the applicant was the father. 
Different from Mr Keegan and V., “they were friends but did not have a steady relationship”.1008 
At childbirth, the applicant visited K.W. and the child at the maternity ward once. Subsequently, 
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he met M. twice at her mother’s house. In addition, he attended her daughter’s christening and, 
during spring 1983, he once babysat M. for approximately an hour.     
K.W. reported to the Social Council that the applicant had alcohol-related problems and, 
therefore, she deemed it inappropriate for him to meet with the child, unless he was sober. In 
response to this, Mr Söderbäck explained that he had been unable to arrange further contact with 
his daughter child primarily due to difficulties in his job. He also admitted that he had problems 
with alcohol. However, according to his account, those had been overcome when he met A.H. in 
1984. They started living together in 1985. In the meantime, K.W. had also met and begun to 
cohabitate with another man (M.W.). They eventually married in 1989.  
The applicant had contact with his daughter on one occasion in 1984. He maintained that 
he wished to visit her more frequently but the mother impeded further contact. However, between 
1984 and 1986, Mr Söderbäck had the chance to periodically see M., since the child-minder of 
A.H.’s son lived close to M.’s. Subsequently, they meet on the occasion of the birthday party of 
A.H.’s son, which was also attended by M. Due to K.W.’s opposition to contact, the applicant 
asked the social welfare office for assistance. A couple of meetings between Mr Söderbäck and 
K.W. took place in the presence of a social worker; the mother reiterated her disagreement over 
allowing him to see the child and, in vain, he kept contacting the authority once every other month.      
In 1988, the husband of K.W., M.W., applied to the District Court for permission to adopt 
M. The applicant opposed this request and applied to the same court for contact rights. The District 
Court decided to authorise M.’s adoption by M.W. due to his constant presence as a nurturing 
father in the child’s life, since she was eight months old. Against this, the District Court held that 
in light of the occasional contact between the applicant and M. (which eventually stopped), “M. 
cannot be considered to have such a need of contact with the applicant as to constitute an 
impediment to adoption”.1009 This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal and, subsequently, 
the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.   
Before the ECtHR, the applicant claimed that the Swedish authorities’ decision to authorise 
M.’s adoption by her mother’s husband, without his consent, had given rise to a violation of his 
right to respect for family life, as guaranteed by Article 8.1010 The Court did not conduct a proper 
assessment of whether family life existed; rather, the Court did no more that observing that, at the 
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time of adoption, the existence of certain ties between the applicant and M. was undisputed.1011 In 
light of this and, given the fact that the arguments’ parties were concerned with the issue of 
compliance with Article 8, the Court went on to consider the case through the lens of family life. 
It was concluded that, having regard to the assessment of the best interests of the child undertaken 
by national courts as well as to the limited contact between the child and her biological father, the 
contested decision fell within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State and, accordingly, 
did not breach Article 8.1012  
The Court began by establishing that the national court’s decision to grant adoption was in 
accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of 
the child.1013 In reaching its final decision on whether the adoption was necessary in a democratic 
society, the Court relied on a careful examination of the facts through the lens of nurture/care. In 
particular, it noted that the encounters that the applicant had with his daughter were “infrequent 
and limited in character”,1014 and that, at the time of adoption, he had not met her for some time. 
Besides these factors giving rise to the mother’s opposition, this situation was also due to the 
applicant’s own problems.1015 Although he allegedly overcame his personal issues by the end of 
1984, the Court observed that he waited almost three years (in June 1987, when the child was four 
years and nine months) before seeking the assistance of the social welfare office to arrange 
contact.1016   
By placing emphasis on these circumstances, the Court aimed to point out that the 
biological father had not been as prompt and proactive as possible. This shortcoming was rendered 
even more worthy of consideration if compared to the situation of the M.W. and his relationship 
with M. In this regard, the Court underlined that the child had been living with her mother since 
birth and with her mother’s husband since she was eight months old.1017 Therefore, M.W. had 
undertaken childcare responsibilities towards M. and the latter recognised M.W. as her own 
father.1018 Therefore, by the time the adoption order was made, de facto family bonds had tied 
K.W. and M.W. for five and a half years, before they married in 1989, and M.W. and M. for six 
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and a half years.1019 Given this state of affairs, the adoption order merely “consolidated and 
formalised” a pre-existing relationship.1020  
In ordering the adoption, the national court had taken into consideration not only the 
evidence provided by the Social Council, according to which adoption was in the child’s best 
interests, but also the submissions made by the applicant and M.W. at the hearing.1021 Hence, the 
Court deemed domestic courts were placed in a better position than a supranational court to strike 
a balance between the competing interests at stake.1022 Having regard to the evaluation of the best 
interests of the child made by the national authorities and the limited contact between the applicant 
and M., the Court concluded that the decision to grant adoption to M. did not exceed the margin 
of appreciation enjoyed by the State.1023 Hence, no violation of Article 8 was found.  
What does this judgment show? At least two relevant points can be made. The 
circumstances of the case replicate the classical scenario of multiple and successive parenting as a 
result of family breakdown. The main tension involved the biological father of a child born out of 
wedlock and the husband of the child’s mother who acts as a social father towards the child. 
Leaving the reasoning temporarily aside, the mere fact that the Court places the applicant in 
comparison with the social father of the child is prima facie indicative of a certain reluctance to 
introduce a father figure outside the social family unit where the child has been raised and, as such, 
represents a resistance on the part of the Court against the reality of fragmented fatherhood. In 
other words, the Court’s preoccupation appears to be more about who to choose between the two 
father figures, rather than how to combine and regulate their coexistence. However, the final 
outcome is clearly a statement of acceptance of the reality of fragmented fatherhood. Put 
differently, by concluding that granting the adoption of the child to the mother’s husband did not 
breach the applicant’s right to respect for family life, the Court acknowledges that biology, on the 
one hand, and nurture and marriage, on the other hand, are not always provided by the same 
individual. Hence, someone can become a child’s legal father (in this case, through adoption), even 
if the biological heritage of the child comes from a different man.   
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Secondly, different from the case of Keegan, the Court did not remark on the nature of the 
relationship from which M. was born. It focused instead on Mr Söderbäck as an individual. This 
might be attributable to the fact that, different from Mr Keegan and V., the biological parents of 
the child in the present case were, at least according to the facts included in the judgment, simply 
friends and never had a steady relationship. 1024  Similarly, when considering the relationship 
between M. and his social father, M.W.’s parenting skills and suitability seemed to have been 
equally evaluated on an individual basis. The Court noted that “the child had been living with her 
mother since her birth and with her adoptive father since she was eight months old; he had taken 
part in the care of M., who regarded him as her father”.1025 That said, however, it cannot be 
excluded that the adoptive father’s eventual victory over the applicant was facilitated by the wider 
‘family package’ that he had to offer; in other words, the specific environment where M. was raised 
amounted to a marital family.  
The Court’s emphasis on nurture is further confirmed by the judgment in K.A.B. v Spain, 
but in a milder form.1026 The applicant was a Nigerian national who migrated to Murcia (Spain) in 
2001, together with his partner C., a Nigerian national, and their son O., born in 2000. In October 
2001, C. was deported from Spain without being able to return for ten years. Owing to the fact that 
the applicant was in Barcelona for work-related reasons, the child was looked after by friends of 
the couple. As the Child Protection Department had not succeeded in reuniting the child with its 
mother, O. was declared abandoned and he was subsequently placed in a children’s home. In 2007, 
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower family court and authorised O.’s adoption by 
the foster family, to which he had been assigned, despite the father’s opposition. The adoption 
order was held in the best interests of the child, having regard to the strong emotional ties O. had 
created with his foster parents.   
Like in the case of Görgülü, but this time explicitly, the Court recalled that Article 8 went 
as far as to include the mere intention to create family life if its failed or incomplete establishment 
is not attributable to the applicant.1027 Therefore, the Court restated that ‘family life’ might also 
refer to a relationship that could have potentially developed between a natural father and his child 
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born out of wedlock.1028 In line with the approach adopted in the case of Schneider, the Court went 
on to identify the nature of the relationship between the natural parents and the degree of interest 
demonstrated by the father both before and after childbirth as the relevant factors to determine the 
existence of family ties.1029 However, in this case, the Court ended up focusing only on the second 
element, at least explicitly.   
In particular, it was held that the failed creation of a tie between K.A.B. and O. was not 
attributable to the father in light of the following circumstances: firstly, the father and his child did 
not cohabitate for a long time; he worked in Barcelona, which was 480 kilometres away from the 
family home; he had not seen his son since the mother’s deportation; and twenty-two days later, 
the Child Protection Department had taken over the child’s guardianship and after another ten days 
he had been placed in a home, before being assigned to a foster family with a view to adoption.1030 
Moreover, it was noted that K.A.B. had expressed wishes to have contact with his child on several 
occasions. He had gone to the Child Protection Department twice in person, in 2001 and 2003, 
arguing to be the biological father of the O. and expressing his intention to undergo a paternity 
test. In the meantime, he had attempted to collect the necessary financial resources.  
Having regard to his precarious situation, the Court was of the opinion that these formalities 
were sufficient to show that he truly desired to be reunited with his child. On the other hand, in the 
Court’s view, the authorities’ inaction, the deportation of the mother without prior verification, the 
failure to assist the applicant when his social and financial situation was most fragile, and the 
failure of the courts to give weight to any other responsibility for the child’s abandonment, coupled 
with the passage of time, had decisively contributed to preventing the possibility of reunion 
between father and son. As a result, the Court concluded that national authorities had failed in their 
positive obligation to take the necessary steps to ensure the father-child reunification, thus 
violating Article 8.   
Therefore, in the cases following the judgment in Keegan, it is possible to observe a shift 
of focus from the interparental relationship to the father-child tie or, at least, its potential. 
Moreover, in assessing the father’s interest and commitment to his child born out of wedlock, the 
Court has gradually loosened its criteria. While in the case of Söderbäck, emphasis was placed on 
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concrete instances of nurture, in the following two cases – Görgülü and K.A.B. – the Court seems 
to be satisfied with mere nurturing intentions. While in the case of K.A.B., these intentions were 
derived from the applicant’s actions aimed at obtaining contact arrangements, in the case of 
Görgülü, the Court referred generally to the father’s willingness and ability to care for his child, 
on the basis of the evaluations conducted by the national authorities. However, whether the 
sufficiency of potential or intended care represents a deliberate evolution in doctrine or the facts 
of the cases forced the Court to lower its requirements remains to be answered. Indeed, it must be 
recalled that, in both Görgülü and K.A.B., the applicants had had limited opportunities to enjoy 
contact with their children prior to lodging their applications.   
Finally, it seems interesting to point out that, different from the other cases, Söderbäck 
ended with a finding of non-violation. To explore the reason for this different outcome, it might 
be relevant to begin by observing that, in the cases of Keegan, Görgülü and K.A.B, the 
interpretation of Article 8 as implying positive, in addition to negative, obligations played a 
significant role in determining the final decision. In the judgment of Keegan, the Court held that 
“the Government have advanced no reasons relevant to the welfare of the applicant’s daughter to 
justify such a departure from the principles that govern the respect for family ties”.1031 In this case, 
the positive obligation at stake, as was first established in Marckx, necessitated acting in a manner 
calculated to enable that tie to be developed and creating safeguards that enable the child’s 
integration into his family from the moment of birth.1032  
Similarly, in the case of Görgülü, it was held that the Government, by refusing to grant 
contact rights to the applicant, “did not fulfil the positive obligation imposed by Article 8 to unite 
father and son”,1033 and having regard to the narrow margin of appreciation enjoyed by States in 
contact-related matters, the reasons advanced by the Government could not be considered 
sufficient to justify the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for family life.1034 The 
Court analysed the legal question from the perspective of the State’s positive obligations under 
Article 8 also in the case of K.A.B. As a result, a violation was found on the basis that, despite their 
margin of appreciation, the national authorities had failed in their duty to act particularly promptly 
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in such matters and had not made appropriate or sufficient efforts to ensure respect for the 
applicant’s right to be reunited with his son.1035  
Against this trend, the Court did not refer to any positive obligation under Article 8 in the 
case of Söderbäck although the claim of the applicant was considered to fall within the notion of 
‘family life’ under Article 8. Although less explicitly, the Court took the contradictory position 
held in X, Y and Z v UK, according to which family ties existed between the applicant and his 
child, but their relationship was not entitled to effective respect under Article 8. As you might 
recall, the case of X, Y and Z involved a female-to-male transsexual, in a stable relationship with 
his female partner, who wished to be recognised as the legal father of a child, born as a result of 
ART. It must be remembered that, in this case, the absence of a biological link was considered (for 
the first time) not an obstacle to finding family life. However, it was concluded that, in that specific 
case, Article 8 did not require the name of the applicant to be registered on the birth certificate, 
thus ruling out the precedent set down in Marckx.  
It is relevant to point out that, different from the case of Keegan – where the mother-father 
relationship had ended before the child’s birth and the father had seen the child only once – in the 
case of X, Y and Z, X had acted as a social father to Z since childbirth. Similarly, based on the facts 
of the case, Mr Söderbäck had the chance to meet his child quite periodically (and certainly more 
than Mr Keegan did). Given that Mr Söderbäck – and, even more so X – had met the child on more 
than one occasion, it seems almost paradoxical that their cases were not considered to involve 
positive obligations to respect their family lives. The finding of non-violation of Article 8 in both 
Söderbäck and X, Y and Z seems to confirm Kilkelly’s view that Article 8’s positive obligations 
are not applied uniformly by the Court and tend to be watered down as the family life at stake 
becomes further detached from the conventional family.  
While, as explained in the previous chapter, X was a female-to-male transsexual who had 
a stable relationship with his female partner, Mr Söderbäck and the child’s mother “were friends 
but did not have a steady relationship”.1036 Therefore, although the Court’s analysis in Söderbäck 
does not contain any reference to the relationship from which the child was born (and neither do 
the subsequent two judgments), the fact that the biological parents did not have a stable 
relationship and, arguably, had not planned to have a child, might have played a certain role in 
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excluding the application of the positive duty to reunite the father with the child. If this 
interpretation holds true, the lack of explicit emphasis on the mother-father relationship in the 
cases following Keegan should not be read as signifying a departure from a derivative definition 
of fatherhood, which is dependent on the interparental relationship to the advantage of a stronger 
appreciation of the direct tie between the father and the child. Rather, the Court’s choice not to 
approach Söderbäck from the perspective of the State’s positive obligations seems to suggest that 
the mother-father relationship retains an essential role in determining the extent to which 
applicants are owed negative as well as positive obligations. Hence, it seems possible to observe 
a persisting attachment to a pseudo-marital conception of fatherhood, despite the lack of explicit 
references to the mother-father relationship as a relevant factor.  
Concerning the parties involved, in all cases considered, the main tension seems to occur 
between the biological father and the adoptive parent(s). However, the latter’s interests in 
maintaining their emotional and social bonds with the child are never explicitly discussed. In the 
case of Söderbäck, the position of the mother’s husband is only indirectly given weight, as a result 
of its coincidence with the best interests of the child.1037 In relation to the children involved, the 
Court has consistently affirmed the paramount importance to be attached to their interests in 
settling such cases. However, the extent to which this principle is actually implemented in the case-
law tends to be contingent on the interpretation of the child’s best interests endorsed by the Court.  
It seems that, with the exception of Söderbäck, the Court tends to favour a specific view of 
the child’s best interests, that of being reunited and living with his/her biological parents, instead 
of another, such as that of providing the child with a stable family unit. This becomes particularly 
evident in the case of Görgülü, where the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that 
the national authorities had failed to consider the long-term implications of a permanent separation 
from his biological father on the child.1038 In so arguing, however, the Court chose to assign 
priority to the long-term consequences over the impact of cutting the emotional ties with his foster 
family on the child’s wellbeing. The same attitude can be detected in the case of K.A.B., where, 
although the Court accepted the assessment of the child’s best interests undertaken by the national 
authorities – according to which it was in the child’s best interest to continue living with his 
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adoptive family1039 – it eventually concluded that the national authorities had not taken sufficient 
and adequate steps to ensure the respect of the father’s right to be reunified with his child.1040  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the finding of a violation in the cases of Keegan, 
Görgülü and K.A.B. does not result from the application of a general rule, according to which, 
whenever possible, a child should be raised by his natural father/parents. Rather, the Court seems 
to argue that the secret placement of children breached the applicants’ right to respect for family 
life on the ground of their demonstrated interest and commitment to their children and, on the other 
hand, the national authorities’ failure to facilitate the father-child reunification. The same can be 
observed with respect to the judgment in Söderbäck, despite its opposite outcome. The Court found 
no violation on the basis of the limited contact between the applicant and his child, coupled with 
the former’s insufficient promptness to seek the assistance of the social welfare authorities. 
Accordingly, the rule seems to be that, if there is a better father figure, his claims should prevail 
over those of the biological father. Therefore, the best interests of the child are assessed in light of 
the specific circumstances of the case, rather than being the expression of conventional norms 
around parenting.  
It is important to note one final remark on the interpretative tools used by the Court. Firstly, 
there is no trace of a dynamic interpretation of the Convention. On the contrary, the Court refers 
to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in all cases, except in Keegan. In the judgment of 
Söderbäck, national authorities were granted a wide margin on the ground that they benefited from 
closer contact with all parties involved and were, therefore, better placed than a supranational court 
to strike a fair balance. Despite the use of the doctrine in its structural variant, it seems that it had 
no effect on the standard of review. Indeed, although the Court relied on the determination of the 
child’s best interests made by national authorities, it still undertook its own assessment of the 
concrete ties linking the child with the applicant and his legal father, respectively. In contrast, in 
the cases of Görgülü and K.A.B., the Court does no more than recall the general principles 
according to which States enjoy a wide margin in settling custody-related matters, while 
restrictions on contact rights call for stricter scrutiny. However, the doctrine is not incorporated 
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within the reasoning; rather, it seems to be used merely as a ‘conclusory label’, with no effect on 
the standard of review.1041  
 Different from the previous set of cases, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation was 
never invoked in conjunction with the rule of consensus. Nor, did the Court explicitly contest 
general legal assumptions, thus clearly indicating the willingness to fight stereotypes and affirm a 
new vision of fatherhood. Nonetheless, both the attention devoted to the particular circumstances 
of the case and the application of the doctrine of positive obligations might be considered proof 
that the Court embarked on an anti-stereotyping analysis and, in so doing, attempted to promote a 
more substantive version of equality.   
 
2.1.3 The Court’s Approach to Unmarried Fatherhood: Change and Continuity  
Based on the case-law analysed, it would seem that, as long as the child was born in a stable and 
committed relationship and there is evidence of the father’s interest and commitment to the child, 
a violation is found. Therefore, as pointed out by O’Mahony, the jurisprudence up till now seems 
to suggest that the Court is not only interested in establishing whether the father is willing and 
committed to developing a relationship with his child and his involvement in the child’s life serves 
the latter’s best interests.1042 Rather, the Court continues to attach a certain degree of importance 
to the length and nature of the mother-father relationship, thus conceiving fatherhood as a mediated 
tie, rather than autonomous.   
More specifically, the existence of a sufficiently lengthy and non-casual relationship 
between the applicant and the child’s mother at the time of conception or before their separation 
and an element of ‘planning’ seem to be essential to the establishment of family life between the 
father and his child or, at least, to increase the likelihood to be regarded as family life. This reading 
of the case-law is further confirmed by subsequent decisions. It is worth mentioning the 
Commission’s admissibility decision in the case of M.B. v UK.1043 Although the application was 
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ultimately declared inadmissible, the decision of the Commission sheds light on the relevance 
attributed to the mother-father relationship in order to establish the existence of family life as well 
as on the characteristics that the relationship should have in order to trigger the protection of Article 
8.  
The applicant began a sexual relationship with a married woman, which ended when the 
woman discovered she was pregnant. A child, E., was born and the applicant sought parental 
responsibility and contact arrangements with respect to the child. However, his request was 
rejected on the ground that admitting the presence of the applicant in E.’s life was likely to be 
detrimental to her welfare because it would disturb the child’s relationship with her mother and 
legal father and, more generally, the stability of the family unit within which E. has lived since 
birth.1044 The applicant complained that, by denying him the chance of any future ties with E., 
national courts had breached his right to respect for family life.  
However, the Commission concluded that no family life could be found to exist between 
them. In order to reach this conclusion, the Commission analysed the circumstances of the case, 
vis-à-vis those in Keegan, where the Court establied the existence of family life was established. 
In particular, it was observed that, different from the case of Keegan, the applicant and the child’s 
mother had never cohabitated and that their relationship had lasted approximately 6-7 months.1045 
Moreover, in this case, the pregnancy was not the result of a deliberate decision, like in the case 
of Keegan, and the applicant had not developed any form of tie with E.. In light of the above, an 
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unplanned pregnancy resulting from a 6-7 months relationship, with no cohabitation, did not prove 
sufficient to cause the applicability of Article 8.1046 
The only exception to the identified trend of requiring a stable and committed relationship 
between the biological parents to establish the applicability of Article 8 can be found in the case 
of Söderbäck, where the biological parents were simply friends. In the latter, the Court observed 
that, at the time of adoption, the existence of certain ties between the applicant and his child was 
undisputed;1047 hence, Article 8 was declared applicable. This would seem to demonstrate that, in 
fact, it is not always essential that the mother and the father had a sufficiently stable relationship 
which would fall within the notion of family life in order to find the existence of family ties 
between the applicant and his child. However, it must be stressed that, although the lack of a steady 
relationship between the biological parents did not prevent the finding of family life, it proved 
decisive in excluding the applicability of the positive obligation to facilitate the reunion of the 
father with his child born out of wedlock and, consequently, in not finding a violation of Article 8. 
Therefore, although not essential to establish the existence of family life between an unmarried 
father and his child born out of wedlock, the mother-father relationship remains necessary to 
trigger the application of positive obligations and, therefore, a stricter review of the case.  
In light of the above, the case-law involving unmarried fatherhood and, more specifically, 
the judgment in the case of Söderbäck displays a tendency to water down the extent of positive 
obligations when the family life in question becomes further detached from the image of the 
conventional family. Once family life is established, the State has, at least in principle, both 
negative and positive obligations towards the individuals involved. However, in the case of 
Söderbäck, the Court appears to have accepted some differential treatment with respect to positive 
obligations in the absence of a stable and committed relationship between the biological parents. 
Just like in the case of X, Y and Z, the finding of a non-violation led to a paradoxical situation, 
where the family life of the applicants is recognised but they are, nonetheless, denied a right to 
enjoy family life.1048  
Given the persisting emphasis – either explicit or implicit – on the mother-father 
relationship, the Court’s approach can be seen as part of a broader legal tendency to extend the 
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rights and responsibilities of marriage to those relationships that resemble it. 1049 Indeed, it seems 
almost self-evident that each of these characteristics mentioned – namely, the length, the nature 
and the ‘planning’ element – is meant to indicate stability and permanence, which, at least in 
principle, typically belong to the institution of marriage. In so doing, the Court seems to suggest 
that marriage-type relationships are a desirable locus, in which to conceive and raise children. To 
some extent, this view is backed up by research evidence indicating that long-term, committed 
cohabitation is almost indistinguishable from marriage, especially in terms of partners’ 
commitment to each other and their children.1050 What appears to be true is that, statistically, 
marital relationships are more durable than non-marital ones. 1051  Nonetheless, it remains 
extremely difficult to substantiate claims that marriage is exceptionally conducive to certain 
‘goods’.1052 Indeed, married and unmarried cohabitating couples are found to share many values 
and, consequently, the determinants of their behaviour have proved more alike than different.1053  
Despite the relevance of this empirical evidence, it is neceassary to keep in mind that the 
unmarried relationships in dispute in these cases have broken down. Therefore, whilst the Court’s 
view might respond to a valid ratio in intact families, it would be paradoxical to attach a certain 
degree of decisiveness to the alleged stability of a relationship that ended in order to mimick the 
image of the marital family. Rather, the emphasis on the mother-child relationship seems to stem 
from the Court’s awareness of the risk of instrumentalisation inherent in contact and joint residence 
disputes. In particular, the Court seems to be conscious of the possibility that the applicant fathers 
are not necessarily concerned with developing or maintaining ties with their children, but they 
might be more interested in reasserting control over the child’s mothers through contact and joint 
residence arrangements. In light of this danger, the Court might have kept the interparental 
relationship as a criterion for testing the true commitment of unmarried fathers towards their 
children.  
More specifically, the Court appears to rely on an assumption linking causal sex with 
irresponsible fatherhood and sexual intercourse in a committed relationship with responsible 
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fatherhood. In other words, the degree of stability of the mother-father relationship is held 
indicative, together with concrete instances of nurture or nurturing intentions, of the father’s true 
motives and intentions. Hence, despite an increased appreciation of the father’s actual involvement 
in the child’s life or of his demonstrated interest, the mother-father relationship continues to 
represent an element against which the truthfulness and the legitimacy of the applicant’s claims 
are assessed. Therefore, when considering the parental relationship, the ultimate goal of the Court 
does not necessarily lie in the recreation of the image of the conventional marital family, but rather 
in the search for a criterion to evaluate the father’s genuine interest in the child.  
 Despite the tenacious hold of the marital family (although in a revisited form), a revaluation 
of the willingness as well as of the parenting suitability of fathers as individuals, rather than as 
members of a conventional family unit, is undeniable. Among the elements accorded weight, it is 
worth mentioning, which included: acknowledgment of paternity (Sahin v Germany, Schneider v 
Germany), attendance of medical examinations together with the mother (Schneider v Germany), 
presence at birth (Lebbink v The Netherlands), frequency of contact (Söderbäck v Sweden, Lebbink 
v The Netherlands, Zaunegger v Germany), cohabitation between the father and the child 
(Zaunegger v Germany), nurturing activities undertaken by the father (Lebbink v the Netherlands: 
changing diapers, babysitting), promptness to seek the social services’ assistance in asserting 
contact rights (Söderbäck v Sweden), and promptness to initiate legal proceedings to obtain contact 
arrangements (Schneider v Germany).  
Throughout the listed case-law, the interpretation of the notion of ‘father’s demonstrated 
interest’ reaches a peak, which resembles the development of the concept of ‘family life’ under 
Article 8. In the case of Schneider, caring intentions – more than actual nurture – expressed through 
the acknowledgment of paternity and the prompt initiation of legal proceedings were relied on by 
the Court to establish the existence of a relationship between an unmarried father and his biological 
child worthy of protection under Article 8, preferably under the heading of ‘family life’ or else 
falling within the notion of ‘private life’. Therefore, while the main analytical focus remains on 
the father-child tie, what is given due regard is the potential of that relationship – rather than its 
reality – and, more importantly, the fact that its development has been obstructed by external 
parties. This attitude signals an extraordinary readiness and – to a certain extent – blind trust 




the Court grounds the establishment of family life on an optimistic and aspirational view of 
fathering, whereby men are keen to carry out parenting roles traditionally performed by women.1054  
Another channel through which the Court’s adherence to the conventional ideology of 
fatherhood can be measured is biology. Leaving aside the Schneider case, the legal definition of 
fatherhood endorsed by the Court remains marked by a remarkable degree of continuity concerning 
the significance of the biological link as one of the factors to be considered when attributing 
parental rights in the post-separation/divorce context. In the cases of Keegan, Görgülü and K.A.B., 
the endorsement of a biological conception of fatherhood can be inferred from the specific view 
of the child’s best interests adopted by the Court. By arguing that the tie between an unmarried 
father and his child should be protected against irreversible processes, like those triggered by 
adoption, and holding that States have the positive duty to facilitate the reunion between a natural 
father and his child, the Court seems to consider biology as necessary to set in motion the 
application of this positive obligation and, therefore, to call for the father-child reunion. In the case 
of Görgülü, the Court went on to explicitly refer to the biological kinship between the applicant as 
his child, together with former’s willingness and ability to look after the child, to conclude that 
national authorities had failed to examine all possible solutions.  
This stance is certainly compatible with the position adopted in the case of Lebbink, namely 
the insufficiency of biological relatedness and the need for additional factual and legal elements, 
revealing the existence of close personal ties to attract the protection of Article 8. Although not 
expressly mentioned, biology seems to remain central also in the cases of Söderbäck, Sahin and 
Zaunegger. Indeed, had the applicants not been the biological fathers, it is doubtful whether the 
existence of family life between them and their children would have been automatically 
established. The same, however, cannot be argued in relation to the case of Schneider v Germany. 
In fact, in the latter case, uncertainty as to the existence of a biological link between the applicant 
and his child was not interpreted as excluding a priori any consideration for the applicant’s request 
for contact arrangements. Thus, it would seem that, at least with respect to Schneider, biological 
relatedness does not determine whether the applicant’s complaint falls within the notion of family 
life and, eventually, whether the refusal of contact arrangements amounts to a violation of Article 
8.  
                                                        




Overall, although the genetic link seems to remain necessary in order to grant 
contact/custody rights, biology shares the stage with other two relevant elements: the parental 
relationship and the applicant’s demonstrated interest and commitment to his child. Therefore, it 
can be argued that, in the context of unmarried fatherhood, the Court endorses a similar view to 
that emerging from the analysis of the ART-related jurisprudence: the figure of the biological 
father has not been replaced. Rather, it coexists – peacefully or in tension – with an increased 
emphasis on nurture/nurturing intentions and a revisited form of marital fatherhood. Hence, also 
in this context, it seems that the Court has gotten closer to the ideology of ‘new fatherhood’, which, 
as previously explained, combines traditional roles with the ‘new’ image of the father as a carer.    
When shaping its jurisprudence on unmarried fatherhood, the Court’s analysis almost 
exclusively focuses on the applicant’s right to respect for his family life and the child’s best 
interests. The implications of the kind of relationship with the fathers on the interests of the other 
parties affected – namely, the biological mother of the child and the adopters – are not taken into 
account, with the exception of Söderbäck. However, also in this case, the position of the mother’s 
husband (prospective adoptive father) is only considered because of its resonance with the child’s 
best interests.  
As anticipated, in the case-law stemming from secret placement, the Court endorses a 
vision of the child’s best interests that, although prima facie favours the applicant’s reunion with 
his child over the undisturbed continuation of the child’s emotional bonds with his foster family, 
is grounded on the specific circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the rule seems to be that, if 
there is a better father figure, his claim should prevail over that of the biological. This explains 
why, despite the willingness of the biological father to take care of the child, the Court concluded 
that the decision to grant the adoption of the child to the mother’s husband did not violate Mr 
Söderbäck’s right to respect for family life. The call for a fact-based investigation of the child’s 
best interests becomes even more visible in the judgments in Zaunegger and Schneider. While in 
the case of Sahin the Court did not question the national court’s determination of the child’s best 
interests, in the two following cases, it found a violation on the ground that national authorities 
had assumed a priori incompatibility between granting contact/residence rights to the applicants 
and the child’s best interests.     
 More generally, grounding the reasoning (beyond the assessment of the best interests of 




relationships between unmarried fathers and their children by general presumptions, which – at 
least in this context – have tended to provoke a negative image of unmarried fathers. In other 
words, a case-by-case analysis has enabled the Court to react against generalisations by carrying 
out an anti-stereotyping review of national decisions. Anti-stereotyping efforts are particularly 
visible in the case-law involving fathers seeking to obtain contact and residence rights against the 
will of the mother, where the Court explicitly attempts to investigate the reasons underlying the 
contested provision or decision. Undertaking such inquiry, the Court discloses and contests the 
operation of stereotypical notions about unmarried fathers. Therefore, the Court’s position appears 
to be in line with the research findings, like those of Dunn et al., who have underlined the 
inappropriateness of a legal presumption of contact or the use of simple rules, such as ‘contact 
ought to be fostered’ or, conversely, ‘contact ought to be restrained’, when determining post-
separation/divorce arrangements.1055 
Finally, although the legal issue at stake remained the same – namely, whether unmarried 
fathers should be granted contact/custody rights after a breakdown in the relationship – throughout 
the whole jurisprudence, the Court made a rather non-homogeneous use of the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation and the interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument. In the cases 
of Sahin and Söderbäck, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation was invoked in its structural 
variant. However, while in the former, the reliance on the doctrine impacted the standard of review, 
thus facilitating the finding of non-violation of Article 8, in the case of Söderbäck, the fact that 
national authorities were better placed to assess the needs of the individuals involved did not 
prevent the Court from undertaking its own review. While the judgments in Keegan and Lebbink 
contained no reference to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, in Görgülü and K.A.B., the 
doctrine – although referred to in its general principles – was employed to merely state a 
conclusion, with no substantial effects on the standard of review.    
Interestingly, the doctrine was invoked in conjunction with the rule of consensus – and 
given the establishment of a common approach, with the interpretation of the Convention as a 
living instrument – only in the cases of Zaunegger and Schneider. However, given that the 
comparative law surveys relied on failed to indicate the existence of a common approach among 
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the laws of the Contracting States, the interpretation of the Convention endorsed by the Court 
ultimately seems to impose new legal conditions, more than reflecting present-day conditions. 
Therefore, in these two cases, it appears that the law is conceived as a tool that should take 
inspiration from social change and, in particular, from the patterns of family life in the 21st century 
(more than from legal realities) and, accordingly, attempt to transform deviant national legal 
realities.  
2.2 Divorced Fathers: Focusing on the Applicant’s Behaviour throughout Proceedings 
The following analysis is aimed at providing a further channel of comparison between the legal 
treatment of contact-related claims brought by divorced fathers and unmarried fathers, 
respectively. As a first observation, it is important to remark that the petita sought in the two sets 
of cases are not identical, although closely related. While unmarried fathers still seek contact 
rights, most of the divorced fathers lodging a complaint with the Court are concerned with ensuring 
the implementation of already existing contact orders. Despite this difference, the analysis of the 
cases brought by divorced fathers will enable us to identify the factors whereby the Court has 
found, or not found, a violation of the applicant’s right to respect for family life and, subsequently, 
contrast them with the approach adopted vis-à-vis the claims of unmarried fathers.  
The circumstances of the cases brought by divorced fathers tend to follow the same plot: 
the non-residential father is unable to have contact with his child following divorce due to the 
mother’s opposition and the alleged failure of the national authorities to implement contact orders. 
Despite the widespread consensus as to the potential benefit of continuing family relationships, 
relational dynamics play a crucial role in determining the quantity and quality of post-
separation/divorce contact. The maintenance of the relationship between a father and his child is 
dependent on and situated within a framework of other family relationships, each of which affects 
the other. Divorce and, more generally, family breakdown is a process which forces parents to 
position themselves with respect to a series of frequently competing discourses.1056 And, it is 
widely agreed that high levels of conflict between parents are likely to render the enforcement of 
contact orders ineffective.1057  
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Given the procedural nature of the issue of enforcement, the resulting judgments are 
primarily concerned with the subsequent stages and the details of the national proceedings. 
Although substantial matters are seldom discussed, it is precisely the lack of consideration of those 
issues that creates opportunities for comparing the expectations raised towards unmarried fathers 
seeking contact with their children born out of wedlock and divorced fathers attempting to arrange 
visits. Overall, as shown in the following cases, the reasoning of the Court does not include any 
consideration pertaining to either the relationship from which the child was born or the 
concreteness of the father-child relationship during marriage. Rather, when given any explicit 
weight, the father’s intention to preserve his relationship with his biological child has been 
assessed by focusing on the conduct and attitude assumed by the applicant in the course of the 
legal proceedings.  
In the case of Glaser v the United Kingdom, a father of three children complained on the 
alleged failure of English and Scottish courts to enforce contact arrangements granted in his favour 
after divorce.1058 He argued, inter alia, that the lack of a prompt response by the national courts 
enabled his former wife to move the children to several addresses, thus significantly reducing (and, 
eventually, eliminating) the chances of ensuring contact.1059 He also submitted that his ability to 
initiate enforcement proceedings in Scotland – where the mother and the children moved – was 
postponed due to a delay in the court informing him of the mother’s location.1060 The Court 
concluded that, although Article 8 encompasses a right for a parent to have measures taken with a 
view to his or her being reunited with the child, and it therefore entails a positive obligation on the 
national authorities to take such measures, in this case, the failure was due entirely to the mother's 
persistent avoidance of the orders and therefore could not be laid at the door of the national 
authorities.1061 Therefore, the Court acknowledged the mother’s behaviour, who left the family 
home and disappeared with the children and her on-going opposition to any contact even when 
they were located in Scotland, as the primary obstacle to the applicant’s enjoyment of his right to 
contact.    
Nonetheless, it seems important to underline that the father’s participation in the 
proceedings was also subject to strict scrutiny in the Court’s reasoning. The underlying ratio lies 
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in the fact that “it is, after all, (their) his own rights and obligations which are at stake” and, 
therefore, the applicant’s “active participation can hardly be dispensed within the normal course 
of events”.1062 Overall, the Court was of the opinion that the non-enforcement was not attributable 
to the authorities’ failure to take reasonable steps in order to protect the applicant’s right to respect 
for family life. Rather, it held that, considering the presence of other individuals involved – 
particularly, children – the authorities succeeded in striking a fair balance between the competing 
interests. 1063  In so arguing, the Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning the 
unreasonable expedition of the proceedings and actually stressed his insufficiently proactive 
behaviour in the course of proceedings.  
It was observed, inter alia, that he could have applied for the domestic court to hear his 
application at an earlier stage, rather than waiting for the enforcement order to be issued.1064 
Moreover, if he wished any more coercive steps to be taken, he could have pursued legal 
proceedings aimed at declaring the mother to be in contempt of court, rather than abandoning them 
throughout the process.1065 Apart from contributing to the failed enforcement of contact orders, 
the applicant’s omissions appear to be read as revealing his insufficient interest in obtaining 
contact and, by extension, in preserving his tie with the child.1066 Taken further, the insufficiently 
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the Court concluded that the alleged violation had not occurred, since the father himself had contributed to obstructing 




proactive attitude of the applicant ended up constituting one of the justifications for not finding a 
violation of Article 8.  
As a further example, the suggested focus on the litigation behaviour of the applicant shines 
through the case of Piazzi v Italy.1067 In this case, however, the failed enforcement of contact rights 
was found to breach the divorced father’s right to respect for family life. The applicant was a non-
resident divorced father, who had been granted contact arrangements with his children. He 
complained that he was unable to exercise his contact rights due to the alleged failure by the social 
services to take the necessary measures, for more than seven years. More specifically, he argued 
that the role of the social services in the enforcement of the court decisions had been too 
autonomous and that the Youth Court had not ensured proper follow-up after making its decisions. 
The assessment of the ECtHR charts the subsequent stages of the national proceedings and, in so 
doing, sheds light on the tenacious litigation behaviour of the applicant vis-à-vis the inadequate 
response and relaxed attitude of national authorities.  
As a preliminary step, the applicant complained about the mother’s opposition to contact 
before the Youth Court. On the basis of psychological evidence, the national court held that the 
mother’s conduct amounted to parental alienation. Therefore, although he continued to physically 
live with his mother, the child was placed in the custody of the social services. The Youth Court 
further noted that it was in the child’s best interest to reconnect with his father. As a result, it was 
held that the child ought to receive psychological support and contact ought to occur every two 
weeks, in the presence of a professional. The following day, the applicant sought the assistance of 
social services in order to ensure the enforcement of the Youth Court’s decision.1068 He submitted 
his first application in December 2003. In the absence of a response, he resubmitted his request to 
the social services in February 2004. He attended a meeting with the person in charge of his case 
in June 2004. Since no visit had been arranged up to this point, the applicant reconfirmed his wish 
to have contact with his child in three letters sent to the social services, between October and 
December 2005.  
His requests were disregarded for a long time and, given the age of the child (eleven years 
old) and the complex family situation, the passage of time had negative repercussions on the 
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applicant’s possibility to reconnect with his child.1069 The social services submitted their first 
report on the child’s psychological condition in 2006. In the meantime, the applicant had pursued 
the implementation of his contact arrangements before the Youth Court. The latter acknowledged 
the failed enforcement of the contact orders only in 2008. In its decision, the national court 
confirmed the contact arrangements previously established and acknowledged that the social 
services had entrusted the mother with arranging the child’s psychological check-ups. Given the 
child’s rage against his father and the expressed refusal to see him, the Youth Court ordered the 
social services to supervise the child’s psychological development and the behaviour of the 
mother. Throughout 2008 and 2009, the applicant attended further meetings with the social 
services, which refused to provide him with any information related to the child. The applicant 
sought an appeal before the Court of Appeal, which rejected his request on the basis that the child 
(who was seventeen years old at the time) expressed opposition to seeing his father.  
In a nutshell, the ECtHR held that national authorities let a situation arising from the non-
enforcement of contact orders escalate, thus compromising any possibility for the applicant to 
reconnect with his child.1070 More specifically, the Youth Court did no more than charging the 
social services with arranging the meetings; and, the social services, in turn, did no more than 
entrusting the mother to organise the psychological check-ups for the child.1071 As a result, it was 
concluded that the national authorities had failed to make adequate efforts to ensure a reconnection 
between the father and the child, thus violating his right to respect for family life. Based on this 
account, it seems that the Court attempts to underline the active litigation behaviour of the 
applicant by comparing it with the delayed and passive attitude of national authorities. The 
applicant’s legal initiative and his conduct throughout the proceedings is, once again, the only 
aspect of his life experience, on which the Court places an emphasis. Taken further, the applicant’s 
litigation behaviour becomes one of the parameters against which a divorced father’s genuine 
interest in his child is measured. 
Through such a stance, the Court might express its concerns about the fact that divorced 
fathers who initiate legal proceedings might not necessarily be moved by a genuine interest in 
preserving contact with their children. Rather, as emerging from the academic literature, power 
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struggles with former spouses can sometimes underlie post-divorce tensions between the 
biological parents of a child. Being aware of this possibility, the Court feels that the applicant 
fathers’ expressed interests in their children cannot always be trusted. Accordingly, just like it has 
been observed with respect to unmarried fathers, the Court might have felt the need to identify a 
criterion for testing the applicant’s true commitment: while the genuine interest of unmarried 
fathers is usually derived from, inter alia, the nature and length of their relationship with the child’s 
mother, the applicant’s behaviour throughout litigation is deemed indicative of a divorced father’s 
true motives.         
When considering complaints brought by divorced fathers, the Court has consistently held 
that “it is undisputed that these matters concern ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 of the 
Convention”.1072 Bearing in mind the intentionality-based test employed by the Court to assess the 
existence of family life under Article 8, the obvious existence of family life between a divorced 
father and his child is not surprising. As previously mentioned, marriage represents the preferred 
evidence of the intention to create family life and, accordingly, heterosexual married families are 
automatically granted the status of ‘family life’. Moreover, as confirmed by the Court’s 
jurisprudence, the father-child relationship arising out of marriage does not follow the course of 
the marital relationship between the parents; rather, it survives parental separation and divorce. 
In the context of unmarried fatherhood, the Court relies on two main factors considered 
relevant to settle contact disputes: firstly, the length and the nature of the relationship between the 
natural parents; secondly, the demonstrated interest and commitment of the father in his child, as 
revealed by the frequency and the nature of their contact or otherwise by his promptness to initiate 
legal proceedings to obtain contact arrangements, provided that the lack of previous contact is not 
attributable to him. Differently, in the case-law involving divorced fathers, it seems that the Court 
has concentrated all its attention on the post-divorce phase and, therefore, on the behaviour of the 
father in the course of proceedings as a means of testing the intensity and genuineness of his caring 
intentions towards the child.  
However, given the decisive role of marriage in defining a father-child relationship as 
worthy of Article 8’s protection, why is the parental relationship in cases brought by divorced 
                                                        




fathers not considered at all?1073 Given the Court’s regard for marriage-like relationships in the 
context of unmarried fathers, the tenacious hold of the marital family should (logically speaking) 
emerge even more clearly in such circumstances. What appears similarly doubtful is the lack of 
interest in the concrete dynamics characterising the father-child relationship throughout the 
marriage. Considering that divorced fathers generally lived with their former wives and children 
up until divorce, it appears surprising that the Court did not consider the applicants’ paternal 
conduct during the intact marital relationship.  
In so doing, the Court does not look for continuity between the pre-divorce relationship of 
the father with his child and the post-divorce reality. Rather, the right to contact appears to be 
conceived as a merely post-divorce arrangement and, as such, something to be adjudicated, while 
past conduct is deemed irrelevant. In order to have his claim considered, a divorced father willing 
to remain involved in his child’s life is required to act in a prompt and collaborative manner 
throughout the course of proceedings, in view of facilitating the implementation of contact 
arrangements. In light of this, the Court seems to promote a “free-floating concept of rights”, 1074 
with no corresponding responsibilities, but only to a certain extent. Against feminist voices 
complaining of a double standard in assessing parental responsibility in relation to contact,1075 the 
behaviour of divorced fathers is not exempt from scrutiny. Rather, if they fail to report for contact 
(like in the case of Glaser v UK), they are labelled ‘irresponsible’ and, consequently, considered 
not meritorious of protection under Article 8. At the same time, however, the lack of any 
consideration for the applicant’s parental conduct during the marriage reveals certain optimism in 
the Court’s approach to divorced fathers and, potentially, a tendency to conceive the role of the 
law as transformative, more than reflective of widespread gender imbalances in the domain of 
childcare.  
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3. Concluding Remarks: Optimism or Reality? And, Which Reality? 
Discussing the UK position, Wallbank asserts that contact is likely to be viewed as an end in itself 
and the goal of contact law is likely to be focused on the future rather than the past. 1076 
Accordingly, it is argued that professionals tend to put the past to one side and ‘to be constructive’ 
in order to benefit the child in the future.1077 A certain tendency to enhance paternal involvement 
in the life of children based on an aspirational vision of fatherhood can be observed more widely. 
For instance, according to the current provisions regulating residence in Italy, joint residence 
arrangements are the default rule and, as such, are not necessarily granted on the basis of the 
father’s involvement during the intact relationship. Evidently, promoting the ideal responsible 
parent, or a constructive approach to the future, entails the risk of ignoring the gendered nature of 
parenting which occurred during the relationship.  
At least prima facie, this perceived need to be forward-looking (as opposed to backward-
looking) with respect to the patterns of care during the parental relationship does not seem to 
penetrate the Strasbourg jurisprudence involving unmarried fathers. In these particular cases, the 
Court has increasingly focused its reasoning on factual circumstances and, more specifically, on 
past behaviour demonstrating the father’s interest and commitment to his child. Even in the 
judgment of Schneider, the establishment of intended family life is grounded on facts that 
demonstrate clear aspirations, not on mere aspirations. Such a backward-looking attitude cannot 
be observed, to the same extent, in relation to divorced fathers. Indeed, although the Court’s 
attention remains directed to the specific circumstances of each case, it shows no interest in the 
father’s conduct throughout marriage, even if the alleged cohabitation between the father and the 
child would be likely to say something about the nature of their ties and, thus, prove useful to 
assessing the father’s genuine concern.    
Nonetheless, the real question is: are these circumstances focused on doing or are these 
circumstances focused on being? In other words, are the decisions taken on the basis of what the 
applicants do or on what they are?1078 The answer is both. Throughout the jurisprudence, the 
interest and commitment of a father to his child is attached some weight – to a lesser or greater 
extent – in order to establish the existence of family life between them and, possibly, a finding of 
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a violation of Article 8, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14. However, it seems interesting 
to point out that the notion of ‘interest and commitment’ is subject to different interpretations, 
depending on whether the applicant is an unmarried or divorced father. Whenever available, an 
unmarried father’s parental investment and, therefore, his involvement in childcare and 
responsibilities during his intact relationship with the child’s mother are taken into consideration 
as a starting point for negotiating contact arrangements. Therefore, ‘interest and commitment’ are 
inferred from acts of nurturing and, more generally, from the concreteness of the social ties, which 
developed between a father and his child born out of wedlock.  
When considering claims brought by divorced fathers, in contrast, the applicant’s ‘interest 
and commitment’ are measured within a specific timeframe – namely, the post-divorce phase – 
and, although the applicant’s presence at visits is deemed relevant, his legal actions constitute the 
strongest evidence. The focus on the applicants’ conduct throughout proceedings might derive 
from the Court’s fear that, after divorce, fathers can lose interest in child-raising, even if they 
previously held such interest. Bearing in mind the various studies on fathering after divorce, this 
concern appears, at least, partially founded. It is well-known and undisputable that many fathers 
spend little time with their children following divorce. However, this pattern is not necessarily the 
direct consequence of fathers’ own decisions and behaviour; rather, it is argued that, while fathers 
are criticised for not being sufficiently present after divorce, at the same time, society as well as 
law spread misconceptions that make it more difficult for fathers to be as involved as mothers, 
especially after divorce.1079       
Regardless of the different factors deemed relevant, the Court’s increased attention to the 
interest and commitment of fathers to their children evidently marks a departure from conventional 
understandings of fatherhood. This aspect of change – which values doing – however, coexists 
with elements of continuity – which, in turn, resonates more with what the applicants are. In fact, 
while contact/custody rights are extended beyond the marital family, they are principally conferred 
on those who most closely resemble some features of the traditional father role (former partner of 
the child’s mother, biological father). Therefore, while separation/divorce and, even before, 
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unmarried families suggest cracks in the marital/conventional family model, “these cracks follow 
rather familiar fault lines.”1080   
Two main aspects of continuity can be observed. Firstly, with the exception of Mr 
Schneider, fathers continue to be valued by virtue of their biological link with the child; secondly, 
they continued to be located as (former) partners of the child’s mother. Although marriage has lost 
its unique role in attaching men to children, marriage-type relationships have been viewed through 
the lens of the best interests of the child within a reconstituted familial domain.1081 Concerns for 
the welfare of the child might, therefore, have played a role in reducing distances between married 
and unmarried fathers as desirable presences in the lives of children, not only on nurture grounds 
but also in light of their relationships with the child’s mother. As such, fatherhood remains, at least 
partially, mediated by the relationship between the natural parents. Although not explicitly 
discussed in the cases brought by divorced fathers, the importance of both biology and the 
relationship where the child was born is arguably confirmed by the unfelt need to prove the 
existence of family life between the applicants and their children.   
In Section 1, it was observed that national systems have tended to react to the decline of 
marriage as a choice or as a life-long commitment by refocusing on biology; in other words, 
biology has served to substitute marriage in connecting men with children. In line with the so-
called “geneticisation of fatherhood”, 1082 it has been argued that the end of marriage has often 
triggered an increased emphasis on the biological link existing between a father and his child born 
out of wedlock as a source of parental rights. This shift of focus from marriage to genes, however, 
cannot be detected in the Strasbourg jurisprudence pertaining to unmarried fatherhood. In the 
latter, biology has not replaced marriage, but rather coexists with a revisited form of marital 
fatherhood as well as with nurture or nurturing intentions. Certainly, the Court’s approach cannot 
be defined as a ‘pure genetics approach’, according to which all unmarried fathers are granted 
rights on the basis of their biological relatedness to the child.1083  
Rather, the Court’s stance increasingly tends to comply with what Collier and Sheldon refer 
to as a ‘genetics plus scrutiny’ model, whereby rights are granted upon the assessment of the 
                                                        
1080 Sheldon, ‘The Regulation of Reproductive Technologies’, 552. 
1081 Ibid.  
1082 Collier and Sheldon, ‘Fragmenting Fatherhood’, 225.  




parenting suitability of the unmarried father and the closeness of his ties to the child.1084 The latter, 
in turn, is inferred from both the nature and length of the interparental relationship and the father’s 
caring intentions and, whenever available, his actual involvement in the child’s life. Therefore, 
having regard to national policies which include blanket restrictions on the attribution of contact 
or residence rights to unmarried fathers or attempt to enforce paternal presence primarily for 
financial reasons, the Court appears the forerunner in overcoming stereotypical images of 
unmarried fathers, accepting that unmarried fathers might be genuinely interested and able to take 
care of their children and, finally, in promoting the idea that also paternal nurture, and not only 
financial provision, serves the child’s best interests.    
 
  
                                                        




CHAPTER 4 – Fatherhood and Family-Work Reconciliation: Challenging 
the Male Breadwinner Model? 
 
Introduction 
This chapter attempts to bring to the fore the definition of fatherhood endorsed by the Court in the 
domain of family-work reconciliation, thereby assessing its degree of deviation from the 
conventional ideology of fatherhood. In line with the previous ones, the structure of the present 
chapter envisages three main parts. Section 1 aims to describe the EU approach to family-work 
reconciliation as well as the parental leave policies introduced in Sweden and the Netherlands, as 
representative of two distinct attempts – one gender-specific and the other gender-neutral – to 
achieve a more balanced sharing of parental responsibilities between men and women. Section 2 
will focus on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and, in particular, will seek to determine whether 
and, if so, to what extent the Court departs from the male breadwinner model when adjudicating 
cases concerning the refusal to grant parental leave to fathers. Finally, Section 3 will draw together 
the different strings of the analysis and will attempt to provide an answer to the various sub-
questions addressed in this thesis.  
 
1. Reconciliation Attempts at the National and EU Levels: Tensions within the 
System 
In recent decades, all major industrialised societies have witnessed a significant transformation in 
the organisation of employment and care arrangements. 1085  A model has supplanted the 
conventional paradigm of man-breadwinner/woman-homemaker, where men continue to devote 
their time primarily to paid work, while women juggle employment and unpaid work in the home. 
Therefore, despite women’s heightened participation in the workplace, a fully gender egalitarian 
“dual-earner-dual-carer society”1086 – where “men and women engage symmetrically in both paid 
work and unpaid caregiving”1087 and refrain from placing the “primary responsibility for the care 
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of very young children (…) in the hands of out-of-home carers”1088 – is still far from being a 
European reality.1089  
This failure has been described as a “stalled revolution” 1090  or, more recently, as an 
“incomplete revolution”1091 due to two main reasons. Firstly, the revolution has been restricted to 
certain social groups, in particular couples with higher education and with stronger positions in 
the labour market.1092  Secondly, “the masculinization of the female life-course has not been 
matched by an equivalent feminization of the male one”.1093 More explicitly, men’s engagement 
in unpaid care work has increased only slightly, thus leaving the division of unpaid care work 
almost untouched.1094 The combination of a heightened participation of women in paid work and 
limited or no change at all in the distribution of unpaid family and housework, in turn, has produced 
what public discourse refers to as a ‘care deficit’.1095  
It has been argued that, in Europe, special protections for maternity and pregnancy are 
almost taken for granted.1096 At the EU level, this is confirmed by the directive on the Safety of 
Pregnant Workers and Workers Who Have Recently Given Birth or Are Breastfeeding,1097 which 
requires all States to provide for at least fourteen weeks of paid maternity leave, two of which are 
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compulsory. Other signs of this protectionist approach are, firstly, the absence of a ‘sister-
directive’ on paternity leave and, secondly, the significantly longer duration of maternity leave 
compared to paternity leave, in all European States.1098 These policies have certainly not helped to 
form a ‘dual-carer-dual-worker society’ by “crystallising historically embedded gender 
norms”,1099 such as the assumption that women are primary caregivers and, therefore, best suited 
to play a preeminent role in the private, and not public, sphere.  
In the context of family-work reconciliation, both mothers and fathers experience the stress 
of balancing family and work obligations, but in different ways. Mothers are subject to social 
expectations that translate into the prioritisation of family commitments over their professional 
development and, consequently, curtail their financial independence. Fathers are also expected to 
comply with different social expectations: their role as breadwinners overshadows their 
participation to care. Feminist scholars have often analysed issues around family-work 
reconciliation from the woman’s perspective.1100 They have called for the recognition of the value 
of unpaid family care and domestic work, equal opportunities in the workplace and a restructuring 
of the culture of work to facilitate reconciliation. They have also argued for greater involvement 
of fathers in the family realm and this claim has resulted in increased but predominantly financial 
obligations of fathers in relation to paternity.  
At the same time, changing discourses, policies and laws have attempted to redefine and 
re-position fatherhood by highlighting the image of fathers as carers, and not just as economic 
providers, in line with the ideology of ‘new fatherhood’. It is precisely because of this climate of 
change around fatherhood that certain countries have introduced policies to support families in an 
effort to share paid and unpaid work. Among Western European States, Sweden and the 
Netherlands have distinguished themselves for their proactive policies for enhancing fathers’ 
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nurturing role and, more generally, for their particularly strong capacity for adapting to the 
weakening of the male breadwinner norm.1101  
In the Swedish context, it is argued, “making men into fathers (…) meant the unmaking of 
men as sole breadwinners”.1102 Since the 1960s, fatherhood has become closer to care than cash in 
Swedish policy discourse and practice.1103 As observed by Bergman and Hobson, the model of 
fatherhood in law and policy has shifted from an emphasis on establishing paternity and therefore 
financial responsibilities to an emphasis on securing fathers’ involvement in childcare through 
joint custody arrangements and, even before, generous parental leave policies.1104 This change has 
been enabled by a responsive welfare state, which has assumed more and more responsibility in 
the financial support of children who are no longer living with both parents,1105 and plays a 
prominent role in in supporting parents’ dual responsibilities at home and in the workplace.  
The case of Sweden is particularly recognised for the so-called ‘daddy month(s)’ 
programme, which was introduced in 1995 and reformed in 2002.1106 This policy provides for a 
parental leave period of 480 days, which can be distributed over the period until the child turns 
eight years old or finished first grade in school.1107 Parents can split the leave in accordance with 
their individual preferences, apart from 60 non-transferrable days that must be taken by each parent 
at the highest benefit rate (80% of their earnings).1108 Although it was drafted in gender-neutral 
terms, it aimed to be, and was perceived as, a policy for fathers.1109 Since mothers tend to take at 
least two months leave, the restriction imposed by the policy attempts to influence and de facto 
only impacts men’s parental leave take-up rates.1110  
Overall, this policy has proved quite successful. In the period of 1993-2004, the share of 
fathers taking no days of parental leave decreased from 54% to 18%.1111 Moreover, according to 
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existing data, 47% of fathers used approximately one month of parental leave after the introduction 
of the ‘daddy month(s)’, against 9% prior to the reform. Overall, there has been a steady increase 
in male share in parental leave, from 0.5% to 20% in 2012.1112 However, Bergman and Hobson 
have asserted that these figures should be interpreted with caution.1113 Although the policy has 
achieved its short-term goal of increasing fathers’ take up rates, there seems to be no evidence that 
fathers who use more parental leave actually engage more in childcare.1114  
For instance, statistical data suggest that fathers tend to avail of parental leave mostly 
during summer months and around Christmas. 1115  In such context, parental leave risks not 
supporting the underlying ideology of participatory fatherhing, and is instead used as a means of 
prolonging a vacation with the child’s mother.1116 Moreover, mothers predominantly take the 
transferrable portion of leave.1117 This division of the parental leave indicates that men’s career 
breaks remain less affordable than women’s and, accordingly, men are still expected to act as the 
main breadwinner. 1118  Therefore, although the image of the father as caregiver has become 
hegemonic in Swedish society, the use of parental leave remains driven by economic factors and, 
accordingly, constrained by labour market dynamics.1119  
Different from Sweden, the Dutch government did not introduce policies directly targeted 
at fathers. Rather, it devised flexible work and parental sharing schemes – which, inter alia, 
provide for a decrease of regular working hours, the creation of new shifts, compressed worked 
weeks and other flexible work patterns – to assist couples willing to achieve more egalitarian 
divisions of employment and family responsibilities.1120 As reported by Eurofound, parental leave 
take-up rates increased for both men and women between 2001 and 2013.1121 In 2001, 35% of 
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women and less than 10% of men chose to make use of parental leave. In 2013, take-up rates 
reached 24% for men and over 57% for women. However, most fathers do not have the opportunity 
to engage in care activities other than during their leisure time and, as a result, women remain in 
charge of three-quarters of the care work.1122  Research evidence indicates that, although the 
number of regular working hours has decreased, working time norms remain almost unaltered: 
most men continue to work full-time, whilst women are more likely to work part-time. 1123 
Therefore, the one-and-a-half-earner represents the predominant model among parents.1124 
The traditional gendered division of labour between men and women and its repercussions 
on both families and individuals has emerged as a policy issue, also at the EU level.1125 However, 
an over-emphasis on the public domain has resulted in measures, which conceive the attainment 
of gender equality in the workplace as independent of any change in the private dimension of 
parenthood.1126 Whilst demands for altering the workplace structures are at the core of the EU 
discussions, the behaviour of men and parents in relation to childcare are rarely questioned and 
debated.1127  Otherwise stated, within the EU discourse, “reconciliation has (long since) been 
synonymous with accommodating women”.1128  
Prior to the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam,1129 the EU endorsed what McGlynn calls 
a ‘traditional ideology of motherhood’, according to which childcare is the primary, if not the sole, 
duty of mothers. 1130  In so doing, the EU indirectly (re)produced a ‘traditional ideology of 
fatherhood’, which portrayed fathers as solely breadwinners.1131 This attitude shined through the 
early jurisprudence of the ECJ, such as the judgment in Hofmann.1132 In this case, a German father 
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sought parental leave. He argued that, had he been the child’s mother, he would have been granted 
such an entitlement. The Court clarified that the principle of equal treatment is subject to two 
exceptions. Gender-specific provisions are not in breach of EU law, if they pursue one of these 
two aims: first of all, if they seek to ensure the protection of a woman’s biological condition during 
and after pregnancy; secondly, if they are intended to safeguard the special bond between a woman 
and her child over the period, which follows pregnancy and childbirth.1133  
At least prima facie, the Parental Leave Directive 19961134 puts forward the idea that, 
concerning the care of young children, men and women should be treated alike.1135 In providing 
for a non-transferrable (at least, in principle) three months period of leave for mothers and fathers, 
this Directive addressed parents in gender-neutral terms and, allegedly, promoted an equal sharing 
of paid and unpaid work between mothers and fathers. De facto, however, it did not lead to any 
advancement in the process of equalising the relations between men and women.1136 If, from a 
theoretical perspective, gender-neutrality constitutes a fundamental step towards the achievement 
of equality, from a practical perspective, its ability to create a new set of norms for fatherhood has 
been constrained by various factors, such as the lack of financial compensation offered to parents 
and, more importantly, the possibility for Member States to provide for shorter utilisation periods 
and to opt for transferability.1137 As a consequence, due to the scant use of parental leave by fathers, 
this provision has become a sort of ‘extended maternity leave’, thus cementing the image of 
women as primary caregivers and leaving the ‘nature’ of fatherhood untouched.  
Even after the Treaty of Amsterdam, which considerably strengthened the principle of 
equality, it is questionable to what extent the EU’s commitment to family-work reconciliation 
translated into practice or remained just rhetoric. New legislative measures, such as the Amended 
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Equal Treatment Directive1138 and the Recast Directive,1139 recognised fathers as caregivers for 
the first time, but failed to confer specific rights on them.1140 They did no more than require the 
same level of protection provided for maternity leave to be extended to paternity and adoption 
leaves, if Member States have already introduced such rules into national law. A further attempt 
to revise the Parental Leave Directive was undertaken in March 2010. 1141  Although the 
consultation process rightly focused on the factors which compromised the successful 
implementation of the 1996 Directive – in particular, the need for payment as well as for strict 
non-transferability – the amendments made to the provisions are limited: the duration of parental 
leave is increased by one month to a minimum of four months leave; it is possible for all but one 
month to be transferred between partners. Therefore, despite discouraging transferability, the 
Parental Leave Directive 2010 fails to prohibit it (apart from a month).1142 This remains a crucial 
factor compromising fathers’ involvement in family care.1143  
A third phase seems to have been inaugurated by the ECJ decision in the case of Roca 
Alvarez,1144  where a Spanish law which treated employed mothers and fathers differently in 
relation to flexible work schedules for feeding the baby was held in breach of the Equal Treatment 
Directive. This judgment has been perceived as making a U-turn in the EU’s previous approach to 
work-family reconciliation: the Court emphasised, inter alia, that reserving the right-holder’s legal 
status to employed mothers was “liable to perpetuate a traditional distribution of the roles of men 
and women by keeping men in a role subsidiary to that of women in relation to the exercise of 
their parental duties”.1145 On this basis, the Court has been praised for not only acknowledging the 
climate of change around fatherhood, but also for making the most of it by challenging a gender 
division of labour previously entrenched.1146 That said, it remains to be seen how strongly this 
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decision alone – in the absence of, inter alia, a legislative framework which confers rights on 
fathers – can mark an actual departure from the traditional vision of fatherhood.1147  
 National data sources indicate that, although men’s parental leave and paternity leave take-
up rates are rising in most Member States, they remain relatively low.1148 Therefore, as exemplified 
by the cases of Sweden and the Netherlands, these rights have largely gone unused or have resulted 
in limited sharing of childcare responsibilities.1149 Why is this case? Among other factors, it can 
be argued that national as well as EU policies have attempted to respond to a care deficit, but they 
have failed to address its gendered, economic and cultural dimensions. Using Dowd’s words, they 
have lacked “sensitivity to context”.1150 As pointed out by Seward et al., higher rates of men’s 
parental leave take-up and higher paternal involvement in their children’s lives are heavily 
contingent upon “egalitarian beliefs, the amount and source of income, education and the hours 
worked”.1151 As a result, while the negotiations around parental leave might, for some couples, be 
shaped by their individual desires, for others, it is the “logic of gendered choices”,1152  and, 
therefore, “interactional pressures and institutional design”,1153 which determine who takes leave. 
Malin has identified three main obstacles to higher uptake of parental leave by fathers.1154 
Firstly, fathers tend to be entitled to shorter paid leave than women. As a result, leave 
compensation and pay disparities make it financially difficult for men, who are generally the higher 
earner, to use parental leaves.1155 Another factor influencing the take up of parental leave is the 
lack of availability of adequate information about the leave. Employers do not always offer 
parental leaves to workers and, even when available, these policies are not openly disclosed.1156 
Thirdly, hostility at the workplace and fear of isolation from the labour market are additional 
deterrents for fathers who wish to take parental leave.1157 It is easy to imagine that, in times of job 
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insecurity and market competitiveness, these obstacles become even more insurmountable: most 
fathers do not have the option not to work or find it difficult to make requests to their employers.1158  
Townsend has described fatherhood as part of a “package deal” composed of four facets: 
work, marriage, home, and children.1159 These four elements are connected to each other: they are 
mutually reinforcing, although their interactions do not produce a stable balance.1160 Fatherhood 
and employment contribute to reinforcing each other in multiple ways. For instance, having 
children might offer a reason for devoting oneself to paid employment.1161 At the same time, 
employment enables a father to secure adequate housing and financial support for his family.1162 
Although constructed as an expression of paternal love, however, employment is also likely to 
alienate fathers from intimate relationships and, therefore, to render the development of emotional 
ties between a father and his child contingent upon the mediation of their wives, who schedule and 
manage family life.1163 “Mothers and fathers (therefore) collude in a gendered system of parenting 
that keeps fathers on the sidelines as helpers, playmates, and occasional disciplinarians”.1164  
It is no coincidence that, especially in masculinities scholarship, men’s position in paid 
work and – more particularly, the pressure to be a breadwinner and the reduced opportunities to 
play a nurturing role – is often referred to as an example of the price men have to pay for 
privilege.1165 Apart from minimising fathers’ involvement, what Williams calls “domesticity” – 
namely, a gender system which determines the current organisation of market work and family 
work – “provides for caregiving by marginalizing the caregivers”, thus excluding them (mostly, 
women) from most of the social positions of authority and responsibility.1166 This explains why 
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feminists have been long since advocating for paternal involvement partly to share the gendered 
costs of care and, in the longer-run, to achieve greater gender equality. 1167  Family-work 
reconciliation expresses very clearly the idea of complementarity between private and public 
sphere: as argued by Fredman, “the goal of equal participation of women in the workplace needs 
to be matched by equal participation of men in the home”.1168   
 
2. The Reaction of the Court: Fighting Gender Stereotypes 
Compared to the European Union, the ECtHR contribution to the debate around reconciliation has 
attracted far less attention by legal scholars. This can be attributable to the limited number of 
relevant cases that have been brought before the Court till now. Moreover, the right to parental 
leave, which is considered to fall within the scope of the right to respect for family life, represents 
a recent area of intervention by the Strasbourg Court. After the case of Petrovic v Austria,1169 
which was settled in 1998, the Court harked back to the issue of parental leave only in 2009 and, 
since then, only two judgments have contributed to discussing and, to some degree, to advancing 
the roles of fathers in family care: Weller v Hungary1170 and Konstantin Markin v Russia.1171 In all 
                                                        
result of the gender imbalances in the domain of care. See, inter alia, N. Folbre, Who Pays for the Kids? Gender and 
the Structures of Constraints (Routledge, 1994); W. Korpi, ‘Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class and Patterns of 
Inequalities in Different Types of Welfare States’ 2000 7 Social Politics 127-191; G. Esping-Andersen, Social 
Foundations of Postindustrial Societies (OUP, 1999).    
1167 A. Doucet, Do Men Mother? Fathering, Care and Domestic Responsibility (Toronto University Press, 2006), 7-
8. 
1168 S. Fredman, ‘Reversing Roles: Bringing Men into the Frame’ 2014 10(4) International Law in Context 442.  
1169 Petrovic v Austria, Application no. 20458/92, 27 March 1998.  
1170 Weller v Hungary, Application no. 44399/05, 31 March 2009.  
1171 Konstantin Markin v Russia, Application no. 30078/06, 7 October 2010 (Chamber), 22 March 2012 (Grand 
Chamber). A few months after the decision in Markin, the Court was faced by a similar application. In the case of 
Hulea v Romania (Application no. 33411/05, 2 October 2012), the applicant had worked in the army since 1991. In 
2001, his second child was born. His wife, who was a teacher, took parental leave for the first ten months. At the end 
of this period, the applicant applied for parental leave. The Ministry of Defence rejected this request on the ground 
that the legislation defining the status of army personnel provided for parental leave for women only. In the meantime, 
the Constitutional Court held unconstitutional the contested provision, as in breach of the principle of equality before 
the law and of non-discrimination on grounds of sex, both enshrined in the Constitution. The law, however, was 
amended to include servicemen among beneficiaries of parental leave, only in January 2006. When drawn to the Court 
of Appeal’s attention (April 2005), the applicant’s claim was rejected on the ground that the statutory provision in 
question was not applicable, since the applicant had not provided evidence of having paid his social-insurance 
contributions necessary to benefit from parental leave. Further, his request for compensation of non-pecuniary damage 
was rejected as founded. The Court found a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, on the ground 
that the court of appeal had refused, without sufficient reasons, to compensate the moral damage suffered by the 
applicant as a result of the denial of parental leave. This case will not be explored in the text because the judgment is 
primarily focused on the issue whether the refusal to award compensation for discrimination with respect to his right 




three cases, the legal question at stake was whether the refusal to grant parental leave to fathers 
amounted to a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. 
In line with the approach adopted in the previous chapters, the following analysis draws 
inspiration from a major social transformation, which has had an impact on the functioning of the 
family, and seeks to decipher the ECtHR’s reaction. More specifically, it is the impact of a 
heightened participation of women in employment on the definition of fatherhood endorsed by the 
Court that is at the core of the jurisprudential analysis. Against the background provided in the 
previous section, it will be interesting to understand whether and, if so, to what extent the 
Strasbourg Court challenges a conventional understanding of fatherhood that, in this specific 
domain, resonates with the male breadwinner model. Accordingly, this chapter will also 
investigate whether the abovementioned changing culture of fatherhood, which has given rise to 
new expectations on men, has crossed national boundaries and permeated the corridors of the 
Court.   
In this domain, the essence of conventional fatherhood and, more generally, of the 
conventional family is well captured by the ‘ideology of domesticity’, as defined by Williams. 
Using her own words, the ideology of domesticity held and, to some extent, continues to hold that 
“men ‘naturally’ belong in the market because they are competitive and aggressive; women belong 
in the home because of their ‘natural’ focus on relationships, children, and an ethic of care”.1172  
The reference to ‘nature’ and to the ‘natural’ link between one specific gender and one specific 
role sheds light on the strong influence exercised by gender stereotypes in determining a traditional 
division of labour between men and women. More specifically, “sex-role stereotypes” – namely, 
those stereotypes, which describe the “proper roles of men and women not by reference to 
individuals’ personality traits, but by the type of conduct desirable for each sex”1173 – tend to give 
a ‘natural’ form that must be accomplished to be recognised and appreciated as a man or woman. 
The generalised view that men should be the primary breadwinners, whilst women should 
be mothers and homemakers is, possibly, the most common sex-role stereotype. For the sake of 
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simplicity, it will be called ‘man-breadwinner/woman-homemaker stereotype’. However, it is 
intended to comprise at least three distinct, although interrelated, stereotyped notions:1174  
 Women are, or should be, the primary caregivers and, therefore, they should play a special 
role in childcare. 
 Men should be the primary breadwinners and, therefore, assume the burden of meeting 
their families’ financial needs and responsibilities because they lack the nurturing attributes 
that belong to women and, consequently, are worse caregivers than women.   
 Women should be homemakers and, therefore, at the centre of the home and family life, 
undertaking, inter alia, domestic responsibilities. 
This stereotype displays the characteristic of resilience, which is typical of gender 
stereotypes.1175 In other words, this stereotype is both socially persistent and socially pervasive, 
thus creating the conditions for social stratification and subordination.1176 Indeed, some scholars 
have pointed out that, despite changes in gender relations – in primis women’s entry into the 
workforce – stereotypes of women have remained quite immutable.1177 This does not amount to 
saying that social change has been ignored completely; rather, it is reflected in “images of sub-
types of women”,1178 which are quite distant from the general stereotype of women as a group. 
Gender stereotypes become particularly problematic when they are embedded in law. The latter, 
often echoing the voice of the State, excuses the application of gender stereotypes and contributes 
to a climate of legitimacy and normality that enables their perpetuation.1179  
Given the strong influence of gender stereotyping in organising work and family life, the 
Court’s departure from the conventional ideology of fatherhood is very much dependent on its 
ability to uncover and contest sex role stereotypes. In the previous chapter, the Court’s dismissal 
of generalisations when deciding whether the refusal of contact/custody rights breached Article 14 
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taken in conjunction with Article 8 evidently shows that stereotypes are also operative in the 
context of unmarried fatherhood. However, it was not the ‘gender’ characterisation of those 
stereotypes that was explicitly contested by the applicants. Only in one case – Zaunegger v 
Germany – did the applicant complain that he had been subject to discrimination not only in 
comparison with divorced fathers, but also on grounds of sex. Differently, in the case-law 
concerning family-work reconciliation, Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, is 
consistently singled out on the basis of sex.  
Moreover, it seems relevant to underline that, despite the trend in fighting stereotypes 
observed in the previous chapter, the Court never used the word ‘stereotype’ with respect to the 
claims of unmarried fathers. Rather, it preferred to talk about “general considerations”, 1180 
“general feature”,1181  and “general legal assumption”.1182  Against this stance, in the case of 
Markin v Russia – which can be considered paradigmatic of the Court’s position on family-work 
reconciliation – the Court, for the first time, named ‘gender stereotypes’ as insufficient grounds 
for justifying a difference in treatment between men and women. This is symptomatic – as it will 
emerge from the following analysis – of an increased awareness of the Court of its own role in 
challenging stereotypes as well as of the Court’s undertaking of the anti-stereotyping approach 
envisaged by Timmer, to near perfection.  
Apart from testing the Court’s anti-stereotyping efforts, the jurisprudential analysis will 
seek to establish to what extent the multiplicity of parties involved – namely the mother, the father 
and the child – is taken into consideration when declaring that a refusal of the right to parental 
leave to the applicant father is incompatible with the Convention. More specifically, is the right to 
parental leave framed in terms of the father’s interests, the best interests of the child, greater 
equality for women, or labour market needs and whether none, some or all of them apply? In the 
debates on family-work reconciliation, it is has been argued that children tend to be viewed as 
objects and hindrances, rather than as individuals with their own rights, needs and desires.1183 Just 
like in the context of separation and divorce, the Court might, therefore, run the risk of endorsing 
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an adult-centric vision of family life and face an overall danger of placing children ‘outside’ legal 
disputes, thus neglecting their experiences and treating them as mere objects of privilege.1184  
To conclude, compared to the previously considered case-law domains, the Court’s 
jurisprudence on parental leave is characterised by a certain degree of continuity and consistency. 
It seems to display at least two clear interrelated trends: firstly, the employment of the law as a 
tool that is reflective, more than transformative, of national legal realities; secondly, and as a result 
of changing social and legal realities at the national level, a progressive overcoming of the 
traditional understanding of fatherhood as the mere breadwinner and, consequently, a growing 
adherence to the model of ‘new fatherhood’. This move away from conventional fatherhood 
reaches its peak in the judgment of Markin v Russia, where the Court embarks on a complex anti-
stereotyping analysis to the benefit of both men and women.  
2.1 Petrovic v Austria:1185 Limited Anti-Stereotyping Efforts and the Perpetuation of a Gendered 
Division of Labour 
In Petrovic v Austria, the applicant was denied parental leave allowance by the local authorities 
on the ground that under the Unemployment Benefit Act 1977 only mothers could benefit from 
it.1186 He brought an action before the local employment office and argued that the legal provision 
which excluded fathers from the beneficiaries of parental leave allowances was discriminatory 
and, consequently, unconstitutional. His claim and subsequent appeal to the Vienna Regional 
Employment Office were dismissed. Finally, he lodged an application in the Constitutional Court. 
The latter did not accept the case for adjudication due to insufficient prospects of success. It was 
added that Mr Petrovic’s complaint was unfounded, given that the legislature enjoyed a certain 
period of time to adjust the law to societal changes.1187 Once before the Commission, the applicant 
alleged that the refusal to grant him a parental leave allowance and the discriminatory nature of 
that decision amounted to a violation of Article 8 as well as of Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
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Article 8.1188 The Commission considered the application admissible only in its second part and it 
was subsequently submitted to the Court.1189  
 The first issue to be settled concerned the applicability of Article 14 taken in combination 
with Article 8. While accepting the Government’s first submission – namely, that Article 8 did not 
provide for any positive obligation to financially assist parents in undertaking childcare 
responsibilities – the Court noted that parental leave allowances aim to advance family life and, 
inevitably, influenced the latter’s organisation by permitting one of the parents to take time off 
from work and look after the children.1190 Since the grant of the allowance at issue demonstrated 
respect for family life, the applicant’s claim was considered to fall within the ambit of Article 8.1191 
Hence, Article 14, taken together with Article 8, was held applicable.  
 Mr Petrovic substantiated his claim by underlining that, according to the law, the allowance 
could not be paid until eight weeks after birth and it required the right to receive maternity benefits 
to be previously exhausted.1192 Therefore, in his view, the allowance at issue was not meant to 
protect mothers but rather to support parents who wished to stay at home and take care of their 
children.1193 In response, the Government argued that there was no shared European approach to 
the issue at hand and, consequently, the Austrian legislature’s decision to reserve the right to 
parental leave allowance exclusively to mothers fell within the margin of appreciation of the 
State.1194 As a further justification, the Government noted that the contested provision mirrored 
the gendered division of labour, which characterised the society at the material time.1195       
 The Court began by clarifying the different purposes between maternity leave (and the 
related allowances) and parental leave (and the associated allowances). In the Court’s view, while 
the former is primarily designed “to enable the mother to recover from the fatigue of childbirth 
and to breastfeed her baby is she so wishes”, the latter concerned the subsequent period and aimed 
“to enable the beneficiary to stay home to look after the infant personally”.1196 It followed that, 
with regards to the need to look after the child in this period, “both parents are similarly 
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placed”.1197  Accordingly, it was noted that the advancement of the equality of the sexes was a 
major goal within the Council of Europe and that very weighty reasons were needed for such 
differential treatment to be declared compatible with the Convention.1198  
However, the Court was of the opinion that, as argued by the Government, States should 
be granted a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to what extent differences in 
otherwise similar situations justify a different legal treatment.1199 Concerning the matter under 
scrutiny, the Court noted that in the 1980s most jurisdictions did not grant a right to parental leave 
allowance to fathers.1200 Rather, the idea of providing financial assistance to one of the parents, at 
their own discretion, to enable him/her to take care of the child emerged only later.1201 The Court 
went on to observe that the extension of similar allowances to fathers occurred gradually, in 
conjunction with an increasingly equal sharing of childcare responsibilities between men and 
women.1202 This shift had also taken place within the Austrian legal system: fathers were granted 
the right to parental leave in 1989 and became eligible for the associated allowance in 1990.1203 
Therefore, the Court found it difficult and, perhaps, unreasonable to condemn the Austrian 
Government for having provided for parental leave in a progressive manner, also given that the 
amended legislation was very forward-thinking in Europe.1204 To conclude, in light of the wide 
variety of legal approaches adopted by the States, the Austrian authorities’ refusal to grant the 
applicant was considered to fall within the State’s margin of appreciation.1205 Hence, no violation 
was found. 
The Court’s intervention ought to be praised for adequately differentiating between 
maternity leave and parental leave and, consequently, for taking the critical step of distinguishing 
between pregnancy and childbirth, on the one hand, and parenthood, on the other hand.1206 
Campaigns for women’s equality in the workplace have often pushed for and led to attempts to 
secure maternity rights.1207 The practice of granting rights to women only has, however, given rise 
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to serious concerns as to its potential danger of reinforcing and entrenching women’s responsibility 
for childcare.1208 Although aimed at neutralizing disadvantages and ensuing women’s participation 
in the labour marker, these policies ultimately “reinforce biological differences, reify social 
expectations and drive women to lower paying lower categories”.1209 As explained by Fredman, a 
specific-rights-approach tends, in fact, to treat pregnancy and maternity as a continuum.1210 As a 
result, fathers are likely to be precluded from the possibility of being either entitled or required to 
undertake caretaking responsibilities.  
Although the Court does not openly talk of stereotypes, it is clear that welfare policies that 
reserve the right of parental leave to mothers only are informed by gender stereotypes. Indeed, as 
argued by Cook and Cusack, the extent to which the reality of parenthood is actually gendered 
and, accordingly, gender-neutral parenting reflects only an aspirational view of fatherhood are 
irrelevant considerations to determine whether a generalised view can be classified as a stereotype. 
1211 As long as one’s needs, wishes, abilities and circumstances are not attached any weight, any 
generalisation applied to him/her will eventually reach the threshold of stereotyping, even if it 
describes the actual position of the individual concerned. 1212  The present case, therefore, 
represents the first instance where the Court is directly faced with gender stereotypes and, more 
precisely, with sex role stereotypes.1213  
 However, the anti-stereotyping efforts invested remain limited and the Court ended up not 
contesting the ‘man-breadwinner/woman-homemaker’ stereotype because it was not backed up by 
European consensus.1214 In line with the methodology developed by Timmer, the Court referred to 
the historical context, in which the contested legislation developed.1215 It observed that “originally, 
welfare measures of this sort – such as parental leave – were primarily intended to protect mothers 
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and to enable them to look after very young children”.1216 In so noting, the Court endorsed the 
view that these policies were not harmful because their goal was to protect and meet the wishes of 
mothers to take care of their children. Nonetheless, by not spelling out the current effects of such 
measures, the Court missed the crucial opportunity of identifying and exposing a harmful 
stereotype. Despite the promising beginnings, the Court ended up accepting the de facto use of the 
leave by the mother. In so doing, this judgment de facto reproduces the traditional ideology of 
fatherhood which, in this domain, resonates with the male breadwinner model: the father cannot 
afford to stay at home and receive no remuneration because he is expected to financially provide 
for his family.  
Apart from limiting paternal involvement, discrimination against fathers has negative 
consequences on the mother and on the entire family. Quite progressively, Judges Bernhardt and 
Spielmann (in their joint dissenting opinion) pointed out that reserving parental leave allowances 
to mothers did not only perpetuate a traditional division of roles, according to which childcare is 
the primary responsibility of women in their capacity as the lower earner or unemployed parent.1217 
Moreover, if she chose to continue her professional career and the father chose to stay home to 
look after the child, the family would have lost out on her allowance entitlement if she took time 
off from work.1218 The two dissenting judges went as far as to assert that “traditional practices and 
roles in family life alone do not justify a difference in treatment of men and women”, thus reaching 
the second phase of the anti-stereotyping analysis.1219  
In contrast to these voices of dissent, although it appropriately distinguishes between 
maternity leave and parental leave, the majority does not show itself to be fully aware of the 
shortcomings inherent in conferring parental rights to women only. The Court’s limited anti-
stereotyping efforts, however, should not be interpreted as indicative of its general inability or 
unwillingness to contest stereotypes. Rather, the cautious attitude of the Court should be placed in 
a context, where there was not yet a European consensus on the issue about whether parental leave 
should be extended to fathers too. Equally, the Court’s reliance on the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation as a means of ascertaining whether there had been a violation of Article 14, taken in 
combination with Article 8 should not be read as the Court’s choice to abstain from engaging with 
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the matter in a substantive manner. Rather, as the Court’s choice not to go beyond the social and 
legal conditions at the material time and, therefore, not to push the interpretation of the Convention 
too far beyond national choices.  
As a result, the position held by the Court is that legal change at the national level should 
follow from social change and the interpretation of the Convention should reflect national legal 
realities. The Court seems, therefore, to agree with Fineman as to the nature of the law as “more 
reflective than constitutive of social norms”.1220  Given the gradual nature of the advancement of 
the equality of the sexes in European States, inevitably, there is a transitional phase where the law 
is caught between the needs of the past and those of the future. As such, in the Court’s view, States 
cannot be expected to provide an immediate reform of the law in accordance with a still-evolving 
reality. Rather, they deserve a sort of a ‘grace period’ to adjust their legal provisions to the changed 
social norms and practices. A problematic aspect, however, concerns the establishment of 
consensus. Indeed, the Court failed to ground its finding as to the lack of consensus on comparative 
data. Rather, the absence of consensus was presented as a consequence of a progressive – as 
opposed to, already accomplished – social process.   
2.2 Weller v Hungary 1221 : The Implicit Refusal of Justifications based on Stereotyped 
Perceptions 
In this case, the first applicant, a Hungarian national, married a Romanian citizen, who gave birth 
to their twin sons, the second and third applicants. The first applicant applied for maternity benefits 
in his own name and on behalf of his children. His request was rejected as, according to the Family 
Support Act, only mothers with Hungarian citizenship, adoptive parents and guardians were 
entitled to the benefit in question and a natural father could only request such an allowance if the 
mother died. Moreover, the Act only applied to those non-Hungarian citizens who had obtained 
settlement permits, being either refugees or citizens of another Member State of the EU. Since the 
applicant’s wife did not fall into either of these categories, the claim was rejected. The first 
applicant unsuccessfully challenged this decision before the courts. The Regional Court, inter alia, 
explained that “the purpose of maternity benefit was to support the mother and not the entire family 
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or the children”.1222 As a result, the applicants could not legitimately argue to have suffered 
discrimination.    
 Before the Strasbourg Court, the Government invoked the application of the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation on the ground that the Member States of the Council of Europe provided 
for a variety of different social security schemes, especially in relation to maternity allowances.1223 
Moreover, it argued that the goal pursued by maternity benefits was not merely pecuniary 
assistance but consisted in “facilitat(ing) the development of the foetus” and enabling the mother 
“to maintain a healthy life”.1224 In the Government’s view, this was confirmed by the fact that the 
eligibility for the allowance depended also on the mother’s participation in courses on parental 
care.1225 Therefore, the exclusion of a natural father from the scheme in question was considered 
justifiable.1226 
 On the contrary, the applicants were of the opinion that, despite its misleading name, the 
benefit at stake was not intended to reduce the hardship of pregnancy and delivery; rather, since 
also adoptive parents and guardians were entitled to receive it, its nature was primarily 
financial.1227 At least prima facie, this interpretation was confirmed by the text of the relevant 
domestic law (included in the judgment). Section 1 provided that the Act was aimed to regulate 
the system and the various types of leave granted by the State, with the ultimate purpose of 
“promot(ing) the social security of families and to reduce the material burden of bringing up the 
children”.1228 Since the benefit was granted after birth when the responsibilities of both parents 
became equal, the applicants complained that the provision stipulated in the Family Support Act 
amounted to discrimination against the first applicant on the basis of parental status.1229 In addition 
to this, the fact that the children were also denied the benefit as a result of their mother’s 
nationality, even if they were Hungarian nationals by birth, amounted to a difference in treatment 
compared with other Hungarian children.1230 As a result, the applicants complained a breach of 
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.  
                                                        
1222 Ibid, para 12.  
1223 Ibid, para 16.  
1224 Ibid, para 17.  
1225 Ibid.  
1226 Ibid, para 19.  
1227 Ibid, para 20.  
1228 Ibid, section B of the judgment ‘Relevant Domestic Law’.  
1229 Ibid, para 21.  




Prior to entering upon the merits of the case, the Court made some general remarks 
concerning the application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and the interpretation of 
the Convention as a ‘living instrument’. In particular, it held that, although the Contracting States 
are granted a certain margin of appreciation in establishing whether and under what circumstances 
differences in otherwise similar situations legitimise a difference in treatment, the final decision 
as to the compatibility with the Convention’s framework lies with the Court.1231 In this final 
evaluation, the Court must take into consideration any “changing conditions” in Contracting States 
and react to any “emerging consensus” as to the standards to be attained.1232    
The Court went on to establish the applicability of Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 in the present case. It briefly held that, since the grant of maternity benefits contributed 
to respecting the right to respect for family life of the applicants and the latter had been deprived 
of this allowance on grounds of discrimination, there was no reason to argue otherwise.1233 When 
assessing whether the difference in treatment breached the Convention, the first step undertaken 
by the Court consisted in deciphering the nature of the maternity allowance in question. On this 
point, it shared the same view of the applicants: the benefit at stake refers to the period following 
childbirth and, accordingly, its nature is primarily pecuniary. 1234  In line with the applicants’ 
submissions, the Court pointed to the multiplicity of beneficiaries to further demonstrate that the 
benefit was designed not only to diminish the hardship of childbirth suffered by the mother, but 
also to provide support to new-born children and their families.1235 Accordingly, the fact that the 
grant of the benefit was conditional upon the mother’s participation in courses on parental care 
could be advanced as a decisive counter-argument, since adoptive parents and guardians were 
clearly not required to meet this requirement.1236  
When assessing the different treatment suffered by the first applicant, the Court reiterated 
that mothers and fathers are similarly placed as far as childcare is concerned.1237 The Court also 
acknowledged that Contracting States enjoyed a margin of appreciation in shaping their social 
security systems.1238 However, it was held that the absence of a common European approach did 
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not free them from the responsibility to grant these allowances without discrimination.1239 Given 
that the benefit in question was also conferred on adoptive parents and guardians, the Court 
observed that the first applicant had been discriminated against not on grounds of sex, but rather 
on the basis of his parental status.1240 Since no reasonable and objective justification had been 
offered by the Respondent State to exclude natural fathers from a scheme aimed at supporting all 
those raising new-borns, the Court found a violation of Article 14, in conjunction with Article 
8.1241 The same conclusion was reached with respect to the second and third applicants’ exclusion 
from the benefit. The Court held that the Government had failed to put forward any convincing 
argument to justify the grant of a maternity benefit on the condition that one specific biological 
parent, namely the mother, is a Hungarian national.1242   
If considered from the first applicant’s standpoint, the legal issue at stake is very similar, 
if not identical, to the complaint in the case of Petrovic. It is true that, as suggested by Judge 
Tulkens in her concurring opinion, the leave under scrutiny pursued two different goals: the 
parental leave scheme considered in the previous case aimed to recover the loss of salary of stay-
at-home parents; differently, the maternity benefits claimed by the applicants intended to offer 
financial assistance to young parents, thus enabling them to take time off work and look after their 
children. 1243  Nonetheless, both measures – despite the misrepresentative name of ‘maternity 
benefit’ in the present case – were connected to gender-neutral activities, namely to childcare in 
respect of which mothers and fathers were similarly placed. As a result, the issue to be determined 
remained the same as in Petrovic, namely whether excluding fathers from parental rights – as 
opposed to maternity rights – constituted a violation of Article 14, in conjunction with Article 8.  
However, different from the previous case, the present judgment expressed the Court’s 
refusal to accept a justification that is informed by a stereotyped perception of the group to which 
the applicant belongs. 1244  What led to a reverse outcome appears to be the existence of an 
“emerging consensus”1245 in Weller, compared to the finding of “no common standard”1246 in 
                                                        
1239 Ibid.  
1240 Ibid, para 33.  
1241 Ibid, para 35.  
1242 Ibid, para 38.  
1243 Ibid, Concurring Opinion of Judge Tulkens.   
1244 This argument is made by Nikolaidis with respect to the judgment in Marckx v Belgium, but can be extended to 
the present case. See C. Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European Human Rights Law – The quest for substance 
in the jurisprudence of the European Courts (Routledge, 2015), 70.  
1245 Weller v Hungary, para 28. 




Petrovic.1247 Although the significance of any “emerging consensus” for the Court’s assessment 
appears only under the section ‘general principles’ of the judgment (and it is not reiterated in the 
following section ‘Application of these principles to the present case’), it seems that it had a 
concrete impact on the outcome of the case under scrutiny. More specifically, the Court’s reliance 
on “emerging consensus” narrowed down the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State and, 
consequently, led to a stricter review, compared to that carried out in Petrovic.  
Moreover, while the subject matter in which the Contracting States enjoy a margin of 
appreciation and its corresponding scope remain to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis, the 
Court asserts that whenever a State provides for a family allowance scheme, it must confer grants 
without discrimination. As such, this judgment constitutes an example of what Arnardóttir refers 
to as a kind of ‘magnifying effect’ of Article 14: where a State decides to accord protection to a 
certain interest in the form of ‘right’ in its national legislation, although not required and therefore 
above the minimum standards established by the Convention, it must do so in a non-discriminatory 
manner.1248 In this case, therefore, given the discriminatory aspect of the contested decision, the 
Court felt prepared to find a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, despite 
the presence of a merely “emerging consensus” (as opposed to an established European common 
ground).   
Having regard to the anti-stereotyping approach developed by Timmer, the Court has not 
properly undertaken any of its steps. Nonetheless, by finding a violation of Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8, it has de facto contested the ‘man-breadwinner/woman-homemaker’ 
stereotype. Despite reaching the ‘right’ outcome, however, the Court missed the chance to define 
(although not obliged to) undue (since not related to either pregnancy or childbirth) specific rights 
as a form of sex discrimination. Secondly, the opportunity to unpack the meaning of the legal 
provision in question, thus overtly challenging its underlying gender assumptions, was also missed. 
The Court could have gone beyond the establishment of a difference in treatment and sought to 
dig a bit deeper into the reasons behind the exclusion of natural fathers from such benefit. In so 
doing, it could have identified the operative stereotype and, possibly, ‘unmasked’ it by making 
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clear the adverse effects of reserving an apparently gender-neutral allowance to mothers, guardians 
and adoptive parents. Irrespective of the above, the ultimate outcome of this ruling is that of 
refusing the misconception that fathers are unwilling and unable to take care of their children.  
As a final remark, it appears interesting to note that the present application was brought by 
the father and his children, but not by their mother. In her concurring opinion, Judge Tulkens 
argues that the mother is actually “the first victim” of the authorities’ refusal to grant the maternity 
benefits to the father.1249 In her view, given that the sought benefit is called ‘maternity benefit’, its 
main purpose was to enable mothers to recover from childbirth and to breastfeed their new-
borns.1250 Whilst agreeing on the mother’s ability to fulfil the requirement for the ‘victim status’, 
a different ratio is suggested. Given that the text of the law describes this allowance as benefiting 
the whole family (despite its title and the Government’s submissions), the mother could have 
lodged her own application with the Court by relying on the negative impact of an alleged misuse 
of specific rights beyond the stage of pregnancy and childbirth, within the gender-neutral terrain 
of parenthood, based on her ability to combine family and work responsibilities.   
2.3 Konstantin Markin v Russia:1251 Moving Beyond the ‘Maternal Wall’1252 
The legal question put forward to the Court in the case of Kostantin Markin v Russia was whether 
the refusal to grant parental leave to male military personnel, when such entitlement was available 
to servicewomen, constituted discrimination on grounds of sex.1253 This judgment represents the 
natural continuation of the jurisprudence analysed thus far and, at the same time, embodies the 
Court’s most advanced stance on the issue of family-work reconciliation. Like the judgment in 
Weller, it constitutes an example of the Court’s refusal to accept a justification that, in its view, 
                                                        
1249 Weller v Hungary, Concurring Opinion of Judge Tulkens.  
1250 Ibid. 
1251 Konstantin Markin v Russia, Application no. 30078/06, 7 October 2010 (Chamber), 22 March 2012 (Grand 
Chamber).    
1252 ‘Maternal wall’ is widely used to exemplify the stereotypes and discrimination that women face in the 
workplace due to three main reasons: “past, present, future pregnancies”, use of maternity leave(s), and part-time or 
flexible work schedules. See Williams, ‘Unbending Gender’, 69-72; J. Williams and E. Westfall, ‘Deconstructing 
the Maternal Wall’, 31.   
1253 For the sake of accuracy, I wish to specify that this is a case of double-, or otherwise called intersectional, 
discrimination. In the present case, the difference in treatment suffered by Markin is the result of a mix of two different 
grounds of discrimination, the latter being sex and military status. Under Russian law, men who are civilian workers 
are in fact entitled to three years’ parental leave, in the same way as women are. On this, see the submissions of the 




underlies a stereotyped image of the group to which the applicant belongs. However, the reasoning 
provided displays a much thicker anti-stereotyping analysis.    
In this case, the applicant was a military serviceman and father of three children. Following 
his divorce with the mother of his children, the couple agreed that the three children would live 
with their father, while the mother would pay child support. His children being very young at that 
time, Markin applied for three years’ parental leave allowance. His military unit rejected his 
request because, according to the law, a leave of such duration could only be granted to military 
servicewomen. When challenging the decision of the military unit before a court, the latter pointed 
out that he had failed to demonstrate that he was the sole carer of his children. He was eventually 
granted a three-month parental leave in view of his difficult family situation; this decision was 
subsequently deemed unlawful and was quashed by a higher military court.  
As a last resort, the Mr Markin applied to the Constitutional Court arguing that the 
contested provisions breached the equality clause in the Constitution. What is particularly 
interesting, from a gender perspective, is the justification provided by the Russian Constitutional 
Court, when rejecting Markin’s application: “By granting, on an exceptional basis, the right to 
parental leave to servicewomen only, the legislature took into account, firstly, the limited 
participation of women in military service and, secondly, the special role of women associated 
with motherhood”.1254 Having exhausted all domestic remedies, Markin lodged an application with 
the Strasbourg Court arguing that the refusal to grant him parental leave amounted to 
discrimination on account of his sex, thus breaching Article 14 of the Convention taken in 
conjunction with Article 8.  
On 22 March 2012, the Grand Chamber – confirming the Chamber’s findings – came to 
the conclusion that the difference in treatment, of which the applicant was a victim, could not be 
considered reasonably or objectively justified; thus, there had been a violation of Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 8. Clearly, this has to be considered a landmark decision in the context 
of redefining the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood and the Court’s reasoning can be viewed 
as progressive in many regards. Having regard to the anti-stereotyping analysis illustrated in 
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Chapter 1, the judgment of the Grand Chamber certainly represents a successful attempt to combat 
gender stereotypes in order to support gender egalitarian dynamics.  
Prior to entering upon the merits, the Grand Chamber – and, previously, the Chamber – 
shared some general remarks on its own procedure to establish the existence of discrimination 
contrary to Article 14. In particular, it was explained that not every difference in treatment 
necessarily amounted to a violation of the Convention. 1255  Rather, in order to be held 
discriminatory, a difference in treatment must have no objective and reasonable justification.1256 
In other words, to be held compatible with the Convention, a difference in treatment has to pursue 
a legitimate aim and stem from a relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought.1257 Concerning the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the Court – in both its 
compositions – recalled the general rules stated in the judgment of Weller (at paragraph 28).1258  
The Court began by assessing the applicability of Article 14, taken in conjunction with 
Article 8, to the case at hand. Once again, it was noted that, by allowing one parent to take time 
off from work and look after his/her child, parental leave and related allowances promoted respect 
for family life and, consequently, fell under the scope of Article 8.1259 As in its previous two 
judgments, the Court acknowledged that, in so far as the role of taking care of the child is 
concerned, men and women are “similarly placed”. 1260  Indeed, as explained in the Petrovic 
judgment, parental leave – different from maternity leave – relates to the period following 
childbirth and aims to enable parents to stay home and look after their young children 
personally. 1261  Once established that, for the purposes of parental leave, the applicant, a 
serviceman, was in an analogous position to servicewomen, the Court went on to examine whether 
very weighty reasons had been put forward for such a difference in treatment to be held compatible 
with the Convention.1262  
Despite the same incipit, when considering the Government’s argument relating to the 
special role of women in bringing up children, the Court’s assessment overturns its previous 
jurisprudence. As explained above, in the case of Petrovic v Austria, a distinction on the basis of 
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sex with respect to parental leave entitlements was found not to be in violation of Article 14 
because, at the material time (the 1980s), there was no European consensus concerning the matter 
in question.1263 However, it was noted that, in the subsequent case of Weller v Hungary, the Court 
had departed from the outcome in Petrovic by concluding that the exclusion of natural fathers from 
benefits granted to mothers, guardians and adoptive parents constituted a violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with Article 8.1264  It was further added that, since the adoption of the 
judgment in the Petrovic case, the legal situation had evolved: in the majority of Contracting 
States, including Russia, parental leave entitlements had been made available to both mothers and 
fathers and, more importantly, to both servicemen and servicewomen.1265 In the Chamber’s view, 
this was an unequivocal sign that contemporary European societies had gradually moved towards 
a more equal sharing of childcare responsibilities between men and women and that, most 
importantly, men’s caring role had gained recognition.1266  
Hence, unlike the Austrian authorities, the Russian Government could no longer rely on 
the absence of a common standard between the Contracting States to justify the different treatment 
in connection with parental leave.1267 Therefore, despite starting off with the same observations as 
in the Petrovic case, the Court eventually dismissed the applicability of the doctrine of the margin 
of appreciation and concluded that the current societal and legal realities no longer allowed for 
parental leave policies that excluded fathers. In other words, the Court implicitly states that, a 
notion that has been generally held true for several years and decades might be legitimately called 
into question when it becomes obsolete and it reflects an old-fashioned vision of the roles of men 
and women. Hence, the overturning of Petrovic in fact shows consistency and, more specifically, 
the Court’s reliance on national realities – both social and legal – to advance a new interpretation 
of the Convention provision. Reality had changed and, in turn, the Convention had to be 
reinterpreted and applied differently. 
The Court also added that, rather than compensating for factual inequalities between men 
and women, the contested difference in treatment ended up reinforcing gender stereotypes to the 
detriment of women’s professional career and men’s family life.1268 The Court went even further 
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to clarify ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ that “reference to traditions prevailing in a certain 
country” 1269  does not amount to sufficient justification for a difference in treatment. More 
specifically, the Grand Chamber held that:  
 
[G]ender stereotypes, such as the perception of women as primary child-carers and men as primary 
breadwinner, cannot, by themselves, be considered to amount to sufficient justification for a 
difference in treatment, any more than similar stereotypes based on race, origin or sexual 
orientation.1270  
 
In so arguing, the Court explicitly dismissed the Government’s argument concerning the 
allegedly evidence-based special biological and psychological connection between the mother and 
the new-born child in the period following the birth as not convincing. 1271  Nor was the Court 
persuaded by the second argument advanced by the Government; namely that extending 
entitlements of parental leave to servicemen would have impaired the effectiveness of the armed 
forces. 1272  As a result, it was concluded that the difference in treatment could not be held 
reasonably or objectively justified and, as such, amounted to a violation of Article 14, in 
conjunction with Article 8.  
Through the judgment of Markin, the dissenting opinion expressed by Judges Bernhardt 
and Spielmann in the case of Petrovic reaches the stage of majority and becomes majoritarian. Sex 
role stereotyping formed the cornerstone of the present judgment. For the first time in its  case-law 
concerning the right to parental leave, the Court is explicit in naming the man-
breadwinner/woman-homemaker stereotype. It empathically asserted that the contended 
provisions rested on traditional gender roles and gender stereotypes, which perpetuate de facto 
discrimination against both men and women. In order to identify the stereotype at stake, the Court 
engaged in a careful examination of the reasoning provided by the Constitutional Court and the 
Government to justify excluding servicemen from parental leave allowances. It could have further 
relied on the facts of the case and, more specifically, on the applicant’s engagement in childcare 
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as a sole parent after his divorce with the children’s mother. By drawing attention to this 
circumstance, the Court could have more tangibly proved the untenability of sex role 
generalisations.  
For instance, the post-divorce agreement which conferred the full childcare responsibility 
on Mr Markin could have been read as a clear manifestation of Markin’s intention to act as a 
parent. Moreover, the applicant’s desire to become and remain involved in the life of his children 
could have been further deduced from the institution of proceedings aimed at opposing the national 
authorities’ refusal and at obtaining three years’ parental leave. Finally, Markin’s actual 
participation in his children’s development could also be inferred from his systematic absences 
from the place of work, for which he was repeatedly disciplined. However, the Court decided not 
to rely on the individual circumstances of the applicant, possibly due to the ambiguity surrounding 
his family situation. After the Chamber’s judgment, new relevant circumstances emerged that 
casted doubt over the accuracy of the factual account initially provided: as submitted by the 
Government, Markin had remarried his former wife in April 2008, they had a fourth child together 
in August 2010 and, apparently, they had never ceased living together.1273 By not relying on the 
specific circumstances of the case, the Court, therefore, seems to promote the conferral of parental 
leave on fathers (and not only on mothers), on grounds of an aspirational vision of fatherhood and 
gender equality.  
Apart from identifying and exposing sex role stereotyping, the Court took another step in 
its process of ‘naming’ by acknowledging the harm of stereotypes on both men and women. Apart 
from raising women’s inferiority in the public sphere as a result of gender stereotypes, the Court 
throws light on the other side of the coin, namely the inferior status of fatherhood within the 
domain of care, compared to the superior status of motherhood.1274 As argued by Williams and 
Segal, men as well women are affected by the maternal wall when they apply for parental leave or 
otherwise undertake traditionally feminine nurturing roles.1275 In this regard, the Grand Chamber’s 
assessment offers a more comprehensive account of the context, if compared with that of the 
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Chamber’s.1276 The latter had merely argued that “the reference to the traditional perception of 
women as primary child-carers (cannot) provide sufficient justification for the exclusion of the 
father from the entitlement to take parental leave if he so wishes”.1277 Thus, this argument had 
been criticised for drawing attention to the effect of forcing military servicemen who are also 
primary caretakers to choose between professional and family life, while disregarding the impact 
of gender stereotypes on women’s access to and successful pursuit of a career within the army.1278  
Differently, the Grand Chamber recognises the double-sided harm of gender stereotypes: 
it held that “such difference has the effect of perpetuating gender stereotypes, and is 
disadvantageous both to women’s careers and to men’s family life”.1279 In so arguing, the Court 
enriches its process of ‘naming’ by identifying the law as a means of perpetuating the stereotype 
under scrutiny. Nonetheless, part of the above criticism continues to hold true even with respect to 
the Grand Chamber’s judgment. Indeed, although the Court goes exceptionally beyond the 
arguments submitted by the parties by considering the impact of the contested decision on 
women’s participation in paid employment, the Court still fails to mention how excluding men 
from parental leave entitlements contributes to worsening the double shift of women.  
 Following the anti-stereotyping approach illustrated above, the Court successfully embarks 
also on the phase of ‘contesting’. Among the multiple steps taken, Article 14 was declared 
applicable, the very weighty reasons test was employed and, more importantly, gender stereotypes 
were considered insufficient justification for a difference in treatment. In so doing, the Court 
establishes that generalisations are not accepted as a reason to breach the human rights of 
individuals and, moreover, it indicates that it will not accept the culturally-dominant gender 
ideology as true without questioning or testing it.1280 The application of the very weighty reasons 
test logically resulted in the State being left with a narrow margin of appreciation. This represents 
a further distinguishing element in the present judgment, if compared to the Petrovic case. Indeed, 
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in the latter, the lack of a European consensus was given priority over the existence of a suspect 
ground of discrimination and eventually overruled the need for very weighty reasons.  
Apart from being connected to the application of the very weighty reasons test, the limited 
width of the margin is also determined by the existence of a European consensus on the matter 
under scrutiny. Different from the previous two judgments, in the case of Markin, the Court made 
a significant effort to provide evidence of the suggested shared approach among Contracting States 
by conducting comparative law research and enclosing its detailed findings in the text of the 
judgment. Two main trends have emerged: firstly, as far as civilians are concerned, both parents 
are entitled to parental leave in twenty-eight out of the thirty-three (properly listed) States 
considered;1281 out of the same sample, twenty-three States provide for parental leave to both 
servicemen and servicewomen.1282 
Despite the Court’s demonstrated awareness of the impact of gender stereotypes on both 
men and women, what is still not considered is the harm that the ‘male breadwinner/female 
homemaker’ stereotype inflicts on children. Although extensive research evidence has cogently 
proved correlations between parental leave and children’s cognitive and socio-economic 
outcomes,1283 the right to parental leave is paradoxically conceived as only a tool for parents to 
balance their family life and work life, thus freeing men from gender stereotypes and promoting 
women’s gender equality in the workplace. However, the Court’s reasoning does not make any 
reference to the fact that, apart from harming the father’s right to respect for family life and the 
mother’s interests in pursuing a professional career, the refusal to grant parental leave to 
servicemen might have an ultimate impact on the child’s wellbeing.1284  
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 It seems clear that policies seeking to free parents from a workplace culture that leaves 
them no or limited time to care for their children can be legitimately invoked to meet not only the 
wishes of the adults concerned, but also the best interests of the child.1285 Indeed, reiterating the 
expression used by Judge Tulkens in her concurring opinion to the judgment in Weller, it can be 
argued that the child was the “first victim” of the national authorities’ refusal to grant parental 
leave to Mr Markin, as it had the factual result of depriving the child from the care of one of his 
parents at a very early age. By failing to consider the child’s interests, the Court constructs the 
right to parental leave from an essentially adult-centric perspective. This perception is allegedly 
reflective of a wider view of parenting as “something which is ‘done’ to children” 1286  and 
conceives children as dependent and in need of protection, thus giving little consideration to their 
subjectivity.1287  
Finally, the case of Markin brings a further novel element, if compared to the previous 
jurisprudence, and an important issue to the table. It is widely agreed that resolving or, at least, 
alleviating family-work conflicts requires not only shifts within the private triangle, but also a 
complementary reorganisation of the workplace and increased involvement of the State.1288 In 
certain contexts, certainly in the US, the primary responsibility for the wellbeing of children is 
placed upon the private family, as opposed to the public State.1289 As explained by Fineman, the 
autonomy of the private family to fulfil this responsibility independently of the State and the 
market is contingent upon its ability to provide for both economic support and caretaking labour 
and, therefore, upon the existence of a gendered division of labour within the family itself.1290 As 
a result, “men’s role as economic providers serves an essential function in an ideological system 
in which dependency is privatised and will not be readily displaced until there is some greater 
public responsibility for the provision of essential goods”.1291  
Although still confined to a concurring opinion, the issue whether Article 8 entails a 
positive obligation on States to create a legal system of parental leave was openly discussed for 
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the first time by Judge Pinto De Albuquerque. In his concurring opinion, the latter argues that the 
right to parental leave does not only fall within the scope of Article 8, but is a Convention right.1292 
More specifically, it represents an additional component of the right to respect for family life, 
which the Convention – interpreted as a living instrument – certainly includes.1293 He extrapolated 
the two main consequences from this understanding of the right to parental leave: firstly, its 
protection is ensured by Article 8, regardless of any discrimination contrary to Article 14; 
secondly, States are under the obligation to provide for parental leave policies.1294 It remains to be 
seen whether, in the wake of the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Bernhardt and Spielmann in 
the case of Petrovic, the question raised by concurring opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque 
will eventually prove prophetic and draw the attention of the majority.    
To conclude, although the Court does not go as far as to discuss States’ positive obligations 
in the context of equality, it attempts to “challenge the deeply ingrained gender roles and gendered 
ideology on which society is based”.1295 It does so by piercing through gender stereotype that men 
are not caring and their role is only in the market.1296 By refusing references to traditional division 
of roles between men and women as a sufficient justification to exclude fathers from the right to 
parental leave, it implicitly promotes the idea that fathers are able to nurture children as much as 
mothers. In so arguing, the Court ends up repudiating a legal construction that equates fatherhood 
to just breadwinning. Rather, it seems to support the ideology of ‘new fatherhood’ and a dual-
earner/dual-carer family model, the latter of which presupposes an overlap of (traditionally 
gendered) roles and is achievable through effective family-work reconciliation.  
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3. Concluding Remarks: Departing from a Gendered Division of Labour, 
Adding a Layer to Conventional Fatherhood  
The Court has shown itself to be aware of the importance of distinguishing between maternity 
leave and parental leave, since the very beginning. Despite declaring mothers and fathers ‘similarly 
placed’ with respect to childcare since Petrovic v Austria, the explicit overcoming of a gendered 
division of labour is accomplished only in the landmark case of Markin v Russia. Although a 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 was already found in the decision of 
Weller v Hungary, the latter fails to undertake an anti-stereotyping analysis and, therefore, delivers 
an outcome which, only implicitly, departs from the conventional definition of fatherhood and, 
supposedly, leaves the conventional definition of motherhood untouched. In other words, in the 
judgment of Weller, the Court begins to “bring men into the frame” through what Fredman calls a 
“levelling up option” – which consists in extending women’s parenting rights to fathers.1297 
However, it is only in the judgment of Markin that the Court discards references to a gendered 
division of labour as insufficient justification of discrimination and, explicitly, overcomes the 
images of the man-breadwinner and the woman-homemaker as determining the allocation of the 
right to parental leave.  
Therefore, the full adoption of an anti-stereotyping approach proved fundamental to move 
beyond the father’s situation and grasp the double-edged nature of the man-breadwinner/woman-
homemaker stereotype, although not yet in its fullest sense. Nonetheless, the right to parental leave 
is still constructed according to an adult-centric vision of parenting. In other words, even in the 
progressive judgment in Markin, this right is framed in the interests of fathers to be involved in 
the care of their children and in the interests of women to enter the workplace or to continue to be 
employed, but not in the interests of the child to be cared for by their parents. Similarly, although 
being applicants, in the case of Weller, the children were recognised victims of a violation of 
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, but on different grounds, namely the nationality of 
their mother.  
Having overturned the traditional distribution of roles between men and women, it seems 
interesting to identify the successor(s) of breadwinning/economic provision in the legal definition 
of fatherhood endorsed by the Court. Once again, the conventional feature under scrutiny – 
                                                        




although put under serious challenge by social transformations – is not completely abandoned 
within the Court’s jurisprudence, but rather it coexists (in tension) with the emerging image of the 
‘father as carer’.1298 Therefore, also in this case-law domain, the Court ends up supporting the 
complex image of the ‘new father’, which encloses both change and continuity. According to the 
emerging definition, a father does not abandon his traditional role as provider, but rather combines 
it with nurturing responsibilities through the take-up of parental leave.   
Furthermore, in supporting the combination of parental and professional responsibilities 
within fatherhood as essential in order to ensure a similar arrangement for mothers, the Court 
accepts the reality of fragmented fatherhood, which, in this particular context, consists in a more 
equal split of breadwinning and childcare responsibilities between men and women. The Court 
seems to suggest that nurture is no longer the sole responsibility of mothers and breadwinning 
functions no longer fall within men’s exclusive competence. The Court is of the opinion that 
policies that make parental leave entitlements available to both men and women are to be fostered, 
as they facilitate a fair fragmentation of childcare and professional roles – traditionally performed 
along gendered lines – between mothers and fathers. In this domain, therefore, the acceptance of 
fragmented fatherhood is conducive to the normatively desirable dual-earner/dual-carer family 
model. Concerning fatherhood’s other conventional features, all the applicants were the biological 
fathers and, with the questionable exception of Mr Markin, all married to the child’s mother. 
However, whether their conventionality made a difference to the outcome of their claims cannot 
be established.  
Finally, it is worth emphasising the role played by the rule of consensus in determining the 
endorsement of this (partially) new definition. This jurisprudence displays a regular use of the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation inasmuch as it confirms a relationship of indirect 
proportionality between the width of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by States and the width 
of the consensus among the States within the Council of Europe. In the case of Petrovic v Austria, 
the Court observed that, at the end of the 1980s, States had gradually started to provide for parental 
leave to fathers, (and not only to mothers), in line with a more equal sharing of childcare 
responsibilities between men and women in society. Despite these evolving societal and legal 
realities, however, at the material time, there was no European common ground between the laws 
                                                        




of the Contracting States and, therefore, the State was considered to enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation.  
Arguably, the case of Weller v Hungary operates as a good transition in the process of 
establishing a common European standard and, as such, contributes to legitimising the decision to 
overturn the Petrovic judgment in the case of Markin v Russia. As mentioned above, the reliance 
on the existence of an “emerging consensus” justifies the award of a narrower margin of 
appreciation and, consequently, the application of a stricter standard of review. As a result, even 
if no common ground exists yet, the Hungarian authorities’ refusal to grant the applicant ‘maternity 
benefits’ is found incompatible with the Convention as a result of the magnifying effect of Article 
14. The status of consensus maintains its relevance in the judgment of Markin v Russia, namely at 
the time where its formation is completed.1299 Therefore, it would seem that the employment of 
Article 14 to also cover those additional rights voluntarily provided by the State played only a 
temporary role in determining whether a violation had occurred. Indeed, as soon as the Court could 
establish that the majority of States provided for parental leave to both men and women and, more 
importantly, to both servicemen and servicewoman, it no longer felt the need to state that, 
whenever States go beyond the Convention requirements, they cannot apply additional rights in a 
discriminatory manner.  
The existence of an established European standard eventually worked as an empowering 
tool in the Court’s jurisprudence. It was used as a solid basis thereby challenging discriminatory 
provisions and departing from a conventional understanding of fatherhood as solely related to 
economic provision. The important weight attached to consensus reveals the Court’s willingness 
to respect national choices and, more generally, its conception of the Convention as a means of 
reflecting the legal realities of the Contracting States, more than pushing for legal change at the 
domestic level. Apparently, it is social change and, eventually, legal change at the national level 
that prompt and legitimise the undertaking of an anti-stereotyping approach at the Strasbourg level 
and, accordingly, an interpretation of the Convention provisions that departs from the national 
choice of the Respondent State.   
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 However, the Court does not seem to have made the most out of the existence of a solid 
European consensus. Indeed, as suggested by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, the existence of a 
shared approach in the field could have been relied on to call for a dynamic interpretation of Article 
8. This, in turn, would have led to the construction of the right to parental leave as an integral 
component of the right to respect for family life and, therefore, as a right per se. Indeed, as 
previously mentioned, to date, the right to parental leave is considered worthy of protection under 
Article 8, only inasmuch as there is a discriminatory dimension at stake. This limited 
understanding of the right to parental leave, coupled with the Court’s demonstrated tendency to 
anchor its interpretation to established – rather than new – conditions, makes it clear that the Court 
is definitely not a forerunner in the domain of family-work reconciliation. Rather, having regard 
to some national standards – as in Sweden – the Court is certainly lagging behind. Given the 
currently parasitic nature of the right to parental leave, it is unimaginable that the Court will affirm 
a positive obligation to provide for gender-specific provisions, like the Swedish ‘daddy month’, 





















This chapter investigates the extent to which heteronormativity continues to shape the Court’s 
jurisprudence involving (prospective) homosexual parents and, more specifically, fathers. Section 
1 provides an overview of the national trends towards the recognition of homosexual individuals 
in their capacity as partners and parents. In so doing, it underlines that these two types of 
recognition do not usually move along together; rather, the conferral of partnership rights tends to 
precede the opening of family avenues. Apart from demonstrating that the same dynamic has 
driven the development of the Court’s jurisprudence, Section 2 puts the Court’s adherence to 
heteronormative standards to the test by providing a critical analysis of the limited, but meaningful 
case-law pertaining to homo-parenthood. Finally, Section 3 attempts to mainstream the principal 
findings of the investigation, thus offering a tentative answer to the various research sub-questions.  
         
1. National Responses: Two Distinct Stages of Development – Partnership 
Rights and Parental Rights 
Compared to other unconventional family arrangements, the emergence of same-sex unions has 
challenged the traditional paradigm of the family in a more holistic way. Apart from constituting 
a conventional feature of fatherhood itself, heterosexuality often represents a prerequisite for the 
existence of other conventional characteristics. While unmarried families deviate from the 
conventional model of partnership and parenting due to their non-marital nature, the biological 
link – regardless of its sufficiency or not – served as a trait d’union between the ideal and the 
alternative. Similarly, when discussing the employment of ARTs by heterosexual couples, despite 
the partial/full departure from biology, their adherence to a different-sex, bi-parental model of 
parenting has been relied on for inclusive purposes. Conversely, within the domain of 
homosexuality, the chances to mimic the traditional family are significantly lower. The typical ‘as 
if’ attitude of the law has a limited, if any at all, margin of operation in the terrain of homosexual 




 Lesbian and gay families, together with adoptive, foster and step-families, constitute a 
further manifestation of the on-going fragmentation of parenthood. Same-sex couples’ lack of 
reproductive sufficiency inevitably challenges the conventional biological paradigm and leads to 
scenarios involving more than two individuals fulfilling complementary parental functions. 
Consider, for instance, a lesbian couple willing to conceive a child through an anonymous sperm 
donor. In such situation, three adults will be involved - more or less directly - in the reproductive 
process: the two women and the male sperm donor. Therefore, the resulting child will have two 
biological parents, one of whom is also performing nurturing activities and two social parents, one 
of whom is genetically unrelated. However, in most national jurisdictions, only one of them will 
be recognised as a legal parent of the child, namely the biological mother. Similar to the possibly 
unknown biological father, but for a different reason, the second nurturing parent might remain a 
legal stranger to the child.  
 The discrepancy between legal and social realities emerges even more clearly when the 
prospective parents are a gay male couple. One available reproductive option is surrogacy: 
according to its traditional method, the surrogate mother is pregnant with her own biological child 
and the sperm is donated by one of the intended fathers, namely one of the gay male partners. 
Following the conventional rules regulating filiation, in similar circumstances, parturition, rather 
than biological relatedness, makes the surrogate mother the legal mother of the child. The 
identification of the legal father can follow illogical routes: should the surrogate be married, her 
husband will be recognised as the legal father of the child regardless of their biological 
unrelatedness. Otherwise, legal fatherhood will be attributed to the biological father, who acts as 
a parent to the child in accordance with his pre-conception intention. Therefore, the application of 
those rules, which were created to regulate the ‘conventional family’, points to marriage (as 
opposed to biology) as the primary locus of fatherhood in surrogacy situations, unless otherwise 
agreed in a valid contract.  
 The other parenthood route available to homosexuals is adoption, which – as already 
ascertained in relation to heterosexual couples – departs from the conventional rule of biology and 
challenges the bi-parental structure of the conventional family. This becomes particularly evident 
in cases of second-parent adoption, namely where one’s homosexual partner wishes to adopt the 




child will be predictably exposed to a multi-parental environment: two biological and, possibly, 
legal parents, one of which is also acting as a nurturing parent, and an additional nurturing parent.  
 These points of disjuncture between the conventional family and homosexual families 
explain why, even in the most broad-minded societies, the inclusion of same-sex couples within a 
legal framework of the family has only taken place progressively and in a fragmented fashion.1300 
A general trend reveals that legal recognition of same-sex couples has gone through – or, is about 
to go through – two stages of development, in most jurisdictions. The first phase is characterised 
by the recognition of same-sex couples as couples,1301 and, therefore, implies the extension of 
partnership rights traditionally conferred on heterosexual couples to their homosexual 
counterparts. At this stage, the most visible demand for recognition relates to access to the 
institution of marriage or to a formal marriage-like relationship status, like civil partnership.1302 
The second phase, which is more relevant for current purposes, focuses on the legal recognition of 
homosexual individuals and couples as parents and, as such, consists in conferring parental status 
or parental rights on them.1303 In the past, children of homosexual parents tended to arise primarily 
from previous heterosexual relationships.1304 In contemporary times, the opportunities opened up 
by ART and increased access to adoption have made homo-parenthood1305 increasingly detached 
from heterosexuality.1306 Yet, this second dimension of legal recognition is still ‘on the way’ in 
most European countries. Indeed, despite a rapid and heightened legal recognition of same-sex 
                                                        
1300 M. Jantera-Jareborg, ‘Parenthood for Same-Sex Couples – Scandinavian Developments’ in K. Boele-Woelski 
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European Perspectives (Intersentia, 2012), 91.  
1301 Ibid, 92.  
1302 On processes that led to the legal recognition of same-sex relationships in Canada, the UK, New Zealand and 
Australia, see L. McNamara, Human Rights Controversies – the Impact of Legal Reform (Routledge, 2007), chapter 
3 ‘Pushing the boundaries of human rights protection: Equality and the recognition of same-sex relationships’. On 
the formalisation and legal consequences of same-sex marriages and partnerships in European countries, see Part I in 
K. Boele-Woelski and A. Fuchs (eds.), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe – National, Cross-
Border and European Perspectives (Intersentia, 2012), 91; otherwise, for a less recent but world-wide perspective, 
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1303 Jantera-Jareborg, ‘Parenthood for Same-Sex Couples’, 92.  
1304 Ibid, 119.  
1305 Among others, Ruspini defines ‘homo-parenthood’ as “denoting a situation in which at least one adult refers to 
him or herself as homosexual who is or wishes to be a father or mother of at least one child”. See E. Ruspini, Diversity 
in family life – Gender, Relationships and Social Change (Policy Press, 2013), 144. 




relationships, the main differences between marriage and registered partnership laws are likely to 
concern children-related matters.1307 
 French legislation – more specifically, its evolution and current state – provides a good 
example of the above two stages of development. In November 1999, a campaign for legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships culminated in the creation of a new form of conjugal 
relationship under the law, namely the Pacte civil de solidarité (PACS). Once the law on the PACS 
was enacted, however, the struggle for the equality of same-sex couples was not over. Indeed, a 
PACS did not allow the partners to jointly adopt a child, nor to be granted joint parental authority 
over the biological child of one of them or to have access to ART.1308 This further step has been 
only partially taken in May 2013, when France legalised same-sex marriage and allowed 
homosexual couples to jointly adopt children. Nonetheless, full equality continues to have a long 
way to go.1309  For instance, access to ART remains a privilege of heterosexual couples and 
surrogacy is still unlawful.1310 Moreover, homosexual couples are still excluded from the benefit 
of the presumption of co-parenthood and, therefore, have to initiate an intra-family adoption 
process.1311  
 Even in the Nordic countries – which were the first in the world to expand the traditional 
boundaries of family law to include same-sex relationships and families 1312  – differences in 
treatment between same-sex couples and their heterosexual counterparts persist to date. Under the 
lead of Denmark, the Scandinavian countries have enabled the formalisation of same-sex 
relationships through the institution of registered partnership since the late 1980s.1313 According 
to these regulations, same-sex couples, who had registered their relationships were subject to the 
rules of marriage, but with some exceptions. In the period between 1999 and 2003, legal reforms 
                                                        
1307 N. Polikoff, ‘Recognising Partners but Not Parents/Recognising Parents but Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family 
Law in Europe and the United States’ 2000-2001 17 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 712. Moreover, 
legal summaries country-by-country are provided by ILGA Europe and available at http://www.ilga-
europe.org/home/guide_europe/country_by_country last access on 24th April 2013.  
1308 B. Perreau, The Politics of Adoption – Gender and the Making of French Citizenship (The MIT Press, 2014), 31-
34; D. Borrillo, ‘The “Pacte Civil de Solidarité” in France: Midway between Marriage and Cohabitation’ in R. 
Wintemute and M. Andenaes (eds.), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships (Hart, 2001), 475-492.   
1309 Perreau, ‘The Politics of Adoption’, x. 
1310 Ibid.  
1311 Ibid.  
1312 Jantera-Jareborg, ‘Parenthood for Same-Sex Couples’, 94.  
1313 For details on the reform processes undertaken in the Nordic countries, see H. Frioriksdottir, ‘The Nordic 
Model: Same-Sex Families in Love and Law’ in D. Gallo, L. Paladini and P. Pustorino (eds.), Same-Sex Couples, 
before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Springer, 2014), 161-180; on Europe more widely, 




in Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Denmark removed the original exclusion of registered 
partnerships from the rights of joint parenthood and allowed second-parent adoption.1314 Joint 
adoption turned out to be a much more divisive issue.1315 To date, same-sex registered partners are 
permitted to jointly adopt a child only in Sweden, Iceland and Denmark.1316 In Norway, the right 
to joint adoption is reserved to homosexual married couples, while it remains unrecognised in 
Finland.1317 
 Unlike in the other Nordic countries, which replaced the option of registered partnership 
with a gender-neutral marriage concept between 2009 and 2012, in Finland, this reform will 
become effective only in March 2017. Therefore, registered partnerships will remain the only 
viable means of formalisation of same-sex relationship until then. Notwithstanding the current 
status, homosexual registered partners are entitled to second-parent adoption since 2009. Finally, 
as a further product of same-sex marriage reforms, lesbian couples were accorded access to ART 
and to rights to co-parenthood in Norway and Iceland.1318 Differently, in Denmark and Finland, 
rights to co-parenthood do not automatically follow from ART. Therefore, lesbian couples are 
required to apply for second-parent adoption.1319    
  Taking the best interests of the child into account has played a fundamental role in 
preventing, slowing down or constraining the process of attaching legal recognition to homo-
parenthood. Opponents to gay adoption and access to ART by homosexuals have commonly put 
forward three main lines of argument.1320 Firstly, they have claimed the unsuitability of lesbians 
and gay men as parents and the inevitable harm inflicted by their sexual orientation and associated 
lifestyle on children’s cognitive and emotional development, gender identity and sexual 
                                                        
1314 Jantera-Jareborg, ‘Parenthood for Same-Sex Couples’, 102. According to some commentators, the previous 
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4 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 305.  
1315 Jantera-Jareborg, ‘Parenthood for Same-Sex Couples’, 104.  
1316 Ibid, 105. 
1317 Ibid.  
1318 Ibid, 115. 
1319 Ibid, 111. 
1320 J. Tobin and R. McNair, ‘Public International Law and the Regulation of Private Spaces: Does the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child Impose an Obligation on States to allow Gay and Lesbian to Adopt?’ 2009 23 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 119. One of the most active (and cited by politicians) commentators who 
opposed placement of children in homosexual families is Lynn Wardle. See, for instance, L. Wardle, ‘The Potential 
Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children’ 1997 University of Illinois Law Review 833-920. For a critical 
assessment of all the different lines of argument put forward by opponents to placement of children with homosexuals, 
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orientation.1321 Secondly, some commentators have relied on and perpetuated sex role stereotypes, 
which prescribe differentiated parenting roles for women and men, and insisted that children need 
a (real) father and a (real) mother actively involved in their lives.1322 Thirdly, it has been argued 
that children raised by homosexuals are more likely to be exposed to social stigma and 
discrimination and less able to establish positive social relationships.1323 Against such opposition, 
it is often emphasised that comparative research has consistently documented the mental health 
and parenting skills of homosexual parents and the lack of any difference between children raised 
by homosexual parents and those raised by heterosexual parents, in terms of social, psychological 
and gender development.1324 In a nutshell, existing literature strongly indicates that the wellbeing 
of children does not depend on the sexual orientation of their parents, but rather on the quality of 
family ties, the character of daily interactions and the emotional strength of their relationships with 
their parents.1325  
 Therefore, social and legal hostility towards homosexuality can be understood as a reaction 
to the breach of gender norms and, more specifically, as an attempt to preserve conventional 
understandings of masculinity and femininity.1326 In this regard, gay fathers face considerably 
more challenges than lesbian mothers. Firstly, there is a remarkable gap in the literature concerning 
the experience of children living with gay fathers (if compared to the research evidence on the 
experience of children living with lesbian parents) and, therefore, less is known about them.1327 
Moreover, fathers are more likely to be affected by harmful stereotypes about gay men and 
parenting and, inter alia, have shown complex issues in relation to ‘coming out’ with their children 
and partners, such as fear of homophobia on the latter’s side.1328 Furthermore, although the same-
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1326 S. Law, ‘Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender’ 1988 Wisconsin Law Review 187. 
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sex composition of the couple evidently brings the traditional division of labour along gendered 
lines into question, gay fathers have to face the notion that women have stronger caring and 
parenting abilities than men and, therefore, only the former should be engage in nurturing. 
 As an additional challenge, available parenthood routes are unquestionably more limited 
for gay men, compared to lesbians. Whilst lesbians can resort to the relatively uncomplicated and 
affordable option of donor insemination, surrogacy – when lawful – poses, inter alia, great 
economic barriers to gay men pursuing parenthood.1329 Similarly, co-parenting arrangements – in 
which, for instance, a lesbian conceives and gives birth to a child genetically related to a gay man, 
under the agreement that the child will be raised jointly and, possibly, together with their respective 
partners – have proved a difficult choice, in light of the emotional and legal challenges they 
trigger.1330 As a result, adoption tends to be the most common parenting choice for gay men.  
 
2. The ECtHR: The Late and Partial Inclusion of Homosexual Relationships 
within the Scope of Family Life  
Homosexuality departs from the conventional ideology of fatherhood and, more generally, of the 
family in three major ways. Firstly, the homosexual nature of the relationship impedes natural 
reproduction. Therefore, the means through which same-sex couples can have a child – namely, 
adoption, ART and surrogacy – prescind from the biological contribution of either one or both 
parents. Secondly, within the perimeter of Western Europe, only eleven States permit same-sex 
couples to marry.1331 Although a number of legal systems provides for the institution of registered 
partnership, homosexual relationships remain largely incapable of formalisation under the law.  
 As a result, neither biology nor marriage can be relied on as grounds to allocate parental 
status and parental rights to gay fathers. Moreover, same-sex relationships undermine the 
assumption that personal attributes, such as dominance and nurturance, are determined by and 
                                                        
1329 On the issues faced by gay men seeking to have children through surrogacy, see A.Goldberg, Gay dads: 
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‘naturally’ associated to one sex or the other.1332 Moller Okin has argued that same-sex couples 
might offer a “particularly good model of parenthood” because, among others things, they are “far 
less likely than heterosexual families to practice anything resembling a gendered division of 
labour”.1333 This perception is substantiated by empirical research pointing to a more equal sharing 
of paid work and unpaid work in lesbian families.1334  
 The above-mentioned two stages of development can be detected also within the Court’s 
jurisprudence. The early case-law involving homosexual couples or individuals was primarily 
concerned with defining the partnership rights of the applicants. The Court was called to enter the 
terrain of homo-parenthood only in 1999 and, since then, only five cases have been brought by 
homosexuals seeking to obtain parental status and parental rights. While the case of Salgueiro da 
Silva Mouta v Portugal concerned the refusal of parental responsibility to an homosexual man 
living with another man, the following four cases – Fretté v France (single-parent adoption by a 
single homosexual man), E.B. v France (single-parent adoption by a lesbian living together with 
her female partner), Gas and Dubois v France1335 (second-parent adoption) and X and Others v 
Austria 1336 (second-parent adoption) arose from requests for single-parent and second-parent 
adoption.  
 Although the last three judgments concern lesbian women and, as such, do not directly 
contribute to the debate around conventional fatherhood, their analysis is still useful to shed light 
on the bigger picture regarding the tenacity of heterosexuality as an essential parameter of legal 
parenthood. In particular, since the cases of Fretté v France and E.B. v France stemmed from 
similar factual circumstances and raised the same legal question, the two judgments offer the 
chance to compare the legal treatment accorded to lesbian and gay single prospective adoptive 
parents, respectively, vis-à-vis requests for single-parent adoption. The same comparison cannot 
be undertaken in relation to second-parent adoption since both available cases – namely, Gas and 
Dubois v France and X and Others v Austria – concerned a lesbian couple. However, the latter 
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will provide interesting insights as to the persistence of a heteronormative understanding of 
marriage within the Court’s jurisprudence.    
 A further and – more substantial – manifestation of the above-mentioned two stages of 
development is constituted by the “underdevelopment of the ‘family life’ limb of Article 8” in the 
terrain of homosexuality.1337 The Court has for a long time understood homosexuality as an 
essentially private manifestation of human personality and, therefore, has failed to analyse a wide 
array of matters relating to same-sex relationships through the lens of family life. 1338  The 
“privatisation of homosexuality”1339 has been rightly interpreted as an attempt by the Court to 
preserve a strong heteronormative definition of the family. 1340  At the same time, however, 
according autonomy to private life has enabled the Court to assert that partnership rights exist also 
outside the conventional family context.1341  
 The Court’s heteronormative definition of family life was left unquestioned for almost 
three decades, until when the Court accepted that a same-sex couple is capable of establishing 
family life for the purposes of Article 8 in the landmark decision of Schalk and Kopf v Austria.1342 
This jurisprudential advancement was justified on the basis of the following argument:  
 
[A] rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples has taken place in many member 
States. [...] In view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in 
contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the purposes of 
Article 8. Consequently the relationship of the applicants, a cohabitating same-sex couple living in 
a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of “family life”, just as the relationship of a 
different-sex couple in the same situation would.”1343   
 
Prior to this judgment, the Court had repeatedly excluded that the emotional and sexual 
relationship of a same-sex couple constituted family life – even in cases of long-term cohabitation 
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– in contrast to its own jurisprudence involving unmarried families.1344 Furthermore, it had even 
declared discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation compatible with Article 14, in light of 
“the special protection to be afforded to the traditional family”.1345 In light of this past, the decision 
in Schalk and Kopf v Austria was perceived as a milestone in the process of ensuring equal 
enjoyment of family rights to homosexual couples by signalling the adoption of a more consistent 
approach to non-traditional families and alleviating the pre-existing hierarchy between unmarried 
heterosexual couples and their homosexual counterparts.  
 However, its revolutionary potential was dramatically reduced by the lack of any definition 
of the elements that entailed the finding of ‘family life’ in the case under scrutiny.1346 As emerging 
from the above quote, cohabitation appears the only aspect of the applicants’ relationship that the 
Court took into account. However, previous jurisprudence demonstrated that living together in a 
stable partnership did not per se entail the full protection of Article 8. Moreover, as to the issue of 
whether access to marriage was a prerequisite to the applicants’ effective enjoyment of their family 
rights, the Court concluded that Contracting States were not obliged to either extend marriage 
rights to same-sex couples or provide them with alternative modes of recognition - at least, not for 
now but possibly in the near future.1347 Indeed, the Court held, “the area in question must (…) still 
be regarded as one of the evolving rights with no established consensus, where States must also 
enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes”.1348  
 The situation, however, seems to have changed. In the case of Oliari and Others v Italy – 
which was decided in July 2015 – the Court found that Italy had failed to fulfil its obligation to 
ensure that the applicants – three gay couples – could avail themselves of a specific legal 
framework providing for the recognition and protection of their union, thus violating their right to 
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respect for family life.1349  The Court noted that there was a tension between the social reality of 
the applicants, who had for the most part openly lived their relationship in Italy, and the legal 
reality of non-recognition. Along the lines of its judgment in Shalk and Kopf v Italy, inspiration 
was drawn from the situation in the countries of the Council of Europe, where the Court could 
observe a trend towards legal recognition: 24 of the 47 States have legislation which provides for 
such recognition.1350 It further observed that the Constitutional Court had underlined the need for 
legislation to recognise and protect same-sex unions on several occasions and that, according to 
recent surveys, such recognition was supported by a majority of the Italian population.1351 In light 
of these, the Court held that, in order to find a non-violation of Article 8, it would have had to 
ignore the changing conditions in Italy and would have had to be reluctant to apply the Convention 
in a practical and effective manner.1352         
 Apart from delaying the entry of homosexual couples into the realm of family life, the 
Court’s early jurisprudence related to homosexuality refused to investigate the discrimination 
complaint brought by the applicants, arguing that the issues raised under Article 14 had already 
been considered by finding a violation of Article 8.1353 The recognition of sexual orientation as a 
ground protected by Article 14 through the judgment in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal 
signalled a change in the Court’s attitude, but only to a certain extent. Indeed, having regard to the 
latest judgment against Italy, the Court seems to have fallen back into old habits.1354 However, as 
pointed out by Nikolaidis, addressing cases of systemic disadvantage and stereotyping through 
Article 8 has proved useful for stressing that anti-discrimination does not merely consist in treating 
individuals similarly.1355 Rather, it is more widely about enabling an individual to conduct his/her 
own life without being exposed to oppression and disadvantage on the basis of his/her personal 
characteristics.1356  
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 One of the principal foci of the following jurisprudential analysis is a consideration of 
whether the Court supports or challenges heteronormativity, in the cases brought by gay 
(prospective) fathers. In other words, it seeks to understand the extent to which the ECtHR has 
succeeded in escaping the normative force of heterosexuality and, therefore, the extent to which 
the ‘protection of the traditional family’ has been questioned as a legitimate aim for providing a 
difference in treatment on grounds of sexual orientation. Given that the traditional connectors of 
fathers to children are likely to be missing, the Court is likely to be left with nurture or nurturing 
intentions as the only elements to ground the compatibility of the contested decision with the 
Convention. Therefore, in addition to disclosing the Court’s attachment or departure from 
heteronormativity, the case-law on homo-parenthood constitutes a unique opportunity for testing 
the sufficiency of nurture and nurturing intentions in the absence of conventional paternal features.   
2.1. Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal:1357 ‘Violation’, but Still Connected to Heterosexuality 
In Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal, the applicant married C.D.S in 1983 and, four years later, 
their daughter, M. was born. The applicant separated from his wife in April 1990 and has since 
then started cohabiting with a man, L.G.C. During the divorce proceedings, the applicant signed 
an agreement with C.D.S. according to which C.D.S. was to have parental responsibility for M. 
and the applicant a right to contact. However, the applicant was unable to exercise his right to 
contact because C.D.S. failed to comply with the agreement. Subsequently, the applicant applied 
for an order giving him parental responsibility for the child, alleging that M. was living with the 
maternal grandparents. In response to this request, C.D.S. accused the applicant of having sexually 
abused M. The Family Affairs Court found that, given the mother’s uncooperative behaviour, the 
father was better able to take care of M.. On the basis of psychological reports, the Court clarified 
that, in addition to “providing the economic and living conditions necessary to have the child with 
him”, he had proved capable of “providing her with the balanced conditions she needs and of 
respecting her right to maintain regular and sustained contact with her mother and maternal 
grandparents”.1358  
M. had lived with her father for approximately nine months, when she was allegedly 
abducted by C.D.S. The latter appealed against the Family Affairs Court’s decision to the Lisbon 
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Court of Appeal, which overturned the lower court’s decision and awarded parental responsibility 
to C.D.S., with contact to the applicant. The Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that “despite the 
importance of paternal love, a young child needs the care which only the mother’s love can 
provide” and, therefore, custody should “as a general rule” be granted to the mother.1359 Moreover, 
it was noted that, even if society was becoming increasingly tolerant of homosexuality:  
It cannot be argued that an environment of this kind is the healthiest and best suited to a 
child’s   psychological, social and mental development, especially given the dominant model in our 
society. (…) The child should live in a family environment, a traditional Portuguese family, which 
is certainly not the set-up her father has decided to enter into, since he is living with another man 
as if they were man and wife.1360 
The right to contact granted to the applicant was never respected by C.D.S.. In connection with the 
proceedings for the enforcement of the Court of Appeal’s decision, the applicant learnt that M. had 
moved to the North of Portugal. The applicant made two unsuccessful attempts to see his daughter.  
 Before the ECtHR, the applicant complained that the Court of Appeal’s decision to award 
parental responsibility of M. to the mother because of his sexual orientation amounted to a 
violation of his right to respect for family life, taken in conjunction with Article 14. On the 
contrary, the Government argued that Contracting States enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in 
settling issues of parental responsibility.1361 Moreover, given the paramount importance to be 
attached to the child’s best interests, it was submitted that national authorities were better placed 
than an international court.1362 It was further contended that the Court of Appeal had only taken 
the child’s interests – and not the applicant’s sexual orientation – into consideration when reaching 
the final decision.1363 Therefore, in the Government’s view, the applicant had not been treated 
differently from his ex-wife.1364 
 As a first step, the Court established that the Court of Appeal’s decision amounted to an 
interference of the applicant’s right to respect for family life and, therefore, declared Article 8 
applicable. It further observed that “the Convention institutions have held that this provision 
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applies to decisions awarding custody to one or other parent after divorce or separation”.1365 
However, when assessing compliance with the Convention, the Court chose to consider the 
complaint exclusively under Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, thus not dealing with 
the issue under Article 8 in isolation. Moving onto the merits of the case, the Court acknowledged 
that the child’s interests had been given due regard by the Court of Appeal; however, it was also 
noted that a new factor, namely the fact that the applicant was an homosexual and was living with 
another man, was introduced when overturning the decision of the lower court.1366 As a result, the 
Court found a difference of treatment between the applicant and the child’s mother on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  
To establish whether it was justified, the Court began by noting that it pursued a legitimate 
aim, namely the protection of the health and rights of the child.1367 It went on by observing that, 
in light of the above excerpts, the references to the applicant’s homosexuality were not “merely 
clumsy or unfortunate” statements1368 or mere obiter dicta with no impact on the outcome of the 
case, as suggested by the Government, but rather decisive factors in the final decision.1369 The 
Court observed that this conclusion was further substantiated by the fact that, when according him 
a right to contact, the Court of Appeal advised the applicant to abstain from assuming conduct, 
which would make the child understand that he was living with another man in a stable 
relationship. 1370  Therefore, no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the goal pursued could be established and the Court found a violation of Article 8 
taken in conjunction with Article 14.1371  
 In this judgment, the Court held the incompatibility of a refusal to award parental 
responsibility based on considerations regarding the applicant’s homosexuality with the 
Convention, thus explicitly including the ground of sexual orientation within the scope of Article 
                                                        
1365 Ibid, para 22.  
1366 Ibid, para 28.  
1367 Ibid, para 30.  
1368 Ibid, para 33.  
1369 Ibid, para 35. 
1370 Ibid.  
1371 Ibid, para 36. This conclusion constitutes evidence of the ‘magnifying effect’ of Article 14, as noted by 
Arnardóttir. More specifically, it shows that Article 14 is applicable when the facts of the case fall within the ambit 
of another Convention right (Article 8), but whether the latter has been violated is not, at least in principle, a relevant 
matter. See O. Arnardóttir, ‘Discrimination as a magnifying lens – Scope and ambit under Article 14 and Protocol 
No. 12’ in E. Brems and J. Gerards (eds.), Shaping Rights in the ECHR – The Role of the European Court of Human 




14.1372 Although not expressly stated, the Court rejects the reliance on general considerations as a 
means of adjudicating the allocation of parental rights to homosexuals. Gender stereotypes 
undoubtedly formed the cornerstone of the Court of Appeal’s judgment. As emerging from the 
above quotes, the refusal of custody to the applicant was heavily informed by two stereotypical 
notions: the man-breadwinner/woman-homemaker stereotype and the assumption that homo-
parenting is not in the child’s best interests. Whilst the first falls within the sub-category of sex-
role stereotypes (see previous chapter), the second embodies a “compounded stereotype”,1373 since 
it is created by the intersection of gender stereotypes with other stereotypes. In this specific 
instance, the traits of the applicant as a homosexual man and, therefore, his gender and sexual 
orientation were compounded in a way that denied him the right to custody of M..  
In light of this, the anti-stereotyping approach introduced in Chapter 1 becomes a useful 
tool to evaluate the Court’s ability to overcome the conventional ideology of fatherhood, also in 
this context. Concerning the first phase, the Court named the gender stereotypes at issue, but only 
implicitly – namely, by referring to the justifications put forward by the Government, in their exact 
wording, to infer the incompatibility of the difference in treatment suffered by the applicant with 
the Convention. Although not embarking on all steps of the contesting process (in other words, no 
weighty reasons test, no stereotypes as insufficient reasons), the Court ultimately contests their 
validity as sufficient justifications for a difference in treatment by finding a violation of Article 8, 
taken in conjunction with Article 14. This conclusion, in turn, amounts to denying any legitimate 
connection between one’s sexual orientation and his/her ability to raise a child and, as such, it 
contributes to challenging the persistence of heterosexuality as a conventional ground for 
attributing parental right to biological fathers.  
Despite its unquestionably progressive character, as argued by Hodson, this judgment is 
“likely to be of limited relevance for children of LGBT families” and, therefore, for gay 
prospective fathers. 1374  Indeed, the extent to which the final decision is disconnected from 
heterosexuality and, therefore, what new or additional factor(s) has/have succeeded in connecting 
the applicant to his child remain(s) to be ascertained. With the exception of his sexual orientation, 
the applicant embodies the image of the conventional father: firstly, he is the biological father of 
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the child, with respect to whom he applied for parental responsibility; secondly, he is the ex-
husband of the child’s mother and M. was born within wedlock; thirdly, as emerging from the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment, he can allegedly financially provide for his child. Therefore, although 
his homosexuality became a barrier to the attribution of parental responsibility, the father-child 
relationship at stake concerned a child born within wedlock and his biological father and, as such, 
“the law could not depart too flagrantly from reality”.1375  
At the same time, however, one of the clear messages conveyed is that being non-
heterosexual is not seen as amounting to a lack of fitness for fatherhood. Moreover, it is important 
to point out that, prior to divorce, the applicant had cohabitated with his former wife and M. for 
almost three years. Moreover, following the lower court’s conferral of parental responsibility on 
the applicant, he had lived with and took care of M. for an additional period of nine months. 
Furthermore, his caring and parenting abilities had been documented by psychological evidence 
collected during the proceedings before the lower court and, more importantly, relied on by the 
same court to rule on the transfer of the parental responsibility of M. from her mother to the 
applicant. Therefore, although not spelt out by the Court, one could argue that – in the wake of its 
own jurisprudence pertaining to unmarried fathers – the applicant’s ‘demonstrated interest and 
commitment’ to his child as well as the existence of close personal ties between them might have 
influenced the Court’s decision, whereby the Court of Appeal’s refusal to grant him parental 
responsibility breached his right to respect for family life, taken in conjunction with Article 14.  
2.2 Fretté v France: 1376 Heterosexuality Remains Necessary to Become a Legal Father  
The applicant, Philippe Fretté, applied for prior authorisation to adopt a child. During his first 
interview with the psychologist, he revealed he was homosexual and he was strongly urged to 
refrain from continuing the adoption process. In 1993, the Paris Social Services, Youth and Health 
Department refused the applicant’s request on the ground that he offered “no stable maternal role 
model” and had “difficulties in envisaging the practical consequences of the   upheaval   occasioned   
by   the   arrival   of   a   child”.1377 It was also stated that: “Mr Fretté has undoubted personal 
qualities and an aptitude for bringing up children. A child would probably be happy with him. The 
question is whether his particular circumstances as a single homosexual man allow him to be 
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entrusted with a child.”1378  
An appeal lodged by the applicant was dismissed on the ground that the applicant’s “choice 
of lifestyle” casted doubts as to his ability to ensure a suitable home for the child from an 
educational, psychological and family perspective. 1379  In the meantime, Mr Fretté lodged an 
application for judicial review with the administrative court. The Paris Administrative Court noted 
that there was no evidence to establish or even suggest that Mr Fretté’s lifestyle could endanger or 
fail to adequately provide for the life of any child adopted.1380 Paris Social Services appealed to 
the Conseil d’Etat, which set aside the Administrative Court’s judgment and, as for the merits, 
dismissed the applicant’s request for prior authorisation. It found that the applicant, “having regard 
to his lifestyle and despite his clear personal qualities and aptitude for bringing up children, did 
not provide the requisite safeguards – from an educational, psychological and family perspective 
– for adopting a child”.1381 
Before the ECtHR, the applicant contended that the rejection of his application had 
implicitly been based exclusively on his sexual orientation.1382 Since the French legal system 
allowed for adoption by a single, unmarried parent, Mr Fretté argued that homosexuals and 
bisexuals were a priori excluded from the possibility to adopt on the basis of their sexual 
orientation, with no regard been given to their individual personal qualities and predisposition to 
raise a child.1383 In light of this, he complained that the refusal of authorisation to adopt had 
breached his rights under Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8.1384 In response to this, 
the Government argued that the applicant’s complaint did not fall within the scope of the 
Convention since Article 8 did not protect mere aspirations – not yet materialised – to found a 
family. 1385  Moreover, as to the justification for the refusal, the Government explained that, 
although the expression ‘choice of lifestyle’ did encompass sexual orientation, it included 
additional elements, which proved the applicant’s inability to provide the child with a suitable 
environment.1386   
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Having clarified that the Convention does not guarantee a right to adopt, the Court further 
explained that “the right to respect for family life presupposes the existence of a family and does 
not safeguard the mere desire to found a family”.1387 Although the Court found that there was no 
interference with Article 8, it decided to proceed with the claim under Article 14 in light of the 
fact that French law authorised single persons to adopt but disallowed the applicant from doing so 
on this of the sexual orientation. Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, was eventually 
held applicable on the ground that, although no express reference was made to his homosexuality, 
a detailed examination of the case file showed that that criterion was implicitly, but undeniably, 
the decisive factor in determining the refusal of Mr Fretté’s application by national courts.1388  
As a following step, the Court was called to establish whether the difference in treatment 
was discriminatory for the purposes of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8. 1389 
According to the first limb of the analysis, the refusal was found to pursue a legitimate aim, namely 
the protection of the health and rights of children who could be involved in the adoption 
procedure.1390 The Court went on to prepare the grounds for ascertaining whether the difference in 
treatment was justified. In this case, the State was granted a wide margin of appreciation on two 
grounds.1391 Firstly, it was observed that, although most of the Contracting States abstain from 
expressly excluding homosexuals from adoption, when the latter is an option for single persons, 
there is no common ground within the social and legal orders of Contracting States on the issue of 
adoption by homosexuals and, more generally, the law appears to be going through a “transitional 
stage”. Secondly, a wide margin of appreciation should be granted as a result of the fact that 
national authorities benefit from their direct and constant connection with local realities and, 
therefore, are better placed than an international court to assess local needs and conditions (the 
‘better placed’ argument).1392  
The Court further held that the core issue resonated with the conflict between the interests 
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of the applicant and those of the children who are eligible for adoption.1393 Adoption meaning 
“providing a child with a family” and not vice versa, it was argued that States should guarantee 
that the chosen adopter can offer the child the most suitable family environment. In that regard, 
the Court observed that the lack of a shared consensus crossed legal boundaries and characterised 
the whole scientific community.1394 In particular, the Court held that: 
It must be observed that the scientific community – particularly experts on childhood, psychiatrists 
and psychologists – is divided over the possible consequences of a child being adopted by one or 
more homosexual parents, especially bearing in mind the limited number of scientific studies 
conducted on the subject to date.1395 
 
As a result, national authorities – which grounded their decisions on the Government 
Commissioner’s submissions – were entitled to reject the applicant’s request for authorisation to 
adopt to safeguard the interests of the potential adoptees.1396 To conclude, given the wide margin 
of appreciation enjoyed by States on the matter under scrutiny and the need to protect children’s 
best interests, the justifications provided by the Government were considered objective and 
reasonable and, therefore, no violation was found.  
 As a preliminary remark, Hodson’s statement as to the limited relevance of the judgment 
in Salgueiro for gay prospective fathers proved prophetic.1397 Although the Court might seem to 
have taken a step back in the Fretté case, differing outcomes might simply derive from the different 
factual circumstances and, especially, those taken into consideration by the Court. As underlined 
by Judges Bratza, Fuhrmann and Tulkens in their partly dissenting opinion, in the case of 
Salgueiro, “there was already an established family life between the applicant and his 
daughter”.1398 In the present case, no prior tie of filiation existed and the Court did not want to find 
itself out of step with national practices.1399  
 This brings us to discuss the non-applicability of Article 8, compared to the Court’s case-
law in the domains of ART and unmarried fatherhood. The claim of Mr Fretté is similar to those 
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brought by Ms Evans, Mr Dickson and Mrs Dickson, as all the four applicants wished to become 
parents, either via ART or via adoption. It seems important to recall that, however, in the Evans 
and Dickson cases, Article 8 was held applicable. More specifically, in Evans, it was found that 
the matter at stake fell within the notion of private life, which, inter alia, encompasses the right to 
respect for both the decisions to become and not to become a parent.1400 In the case of Dickson, 
the Court found that the refusal of artificial insemination facilities affected the applicants’ private 
and family lives, which notions include the right to become genetic parents.1401 In light of the 
interpretation of Article 8 advanced in Evans and Dickson, it is not clear what distinguished the 
situation of Mr Fretté – apart from his sexual orientation – from those of the other applicants and 
determined the inapplicability of Article 8. At the same time, however, given that the case of Fretté 
was decided prior to the other two, the Court might have simply felt ready to widen the scope of 
Article 8 only at a later stage.   
 Similar doubts of inconsistency are casted by a comparison between the irrelevance of 
‘mere’ desires, as stated in Fretté, and the definition of ‘intended’ family life adopted in the domain 
of unmarried fatherhood.1402 However, these doubts can be easily dismissed in light of the fact 
that, in the cases where this notion of family life was used, the Court explicitly circumscribed its 
relevance to the “potential relationship which could develop between a child born out of wedlock 
and his natural father”.1403 Moreover, what is valued for the purposes of intended family life are 
the nature and length of the mother-father relationship and the father’s demonstrated interest and 
commitment to his already existing child, both before and after birth. 1404  Hence, although 
‘intended’, this widened definition of family life seems to depend on the existence of a child, if 
not on the existence of a child biologically related to the applicant and born in a stable relationship 
between the applicant and the child’s mother.1405 Hence, this notion of family life is not applicable 
to aspiring adopting parents, even if the situation of Mr Frettè can be, to a certain extent, considered 
similar to the situation of an unmarried father who has never lived or met his child.  
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 Another important distinguishing factor of the current judgment, compared to the previous 
decision in Salgueiro, concerns the application of the margin of appreciation. While it was not at 
all mentioned in the previous case, the doctrine constitutes the core of the reasoning in Fretté. This 
different approach appears to further substantiate the perception as to the specific facts identified 
by the Court as relevant in the case of Salgueiro: Mr Salgueiro’s complaint was framed as the 
refusal of parental responsibility to a biological and divorced father, rather than to a homosexual 
man living with another man. Moreover, the existence of a European consensus, also reflected by 
a well-established Strasbourg jurisprudence, as to the importance to ensure continuation of family 
life between a father and his child despite divorce might explain why the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation was not held applicable in the previous case, although invoked by the Government.  
 The use of the doctrine in this case is problematic in at least one and possibly two respects. 
Firstly, in the present judgment, the reliance on the doctrine constitutes a clear example of judicial 
deference. Indeed, the award of a wide margin of appreciation to the State served to impose 
restrictions on the power of judicial review of the Court. As such, rather than undertaking a 
proportionality analysis, as required by Article 14, the Court eventually abstained from 
substantively scrutinising the refusal of the national courts to authorise Mr Fretté to adopt. 
Therefore, although the non-articulation of the Court’s reasoning inevitably serves to obscure the 
true basis on which the Court decides whether a difference in treatment is justifiable and, 
accordingly, what features are required for a prospective father to obtain the authorisation to adopt, 
the doctrine did not operate as a mere “conclusory label”1406, but rather as a means of adjudication. 
 Secondly, although it avails itself of one of the magnifying effects of Article 14 by 
considering the case through the lens of discrimination even if Article 8 was held inapplicable, the 
Court eventually disregards the suspect nature of the discrimination (as established in Salgueiro) 
and awards a wide margin of appreciation to the State on the ground of a lack of common ground 
among the laws of the Contracting States. However, the establishment of consensus, apart from 
not relying on comparative data,1407 seems to be carried out in relation to the wrong issue, namely 
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with respect to the general question whether homosexuals should be allowed to adopt. Bearing in 
mind the variety of magnifying effects of Article 14 – as identified by Arnardóttir – one could 
have expected the Court to state that, whenever States decide to provide for an additional right 
beyond the requirements of the Convention (in this case, the right to adopt), they are required to 
do so in a non-discriminatory manner. Such approach would have certainly led to the finding of a 
violation, as single individuals were allowed to adopt under French law and the request of Mr 
Fretté had been rejected on the sole basis of his sexual orientation. However, it might have been 
simply too early for such use of Article 14 to be proposed, as subsequent jurisprudence shows.   
 Moving onto the second line of reasoning adopted by the Court, namely the need to protect 
the child’s best interests, two main observations can be advanced. Firstly, as argued by O’Flaherty 
and Fisher, by conceptualising the interests of the applicant and those of adoptable children as 
competing, the Court posed a false dilemma.1408 Indeed, the actual tension exists between the rights 
of homosexual and heterosexual prospective adoptive parents, bearing in mind the paramount 
importance of the best interests of the child.1409 Hence, the children’s best interests should not 
simply represent one of the elements to take into account to achieve the desired balance, as held 
by the Court. Rather, as enshrined by Article 21 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
States are required to ensure that the child’s best interests are the paramount consideration in 
decisions concerning the placement of children for adoption.  
 In practice, however, it is argued that “the tendency has been to appropriate this principle 
as a tool to serve the political and the moral agendas of adults”.1410 Arguably, a misappropriation 
of this principle can be detected also in the present case. Indeed, its application has translated into 
a subjective assessment – namely, in accordance with “the value system of the decision-maker”.1411 
                                                        
natural that the national authorities, whose duty it is in a democratic society also to consider, within the limits of their 
jurisdiction, the interests of society as a whole, should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when they are asked to 
make rulings on such matters.” (para 41). The Court fails to back up its own references to “most of the Contracting 
States” and, therefore, its conclusions, as to the lack of a common approach with accurate comparative research, 
indicate an alleged disparity of legal approaches. Moreover, the reference to “social orders” casts doubts as to the 
domain within which the existence of consensus is sought and assessed – i.e., whether legal responses or social 
responses matter. According relevance to societal attitudes in order to establish the existence of a common ground 
entails the risk of letting social prejudice and stereotypical notions define the human rights of individuals.   
1408 Fretté, para 42.  
1409 M. O’Flaherty and J. Fisher, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: 
Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles’ 2008 8(2) Human Rights Law Review 219. 
1410 Ibid. 





The French authorities and, more problematically, the Court seem to endorse or, at least, to accept 
the presumption that a certain category of individuals, namely single homosexual men, should be 
disfavoured a priori because they do not serve the best interests of the child. The stereotype at 
issue is, therefore, of a compounded nature. The traits of Mr Fretté as a single homosexual man 
were compounded in a way that denied him permission to adopt. On the other hand, an objective 
application of the principle of the best interests – like that proposed by the partly dissenting Judges 
Bratza, Fuhrmann and Tulkens – would have justified the refusal of authorisation on the basis of 
his sexual orientation only “if it had been combined with conduct that was detrimental to a child’s 
upbringing”.1412 
 Under the belief that children need parents, eligibility for adoption within national statutes 
has become increasingly focused on parental behaviour, rather than on characteristics of the 
prospective parent.1413 This shift, however, does not appear to have taken place either in France or 
within the Court’s jurisprudence, at least, at the material time. Indeed, despite the national courts’ 
emphasis on several occasions, any decisiveness of Mr Fretté’s “personal qualities and aptitude 
for bringing up children” 1414  was dismissed to the advantage of his sexual orientation and 
associated lifestyle. As pointed out by the partly dissenting judges, if Fretté had been a 
heterosexual or if he had concealed his homosexuality, he would have certainly been granted 
authorisation because his personal qualities were acknowledged throughout the proceedings.1415  
 Evidently, Mr Fretté’s qualities and conduct were not at the core of the analysis. Rather, 
what was questioned and eventually rejected was the general idea of a homosexual man raising a 
child, to whom he has no biological or legal connection.1416 As a result, the Court did not only fail 
to adopt an anti-stereotyping perspective; rather, it contributed to perpetuating gender stereotypes. 
In so doing, it confirmed the indispensability of heterosexuality to make someone a father worthy 
of legal recognition. This appears even truer, if regard is given to the jurisprudence that followed.  
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2.3 E.B. v France:1417 Gender Stereotyping and a Reinterpreted Ambit of Article 14   
E.B. was in a stable relationship with a woman, Ms R., who did not feel committed by the former’s 
application to adopt. The national authorities’ refusal to authorise E.B. to adopt was grounded on 
the lack of a paternal referent and the ambivalence of the commitment of each member of the 
household.1418 Also in the case of E.B., the Court came to the inescapable conclusion that “her 
sexual orientation was consistently at the centre of deliberations in her regard and omnipresent at 
every stage of the administrative and judicial proceedings”,1419  and, therefore, that E.B. had 
suffered a difference in treatment. However, different from the outcome in Fretté, the justifications 
put forward by the Government were deemed unconvincing and a violation of Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8 was found.  
 As to the applicability of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, the Court reiterated 
that Article 8 does not include either the right to adopt or the right to found a family. In order to 
explain why the issue at stake did not fall within the notion of family life, the Court restated that 
the right to respect for family life requires the existence of a family and – in line with the 
interpretation provided in relation to the judgment in Fretté – confirmed the relevance of the 
mother-father relationship and/or of the biological link between the father and the child to 
determine whether a parent-child relationship might exceptionally fall within the notion of 
‘intended family life’. Indeed, it was held that the right to respect for family life presupposes – at 
the very least – “the potential relationship between, for instance, a child born out of wedlock and 
his or her natural father, or the relationship that arises from a genuine marriage, even of the family 
life has not yet fully established”.1420 Although the relationship in question could not qualify as 
‘family life’, the Court concluded that it would still fall within the broad concept of ‘private life’, 
which incorporates, inter alia, the right to establish and develop ties with other human beings and 
the right to respect decisions to become or not become a parent.1421  
 Although national administrative authorities did not expressly rely on E.B.’s ‘choice of 
lifestyle’ to justify their refusal, the Court acknowledged that the first ground of dismissal relied 
on by the Government was clearly a pretext for rejecting the application on the basis of her sexual 
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orientation.1422 As emphasised by the Court, the lack of a paternal or maternal figure in the 
household represented a direct consequence of single-parent adoption, which is expressly allowed 
by French law. Consequently, to require a prospective single-parent to establish the presence of a 
referent of the other sex amounted to render void the right of single persons to apply for 
authorisation.1423 In the Court’s opinion, the reliance on that specific ground might have therefore 
led to an arbitrary refusal.     
 In relation to the second ground of dismissal, the Court considered that the lack of 
commitment of Ms E.B.’s cohabitating partner had nothing to do with the applicant’s sexual 
orientation, but simply reflected the de facto situation and its implications for the adoption of a 
child.1424 Therefore, it concluded that the applicant had not been discriminated against on the basis 
of her sexual orientation in this regard. However, the Court was of the opinion that the two grounds 
ought to be treated concurrently, rather than separately, since they belonged to the overall 
assessment of the applicant’s situation.1425 As a result, the illegitimacy of the first ground was 
found to affect the entire decision.1426   
 Having established a difference in treatment, the Court skipped the comparability test and 
embarked directly on a proportionality analysis. To prepare the terrain, it argued that, whenever 
sexual orientation is in question, there is a need for particularly convincing and weighty reasons 
to justify a difference in treatment that affect Article 8 rights. 1427  It further stated that the 
Convention is a living instrument and, therefore, it has to be interpreted in light of present-day 
conditions.1428 In light of the above and given that French law allows for single-parent adoption, 
the Court concluded that the reasons advanced by the Government could not be considered as 
sufficiently convincing and weighty to justify the refusal to grant authorisation to adopt to Ms 
E.B.1429 Before finding a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, the Court 
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lifestyle: married and cohabitating with a female partner, we have not been able to assess her ability to provide a child 
with a family image revolving around a parental couple such as to afford safeguards for that child’s stable and well-
adjusted development”. 
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1426 Ibid.  
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stressed that, as emerging from the judgment of the Conseil d’Etat, the applicant possessed 
“undoubted qualities and an aptitude for bringing up children”, which were certainly compatible 
with the child’s best interests.1430  
 Despite the ‘good’ outcome, it might appear problematic to consider the judgment in E.B. 
v France as a milestone in the process of ensuring equal family rights to homosexuals due to a 
poorly justified departure from precedent. No explanation is offered to justify the shift from a wide 
margin of appreciation to the weighty reasons test. Given the precedent in Fretté, one would expect 
the Court to explain why the rule of consensus was no longer relevant or whether consensus had 
emerged.1431 The application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation was never considered; 
rather, at least according to Johnson, given the absence of any reference to present-day conditions 
that triggered a dynamic interpretation, the living instrument doctrine was used to endorse judicial 
activism and, more precisely, to “concretely interpret the Convention to challenge a 
heteronormative consensus”.1432      
 Apart from failing to explain the alleged changed conditions, vis-à-vis the same evidence, 
the Court decided to attach weight to the applicant’s parental abilities and their compatibility with 
the child’s best interests in the case of E.B., but not in the case of Fretté. Indeed, it must be recalled 
that the Conseil d’Etat had explicitly recognised the applicant’s “undoubted qualities and aptitude 
for bringing up children”, although eventually concluding that he did not provide the necessary 
safeguards for adopting a child.1433 Hence, while the qualities and aptitude for raising a child were 
considered sufficient to authorise a lesbian woman to adopt, they proved insufficient to trigger the 
same positive outcome for a gay man. One possible interpretation of such difference seems to 
confirm the Court’s strong attachment to a conventional ideology of fatherhood. The Court seems 
of the opinion that nurturing abilities and intentions do not suffice to make someone a father; 
instead, in order to be valued, they need to be complemented with traditional features, such as 
biology, marriage and heterosexuality.   
 Moreover, it seems that, in the case of E.B., the Court decided to pick and chose the factual 
circumstances relevant to the determination of the child’s best interests. As pointed out by the 
dissenting Judge Costa joined by Judges Turmen, Ugrekhelidze and Jociene, the fact that E.B.’s 
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cohabiting partner did not support the adoption plan was unlikely to meet the guarantees required 
by the French law to ensure the child’s best interests.1434 As argued by Bainham, “there is a strong 
case for saying that someone whose long-term partner is unwilling to join in should not be allowed 
to proceed”1435 – in primis, the potential for conflict between the applicant and her partner and the 
child’s potential exposure to such conflict.1436  
 It must be noted that the Grand Chamber attempted to prepare the ground for a departure 
from precedent by identifying three differences between the case of Fretté and that of E.B. Firstly, 
it noted that the national administrative authorities had not openly referred to E.B.’s ‘choice of 
lifestyle’; secondly, they had even acknowledged the applicant’s child-raising and emotional 
capacities; finally, although E.B. had applied for adoption as an individual, the presence of her 
partner was an element that had not featured in the previous case.1437 However, none of these 
factors appear distinguishable or decisive enough to justify a jurisprudential shift. Concerning the 
first one, the Court itself recognised, despite not making an explicit reference to it, that E.B.’s 
sexual orientation had informed all stages of the domestic proceedings and determined the ultimate 
refusal. In relation to the second element, positive considerations regarding the applicant’s 
personal qualities and aptitude for raising a child were also included in the case-file of Mr Fretté 
and, more importantly, their acknowledgement did not prevent a refusal in either case. 1438 
Therefore, the potential presence of a co-parent – who did not wish to become involved – 
represents the sole real ‘distinguishing’ feature. However, the Court deemed the above 
circumstance irrelevant for the purpose of establishing discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation and, accordingly, for the resolution of the case. 
 Given the absence of distinguishing factual elements and the failed reference to the rule of 
consensus, it remains to be ascertained what instigated the jurisprudential turn in the case of E.B. 
Two possible, and not mutually exclusive, explanations can be advanced. Firstly, one could argue 
that sex role stereotypes might have played a role in determining the outcome in E.B. v France. 
More specifically, the application brought by Ms E.B. might have attained greater success by virtue 
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1436 The dissenting Judge Mularoni was of a similar opinion: “where a single person seeking to adopt is in a stable 
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of the gender of the applicant and the associated stereotypical notion that women have stronger 
nurturing and parenting abilities than men. If this turns out to be true, the Court’s jurisprudence on 
adoption by single homosexuals might be accused of being tainted by sympathy towards lesbians 
and, more specifically, of replicating a traditional division of labour along gendered lines within 
the context of homosexual relationships, with the inevitable consequence of excluding gay men 
from the realm of childcare.   
 At the same time, however, the Court’s departure from precedent might also be read as 
signalling the Court’s starting to employ Article 14 as a magnifying lens, within the domain of 
homo-parenthood, to cover not only the rights enshrined in the Convention, but also those 
additional rights provided by States.1439  Different from the case in Fretté v France, the present 
judgment does not seem concerned with the general question whether homosexuals should be 
given access to adoption, but rather with the more specific issue of discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation. This might explain why the Court did not consider the existence or non-
existence of consensus and stated the need for weighty reasons to justify the contested difference 
in treatment. Although within the first stage of analysis (applicability of Article 14, taken in 
conjunction with Article 8), the Court explicitly stated that “the State which goes beyond its 
obligations under Article 8 in creating such a right (…) cannot, in the application of that right, take 
discriminatory measures”. 1440  Hence, overruling the decision in Fretté seems to be, 
simultaneously, informed by stereotypical notions around parenting and the outcome of the use of 
Article 14 as a magnifying lens.  
2.4 Second-Parent Adoption Cases: the Special Status of Marriage and the (Limited) Magnifying 
Effect of Article 14 
The institution of second-parent adoption aims to establish a legal connection between the 
biological child of one partner/first parent and the other partner/second parent without the first 
parent being deprived of any parental rights. As such, different from single-parent adoption, it 
serves to place a legal stamp on already existing social ties. The Court has thus far expressed its 
views on the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of second-parent adoption in two 
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cases: Gas and Dubois v France,1441 and X and Others v Austria.1442 Although lesbian couples 
brought these complaints, the judgments are relevant to the current analysis, as indicative of the 
Court’s persisting attachment to marriage as a preferred locus for parenthood. The current position 
of the Court can be summarised as follows: States can legitimately maintain access to second-
parent adoption as a privilege for married couples; but, in case they provide this possibility to 
unmarried couples, they cannot do so in a discriminatory manner to the disadvantage of unmarried 
same-sex couples.  
 In the case of Gas and Dubois, the applicants were two lesbian women, which had 
cohabitated since 1989. In 2000, Ms Dubois gave birth to a daughter (A.) conceived by means of 
anonymous sperm donation. The child lived with them since birth. After entering into a civil 
partnership agreement, the non-biological mother applied for a simple adoption order in respect of 
her partner’s daughter. The Court of Appeal, in line with the lower court’s views, held that, despite 
Ms Gas’ demonstrated active involvement in ensuring the child’s emotional and material 
wellbeing, the legal implications of the sought adoption order would not be in the child’s best 
interests. Indeed, such adoption would have resulted in transferring parental responsibility to the 
adoptive parent, thus depriving Ms Dubois of her own rights in relation to the child.1443 
 Since a transferral of parental responsibility did not occur where the adoptive parent was 
married to the adoptee’s biological parent, the applicants claimed that they had been subject to 
discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation due to the legal prohibition of same-sex 
marriage in France, at the material time. The discriminatory difference in treatment was 
complained with respect to both married couples and heterosexual couples, who cohabitated or 
had entered a civil partnership, since the latter could bypass the contested legal requirement by 
marrying.1444 To substantiate their claims, the couple drew a comparison between the situation of 
A. and that of another child, who was conceived via anonymous sperm donation by a woman living 
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together with a man.1445 In the second scenario, the man cohabitating with the mother would have 
automatically become the child’s legal father, without the need to apply for simple adoption.1446      
 As to the applicability of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, the Court did no 
more than state that the examination of the applicants’ specific situation entailed the conclusion 
that ‘family life’ existed between them. This issue was considered in more depth in the 
admissibility decision, where the Court concluded that the ties between the couple and A. 
amounted to family life on the ground that the couple had cohabitated since 1989, they had entered 
a civil registered partnership and they were jointly involved in the child’s upbringing.1447 Thus, in 
line with the jurisprudence on unmarried parents, the Court seems to derive the existence of de 
facto family ties from the length and nature of the relationship between the applicants and their 
joint provision of care to A.   
 When considering the applicants’ legal situation compared with that of married couples, it 
reiterated a lack of obligations on Contracting States to grant same-sex couples access to marriage, 
as established in the judgment of Schalk and Kopf v Austria. More importantly, it added that Ms 
Gas and Ms Dubois and a married couple were not similarly situated because marriage conferred 
a “special status”, which, in turn, entailed ‘special’ social, personal and legal consequences.1448 
Hence, for the purposes of second-parent adoption, the Court held that the situation of the 
applicants was not comparable to that of a married couple. In summary, the Court accepted the 
Government’s submission according to which, because marriage remained the institution that 
ensured the highest degree of stability, restrictions on simple adoption pursued a legitimate aim, 
namely the provision of a stable framework for children’s care and upbringing.1449 In other words, 
the Court accepts that stereotypical notions about marriage as a legitimate justification for 
discrimination.   
 In relation to the second part of the applicants’ claim, the Court merely observed that a 
simple adoption order would have been also refused to an unmarried heterosexual couple and, 
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therefore, no difference in treatment could be found. More alarmingly, Ms Gas and Ms Dubois’ 
complaint of indirect discrimination was dismissed outright, by simply referring to its previous 
findings concerning marriage (paragraphs 66-68).1450 Accordingly, no violation of Article 14, taken 
in conjunction with Article 8, was established.    
 This judgment appears to backtrack and reinstate the protection of the marital family, in 
light of its allegedly unique positive implications for children, as a justification for excluding same-
sex couples from second-parent adoption. As a consequence, it suggests that, it is acceptable for 
national legislations to subject the recognition of someone/social parent as a child’s legal parent 
on the existence of a marital connection with the child’s biological parent and the aspiring second 
parent. Similar to the judgment in Fretté, although with respect to a lesbian couple in a civil 
partnership, the Court restates the insufficiency of nurture (and not only nurturing intentions) to 
make someone a legal parent. In other words, the provision of care since the child’s birth is deemed 
to deserve weight only if it occurs within a married family. Hence, the Court reinforces the marital 
conception of parenthood. 
 Paradoxically, reserving the legal possibility of adopting one’s partner’s child to married 
families is portrayed as a child-friendly measure. The reasoning underlying this approach can be 
summarised as follows: unmarried couples’ access to children – through adoption, artificial 
reproductive technologies, award of parental responsibility, etc. – ought to be restrained as much 
as possible because, different from marriage, civil partnerships accord “greater leeway with regard 
to entering into them and terminating them”. 1451  Otherwise stated, de facto relationships are 
deemed more prone to crisis and sudden breakdown and children are the most vulnerable victims 
in such events. At the other end of spectrum, however, high divorce rates seriously challenge the 
foundation of the suggested narrative.   
 Actually, what seems to run contrary to the child’s best interests is the exclusion - rather 
than the claimed inclusion - of same-sex partners from second-parent adoption and, more 
generally, the maintenance of differences between civil partnership and marriage laws (perfectly 
acceptable, according to the judgment in Schalk and Kopf v Austria).1452 As pointed out by a study 
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of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the consequences of non-recognition 
of parent-child emotional and social ties are of daily importance.1453 Social parents are prevented 
from making decisions concerning fundamental aspects of their child’s life, for instance in 
questions about their education and health care. Moreover, they are ineligible for State benefits 
and fiscal privileges, which are specifically designed to support families. Further uncertainties 
arise in the case of parental separation: the child does not benefit from the safeguards ensured by 
divorce laws and, consequently, the position of each parent in relation to custody, contact and 
alimony remains totally undefined. Similarly, should the child’s biological mother die, the co-
parent would not automatically be entrusted with the child’s custody; on the contrary, the child 
would become an orphan and, most probably, be placed in the care of a guardian or a foster family.  
 In the present case, however, even if the child had a legal tie with her biological mother 
only, this was not deemed by the majority to prevent the applicants from conducting a normal 
family life.1454 Having regard to the positive obligations stated in the case of Marckx, it is difficult 
to explain why France was not considered to have a positive duty to legally recognise an existing 
family tie, in the case of Gas and Dubois. In line with the observation made with respect to the 
judgments in X, Y and Z v UK, the non-application of the positive obligation to the present case 
seems to constitute a further example of the Court’s tendency to water down positive obligations 
when the family life at stake has unconventional features.1455 More precisely, the sexual orientation 
of the couple might have been interpreted as justifying a departure from its previous jurisprudence 
and, therefore, a differential treatment with respect to the positive obligation to grant legal 
recognition to de facto family ties. As a result, just like X, Y and Z, the applicants’ relationships 
are recognised as ‘family life’ under Article 8, but, paradoxically, are denied legal recognition and 
protection.     
 Another possible explanation for the controversial final outcome of the case is pointed out 
by Judge Villiger in his dissenting opinion: “the judgment focuses on the adults, but not on the 
children who are nevertheless an integral part of the applicants’ complaint”.1456 Indeed, as argued 
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by the dissenting judge as well as by Judges Spielmann and Berro-Lefèvre in their concurring 
opinion, it is undisputed that depriving a child from the possibility of joint parental custody and, 
thus, leaving him/her in a precarious legal status runs counter the child’s interests.1457 Judge 
Villiger went even further to argue that, as a result of the contested legislation, children of same-
sex couples suffered different treatment, contrary to Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 
8, if compared to children of heterosexual couples. Indeed, while the latter could benefit from joint 
parental responsibility, if the parents marry, children of same-sex couples are a priori excluded 
from this possibility.  
 As argued by the dissenting judge, the crucial problem was the blanket prohibition of joint 
parental custody over children of the parent of a same-sex couple. As recalled by Judge Villinger, 
this was not the first instance where the Court was called to decide upon the compatibility of a 
blanket provision with the Convention. In the cases of Zaunegger and Schneider, the Court was 
confronted by blanket legislation, which prohibited contact or joint custody against the mother’s 
will to all unmarried fathers.1458 However, different from the present case, in those judgments, the 
Court held that the legislation did not meet the proportionality test and concluded that, in the name 
of the child’s best interests, national authorities should have decided on a case-by-case basis, 
having regard to the specific circumstances of each case. Differently, in the case of Gas and 
Dubois, the Court was of the opinion that the difference in treatment was justified by the special 
status that marriage holds in society. As such, it seems that the Court feels ready to contest 
stereotypical notions around unmarried families, but only within the context of heterosexuality.  
 The fact that the Court blindly accepted that reserving a special status to marriage (in the 
wake of the decision in Schalk and Kopf v Austria) did not amount to discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation confirms its adherence to a heteronormative paradigm.1459 The same stance 
was adopted in the latest judgment delivered by the Court in homo-parenthood, namely in the case 
of X and Others v Austria. The factual circumstances are similar to those in Gas and Dubois, with 
two differences: under Austrian law, second-parent adoption was allowed not only to married, but 
also to unmarried heterosexual couples; the applicants were two lesbians in a stable, but not 
formalised, relationship and the biological son of one of them. The latter was born out of wedlock 
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from a heterosexual relationship and had lived with his mother and her partner since he was five 
years old.1460  
 When considering whether the difference in treatment of the applicants (a same-sex couple) 
vis-à-vis unmarried heterosexual couples in which one partner wished to adopt the other partner’s 
child was justified, the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 
8.1461 In particular, the Court began by noting that had the adult applicants been a man and a 
woman, national authorities would not have been able to refuse their request as a matter of 
principle, rather they would have been required to investigate whether the requested adoption was 
in the child’s best interests.1462 In light of this, the Court concluded that there was a difference in 
treatment and the latter was inevitably based on the couple’s sexual orientation.1463  
 When assessing whether the differential treatment was justified, the Court found it 
important to stress that it was not called to rule on the general issue of same-sex couples’ access 
to second-parent adoption, but rather on the narrower question of alleged discrimination between 
unmarried heterosexual couples and same-sex couples with respect to second-parent adoption.1464 
It went on to reiterate a series of general principles developed in its previous case-law. Firstly, it 
was observed that the Convention is a living instrument and, therefore, States are required to take 
into consideration recent developments in society – for instance, the multiple ways of leading one’s 
family life – when designing measures to protect the family in its traditional sense.1465 Moreover, 
it was noted that, when a suspect ground like sexual orientation is at stake, States enjoy a narrow 
margin of appreciation.1466 Further, it argued that, different from individual adoption – where there 
has been no previous contact between the adopter and the child – in cases of second-parent 
adoption – like the present one – the adopter already enjoys family ties with the child; and, in line 
with its previous jurisprudence, the Court cannot but recall the importance of providing legal 
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recognition to a de facto family relationship.1467    
 Therefore, the dissenting opinion of Judge Villinger in the case of Gas and Dubois seems 
to have become majoritarian in the case of X and Others v Austria. Indeed, the Court made express 
reference to its previous judgments, including Zaunegger v Germany, where the Court found a 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 because the father of a child born out of 
wedlock was denied an examination by national courts on whether the award of joint custody to 
both parents served the child’s best interests.1468 In other words, the Court states that the national 
court’s refusal to grant second-parent adoption violated Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 because the applicants’ request had not been assessed individually, as second-parent 
adoption for same-sex couples is a priori excluded by law. The underlying reasoning seems to rest 
on a doctrinal evolution pertaining to Article 14, like in the case of E.B. Although there is no 
obligation under Article 8 to extend the right to second-parent adoption to unmarried couples, once 
this additional right is provided, the State cannot ensure its recognition and protection in a 
discriminatory manner. Moreover, in calling for an investigation of the compatibility of the sought 
second-parent adoption with the child’s best interests in light of the specific circumstances of the 
case, the Court implicitly endorses an anti-stereotyping approach.      
However, this positive outcome bears the burden of a continuing preference for marriage. 
In fact, when analysing the situation of the applicants vis-à-vis that of a married family in which 
one spouse wished to adopt the other’s child, the Court found it appropriate to recall the 
considerations made in the case of Gas and Dubois, thus confirming marriage as the privileged 
source of parental status. Hence, also in the case of X and Others v Austria, the Court concluded 
that the first and third applicants were not in a relevantly similar situation to a married couple and, 
therefore, no violation could be found. Based on this judgment, the Court has not yet proved 
prepared to take advantage of the doctrinal development concerning Article 14, when same-sex 
couples are discriminated against if compared to married couples. This has two major implications. 
Firstly, the magnifying effect of Article 14 has not yet led to the adoption of an anti-stereotyping 
approach with respect to the institution of marriage. An individual assessment of the case is held 
unnecessary, when a comparison is with a heterosexual married couple; and, as a result, same-sex 
couples’ widespread exclusion from marriage remains an obstacle to equal parental rights. 
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Secondly, with respect to marriage, the application of Article 14 has not yet proved able to override 
the lack of a European consensus, which – although not explicitly relied on – seems to remain the 
factor determining the final outcome of the case.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks: Continuity and Article 14 as the Only Spark for Change  
Bearing in mind the limited sample of cases at our disposal, it can be concluded that the Court has 
failed to challenge the conventional ideology of fatherhood in two-and-a-half respects. Firstly, 
based on the comparison between the judgment in Fretté v France and E.B. v France, it seems 
possible to detect the Court’s potential endorsement of the man-breadwinner/woman-homemaker 
stereotype and the latter’s role in providing different outcomes, despite common factual grounds. 
As noted above, the two judgments show a different weight attached to nurturing intentions and 
abilities, depending on whether the applicant is a man or a woman: while the applicant’s personal 
qualities and aptitude for raising children is deemed relevant to justify the finding of a violation, 
when the aspiring adopter is a lesbian woman, the same evidence was completely disregarded with 
respect to a single homosexual man.  
 The poorly justified reversal of the judgment in Fretté by the case of E.B. might therefore 
be interpreted as revealing the Court’s adherence to general assumptions which regard women as 
better equipped to take care of children and reduce men’s role to economic provision. As such, the 
Court seems to implicitly state that, when prospective fathers are in question, their demonstrated 
aptitude for raising a child needs to be supplemented with other, conventional features. In fact, Mr 
Fretté’s caregiving and emotional abilities were undisputed; nonetheless, he was found to have 
“difficulties in envisaging the practical consequences of the upheaval occasioned by the arrival of 
a child”,1469 possibly because of the sole fact that he was a single man. Against this, the presence 
of an uncommitted partner within the prospective family of an adopted child was not considered 
an obstacle to ensure the best interests of that child under the assumption that the necessary care 
would be provided by Ms E.B.  
 Secondly, the judgments in Salgueiro, E.B. and X and Others (concerning the applicants’ 
comparison with unmarried heterosexual couples) can be read as contesting the relevance of 
heterosexuality as a determining factor in the allocation of custody rights or of the status of legal 
                                                        




parent on the applicant. Indeed, in all these cases, the Court found a violation because the 
Government failed to provide sufficiently weighty reasons to justify differential treatment on 
grounds of sexual orientation. In other words, the Court is of the opinion that homosexuality per 
se does not amount to sufficient justification for differential treatment. At the same time, however, 
heterosexuality is kept alive as a relevant feature through the Court’s attachment to a 
heteronormative definition of marriage. Indeed, a more attentive analysis of the judgment in 
Salgueiro (especially in light of the subsequent judgment in Fretté) and the judgments in Gas and 
Dubois and X and Others (concerning the applicants’ comparison with heterosexual married 
couples) reveal that the conferral of parental status as well as of parental rights on homosexuals 
remains very much dependent on the existence of a present or past marriage.  
 Marriage – and, possibly, also biology – appeared to be the keystone factor for finding a 
violation in the case of Salgueiro. The persistence of marriage as a privileged legal condition for 
(more, generally) homo-parenthood emerges more clearly from the cases concerning second-
parent adoption. In both cases, the Court concluded that a lesbian couple, in which one partner 
wished to adopt the other partner’s child without severing the mother’s legal ties with the child, 
was not in a relevantly similar situation to a married couple who could avail of second-parent 
adoption. Indeed, it was held that “marriage confers a special status on those who enter into it” and 
“gives rise to social, personal and legal consequences”.1470 Hence, no violation of Article 14 taken 
in conjunction with Article 8 was found.  
 The judgments in Salgueiro, Gas and Dubois and X and Others (concerning the applicants’ 
comparison with heterosexual married couples), therefore, indicates that the apparent departure 
from heterosexuality as a relevant feature is only partial, as it depends on the employment of 
Article 14 as a magnifying lens and, more importantly, is de facto limited by the maintenance of 
special regimes for married couples. Within the context of homosexuality, the special status of 
marriage obstructs the application of Article 14 in its reinterpreted scope. In other words, Article 
14 is not yet magnificent enough to overcome a heteronormative conception of marriage. 
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 This tolerance towards differential treatment grounded on marital status seems to reveal 
the invisible operation of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and, more specifically, the 
Court’s fear to find itself out of step with national practices, in particular with national legislation 
that maintains a heteronormative definition of marriage. In the judgment of Gas and Dubois, the 
impact of the doctrine on the final outcome was expressly recognised by Judges Costa and 
Spielmann in their concurring opinions. As a closing remark, they observed that national 
legislators are better placed than a supranational court to reconsider and bring about change in 
institutions relating to the concept of marriage, the family and parent-child relationships. Since the 
stance adopted in Gas and Dubois was repeated in the judgment of X and Others (concerning the 
applicants’ comparison with with heterosexual unmarried couples), it can be assumed that the same 
considerations applied. Having regard to the judgments in Gas and Dubois and X and Others 
(concerning the applicants’ comparison with heterosexual married couples), therefore, it seems 
possible to draw a link between the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and, more specifically, 
the implicit award of a wide margin to States, and the tenability of marriage as a conventional 
feature of parenthood.  
 Although it was not explicitly relied on in the rest of the case-law (with the exception of 
Fretté1471), the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has possibly remained constantly present in 
the back of the Court’s mind, even when a violation was found. Different from the perspective of 
analysis adopted in the case of Fretté, in the cases of E.B. v France and X and Others v Austria 
(concerning the applicants’ comparison with heterosexual unmarried couples), the issue addressed 
by the Court was not whether single homosexuals or same-sex couples should be given access to 
adoption, but rather whether the difference in treatment between homosexual single 
individuals/couples and their heterosexual counterparts was justified under the Convention. The 
reason why the Court found the refusal to authorise adoption to a single lesbian woman and to the 
stable partner of the child’s mother in breach of the Convention is, to a great extent, attributable to 
the magnifying effect of Article 14.  
 Indeed, as expressly stated in the judgment of E.B., the prohibition of discrimination under 
Article 14 extends beyond the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention 
and it applies also to those additional rights, falling within the general scope of any Article in the 
                                                        




Convention, which the State has voluntarily decided to guarantee.1472 Therefore, the finding of a 
violation should not be read as stating the State’s duty to recognise the right to adopt as an integral 
part of Article 8. Rather, although the existence or non-existence of a common ground among the 
laws of the Contracting States is not explicitly considered, national choices in the domain of homo-
parenthood continue to be respected, provided that they do not give rise to discriminatory treatment 
within the meaning of Article 14.  
  Finally, it seems important to observe that, in the above jurisprudence, the child’s interests 
have been largely ignored or, at best, given a ‘subjective’ interpretation and, therefore, “invoked 
as a self-serving principle”1473 by the Court to gain legitimacy for its decisions. The judgment in 
Salgueiro, despite its positive outcome, fails to consider the implications of the refusal to grant 
custody to the applicant on the interests of the child. Given his status of single homosexual man, 
Mr Fretté’s personal qualities and aptitude for childrearing were left out of the equation when 
determining the best interests of the child. In the case of E.B., the Court decided to pick and chose 
the elements in assessing whether authorising the applicant to single-parent adoption was in the 
best interests of the child. While her personal qualities and aptitude for childrearing were held 
relevant and taken into account, the attitude of Ms E.B.’s partner was attached no weight. In the 
case of Gas and Dubois v France, the child’s best interests were not considered at all. In fact, the 
finding of no violation reveals a total lack of consideration for the on-going cohabitation of the 
couple and child and, more importantly, for the existence of personal ties among them.   
 Differently, in the most recent case of X and Others v Austria, one of the grounds whereby 
a violation was found was that the Austrian Government had failed to provide evidence to show 
that it would be detrimental to the child to be raised by a same-sex couple or to have two mothers 
and two fathers for legal purposes. However, given the privileged status of marriage, the Court 
raised the need for an assessment of the best interests of the child, only when comparing the 
applicants’ situation with unmarried heterosexual couples in which one partner wished to adopt 
the other partner’s child. This amounts to a presumption in favour of the best interests of the child 
in cases of requests for second-parent adoption submitted by married couples. In other words, 
second-parent adoption by a spouse is a priori assumed to be in the child’s best interests, with no 
need for prior assessment. As argued by Wald, also within the Court’s jurisprudence, “(…) the 
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The present concluding chapter takes us back to the core research questions, outlined in Chapter 
1, and attempt to summarise how the Court has positioned itself, identifying trends and potential 
inconsistencies. 
 
1. What features of conventional fatherhood are affirmed, revised or abandoned? 
Overall, rather than departing from a conventional understanding of fatherhood, the Court tends to 
simply add a new layer to it: the father’s interest and commitment to the child, which resonates 
with either the provision of care or the expression of nurturing intentions. Therefore, it would seem 
that, at least within the first three case-law domains (ART, unmarried fatherhood, and family-work 
reconciliation), the Court gets close to the ideology of ‘new fatherhood’, as it combines 
conventional features and roles of fatherhood with an increased importance attached to the ‘new’ 
element of care. Leaving aside the exception of Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy (where the 
biological link was held irrelevant) the jurisprudence pertaining to ART confirms the persistence 
of biology, marriage and heteronormativity as relevant factors to determine whether the right to 
respect for private or family life of the applicants was breached or not. At the same time, however, 
the Court begins to – more or less explicitly – direct some attention to whether close personal ties 
existed (X, Y and Z v UK, Mennesson v France and Labassee v France, Paradiso and Campanelli) 
or could potentially develop (Evans v UK, Dickson v UK) between the father and his (prospective) 
child.  
In the context of unmarried fatherhood, different from the trends identified at the national 
level, biology has not substituted marriage as a connector between fathers and their children. 
Rather, the Court has adopted a ‘genetics plus scrutiny’ approach (with the exception of Schneider, 
where the child’s paternity was uncertain), according to which biology remains a relevant factor, 
but the allocation of contact and residence rights is further contingent on the assessment of the 
concreteness of the father’s ties with his child and his parental suitability. To verify whether this 
additional condition is met, the Court places emphasis on the nature and the length of the 
interparental relationship, coupled with the father’s caring intentions and, whenever available, his 
actual involvement in the child’s life. Hence, biology shares the stage with a revisited form of 




Similarly, in the family-work reconciliation domain, the definition of fatherhood endorsed by the 
Court does not abandon the father’s traditional role as provider, but rather combines it with caring 
responsibilities through the take-up of parental leave.  
Thus, in the abovementioned three domains, the definition of fatherhood endorsed by the 
Court is made of both change and continuity. This mix of conventional and new does not seem to 
characterise the construction of fatherhood and, more generally, of parenthood that emerges from 
the jurisprudence pertaining to homo-parenthood. Indeed, with respect to homosexual applicants, 
the ‘new’ element of (potential) nurture is valued only to a limited extent. More precisely, the 
(potential) provision of nurture is considered relevant to find a violation only when the 
heterosexual counterparts of the applicant are entitled to the sought measure (as a result of the 
employment of Article 14 as a magnifying lens). In the case of E.B. v France, the applicant’s 
personal qualities and aptitude for bringing up a child were attached weight, only because French 
law allowed single-parent adoption. Similarly, in the case of X and Others v Austria, the existence 
of de facto family ties between the applicants was deemed relevant only inasmuch as Austrian law 
enabled unmarried heterosexual couples to access second-parent adoption. 
The conditional nature of the importance placed on nurture, in turn, reveals only a partial 
departure from the norm of heterosexuality. Indeed, whenever the applicants’ counterparts are a 
married couple, the special status of marriage rules out placing any weight on existing de facto 
family ties. Hence, the overcoming of heterosexuality has occurred only outside the domain of 
marriage. And, when marriage is at stake, the Court’s attachment to heterosexuality is kept alive 
by holding the special status of marriage as a valid reason for justifying a difference in treatment 
against homosexuals. Therefore, the definition of fatherhood endorsed by the Court within the 
case-law pertaining to homo-parenthood is either conventional or not. When the Court reaffirms a 
heteronormative vision of fatherhood/parenthood (Fretté v France, Gas and Dubois v France and 
X and Others, concerning the applicants’ comparison with heterosexual married couples), it – more 
or less explicitly – holds heterosexuality and marriage as relevant factors and leaves no space for 
the new element of nurture. On the contrary, when homosexuality is not viewed as lacking 
suitability for fatherhood/parenthood (Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal, E.B. and X and 
Others, concerning the applicants’ comparison with heterosexual unmarried couples), nurture is 




The non-concomitance of change and continuity within this case-law domain is due to the 
particularly problematic coexistence of homosexuality and the conventional ideology of 
fatherhood. Indeed, as previously noted, homosexuality undermines the conventional ideology of 
fatherhood almost in its entirety: it implies biological unrelatedness; most likely, also the absence 
of a marital relationship between the parents and, for certain, a departure from a gendered division 
of labour. The other sociological transformations do not necessarily generate the same gap between 
the evolving social reality and the conventional ideology of fatherhood. Fatherhood out of 
wedlock, for instance, implies a departure from a marital understanding of fatherhood, but 
generally not from the norm of biology. Similarly, the employment of ART is likely to challenge 
a biological definition of fatherhood, but does not necessarily exclude the existence of marital ties 
with the parents of the child. Again, increased participation of women in the workplace is likely 
to undermine the male breadwinner model, but normally leaves the biological link between the 
father and the child as well as the marital or pseudo-marital relationship between the parents intact. 
In other words, while the advent of these three sociological changes have enabled the Court to 
remain anchored to some conventional features, as well as appreciating the new element of nurture, 
homosexuality challenges the conventional ideology of fatherhood in such a holistic manner to 
make the endorsement of mixed definitions (the coexistence of conventional features and the ‘new’ 
element of nurture) hardly possible.  
Finally, the degree of persistence of certain conventional features seems to be determined 
by the extent to which positive obligations are held applicable. The judgments in the cases of X, Y 
and Z, Mennesson and Labassee (concerning the applicants’ right to respect for family life), 
Söderbäck v Sweden, Gas and Dubois and X and Others (concerning the applicants’ comparison 
with heterosexual married couples) exemplify the Court’s trend of ruling out the application of 
States’ positive duties to act in a manner that enables those involved to enjoy their family life and 
to provide legal safeguards to ensure the child’s integration within his/her family as soon as 
practicable, as the family arrangements at stake become further removed from the conventional 
family.1475 In all these cases, the applicants found themselves in a paradoxical position, where the 
Court recognised the existence of de facto family ties (and thus, held Article 8, taken alone or in 
conjunction with Article 14, applicable), but chose not to recognise a right to enjoy their family 
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life.1476 The fact that the relationships between the applicants qualified as ‘family life’ under 
Article 8(1), but were not granted active respect, amounts to restating the relevance of the 
conventional features these families lacked: biological relatedness in the cases of X, Y and Z and 
Mennesson and Labassee; the existence of a stable and committed relationship between the 
biological parents at the time of conception or childbirth in the case of Söderbäck; biology and 
compliance with heteronormative standards (including marriage), in the case of X, Y and Z; and 
marriage, in the cases of Gas and Dubois and X and Others. In the latter, the Court explicitly “finds 
force”1477 in the applicants’ submission that de facto same-sex families exist but are denied the 
possibility of protection and recognition.        
Biology 
The relevance of the biological link between a father and his child to determine whether the refusal 
to confer the status of legal father or parental rights on the applicant father violates the Convention 
has been discussed only within the contexts of ART (Chapter 2) and unmarried fatherhood 
(Chapter 3). The overall picture seems to indicate a persisting attachment to a biological 
understanding of fatherhood but, at the same time, its insufficiency in establishing the existence of 
family life and, even more so, the finding of a violation.  
In the case of X, Y and Z, the crucial question was whether, once the existence of a family 
tie with a child had been established, the State’s positive obligation to act in a manner calculated 
to enable those involved to lead a normal family life could be expected to apply, even if different 
from its previous case-law, the family ties at stake did not involve biological parents and their 
offspring.1478 The Court answered this question negatively and, more specifically, it concluded 
that “Article 8 cannot, in this context, be taken to imply an obligation for the respondent State 
formally to recognise as the father of a child a person who is not the biological father”.1479 Given 
that the lack of a biological connection between X and Z was identified as one of the distinguishing 
factors between the present case and the previous case-law (in primis, Marckx v Belgium), it can 
be argued that biology was held essential to provide an existing family tie with legal recognition 
and, accordingly, indispensable for securing the allocation of the legal status of fatherhood.    
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Similar considerations can be drawn from the judgments in the cases of Mennesson and 
Labassee. Indeed, it was precisely the existence of a biological link between the intended father 
(one of the applicants) and the surrogacy-born children that led to a violation of the latter’s right 
to respect for private life. Although the violation was found with respect to the rights of children 
and under the limb of private life, given the bilateral nature of the tie of filiation, the recognition 
of the father-child tie has inevitable spillovers on the father’s right to respect for family life.1480 
Therefore, holding that the legal recognition of biological parentage is a prerequisite for ensuring 
the respect for the children’s private life and, more generally, the realisation of their best interests 
amounts to a reinstatement of a biological construction of fatherhood.  
Leaving aside the case of Schneider v Germany (which will be discussed later), fathers 
continue to be valued by virtue of their biological connection with their children, also in the post-
separation context. In the cases of Keegan v Ireland, Görgülü v Germany and K.A.B. v Spain 
(concerning the placement of children for adoption without the biological father’s knowledge and 
consent), the Court consistently stated that Article 8 incorporates a right for natural fathers to have 
measures taken with a view of facilitating their reunification with their children and, accordingly, 
a positive duty on the States to protect the integrity of family ties by taking such steps.1481 The 
essence of this positive obligation seems to reflect a biological conception of fatherhood. In other 
words, by arguing that the tie between an unmarried father and his child should be protected against 
irreversible processes, like those triggered by adoption, and holding that States have the positive 
obligation to facilitate the reunion between a natural father and his child, the Court seems to be of 
the opinion that a child shall be raised by his/her biological parents and, accordingly, that States 
should nurture the development of biological ties. In the case of Görgülü, the Court also explicitly 
referred to the biological kinship between the applicant and his child, together with former’s 
willingness and ability to look after the child, to conclude that national authorities had failed to 
examine all possible solutions to the problem, thus finding a violation.1482 
The State’s obligation to facilitate the reunion of a natural father with his child was held 
applicable to all cases concerning secret placement, with the exception of Söderbäck. In the latter, 
the Court concluded that granting the adoption of a child to the mother’s husband did not violate 
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the right to respect for family life of the applicant – despite the biological link with his child – on 
grounds of the limited contact between him and his child. Therefore, the non-applicability of the 
positive obligation should not be read as a departure from biological fatherhood, but rather as 
expressing the insufficiency of biology per se. The limits of biological relatedness and need for 
additional factors was expressly confirmed in the judgment of Lebbink v the Netherlands, where, 
similar to the applicant, the Court expressed its disagreement over the fact that “a mere biological 
kinship, without any further legal or factual elements indicating the existence of a close personal 
relationship, should be regarded as sufficient to attract the protection of Article 8”.1483 
Although not expressly mentioned, biology seems to remain central also in the cases of 
Sahin v Germany and Zaunegger v Germany. Indeed, had the applicants not been the biological 
fathers, it is doubtful whether the existence of family life between them and their children would 
have been automatically established. Against this trend, however, the judgments in Schneider and 
Paradiso and Campanelli seem to point in a different direction. In the latter, although not yet final, 
the Chamber’s decision explicitly ruled out biological parentage as essential to serve the child’s 
best interests and, therefore, to determine whether the child’s removal from his intended parents 
and his placement with alternative carers due to the lack of biological relatedness breached the 
applicants’ right to respect for family life. Firstly, the lack of biological relatedness did not prevent 
the establishment of family life, even if the applicants had cohabitated for approximately six 
months only. However, this cannot be considered totally new in light of the judgment in X, Y and 
Z. More importantly, although the judgment focuses on the issue of the child’s removal and his 
placement under guardianship (different from the Mennesson and Labassee cases), the Court 
seems to argue that the right to respect for family life and, more specifically, the right to have de 
facto ties preserved, does not presuppose the existence of a biological connection.  
Even before the recent judgment in Paradiso and Campanelli, the Court had implicitly 
stated the irrelevance of biological relatedness to assess whether the refusal to grant contact rights 
to an unmarried father breached his right to respect for family life, in the case of Schneider v 
Germany. In the latter, the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the ground that national 
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authorities had failed to examine whether granting contact rights to the applicant (allegedly 
biological father of a child born out of wedlock) was in the child’s best interests, having regard to 
the particular circumstances of the case. Since the child’s paternity had not been established, the 
Court seems to admit the possibility for a violation to be found even in the absence of a biological 
connection. Thus, it would seem that, within the specific case of Schneider, biological relatedness 
is considered irrelevant to establish whether the applicant’s complaint falls within the notion of 
family life and, ultimately, whether the refusal of contact arrangements breaches his right to 
respect for family life. In both Paradiso and Campanelli and Schneider, the Court, therefore, 
seems to accept the detachment of the child’s best interests from his biological parentage and to 
hold that, given the existence of de facto family ties between the applicants and their children, the 
continuation of the child’s cohabitation with his intended/social parents and the request for contact 
rights should be (at least) considered, even in the absence of a biological link.    
Marriage  
The jurisprudence analysed continues to be marked by a persisting attachment to a marital or 
pseudo-marital conception of fatherhood. While the protection of the marital family remains a 
legitimate reason for discriminating against individuals not complying with heteronormative 
standards, in the domain of heterosexuality, marriage persists but in a revisited and milder form. 
In other words, while the existence of a (past) stable and committed relationship between the 
parents might suffice, together with the father’s demonstrated interest and commitment to the child 
and the existence of a biological connection, to determine the conferral of parental rights (contact 
and residence rights) on an unmarried father, the same cannot be observed with respect to same-
sex couples. Not even when the child has lived with the applicants since his/her birth and therefore 
concrete family ties (and not only intentions) exist between the couple and the child, like in the 
cases of Gas and Dubois and X and Others.  
The special status of marriage remains a stumbling block for the Court’s development of a 
notion of substantive equality to the advantage of same-sex couples. The right to adopt is not 
protected by Article 8 per se; but only when Article 14 is invoked. When the comparator is a 
married couple, however, the Court has not yet employed Article 14 as a magnifying lens to cover 
additional rights voluntarily provided by States. Accordingly, in line with the solution adopted in 
Shalk and Kopf v Austria, in the case-law concerning second-parent adoption, the Court does not 




reality’ underlying same-sex couples’ exclusion from the option of second-parent adoption and, as 
such, it reproduces a heteronormative interpretation of marriage. As a result, the conferral of 
parental status on homosexuals remains, at least partially, contingent on the existence of marital 
ties between the parents. This explains also why, in the case of Salgueiro v Portugal, the refusal 
to award parental responsibility to a biological father of a child born from a previous heterosexual 
marriage on the ground of his sexual orientation was considered to violate Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 8.  
The persistence of a marital conception of fatherhood outside the domain of 
heteronormativity is further demonstrated by the judgment in X, Y and Z. Among the arguments 
advanced by the Court, it was pointed out that allowing the recognition of X as a child’s legal 
father while prohibiting X and Y to marry each other would have produced a contradiction within 
the national legal system. In so arguing, the Court seems to implicitly favour a conception of 
fatherhood as a derivative of marriage: in other words, it appears to suggest that the regulation of 
father-child relationships depends on whether the relationship between the parents is formalised 
or can potentially be formalised through marriage. As a result, contrary to what has happened to 
the benefit of unmarried heterosexual fathers, enduring cohabitation and the existence of de facto 
family ties, unless formalised through marriage, have not yet proved decisive in reducing the 
distance between unmarried homosexual couples and married couples with respect to the 
attribution of parental status.  
Moving within the context of heterosexuality, marriage has been replaced by alternative 
organising concepts, such as cohabitation, length and stability, in line with the account provided 
by Collier. 1484  Therefore, the Court continues to construct fatherhood as derivative of the 
interparental relationship, but in pseudo-marital terms. In the domain of ART, the persisting 
relevance of the relationship between the parents emerges as an uncontroversial fact from the 
comparison between the outcomes of Evans and Dickson. Although advancing the same claim, the 
refusal to grant Mr and Mrs Dickson artificial insemination facilities was considered to infringe 
upon the respect for their decision to become genetic parents. Differently, the decision to prohibit 
the use of stored eggs by Ms Evans was held not to breach her right to respect for her private life, 
but rather to strike a fair balance between the various and competing interests involved, in primis 
J.’s right to respect for his decision not to become a parent. Thus, the family contexts that the 
                                                        




aspiring parents would have provided the child with seem to have played a decisive role in 
determining the different outcomes. While Mr and Mrs Dickson were married, Ms Evans had no 
intact relationship with the biological father of the desired child. Hence, the Court seems to favour 
marital fatherhood, broadly interpreted as fatherhood that depends on existing marital or similar 
ties between the father and the child’s mother. 
In the domain of unmarried fatherhood, it is the duration and the nature of the mother-father 
relationship – inter alia, whether it entailed cohabitation and they had planned to have a child – 
that are attached – implicit or explicit – weight. These elements have proved relevant to establish 
both whether the relationship between an unmarried father and his child born out of wedlock could 
qualify as ‘family life’ and whether a violation occurred. More specifically, in this jurisprudential 
area, the Court seems to operate in accordance with a presumption connecting causal sex with 
irresponsible fatherhood and sexual encounters that occurred within a more stable and committed 
relationship with responsible fatherhood. Therefore, the existence of a stable relationship between 
the biological parents at the time of conception or childbirth is employed as a criterion for testing 
the genuine interest of the father in maintaining or developing a tie with his child.  
While the interparental relationship is explicitly mentioned as relevant in the cases 
involving fathers seeking to obtain contact and residence rights against the mother’s will, in the 
other set of cases brought by unmarried fathers, the endorsement of a pseudo-marital conception 
of fatherhood is less obvious. Apart from in the case of Keegan, where the existence of family life 
between the father and his child is constructed as a direct consequence of the mother-father 
relationship,1485 explicit references to the mother-father relationship prima facie seem to give way 
to an increased appreciation of the father-child tie. However, the tenacious hold of a pseudo-marital 
conception of fatherhood is confirmed by the application of the State’s positive duty to facilitate 
the father-child reunion in all but the case of Söderbäck, where the parents were simply friends. In 
line with the previously identified presumption, this judgment seems to state that, if the child is 
not born within a stable and committed relationship, the father does not have the right to have his 
potential ties with the child protected and, consequently, the State is not under the obligation to 
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prevent future ties between a father and his child from being jeopardized by the mere passage of 
time.  
To conclude, it is important to recall that, although kept alive, revisited marital fatherhood 
does not stand alone in the context of unmarried fatherhood. Rather, in addition to biology (with 
the exception of Schneider), it tends to be accompanied by evidence of the father’s interest and 
commitment to the child in order to prove the untenability of gender stereotypes. Hence, the 
definition of fatherhood endorsed by the Court is a derivative of both conventional features – in 
primis, the interparental relationship – and the ‘new’ element of nurture or nurturing intentions. 
As an example, in the case of Sahin, the Court held that general assumptions, which label all 
unmarried fathers as uninterested and irresponsible, did not apply to the applicant, since, inter alia, 
“he had in fact been living with the mother at the time of the child’s birth” and “more importantly, 
he had continued to show concrete interest in contact with her (the child) for sincere motives.”1486 
Although less explicitly, the same combination of elements appear to have determined the final 
outcome in the case of Söderbäck. In addition to the absence of a steady relationship with the 
child’s mother, the insufficient frequency and intensity of the contact between the applicant and 
his child led to the conclusion that granting the child’s adoption to the mother’s husband did not 
breach the biological father’s right to respect for family life.   
Breadwinning 
In the terrain of family-work reconciliation, the Court departs from a conventional conception that 
views the father as just the breadwinner. In so doing, however, it does not free fathers from their 
traditional role of providers; rather, it supports a more balanced division of labour between men 
and women, according to which fathers are also required to undertake childcare duties. Hence, the 
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resulting construction of fatherhood gets closer to the ideology of ‘new fatherhood’, since it 
maintains the father’s role in paid employment but also adds ‘new’ caring responsibilities. Against 
this development, in the domain of homosexuality, it appears that the Court’s reasoning is still 
informed by the man-breadwinner/woman-homemaker stereotype. Having regard to the opposite 
outcomes in the cases of Fretté and E.B., the Court seemingly continues to support a gendered 
division of labour and, on the basis of that, to value the nurturing abilities of lesbians and gay 
males differently.  
Heterosexuality/Heteronormativity  
In X, Y and Z, X’s lack of compliance with heteronormativity lies at the core of the finding of a 
non-violation. His gender identity and, as a result, his impossibility to biologically contribute to 
the child’s conception and to get married to Y (together with the lack of consensus), ruled out the 
application of the State’s positive duty to legally recognise the social tie between X and Z. The 
Court’s attachment to a heteronormative framework emerges even more clearly in the case-law 
concerning homo-parenthood. In the case of Gas and Dubois and X and Others (concerning the 
applicants’ comparison with married couples), the Court resorts to deeply entrenched 
heteronormative standards to justify the States’ enjoyment of a wide margin of appreciation to 
preserve differential treatment on grounds of sexual orientation with respect to marriage (in line 
with Shalk and Kopf) and, as a result, to second-parent adoption.  
Concerning heterosexuality strictly speaking, its relevance as a conventional feature of 
parenthood has been ruled out, but only to a certain extent. The outcomes in Salgueiro, E.B. and 
X and Others (concerning the applicants’ comparison with unmarried heterosexual couples) 
inevitably suggest that heterosexuality is no longer necessary to make someone a legal father and, 
thus, homosexuality per se is no longer legitimately considered a cause of parental unfitness and 
discrimination within the meaning of Article 14. However, a more attentive analysis of the 
reasoning underlying the finding of a violation in Salgueiro (especially in light of the subsequent 
case of Fretté), coupled with the judgments in Gas and Dubois and X and Others (concerning the 
applicants’ comparison with married couples), seem to reveal that heterosexuality is not totally 
overturned, but rather is kept alive through the maintenance of special regimes for married couples 





2. How does the Court (fails to) deal with the concept of fragmented fatherhood? 
The Court has not shown itself prepared to react to the realities of fragmented fatherhood in a 
consistent manner. While it seemingly opposes the split of nurture and biology between two father 
figures in the domain of ART, when considering applications brought by unmarried fathers, the 
Court has proved able to exit a dual-parental scheme, which is made up of one mother and one 
father. In the case of Evans v UK, the conceptualisation of fatherhood as a unitary status goes hand-
in-hand with the Court’s adherence to the ideology of new fatherhood. By stating that by allowing 
Ms Evans to use stored eggs against the will of J. would have resulted in forcing J. into fatherhood, 
the Court does not seem to contemplate the possibility of separating biology, marriage and care 
and these contributions being offered by different men. The same approach can be found in the 
case of Dickson, with the sole difference that fatherhood does not seem to require the effective 
provision of care from the very beginning; rather, the combination of biology and marriage, 
together with nurturing intentions is sufficient to get a parental project started.  
 Equally, in the case of X, Y and Z, although allowing fragmentation for the purpose of 
establishing the existence of family life, the Court ultimately upholds a unitary definition of 
fatherhood, which presupposes the coexistence of conventional features – a biological link, a 
marital relationship between the parents and heteronormativity – and the ‘new’ element of care 
within the same individual. Similarly, moving to the domain of surrogacy, the judgments in 
Mennesson and Labassee seem to convey, inter alia, the message that legal parentage should 
reflect biological parentage in order to ensure the protection of the children’s right to an identity. 
Therefore, in these cases, a violation (although from the perspective of children, but with inevitable 
repercussions on the father’s position) was found with respect to a tie that connected a child with 
his biological, social and married father.  
Therefore, it can be observed that, when it is the full legal status of fatherhood that is 
debated, the Court has shown a certain willingness to maintain the paternal figure as compact as 
possible, in line with the conventional ideology of fatherhood. Against this trend, however, the 
recent judgment in Paradiso and Campanelli openly accepts the possibility that a child is 
biologically related to one man and one woman but is, at the same time, cared for by another set 
of parents. As such, the approach adopted in Paradiso and Campanelli appears more similar to the 
construction of fatherhood emerging from the cases involving a tension between an unmarried 




In both Schneider and Söderbäck, the Court showed greater flexibility – if compared to the 
ART-related cases – in allowing the participation of a third party external to the dual parental 
family in the child’s life. In Schneider, the finding of a violation amounts to the Court stating that 
although the child is raised by another father figure, who is the mother’s husband, granting contact 
arrangements to the child’s (allegedly) biological father might still serve the child’s best interests. 
In so arguing, the Court accepted the coexistence of two paternal figures in the child’s life: the 
legal/social father and the (allegedly) biological father who enjoys ‘intended’ family ties with the 
child.  
A similar openness to fragmented fatherhood can be inferred from the outcome in the case 
of Söderbäck. Although the Court ultimately found no violation, by granting adoption to the 
mother’s husband, which was considered not to breach the applicant’s right to respect for family 
life, this amounts to acceptance that a child might have one biological father and one 
nurturing/marital and possibly legal father, simultaneously. Thus, with the exception of Paradiso 
and Campanelli, it would seem that when the Court has to make a decision concerning the award 
of parental rights, as opposed to the full status of legal fatherhood, it overcomes the assumption of 
exclusivity more easily and, accordingly, is more tolerant of the fragmentation of fatherhood, 
provided that the coexistence of more than one paternal figure serves the child’s best interests.   
The Court’s readiness to deal with the fragmentation of fatherhood is further put to the test 
within the jurisprudence pertaining to family-work reconciliation. In this domain, what is subject 
to challenge and disaggregation is a traditional gendered division of labour and, therefore, the 
persistence of breadwinning and nurture as two separate roles. In the case of Markin v Russia – 
which is paradigmatic of the Court’s approach to fatherhood in the family-work domain – the 
provision of parental leave to fathers is viewed as a means of enabling the establishment of a dual 
breadwinner model. By supporting the idea that men should be as involved as women in taking 
care of their children in order to, inter alia, enable women to pursue their professional ambitions, 
the Court implicitly accepts the fragmentation of both the conventional role of fathers as the sole 
breadwinners and the traditional role of mothers as primary caretakers beyond gender lines. As a 
result, breadwinning and nurture are no longer viewed as exclusively paternal (and masculine) and 
maternal (and feminine), respectively; rather, the Court supports the degendering of both functions 




Finally, having regard to the jurisprudence pertaining to homo-parenthood, the Court was 
only given a chance to accept fragmented fatherhood in Salgueiro. Indeed, while the cases of E.B., 
Gas and Dubois and X and Others involve lesbian women, Mr Fretté did not possess one single 
conventional feature of fatherhood and, as such, fragmentation was not an option. In the case of 
Salgueiro, by finding the refusal to grant custody to the applicant on grounds of his sexual 
orientation in breach of the Convention, the Court implicitly accepts that biology and nurture can 
exist separately from heterosexuality. Although the type of fragmentation at stake is of a different 
nature – since it does not involve a split of paternal functions between two individuals – the 
judgment in Salgueiro resembles the approach taken in Schneider as well as in Söderbäck, 
inasmuch as the failed coexistence of all conventional features within the same individual does not 
prevent the allocation of parental rights on the applicant. 
 
3. Does the Court understand the law as a reflective or a transformative tool? And, what 
is the role of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and of the interpretation of the 
Convention as a living instrument in supporting one or the other conception of the law? 
The Court’s understanding of the role of the law comes into play vis-à-vis two distinct phenomena: 
societal dynamics and national legal realities. Therefore, the above question can be divided in two 
sub-questions: firstly, does the Court conceive the law as destined to fight gender stereotypes and 
affirm a new vision of fatherhood or rather to reflect and compensate for existing gender role 
differences?; secondly, does the Court believe that its interpretation of the Convention should 
reflect national legal systems or, rather, impose new legal conditions and push for legal changes 
whenever this is considered necessary? Therefore, while the first sub-question is closely connected 
to the potential adoption of an anti-stereotyping approach, the Court’s reliance on the rule of 
consensus and, more generally, on the doctrines of the margin of appreciation and the 
interpretation of the Convention as a living instrument are key factors when addressing the second 
sub-question.   
The first sub-question becomes particularly relevant in the domains of unmarried 
fatherhood, family-work reconciliation and, although only to a certain extent, homo-parenthood, 
where the adoption of an anti-stereotyping approach is indicative of the employment of the law as 
a tool for asserting a new definition of fatherhood untied from stereotypical notions. By fighting 




unmarried fathers might be as interested in developing or maintaining a relationship with their 
children as divorced fathers or unmarried mothers and that, more generally, fathers might be as 
capable as mothers to take care of children. Despite the Court’s ambition to free the legal regulation 
of fatherhood from gender stereotypes, the emerging redefinition of fatherhood remains grounded 
on a fact-based assessment of the case, at least within the domain of unmarried fatherhood. Indeed, 
the Court tries to challenge stereotypical assumptions by placing emphasis on the specific 
circumstances of the case and, more specifically, on the father’s demonstrated interest and 
commitment to his child, the nature and the length of the mother-father relationship and the 
existence of a biological link between the father and his child born out of wedlock.  
The same exact approach, however, is not mirrored in the jurisprudence pertaining to 
family-work reconciliation. In the case of Markin (similar to the previous cases), despite the 
comprehensive factual account at its disposal, the Court did not tackle the personal situation of the 
applicant and made rather abstract remarks. More specifically, it stated that parental leave policies 
that exclude fathers are liable to reproduce gender stereotypes, which are detrimental to both 
women’s professional lives and men’s family lives. Thus, despite the significant anti-stereotyping 
efforts deployed, the conclusion that the refusal of granting parental leave to Mr Markin breached 
his right to respect for family life, in conjunction with Article 14, appears to rest on aspirational 
standards of gender equality (although applicable to the applicant’s particular situation), more than 
on the applicants’ particular situation.  
The case-law pertaining to homo-parenthood is characterised by a mixed approach, in at 
least two respects. Firstly, in those cases where Article 14 was employed as a “magnifying lens” 
– namely in Salgueiro, E.B. and X and Others (concerning the applicants’ comparison with 
heterosexual unmarried couples), the Court attempted to establish a new vision of 
fatherhood/parenthood by undertaking an anti-stereotyping analysis. In contrast, when the Court 
did not avail itself of such doctrinal development, it consequently did not embark on a critical 
assessment of the circumstances of the case and, more broadly, of the institution of marriage. In 
so doing, it failed to contest stereotypical notions that deem homosexual men unfit for parenthood 
(Fretté) and marriage as the most stable framework for raising children (Gas and Dubois, X and 
Others).    
Secondly, while in the case of Salgueiro, the Court’s anti-stereotyping attitude translates 




cases, it is further enriched by references to the specific circumstances of the case. In the case of 
E.B., the Court held that the reasons put forward by the Government could not be considered as 
particularly convincing and weighty to justify the refusal to grant the permission to adopt. 
Furthermore, just prior to stating the finding of a violation, the Court stressed the applicant’s 
personal qualities and aptitude for raising children to prove the compatibility of the sought 
adoption with the child’s best interests. In the case of X and Others (concerning the applicants’ 
comparison with unmarried heterosexual couples), the finding of a violation is based on the 
following considerations: the existence of de facto family life between the applicants and the lack 
of evidence produced by the Government to demonstrate that being raised by a same-sex couple 
or having two legal fathers or two legal mothers would run counter the child’s best interests. 
Therefore, while the finding of a violation in Salgueiro rests on rather aspirational standards of 
equality, in the cases of E.B. and X and Others (concerning the applicants’ comparison with 
heterosexual unmarried couples), the Court seeks to propose a new definition of parenthood by 
calling for an individual assessment of the case.    
As acknowledged by the concurring Judges Costa and Spielmann in Gas and Dubois, the 
abstinence of the Court from carrying out an individual analysis in the remaining case-law is a 
direct consequence of the Court’s fear of finding itself out of step with national choices concerning 
the family, parent-child relationships and the concept of marriage. Although marriage has 
undergone significant social changes since the adoption of the Convention (and this was expressly 
recognised by the Court itself), the Court continues to believe that tradition has not yet been 
transformed enough to allow for the imposition of new legal conditions.1487 As a result, States 
continue to be – more or less explicitly – accorded a wide margin of appreciation and the Court 
evades its duty to revise the compatibility of national solutions with the Convention. As such, this 
cautious approach represents the natural continuation of the position held in the case of Shalk and 
Kopf, where, given the deep-rooted social and cultural connotations of marriage in Europe, the 
Court felt that it should not rush to replace the legal provisions of national authorities, who are 
better placed to assess the needs of society.1488  
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This brings us to the second sub-question, namely whether the interpretation of the 
Convention proposed by the Court aims at reflecting or, rather, bringing about change in national 
legislations. For current purposes, another way of framing this question is: to what extent have the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation and the interpretation of the Convention as a living 
instrument contributed to determining the final outcome of a case? Overall, the Court has proved 
generally hesitant to depart from national approaches and, therefore, cautious to prompt legal 
change and impose new legal conditions at the national level. This attitude is likely to stem from 
the Court’s awareness as to the repercussions that a less prudent approach would have on the 
States’ willingness to comply with its decision.1489 Therefore, in many cases, the Court has tended 
to verify, irrespective of a European consensus prior to the case, whether or not a violation has 
occurred. While the absence of a consensus across the Contracting States has generally implied a 
wide margin of appreciation for the State and the ultimate finding of a non-violation, the existence 
of a consensus has normally led to a narrower margin and a violation being found.       
Examples of this trend can be identified in all four case-law domains. In case of X, Y and 
Z, for instance, the Court stated that, “given that transsexuality raises complex scientific, legal, 
moral and social issues, in respect of which there is no generally shared approach among the 
Contracting States”,1490 Article 8 could not be interpreted as imposing a positive obligation to 
provide legal recognition to social ties. In this case, the lack of European consensus triggered the 
inapplicability of the positive obligation and, consequently, led to holding national decisions in 
compliance with the Convention.1491 In the cases of Zaunegger and Schneider, regardless of its 
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The Court found that, given that the issues at stake were of morally and ethically delicate nature and there was no 
uniform approach in this field, the State had to be granted a wide margin of appreciation. Furthermore, it anchored 
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1491 The same reasoning can be found in the judgment of Mennesson v France, concerning the applicants’ right to 
respect for family life. On the establishment of consensus, see para 78. The judgment in the case of Dickson v UK 
constitutes further evidence of the Court’s reliance on consensus, but through a peculiar path. Although it began by 
observing that most of the States provided conjugal visits, it did not continue by stating that, as a consequence, the 
State enjoyed a narrow margin of appreciation. Rather, it held that, given that the Court had never interpreted the 
Convention as requiring States to provide conjugal visits, access to AI by prisoners was an area in which the 
Contracting States could enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that, given that the 
policy placed an extraordinarily high ‘exceptionality’ burden on the applicants, the policy ultimately precluded the 
assessment of the proportionality of the interference with the rights of the applicant, as required by the Convention. 
Therefore, although not for the purpose of establishing the width of the margin enjoyed by the State, it would seem 
that the existence of a certain consensus (most of the States) eventually triggered a strict assessment of proportionality 




problematic establishment (as pointed out in Chapter 3), the existence of a European common 
ground among the laws of Contracting States was relied on to advance a dynamic interpretation of 
the Convention, which takes into account the realities of family life in the 21st century. More 
specifically, the refusal to grant the applicant contact or joint residence rights with respect to his 
child born out of wedlock was considered to breach the Convention, as it was grounded on general 
legal assumptions that no longer responded to the needs of a growing number of unmarried 
families.       
The jurisprudence pertaining to family-work reconciliation is possibly the most 
representative of the Court’s understanding of the role of the Convention as reflecting, more than 
transforming, national legal realities. The finding of a non-violation in the case of Petrovic v 
Austria, which was overturned in Markin v Russia, is explained by the fact that the shift in national 
legislations that started in the late 1980s was deemed completed in 2012. Accordingly, while the 
finding of non-violation in Petrovic was grounded on the lack of a European common ground in 
the field of parental leave, in the case of Markin, the Government no longer enjoyed a wide margin 
of appreciation because – as indicated by comparative data – the majority of Contracting States 
provided parental leave entitlements to both mothers and fathers and, more importantly, to both 
servicemen and servicewomen. 1492  Therefore, it was the changed legislation within the 
Contracting States and the emergence of a consensus in the field of parental leave that prompted 
the finding of a violation.  
Moreover, it seems relevant to point out that, in the case of Petrovic, the importance 
attached to the absence of consensus went as far as to trump the suspect ground of discrimination 
(based on sex). Indeed, although the Court called for very weighty reasons to justify a difference 
in treatment on the basis of sex, it eventually stated that the State enjoyed a wide margin of 
appreciation due to the lack of a European common ground. Hence, an unconditioned reliance on 
the consensus can lead to contradicting statements within the same judgment. Although implicit, 
the same pattern seems to drive the reasoning underlying the judgment in Fretté. In this case, the 
Court chose to prioritise the lack of a European common ground over the suspect nature of the 
badge of discrimination (sexual orientation) in order to determine the width of the margin enjoyed 
by the State. More precisely, the Court held that it was not possible to find converging solutions 
on the issue of adoption by homosexuals either in the legal orders of the Contracting States or in 
                                                        




the scientific community.1493 The lack of consensus, coupled with the fact that national authorities 
were considered better placed to assess local needs and values, implied the grant of a wide margin 
of appreciation to the State and led to the finding of a non-violation. Therefore, just like in Petrovic, 
the reliance on consensus prevailed over the need for weighty reasons owing to the suspect nature 
of the ground of discrimination under scrutiny (sexual orientation).   
In addition to deriving its decision from the existence or non-existence of consensus, the 
Court sometimes demonstrates respect for national decisions by invoking the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation in its structural variant. In the case of Söderbäck, for instance, the fact that 
national authorities were considered better placed to strike a fair balance between the competing 
interests by virtue of their proximity to all parties involved constituted one of the relevant 
considerations whereby the grant of adoption to the mother’s husband did not violate the 
applicant’s (biological unmarried father) right to respect for family life. Another example is 
provided by the judgment in Sahin, concerning the complaint under Article 8. In this case, despite 
the general principle whereby restrictions on contact rights call for stricter scrutiny, the Court did 
not feel prepared to contest the determination of the child’s best interests and, more generally, the 
assessment of the available evidence undertaken by national authorities, in light of their direct 
contact with the individuals involved. As a result, the refusal to grant the applicant contact rights 
against the will of the mother was held not to breach Article 8, as the Court had no reason to 
question the opinion of the national expert who conducted interviews with all parties 
concerned.1494       
Similarly, although not expressly stated by the majority, in the case of Gas and Dubois, the 
role of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in determining the finding of non-violation was 
acknowledged by the concurring Judges Costa and Spielmann. The latter argued that national 
legislators are better positioned than an international court to initiate change in areas concerning 
the institution of marriage, the family and parent-child relationships. Therefore, the conclusion 
whereby special regimes for married couples do not amount to discrimination within the meaning 
of Article 14 appears to rest, even if less explicitly, on the notion that States enjoy a wide margin 
of appreciation when shaping their social policies. The same can be said in relation to the judgment 
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in the case of X and Others (concerning the applicants’ comparison with married couples), as the 
Court did no more than reiterate its precedent in Gas and Dubois.  
Leaving aside the methods employed to establish consensus,1495 these examples constitute, 
at least prima facie, evidence of the fact that the Court does not wish to go beyond the will of the 
Contracting States and, therefore, understands the role of the Convention as being that of reflecting 
national legal developments. However, there are other cases, where the conception of the law 
endorsed by the Court is not immediately clear. This category tends to include those judgments, 
where the final outcome of a violation has very much depended on the Court’s employment of 
Article 14 as a “magnifying lens”.1496 As just stated, in the case of Sahin, the Court found no 
violation of Article 8. However, since the contested legislation accorded different treatment among 
fathers depending on whether their children were born in a marital relationship or outside wedlock, 
the Court concluded that a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 had occurred. 
The same dynamic can be detected in the judgment of Salgueiro, where the Court held that the 
refusal to grant a homosexual divorced father contact with his biological child violated Article 14 
in conjunction with Article 8, without a prior assessment of the applicant’s complaint under Article 
8. In these two cases, therefore, Article 14 served as an aggravating factor.1497 Had the Court 
applied Article 14 in accordance with its wording and, as such, as an accessory guarantee, it would 
not have been able to state the applicability of Article 14 and, even more so, to find the contested 
differential treatment incompatible with the Convention. Moreover, at least in the case of Sahin, 
the employment of Article 14 as a ‘magnifying lens’ ruled out the applicability of the margin of 
appreciation, which facilitated the finding of a non-violation with respect to Article 8. In other 
words, for discrimination purposes, the fact that national authorities were ‘better placed’ did not 
matter. 
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The finding of a violation in the case of Weller v Hungary constitutes further evidence of 
the role played by the magnifying effect of Article 14 in determining the final outcome of a case. 
Indeed, different from the judgments in Petrovic and Markin, the refusal to pay a benefit to natural 
fathers, while available to mothers, adoptive parents and guardians, was considered discriminatory 
within the meaning of Article 14, even if States provided for widely different social security 
systems.1498  More specifically, it was held that, whenever a State decides to go beyond the 
Convention requirements by putting in place a family allowance scheme, it cannot confer benefits 
in a discriminatory manner. In this case, therefore, the magnifying effect of Article 14 
overshadowed the absence of a common European approach and, therefore, the wide margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by States in shaping their social security systems.         
The same kind of magnifying effect led to a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction 
with Article 8, in the cases of E.B. and X and Others, concerning a comparison of the applicants 
with heterosexual unmarried couples. One of the elements revealing the Court’s employment of 
Article 14 as a magnifying lens lies in the core question identified by the Court, which, in the case 
of X and Others, also resonated with the issue with respect to which consensus was established. In 
the case of E.B., different from the previous judgment in Fretté, the Court did not consider itself 
called on to decide on the general question as to whether homosexuals should be allowed to adopt, 
but rather on the narrower issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Similarly, in the 
judgment of X and Others, the Court felt the need to specify that the issue to be decided was not 
the broad question of same-sex couples’ access to second-parent adoption, but rather the 
differential treatment between unmarried heterosexual couples and same-sex couples regarding 
that type of adoption.1499 When addressing this issue, in both cases, the Court drew on the same 
argument advanced in Weller and stated that, although Article 8 does not incorporate the right to 
adopt, States cannot provide additional rights in a discriminatory manner. Had the doctrine of non-
discrimination not evolved to cover also additional rights voluntarily recognised by States, the 
Court would have been unable to find a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 
8.  
Moreover, in the case of E.B., the existence or non-existence of consensus was not under 
consideration at all. This is rather surprising, since it overturned the judgment in Fretté, where no 
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violation was found due to lack of common approach on the issue of adoption by homosexuals. 
Differently, in the judgment of X and Others, the Court touched upon the issue of consensus purely 
to address the Government’s submission that no European consensus existed. It clarified that, 
being concerned with the narrower question of discrimination, only those States enabling 
unmarried couples to access second-parent adoption, namely ten, could serve as the basis for 
comparison; and, given this small sample, it was impossible to establish whether consensus existed 
or not.1500      
In light of the above examples, it seems possible to observe that, whenever Article 14 
deploys its magnifying effect, the issue of consensus and, more generally, the margin of 
appreciation enjoyed by the State become irrelevant. Moreover, having regard to the judgments in 
Sahin and Weller, the employment of Article 14 as a magnifying lens seems only to play a 
temporary role; more specifically, this doctrinal development appears to prove useful when 
consensus has not yet formed. When consensus can be established, the Court stops relying on the 
magnifying effect of Article 14 and goes to back to the existence of consensus as a way of 
ascertaining a violation. This trend becomes visible in both contexts of unmarried fatherhood and 
family-work reconciliation.   
In the latter, the judgment in Weller operated as a good transition between the finding of 
non-violation in Petrovic and its subsequent overturning in Markin. More specifically, given that 
consensus could not yet be established in 2009, the employment of discrimination as a magnifying 
lens served as an alternative reasoning to support the finding of a violation. Once most Contracting 
States provide parental leave to both men and women as well as to both servicemen and 
servicewomen, the Court ceases to rely on the reinterpreted ambit of Article 14 and the existence 
of a common approach among Contracting States returns to be relevant and becomes the reason 
justifying a finding of a violation.  
A similar pattern can be detected with regards to the case-law involving unmarried fathers 
willing to obtain contact and joint residence rights, against the will of the child’s mother. As 
previously argued, the employment of discrimination as an aggravating factor (and, therefore, as 
a magnifying lens) played a decisive role in determining the finding of a violation of Article 14, 
taken in conjunction with Article 8, in the case of Sahin. Once again, if regard is given to the 
subsequent case of Zaunegger, the Court’s recourse to the magnifying effect of Article 14 in Sahin 
                                                        




seems to have served only temporary purposes, namely the need for an alternative line of reasoning 
to substantiate the finding of a violation of Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8. Indeed, 
as soon as the Court was able to establish the existence of consensus – namely, in the judgment of 
Zaunegger – it preferred to ground its findings on a dynamic interpretation of the Convention in 
light of the growing number of unmarried families and the tendency of national legal regimes to 
base residence determinations on the child’s best interests.       
 Regardless of its short- or long-term function, it remains to be established whether the 
employment of Article 14 as a magnifying lens is to be read as reflecting or imposing new legal 
standards on Contracting States. When the ambit of Article 14 is also interpreted as including those 
additional rights (Weller, E.B., X and Others concerning the applicants’ comparison with 
unmarried heterosexual couples), which are voluntarily provided by States, it can be argued that 
the magnifying effect of Article 14 translates into going beyond the will of the Contracting States, 
but only to a certain extent. Indeed, up until the moment when neither the right to parental leave 
nor the right to adopt is protected by Article 8 per se, States remain free to introduce legislation 
that provide for parental leave as well as to allow single-parent adoption and second-parent 
adoption, or not. Similarly, by finding a violation in the cases of Sahin and Salgueiro, the Court 
does not impose new legal conditions, according to which all unmarried fathers should a priori be 
granted contact rights against the will of the child’s mother or all homosexual divorced fathers 
should a priori be accorded parental responsibility with respect of their biological children. Rather, 
in finding a violation, the Court simply imposes new standards of non-discrimination.   
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Court has overall proved quite sensitive towards 
national legal standards by abstaining from imposing new substantive obligations prior to the 
emergence of a common ground among the laws of Contracting States. Given that the ultimate 
responsibility for implementing the Convention rests with States, the Court seems to be of the 
opinion that imposing progressive judgments on unreceptive national authorities does not lead to 
any advancement in the protection of human rights and might even be counter-productive. At the 
same time, however, the Court shows itself aware of the potential risk, which would derive from 
attaching unconditional importance to consensus, of reducing the Convention to a minimum level 
of protection.1501 Being aware of such possibility, the Court manages to alleviate the danger of 
                                                        




upholding conservative national legislations in the name of the States’ margin of appreciation by 
employing Article 14 as a ‘magnifying lens’.  
This doctrinal technique ultimately enables the Court to contest and declare discriminatory 
legislation incompatible with the Convention, without succumbing to the opposite risk of imposing 
new substantive obligations on the States, beyond their willingness. Hence, the application of 
Article 14 in its reinterpreted scope serves as a tool for balancing the two opposing and yet 
complimentary needs of ensuring the effectiveness of human rights, while acting with caution and 
achieving jurisprudential progress only through minimal and incremental steps, not to undermine 
States’ confidence in the Strasbourg machinery. Translated into terms that are closer to the current 
investigation, the employment of Article 14 as a magnifying lens has allowed the Court to subtly 
affirm a new definition of fatherhood, even in the absence of a clear consensus among the 
legislation of Contracting States. In other words, whenever relied on, the reinterpreted scope of 
Article 14 has enabled the Court to update the conventional paradigm of fatherhood.  
More specifically, while waiting for a consensus to be established in the field of parental 
leave, in the case of Weller, the magnifying effect of Article 14 triggered the Court’s departure 
from a definition of fathers as mere breadwinners. In the cases of Salgueiro, E.B. and X and Others 
(concerning the applicants’ comparison with heterosexual unmarried couples), the employment of 
Article 14 as a magnifying lens led to ruling out heterosexuality as a relevant factor when 
determining whether an individual or a same-sex couple shall be granted parental rights or the 
authorisation to adopt. Similarly, in the case of Sahin, the use of discrimination as an aggravating 
factor helped overcome the requirement of marriage as a determining factor in the allocation of 
contact rights and, accordingly, proposed a more nuanced conception of marital fatherhood, 
according which the (past) existence of a stable and committed (not formalised) relationship 
between the parents suffices. However, this remains valid only within the context of 
heterosexuality. Indeed, the Court has not yet showed a willingness to take advantage of the 
doctrinal development concerning Article 14, when same-sex couples are discriminated against if 
compared to married couples. 
Finally, in light of the above, it is not surprising to identify a significant convergence 
between the Court’s jurisprudence and national approaches. In the field of parental leave, the Court 
not only abstains from imposing new conditions, but it seems to even lag behind national standards. 




8 taken alone or affirmed States’ positive obligation to provide for parental leave allowance 
(although mentioned in the partly concurring/partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque in Markin). Rather, the right to parental leave has thus far been accorded protection 
only by virtue of the magnifying effect of Article 14 and, therefore, only when the more specific 
issue of discrimination is in question.  
There is only one case, where the Court does not, at least prima facie, appear cautious to 
depart from national trends. In Paradiso and Campanelli, the Court’s interpretation of the child’s 
best interests as unconnected from biological parentage is particularly progressive, if placed within 
the context of inter-country surrogacy. Indeed, those States that allow surrogacy tend to only 
recognise the parent who has a biological connection with the child as the child’s legal parent – 
echoing the Court’s approach in the cases of Mennesson and Labassee. However, as expressly 
acknowledged by the Court, the core issue upon which the judgment in Paradiso and Campanelli 
focuses was the child’s removal and placement under guardianship, rather than surrogacy.1502 As 
such, it remains difficult to interpret this judgment as the Court’s attempt to impose new legal 
conditions on Contracting States, in the field of surrogacy.  
4. Does the Court properly take into account all affected parties when shaping its 
jurisprudence? 
The Court tends to adopt a minimalist approach, which manifests itself in at least three distinct 
ways. Firstly, it seems unwilling to acknowledge the existence of tension between the various 
individuals involved, unless it is inevitable – like in the case of Evans v UK. Secondly, the Court 
tends to focus exclusively on the arguments brought by the applicants (mostly, fathers) and, more 
generally, on the interests of the applicants, thus ignoring the implications of its own decision on 
other potentially affected parties (essentially mothers, children and prospective adoptive parents). 
This pattern becomes particularly visible in the case-law involving unmarried fathers. The Court 
does not consider either the reasons advanced by the child’s mother for opposing the father’s 
request (not even in Lebbink, where the mother had complained of the father’s violent behaviour 
against the child) or the possible impact on the interests of the mother when granting contact or 
joint residence rights to the applicant. Similarly, in those cases where the applicant contests the 
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placement of the child for adoption without his knowledge and consent, no reference is made to 
the interests of the (prospective) adoptive parents to continue living with the child. The judgment 
in the case of Söderbäck seems to constitute an exception, as the Court directs explicit attention to 
the strong bonds existing between the child and her mother’s husband. However, it remains unclear 
the extent to which the prospective adoptive father’s interests are attached autonomous weight or, 
rather, are taken into account by virtue of their coincidence with the child’s best interests.  
Thirdly, even when both parents jointly lodge the application, the Court implicitly 
identifies the father as a primary applicant and the mother is subsumed by the father’s application. 
As a result, even if the mother is an applicant, her claims are considered only in as much as her 
position aligns with that of the father. This explains why, in the case of Mennesson, the mother’s 
interests were left out in the cold. Although sharing the father’s same claim to be recognised as the 
child’s legal parent, she could not benefit from the Court’s finding of a violation of Article 8 with 
respect to the children’s private life because, different from the father, she was not biologically 
linked to the child. One exception is represented by the judgment in the case of Markin, where the 
adoption of an anti-stereotyping approach enabled the Court to become aware and expose the 
double-harm of the man-breadwinner/woman-homemaker stereotype on both men and women. 
Thus, although the mother was not an applicant, the Court went exceptionally far as to spell out 
the implications of denying fathers the right to parental leave, while available to women, on 
women’s professional ambitions. Nonetheless, it missed the opportunity to draw a link between 
military servicemen’s exclusion from parental leave policies and the double-shift of women. 
Moreover, although approaching the case from the perspective of women’s gender equality, 
the Court failed to consider parental leave as a tool that benefits not only parents, but also 
children.1503 A similar adult-centric vision of family life, which leaves children’s experiences 
outside legal disputes, underlies the judgments in Salgueiro and Gas and Dubois. While in 
Salgueiro the missed reference to the child’s interests did not alter the outcome of the case, in Gas 
and Dubois, the majority’s exclusive focus on the personal situations of the adult applicants led to 
a result, which totally disregards the well-known advantages of providing legal recognition of the 
child’s social ties with his second (social) parent on the basis of the child’s wellbeing.  
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In addition to being disregarded, the child’s interests have sometimes been subsumed 
within the claims of the parents. This ‘swallowing up’ effect is visible in the case of X, Y and Z. 
As argued by the concurring Judge Pettiti, the text of the judgment seems to be excessively 
grounded on the personal claims of X and Y alone and, therefore, disregards the potential conflict 
between the couple’s demands and the child’s right to know his origins.1504 Similarly, in the case 
of Sahin, the Court accepts the assessment of the child’s best interests conducted by national 
authorities by virtue of their closer contact to the parties involved.1505 As argued before, this 
deferential attitude might have given space to the stereotypical belief that contact against the will 
of the mother of a child born out of wedlock runs counter the child’s best interests; therefore, an 
overlap between the child’s interests and the mother’s opposition to contact could possibly be 
assumed. 
Even if considered in isolation, the extent to which the child’s position is effectively taken 
into account depends on the interpretation of the principle of the child’s best interests adopted by 
the Court. As explained in Chapter 1, the deliberately vague nature of this principle entails the risk 
of subjective – as opposed to objective, fact-based – interpretations and, consequently, might be 
used as a pretext for reaffirming conventional ideologies on parenting. As a result, the fact that the 
child’s best interests have been consistently declared weighty or even paramount in settling 
disputes, where the situation of children is at stake, does not necessarily signify that children’s real 
interests have been taken into consideration by the Court, when shaping its jurisprudence. For the 
latter to be stated, it is necessary to investigate to what extent the determination of the child’s best 
interests undertaken by the Court is based on the specific circumstances of the case and, more 
specifically, of the child or, rather, gives voice to the traditional ideology of the family and 
conventional understandings of fatherhood.  
While, as previously noted, the Court’s jurisprudence pertaining to family-work 
reconciliation has systematically ignored the position of children, the case-law in the domain of 
ART and homo-parenthood tends to feature a rather subjective vision of the child’s best interests. 
In the cases of Evans and Dickson, although the interests of the unborn child are not explicitly 
mentioned, they are intended as resonating with that of being raised within a stable dual-parental 
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family and, therefore, remain closely tied to a marital or pseudo-marital conception of fatherhood. 
In the judgment of Mennesson and Labassee, the children’s right to respect for private life is 
considered worthy of protection under Article 8 only with regard to the legal recognition of 
biological parentage. The Court argued that, given the importance of biological parentage as a 
component of identity, depriving a child of the legal recognition of his/her biological parentage 
cannot be considered in the child’s best interests. 1506  In so doing, the Court advances an 
interpretation that is strongly informed by a biological understanding of fatherhood. The only 
exception to this trend is represented by the judgment in Paradiso Campanelli. In this case, the 
Court’s deviation from a biological definition of fatherhood occurred exactly in the name of the 
child’s interest not to be removed from his family and, therefore, to preserve de facto family ties 
with his parents, regardless of whether they are biologically related.   
The child’s interests have been given a subjective and, to a great extent, heteronormative 
reading, also in the context of homo-parenthood. In the cases of Fretté and E.B., the child’s best 
interests were interpreted in accordance with sex role stereotypes in order to establish that, vis-à-
vis the same evidence, the refusal of the authorisation to adopt on grounds of sexual orientation 
breaches Article 14, taken in conjunction of Article 8, when the applicant is a lesbian woman, but 
not a single homosexual man. In other words, the Court seems to be of the opinion that one’s 
personal qualities and aptitude for raising children should be taken into account and considered 
compatible with the child’s best interests when the prospective adopter is a lesbian woman (even 
in presence of an uncommitted and uninterested partner), but not when the application is lodged 
by a single homosexual man. In the case of X and Others, a violation was found on the ground that 
the Government had not submitted particularly weighty and convincing evidence to demonstrate 
that excluding second-parent adoption in same-sex couples, when it is available to heterosexual 
unmarried families, served to protect the interests of the child.1507 However, since this argument 
was not raised with respect to married couples, the Court implicitly considers second-parent 
adoption a priori compatible with the child’s best interests if the parents are married; and, this is 
indicative of the Court’s endorsement of a vision of the child’s interests that is informed by 
normative and stereotypical assumptions around the appropriate family and best locus for 
parenting.       
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On the other hand, when faced with applications brought by unmarried fathers, the Court 
has generally proposed a more objective assessment of the child’s best interests, thus placing 
emphasis on the specific circumstances of each case. This pattern reaches its peak in terms of 
visibility in the judgments of Zaunegger and Schneider, where the Court explicitly refused an 
interpretation of the child’s interests that is grounded on general assumptions, which conceive joint 
residence against the will of the mother and contact, in the presence of a different legal father, as 
a priori contrary to the child’s best interests.1508  The same trend can also be observed in the cases 
arising from secret placement. Although the Court seems to favour a specific view of the child’s 
best interests, that of being reunited and living with his/her biological parents and, therefore, to 
reiterate a biological definition of fatherhood, the finding of a violation in the cases of Görgülü 
and K.A.B. is not based on a general preference for biological over social parenthood. Rather, the 
Court’s reasoning refers to the applicants’ demonstrated interest and commitment to their children, 
coupled with the national authorities’ failure to facilitate the father-child reunification. The Court’s 
reliance on the specific circumstances of the case – as opposed to general assumptions – explains 
also why granting the adoption of the child to the mother’s husband was considered not to violate 
Mr Söderbäck’s right to respect for family life. Rather than assuming that children are better off 
with their biological parents, the Court places emphasis on the child’s concrete ties with her legal 
father, vis-à-vis the limited contact she had with his biological father, and favours the national 
courts’ decision to formalise the child-legal father’s relationship through adoption.  
Therefore, with the exception of the domain of unmarried fatherhood, the vision of the 
child’s best interests endorsed by the Court remains very much inspired by a conventional 
construction of fatherhood. This finding has two major implications. Firstly, in line with the 
account offered by Théry, the principle of the child’s best interests is employed as an “alibi for 
conventional ideologies” ,1509 and, more specifically, for the conventional ideology of fatherhood. 
Secondly, and as a result, children’s interests are de facto denied adequate consideration. This adds 
up to the previous remark pointing to the Court’s total ignorance of the repercussions of excluding 
fathers from parental leave schemes on the child’s interest in being provided parental care at early 
age. In light of the broader picture, therefore, it seems possible to conclude that the vision of family 
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life endorsed by the Court is certainly adult-centric and, more specifically, father-centric in the 
domains of ART and unmarried fatherhood.  
These conclusions confirm the persisting validity of two sets of concerns, widely shared 
by feminist legal scholars. Firstly, an excessive focus on gender equality between the parents – 
even when there is no tension between them – might ultimately leave children’s experiences 
outside of legal disputes and treat them as mere objects of privileges, and not subjects of rights.1510 
Interestingly, although this critique was specifically raised with respect to post-separation/divorce 
disputes, within the Strasbourg jurisprudence, it is far more applicable to the other case-law 
domains. Indeed, while the interests of the children born out of wedlock have been individually 
assessed, in the rest of the case-law, the Court has tended to view children as the “passive recipients 
(…) of the process of parenting”,1511 as opposed to subjects with their own rights and needs and, 
therefore, to construct child’s interests as a corollary of the horizontal, interparental relationship.  
Secondly, redefining fatherhood in isolation is likely to reproduce, rather than challenge 
existing gendered dynamics of work and parenting, as much as the redefinition of motherhood in 
line with liberal values has done. As argued by Fineman, the degendering of motherhood according 
to the ideal of an egalitarian family has done no more than eliminate motherhood as something 
distinct from fatherhood in the law and, therefore, rhetorically.1512 Indeed, in the absence of a 
concomitant reconsideration of fatherhood and paternal behaviour, gender-neutral norms remain 
incapable of affecting the gendered operation of society. Similarly, framing fathers’ rights as 
independent from a positive relationship with mothers and, more generally, outside of a relational 
framework might entail the risk of reconstituting gender inequalities. Indeed, this might lead to 
empowering fathers but, at the same time, ignoring existing patterns of care and, thus, denying 
adequate recognition to mothers’ parental investment.1513     
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ANNEX – TABLE indicating the conventional features of fatherhood that are 




Chapter 2 – ART  
 
 Biology Marriage Breadwinning Heterosexuality/ 
Heteronormativity  
X, Y and Z v UK (1997) 
 
Issue: Whether the refusal to 
register a post-operative 
transsexual as the legal 
father of child born to his 
partner by AI breaches 
Article 8 and Article 14 of 
both the couple and the 
child. 
 
No violation of Article 8  
 
No violation of Article 14 
 
Essential Reinforcement  N.A. Reinforcement   
Evans v UK (2007) 
 
Issue: whether requiring the 
father’s consent for the 
continued storage and 
implantation of fertilised 
eggs breaches the woman’s 
right to respect for family 
life 
 
No violation of Article 8  
 
No violation of Article 14 
 
Reinforcement  Revisitation  N.A. N.A. 
Dickson v UK (2007) 
 
Issue: whether the refusal to 
grant artificial insemination 
facilities to enable a serving 
prisoner to father a child 
violates his and his wife’s 
right to respect for private 
life 
 
Violation of Article 8 
 
Reinforcement Reinforcement  N.A. N.A. 
Mennesson and Labassee v 
France (2014) 
 




Issue: whether the refusal to 
grant legal recognition in 
France to parent-child 
relationships that had been 
legally established in the 
United States between 
children born as a result of 
surrogacy and the intended 
parents breaches Article 8 
 
No violation of the 
applicants’ right to respect 
for family life (Article 8) 
 
Violation of the children’s 
right to respect for their 
private life (Article 8) 
Paradiso and Campanelli v 
Italy (2015) 
 
Issue: whether the removal 
and placement under 
guardianship of a child born 
from surrogacy abroad 
breaches the intended 
parents’ rights under Article 
8 
 
Violation of Article 8 
Irrelevant N.A. N.A. N.A. 
 
 
Chapter 3 – Unmarried and divorced fatherhood 
 
 Biology Marriage  Breadwinning Heterosexuality/ 
Heternormativity  
Keegan v Ireland (1994) 
 
Issue: whether placing a 
child up for adoption 
without the consent of 
his/her biological father 
violates the latter’s right to 
respect for family life 
 
Violation of Article 8 
Reinforcement  Revisitation N.A. N.A. 
Söderbäck  v Sweden 
(1998) 
 
Issue: whether granting the 
adoption of a child to the 
husband’s mother without 
the consent of the biological 
father violates the latter’s 
right to respect for family 
life 





No violation of Article 8 
Sahin v Germany (2003) 
 
Issue: whether the inability 
of father of a child born out 
of wedlock to obtain contact 
rights without the mother’s 
consent violates the father’s 
right to respect for family 
life as well as Article 14 
(compared to divorce 
fathers) 
 
No violation of Article 8 
 
Violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 
N.A. Revisitation N.A. N.A. 
Lebbink v the Netherlands 
(2004) 
 
Issue: see above 
 
Violation of Article 8 
Insufficient   Revisitation N.A. N.A. 
Görgülü v Germany (2004) 
 
Issue: whether granting the 
adoption of a child to an 
adoptive couple without the 
consent of the biological 
father violates the latter’s 
right to respect for family 
life 
 
Violation of Article 8 
Reinforcement  Revisitation N.A. N.A. 
Zaunegger v Germany 
(2009) 
 
Issue: whether the inability 
of father of a child born out 
of wedlock to obtain joint 
residence without the 
mother’s consent violates 
the father’s right to respect 
for family life and amounts 
to discrimination (on 
grounds of sex and 
compared to divorced 
fathers) 
 
Violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 
N.A. Revisitation N.A. N.A. 
Schneider v Germany 
(2011) 





Issue: whether the denial of 
contact to possible 
biological father without 
consideration of child’s best 
interests violates the alleged 
father’s right to respect for 
family life 
 
Violation of Article 8 
K.A.B. v Spain (2012) 
 
Issue: whether the 
placement of a child in a 
children’s home and 
subsequently in a foster 
family (after the mother’s 
deportation) without the 
father’s consent violates the 
applicant’s right to respect 
for private and family life 
 
Violation of Article 8 
Reinforcement  Revisitation N.A. N.A. 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Family-work Reconciliation 
 
 Biology Marriage Breadwinning Heterosexuality/ 
Heteronormativity  
Petrovic v Austria (1998) 
 
Issue: whether the refusal to 
confer parental leave 
allowances on servicemen, 
while available to 
servicewomen, violates a 
father’s right to respect for 
family life 
 
No violation of Article 8 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 14 
N.A. N.A. Reinforcement N.A. 
Weller v Hungary (2009) 
 
Issue: whether the refusal to 
pay benefits to a biological 
father, while available to 
mothers, adoptive parents 
and guardians, violates the 
father’s and the children’s 
right to respect for family 
life, taken in conjunction 
with Article 14 
 




Violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 
Konstantin Markin v 
Russia (2012) 
 
Issue: whether the refusal to 
grant the right to parental 
leave to servicemen, while 
available to servicewomen, 
violates a father’s right to 
respect for family life 
 
Violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 
N.A. N.A. Departure  N.A. 
 
 
Chapter 5 – Same-sex couples  
 
 Biology Marriage Breadwinning Heterosexuality/ 
Heteronormativity 
Salgueiro v Portugal (1999) 
 
Issue: whether the refusal to 
award parental 
responsibility on grounds of 
sexual orientation violates 
the applicant’s right to 
respect for family life taken 
alone and in conjunction 
with Article 14 
 
Violation of Article 8 taken 
in conjunction with Article 
14 
N.A. Reinforcement  N.A. Departure  
Fretté v France (2002) 
 
Issue: whether the refusal to 
grant authorisation to adopt 
on grounds of sexual 
orientation violates Article 8 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 14 
 
No violation of Article 8 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 14 
N.A. N.A. Reinforcement 
(if compared to 
E.B.) 
Reinforcement  
E.B. v France (2008) 
 
Issue: whether the refusal to 
grant authorisation to adopt, 
on the ground of the 
applicant’s life-style as a 
lesbian living with another 
N.A. Departure  Reinforcement 






woman violates Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 
 
Violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 
Gas and Dubois v France 
(2012) 
 
Issue: whether the refusal to 
grant simple adoption order 
in favour of the homosexual 
partner of the child’s 
biological mother, while 
possible for married 
couples, violates Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8  
No violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 
N.A. Reinforcement NA Reinforcement 
X and Others v Austria 
(2013) 
 
Issue: whether the refusal to 
grant simple adoption order 
in favour of the homosexual 
partner of the child’s 
biological mother, while 
possible for heterosexual 
married and unmarried 
couples, violates Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8 
Violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8, concerning the 




No violation of Article 14 
taken in conjunction with 
Article 8, concerning the 
applicants’ comparison with 
married couples 
N.A. Reinforcement  NA Reinforcement/ 
Departure  
 
